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Yonatan Brafman 
Contemporary conflicts over such issues as abortion, same-sex marriage, circumcision, and 
veiling highlight the need for renewed reflection on the justification of religious norms and 
authority. While abstract investigation of these questions is necessary, inquiry into them is not 
foreign to religious traditions. Philosophical engagement with these traditions of inquiry is both 
intellectually and practically advantageous. This does not demand, however, that these 
discussions be conducted within a discourse wholly internal to a particular religious tradition; 
dialogue between a religious tradition and philosophical reflection can be created that is mutually 
beneficial. To that end, this dissertation explores a central issue in philosophy of halakha (Jewish 
law): the relation between the justification of halakhic norms and halakhic-legal practice.  
A central component of philosophy of halakha is the project of ta’amei ha-mitzvot (the 
reasons for the commandments). Through such inquiry, Jewish thinkers attempt to demonstrate 
the rationality of Jewish religious practice by offering reasons for halakhic norms. At its best, it 
not only seeks to justify halakhic norms but also elicits sustained reflection on issues in moral 
philosophy, including justification and normativity. Still, there is a tendency among its 
practitioners to attempt to separate this project from halakhic-legal practice. Legal practice is 
thus isolated from philosophical reflection, and the reasons for the norms do not guide their 
application. Ta’amei ha-mitzvot therefore also provokes queries in legal philosophy concerning 
the relation between normative and legal justification. 
 
 
This study explores the relation between the justification of halakhic norms and halakhic-
legal practice in modern Jewish thought by placing it into dialogue with both moral and legal 
philosophy. This occurs in two stages: First, the philosophies of halakha of three influential 
twentieth-century Jewish thinkers, Yeshayahu Leibowitz (1903-1994), Joseph Soloveitchik 
(1903-1993), and Eliezer Berkovits (1908-1992) are examined and critically assessed. It is 
shown that despite the denials of Leibowitz and Soloveitchik, all their accounts of the reasons for 
the commandments influence their approaches to halakhic-legal practice; they each combine a 
foundationalist approach to justification with skepticism about the practical normativity of 
reason; and none of them adequately grounds halakhic-legal authority. However, their skepticism 
is based on unduly constricted conceptions of reason and untenable alternative sources of 
normativity, such as will, metaphysics, or revelation.  
Second, through engagements with the work of Jürgen Habermas and Joseph Raz an 
alternative to their accounts of the justification of halakhic norms and authority is developed. 
This alternative is described as critical philosophy of halakha, for it does not attempt to justify 
halakhic norms or authority but articulates the rational constraints on, and practical 
consequences of, their justification. In terms of justification, this account is contextualist, that is, 
pragmatic and intersubjective, rather than foundationalist, and it is responsive to failures of 
justification. Correspondingly, it entails pluralism yet avoids moral and epistemic relativism. In 
terms of authority, this account is instrumentalist and thus mediates between normative and legal 
justification without reducing the latter to the former. Consequently, authority is circumscribed 
as opposed to total. Critical philosophy of halakha therefore represents a method whereby the 
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I. Social Conflict and Philosophy: The Justification of Norms and Judaism 
Debates in the United States and beyond over circumcision, veiling, abortion, and same-sex 
marriage highlight the need for renewed reflection on the justification of religious norms and 
authority. On the one hand, religious communities engage in political activism to enshrine the 
prohibitions of their respective religions, whether concerning abortion or homosexuality, into 
law. The religious community asserts a claim to universality for its norms; they are applicable to 
everyone and should be enforced by the state. In such cases, the justification of religious norms 
and authority is clearly relevant. In demanding that their religious norms be imposed on others, 
religious believers expose themselves to the challenges of other citizens for the justifications for 
those norms and the authorities that command them. The role of religious reasons in the political 
debate of ostensibly secular nation-states has been the subject of intense discussion in political 
theory and philosophy of religion, drawing in some of the luminaries of twentieth-century 
philosophy, including inter alia John Rawls, Richard Rorty, and Jürgen Habermas.
1
  
On the other hand, in cases involving circumcision or veiling, religious communities demand 
the right to abide by their traditions’ norms in the face of opposition motivated, at least 
purportedly, by moral concerns. The religious community asserts a claim to legitimate 
particularity. It does not demand that everyone be circumcised or don the veil; it only asserts the 
right to abide by its religious norms without interference. Still, if there is a moral challenge to 
                                                 
1
 See for example John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005); Richard Rorty, 
“Religion as a Conversation-Stopper,” in Philosophy and Social Hope (London: Penguin, 2000), 168–74; Richard 
Rorty, “Religion in the Public Square: A Reconsideration,” Journal of Religious Ethics   , no.    Spring      : 
   –    J rgen  abermas, Between Naturalism and Religion: Philosophical Essays, trans. Ciaran Cronin 
(Cambridge UK & Malden MA: Polity, 2008), 114–148, henceforth BNR; and Eduardo Mendieta and Jonathan 
VanAntwerpen, eds., The Power of Religion in the Public Sphere (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011). 
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subjecting a child to irreversible and medically unnecessary surgery or maintaining a culture in 
which women cannot show their faces in public, then it seems that these religious norms and the 
authorities that command them must be justified even for religious believers themselves.  
A. Philosophical Investigation and Religious Traditions 
While abstract philosophical investigation of these questions is necessary, it has its 
weaknesses. First, due to the disciplinary history of philosophy of religion, it is likely that a 
particular conception of religion, focused on individual belief and neglectful of the centrality of 
law and practice in other religions, will determine the contours of the investigation. Under such 
conditions, philosophy’s claim to universality is merely disguised parochialism. Second, such 
abstract analysis, removed from the concrete concerns and thick language of religious traditions, 
is likely to have limited effect on the practices of religious communities. But if philosophical 
investigation is to help resolve the social conflicts from which it emerges, then it must find a way 
to speak to the parties to the social conflicts. Fortunately, inquiry into the justification of 
religious norms and authority is not alien to religious traditions themselves. Such inquiry 




This does not demand, however, that these discussions be conducted within a discourse 
wholly internal to a particular tradition as communitarians may claim.
3
 Dialogue between a 
                                                 
2
 Focused squarely on the role of religious reasons in public debate, Jeffrey Stout touts the role of immanent 
criticism and expressive rationality in working towards a resolution of these social conflicts. See Democracy and 
Tradition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), 73–91. While inspired by his work, this study takes a 
different approach both by examining Judaism’s resources for resolving these questions and in endorsing an 
approach to justification derived from Jürgen Habermas rather than Robert Brandom. This latter difference has 
significant implications for the constraints on justifications that can be offered for religious norms. See Chapter 5 for 
a brief discussion of these differences.  
3
 See Alasdair MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1989). 
For similar arguments in the Jewish context, see Daniel Rynhold, Two Models of Jewish Philosophy: Justifying 
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religious tradition and philosophical reflection may be created in which both are mutually 
enriched. The religious tradition gains in two ways: by having its claims granted a fair hearing by 
those outside of it and by being held accountable to the internal logic of those claims. Though 
difficult and requiring the subjection of closely held beliefs to criticism, the latter should be 
considered a benefit. Accountability to the consequences of a claim is a hallmark of authentic 
commitment to it. Philosophy, for its part, gains by the input of new perspectives, which renders 
it less parochial and redeems its claim to universality. Further, answers that arise from such 
dialogues are more likely to resolve the social conflicts from which these questions emerge 
because they attempt to speak the language of the participants instead of simply presenting them 
with philosophical or religious dicta.  
B.  Judaism as Party to Social Conflict and as Partner for Dialogue 
Judaism is an attractive candidate for such dialogue with philosophy: it is a party to these 
social conflicts; it offers a unique perspective on some of the underlying issues; and it has a 
robust tradition of inquiry into the justification of its religious norms and authority.
4
 The most 
high-profile cases of Jewish involvement in such social conflicts are a ballot initiative in San 
Francisco and a judicial ruling in Germany to prohibit circumcision.
5
 In opposing them, the 
Jewish community asserts a claim to legitimate particularity. Conversely, organs of the Jewish 
community have engaged in political activism against the recognition of same-sex marriage. 
                                                                                                                                                             
One’s Practices (Oxford UK & New York: Oxford University Press, 2005) though he does not draw these 
conclusions. 
4
 I use the phrase “tradition of inquiry” to describe an intellectual tradition focused on specific issues and 
confronting particular problematics. I draw this notion from MacIntyre’s Whose Justice? Which Rationality?. 
However, as will be indicated in Chapter 5, I reject his contextualist conclusions about these types of inquiries. 
5
 For the text of the proposed ban, see “San Francisco Male Genital Mutilation Bill,” accessed October  8,     , 
www.sfmgmbill.org. For information about the German ruling, see Nicholas Kulish, “German Ruling Against 
Circumcising Boys Draws Criticism,” The New York Times, June 26, 2012, sec. A. 
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They thereby claim universal scope for at least some Jewish religious norms. For example, in a 
statement in response to the Supreme Court ruling declaring the Defense of Marriage Act 
unconstitutional the Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations of America (OU) issued a 
statement in which it declared that “we believe that our Divine system of law…represents a 
system of universal morality, and therefore can stake a claim in the national discourse.”
6
 The OU 
does not merely claim the right of the Jewish community to abide by its sexual norms but asserts 
that they possess universal validity; they are valid for and binding upon everyone. These 
instances capture attention beyond the Jewish community because of their relation to political 
power. But debates about the justification of Jewish religious norms and authority rage within 
the community as well. Gender and bioethical issues are significant sites of contention, for they 
express the tension between the norms of the Jewish tradition, on the one hand, and moral claims 
and scientific facts, on the other. The question of the justification of religious norms and 
authority is thus of importance for Judaism because of its relation with those outside of it and 
because of its internal debates.  
Judaism has a robust tradition of inquiry into questions concerning the justification of its 
norms and authority. This tradition is a feature of Jewish thought’s tendency to focus on issues of 
practical concern. While Judaism never lacked for reflection on theological or metaphysical 
questions, Steven Schwarzschild has aptly noted that it tends to give them a practical twist.
7
 
Questions about God or being become queries about human action. Jewish thought thus contains 
a corrective to philosophy of religion’s tendency to focus on issues of belief. Additionally, 
                                                 
6
 OU Public Relations, “Orthodox Union Statement on Supreme Court’s DOMA Ruling,” June  6,     , 
http://advocacy.ou.org/2013/orthodox-union-statement-on-todays-supreme-court-rulings/. 
7
 See Steven S. Schwarzschild, “An Agenda for Jewish Philosophy in the   8 s,” in Studies in Jewish Philosophy: 
Collected Essays of the Academy for Jewish Philosophy, 1980-1985, ed. Norbert M. Samuelson (Lanham: 
University Press of America, 1987), 101–25. 
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though often a subject of criticism, Judaism’s uneasy combination of chosenness with 
monotheism offers a promising schema for reflecting on the relation between particularism and 
universalism in the justification of religious norms.  
Judaism probes questions concerning the justification of its norms and authority in what has 
recently been termed the philosophy of halakha (Jewish law).
8
 While this area of inquiry 
comprises a number of related questions, two areas are significant for the purposes of this study: 
ta’amei ha-mitzvot (the reasons for the commandments) and theory of halakha. Through the 
former effort, Jewish thinkers attempt to demonstrate the rationality of Jewish religious practice 
by offering reasons for its norms. At its best, it not only seeks to justify halakhic norms but also 
elicits sustained reflection on issues in moral philosophy. Moreover, it inevitably draws its 
participants into reflection on the relation between universalism and particularism in Jewish 
practice. In justifying the commandments Jewish thinkers attempt to explain, on the one hand, 
why it is rational to practice them, but, on the other hand, why only Jews are bound by them. 
Theory of halakha is centrally concerned with conceptualization of halakhic-legal practice,
9
 
including the nature of halakhic-legal authority and halakhic-legal decision-making.
10
   
                                                 
8
 For reasons of style in this study I do not italicize “halakha,” despite the general practice of italicizing foreign 
words. Additionally, while I use the transliteration “halakha,” I retain alternative transliterations in quotations. 
Alternative transliterations of other Hebrew terms are also preserved in quotations.  
9
 See Noam Zohar, “Pituah Te’oreyah Hilkhatit ki-Bases Heyune le-Filosofiyah shel ha-Halakha [Development of 
 alakhic Theory as an Essential Basis for Philosophy of  alakha],” in `Iyunim Hadashim Ba-Filosofiyah Shel Ha-
Halakhah [New Investigation in Philosophy of Halakha], ed. Aviezer Ravitzky and Avinoam Rosenak (Jerusalem: 
Magnes Press, 2008), 43–63 for a different conception of halakhic-legal theory and for an argument for its necessity. 
10
 In this study I use the somewhat unwieldy term “halakhic-legal practice” to describe the practice of interpreting, 
determining, and applying Jewish law. The emphasis on practice leaves open the question of whether halakha 
constitutes a legal system. Halakhic-legal practice is distinguished from halakhic practice simpliciter, which is the 
practice of abiding by the prescriptions and prohibitions of Jewish law. Obviously, to the extent to which halakhic-
legal practice is governed by halakhic norms, it too is a type of halakhic practice. 
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Philosophy of halakha thus represents a promising site for inquiry into the justification of 
religious norms and authority. For that purpose, however, it must not be apologetic or 
exclusively descriptive. To be useful in resolving philosophical questions and social conflicts 
concerning religious norms and authority, the “of” in “philosophy of halakha” must connote 
philosophical reflection on halakha as opposed to the quixotic attempt to discover a ready-made 
philosophy in halakha. Regrettably, philosophy of halakha often does degenerate into apologetics 
or restricts itself to description. Practitioners of ta’amei ha-mitzvot attempt to separate it from 
halakhic-legal practice, even when a thinker is both a philosopher and a halakhic-legal decisor. 
Legal practice is isolated from philosophical reflection and the reason for the norm, which 
ostensibly justifies it, does not guide its application. Theory of halakha, for its part, is often 
restricted to description: Portraying how halakhic-legal practice is conducted without evaluating 
whether that conduct is justified.  
C. Critical Philosophy of Halakha 
A critical philosophy of halakha, in contrast, would join a non-apologetic approach to 
ta’amei ha-mitzvot with a normative theory of halakhic-legal practice. That is, it would be 
intellectually and practically responsive to demands for justification and would reflect on how 
halakhic-legal practice could justifiably be conducted. It would thus create a full-fledged 
dialogue between Jewish thought and contemporary philosophy, in which they are each open to 
the other’s claims while reserving the right to subject them to scrutiny. In this study such a 
critical philosophy of halakha is developed by working at the intersection of Jewish thought and 
contemporary philosophy. Specifically, the relation between the justification of halakhic norms 
and halakhic-legal practice in modern Jewish thought is examined by placing it into dialogue 
with moral and legal philosophy.  
7 
 
This occurs in two stages: First, the philosophies of halakha of three twentieth-century 
Jewish thinkers, Yeshayahu Leibowitz (1903-1994), Joseph Soloveitchik (1903-1993), and 
Eliezer Berkovits (1908-1992), are examined and critically assessed. These figures have been 
selected because of their influence on Jewish communities in the United States and Israel as well 
as on Jewish thought, specifically the rise of philosophical reflection on Jewish law. In addition, 
they each engaged, to varying degrees, in both philosophy of halakha and halakhic-legal practice. 
It is shown that despite the denials of Leibowitz and Soloveitchik, all of their accounts of the 
reasons for the commandments do influence their approaches to halakhic-legal practice. Further, 
they all combine a foundationalist approach to justification with skepticism about the practical 
normativity of reason, which leads them to identify alternative sources of normativity, such as 
human will, metaphysical values, or divine revelation. However, their skepticism is based on 
constricted conceptions of reason and their alternative sources of normativity are untenable. 
Lastly, they do not adequately ground halakhic-legal authority. 
Second, through engagements with the work of the philosopher Jürgen Habermas and the 
legal theorist Joseph Raz an alternative to the approaches to the justification of halakhic norms 
and authority of these philosophers of halakha is developed. This alternative is described as 
critical philosophy of halakha because it does not attempt to justify halakhic norms or authority, 
but articulates the rational constraints on, and practical consequences of, their justification. Its 
account of justification is contextualist, that is, intersubjective and pragmatic, rather than 
foundationalist, and it is intellectually and practically responsive to failures of justification. 
Correspondingly, it entails pluralism yet avoids moral and epistemic relativism, which expresses 
a dual commitment to universalism and particularism. Its account of authority is instrumentalist 
and thus mediates between normative and legal justification without reducing the latter to the 
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former. Authority is also circumscribed as opposed to total: Authority must be grounded for 
areas of competence and in connection with individuals’ preexisting reasons for action. Yet, a 
grounded authority’s directives possess uniquely legal normativity, which may preempt its 
subjects’ own judgments. 
Beyond aiding in the intellectual task of solving philosophical problems or in the practical 
charge of resolving social conflicts, it is suggested that critical philosophy of halakha represents 
a method whereby the modern religious believer may hold herself accountable both to her faith 
and to other individuals.  olding oneself accountable to one’s faith demands taking its claims to 
truth, morality, goodness, or beauty seriously enough to require justification. Holding oneself 
accountable to others requires offering them justifications for one’s actions that affect them that 
they too could accept. And, from a theological perspective, if an object of faith is always 
encountered indistinctly through one’s faith and in one’s interactions with others, justifying 
one’s actions to others opens the possibility of justifying oneself before the object of faith. 
In the remainder of the introduction, this work is situated within the context of the study of 
Jewish thought and law (II), and then its critical methodology is articulated (III). Next, its 
contributions are briefly described (IV), and chapter summaries are offered (V).  
II. The Study of Halakha 
Just as religious practice and law has been a neglected area of study in philosophy of 
religion, halakha has not been a traditional topic of investigation in Jewish thought. Only 
recently has philosophy of halakha developed as a subject of inquiry.
11
 Before turning to 
philosophy of halakha, other paradigms for the study of Jewish law are described and considered 
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in terms of their potential to contribute to the resolution of social conflicts over religious norms 
and authority (A). Recent attempts to describe the object and method of philosophy of halakha 
are then examined (B), before turning to a sketch of ta’amei ha-mitzvot in Jewish thought (C) 
and its academic study (D). 
A. Historical and Legal Theoretic Paradigms 
The academic study of Jewish law has been largely dominated by two paradigms that have 
reigned sequentially: history and legal theory. In a review article, “Methodological Reflections 
on the Study of  alakha,” Jeffrey Robert Woolf notes that the academic study of Jewish legal 
literature qua halakha only developed in the middle part of the twentieth century. Prior to that, 
historians approached Jewish legal literature merely as a source of historical details, without 
interest in the halakhic process itself. Only with the work of Jacob Katz did interest in halakha 
itself develop. Still, the primary focus was historical; halakhic literature must be read from the 
perspective of the halakhic decisor to enable better historical understanding.
12
 This approach, 
while seemingly inert in the context of social conflicts, possesses resources to aid in their 
resolution. In displaying the contingent historical or cultural factors in the development of 
halakhic norms, historical research reveals that contrary to the perspective of many of their 
practitioners, halakhic norms could have been different. Such research also shows how 
interaction and accommodation with surrounding societies is an enduring feature of halakhic 
development, possibly making contemporary adjustment less troubling.  
The historical paradigm, however, suffers from weaknesses inherent to its approach. History 
and legal practice have a vexed relation in any legal system. Legal practitioners question the 
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relevance of an explanation of a norm’s historical origin for its legal validity. From the 
perspective of the legal practitioner, the legal historian succumbs to the genetic fallacy, 
attempting to reduce the validity of the norm to its history.
13
 Further, showing the fluidity of 
halakhic norms and their susceptibility to “external” forces is helpful in creating an awareness of 
contingency, but it offers no guidance as to how exactly religious norms should be changed. 
Indeed, this should not be surprising, for the historical paradigm does not generally declare any 
aims besides scholarship. 
The legal theoretic paradigm, while seemingly more “philosophical” insofar as it is a sub-
field of philosophy of law, even more scrupulously attempts to avoid the impression that it 
possesses aims beyond scholarship. Its development during the apogee of legal positivism, or 
analytic jurisprudence, explains much of its character. The most representative work is 
Menachem Elon’s monumental Jewish Law: History, Sources, Principles, which self-
consciously describes Jewish law in the image of positivism.
14
 However, this description of 
Jewish law is distortive and tendentious. It obscures much of the contingency in Jewish law by 
forcing it into the frame of a system. Further, despite its claim to value-neutrality, it is in the 
service of the nationalistic project of creating a Mishpat Ivri, Hebrew Law, which its advocates 
hope will serve as a source of law in the State of Israel. It implicitly claims that because of 
Jewish law’s purported systematicity it could serve as the law of the State of Israel and because it 
is “ ebrew” it should serve as the law of the Jewish state. It is thus inherently conservative, 
offering no standards of evaluation besides coherence and “Jewishness.”  
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More recent trends in the legal theoretic paradigm have discarded the procrustean bed of 
positivism. Aware of the influence of the legal theory held by the investigator on her analysis of 
halakhic texts, researchers have dedicated themselves to understanding the native, though often 
partial and implicit, legal theories held by halakhic decisors themselves.
15
 There has also been an 
appreciation of the relation between material easily identifiable as law (halakha) and narrative 
(aggadah) in Jewish legal texts.
16
 Yet, the legal theoretic paradigm still lacks the resources to aid 
in the resolution of social conflicts over religious norms and authority. It oscillates between the 
aims of Elon’s positivist project and that of the historical paradigm, even while denying their 
methods. In the first case, it continues to pursue the goal of presenting a coherent Jewish legal 
system but recognizes that a positivist framework is untenable. In the second case, it merely 
deploys legal theory to gain a better understanding of Jewish legal literature in its historical 
contexts. Legal theory allows the halakhic historian to separate those developments that are 
“internal” to law from those that are the result of “external” factors. In either case, independent 
assessment of the justification of halakhic norms and authority is far from its concerns.
17
  
B. Philosophy of Halakha 
Despite being a new entrant on the scene of Jewish thought, philosophy of halakha, properly 
interpreted, represents a more fruitful approach to this type of inquiry. As Avi Sagi points out, 
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sustained philosophical reflection on Jewish law was not a feature of modern Jewish thought 
until the last few decades. However, spurred on by the thought of Leibowitz and Soloveitchik, 
which take halakha as their central object of investigation, it has become a burgeoning area of 
research, especially in the State of Israel.
18
 Notwithstanding this growth of interest, Sagi points 
out that “a critical-reflective endeavor about this new discipline is still missing. The range of 
problems covered by the philosophy of Halakhah and its specific perspective have yet to be 
formulated.”
19
 To that end, both Sagi and Avinoam Rosenak articulate views on the nature of 
philosophy of halakha. While Rosenak works inductively, Sagi presents a methodology. They 
both elucidate important features of philosophy of halakha; however, their accounts must be 
supplemented by a critical orientation, which would fulfill the claim of philosophy of halakha to 
be philosophy.   
In his article “Thoughts on the Connection between Philosophy of  alakha and Philosophy 
of Education,” Rosenak lists a number of topics covered by philosophy of halakha, including: 
to understand the authority of the halakhic system in general and the decisor in particular; to 
clarify the role and power of interpretation; to expose the sources that establish the norms 
and are capable of changing them  to distinguish the status of the concepts of ‘tradition,’ 
‘revelation,’ and ‘reason,’ and their power in the design of the halakha; the definition of the 
concept of ‘truth’ of the halakhic system  what is ‘error’ in the halakhic context and how 
should one relate to controversy; is halakha canonization or codification—and what is the 




Clearly, there is much overlap between the concerns of the legal theoretic paradigm and the 
topics of philosophy of halakha as Rosenak describes them. Indeed, insofar as they both take 
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Jewish law as their object this is to be expected. There are certain issues, like the authority of 
halakha and its decisors, the sources for its norms and their process of change, and its method of 
interpretation, that are so central to Jewish law that any type of research that takes Jewish law as 
its object will engage with them. Let us call analyzing these issues, within any rubric, “theory of 
halakha.” Theory of halakha conceptualizes halakhic-legal practice, delineating its institutions 




Although Rosenak challenges the dominance of the methods of legal theory and suggests 
philosophy of education, along with its focus on pedagogical effect, as an alternative paradigm, 
his identification of the topics of philosophy of halakha exclusively with those of theory of 
halakha already concedes too much. By focusing on the institutions and workings of halakhic-
legal practice, he excludes other concerns arising out of Jewish law such as ta’amei ha-mitzvot 
and the grounding of halakhic-legal authority. 
In contrast, in his presentation of a methodology for philosophy of halakha, Sagi expands its 
boundaries beyond those of theory of halakha. Reflecting on its expected method, he writes,  
The philosophy of Halakhah takes as its starting assumption that Halakhah is not merely a 
legal system but a full and complex way of life, and, in this sense, the philosophy of 
Halakhah is a consistent attempt to disclose its meaning. In phenomenological terms, we 
could say that the philosophy of  alakhah is an explication of the halakhic “given”…. The 
philosophy of  alakhah is… an…attempt to explicate or reflect upon the empirical 
phenomenon of Halakhah so as to expose its meaning, if any…. [T]he philosophy of 




Sagi thus presents a phenomenological approach to philosophy of halakha. Philosophy of 
halakha is concerned with explicating the meaning of the halakha, or, more properly, halakhic 
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norms, for he questions whether there is in fact a unified halakhic system.
23
 He does not see 
halakha as simply law but rather as a “full and complex way of life.” 
This position broadens the object of philosophy of halakha while simultaneously narrowing 
its method and consequences. On the one hand, halakhic life, including particular halakhic norms 
and individual halakhic practices, is taken as the object of investigation as opposed to the 
narrowly legal topics of theory of halakha. Thus, issues like ta’amei ha-mitzvot and the 
grounding of halakhic-legal authority become legitimate and even central topics. On the other 
hand, according to Sagi, philosophy of halakha only uses the phenomenological method. It takes 
halakhic norms as its basic data and exposes their meaning. Philosophy of halakha aims to 
explicate the philosophy in halakha; it is not full-fledged philosophical reflection on halakha, 
which would evaluate the justification of halakhic norms and authority. Indeed, this choice is 
signaled by Sagi’s concern with meaning as opposed to reasons. While there are good arguments 
that even the understanding of meaning implicates reasons, an exclusive concern with meaning 
idles the normative significance of those reasons. Contrariwise, concern with the reasons for 
halakhic norms and authority ineluctably draws the investigator into the normative domain, for to 
fully understand a reason is to assess whether it is, in fact, a valid reason.
24
  
Rosenak’s and Sagi’s respective articulations of philosophy of halakha each have 
contributions and deficiencies. Rosenak draws attention to theory of halakha as an important 
element of this area of inquiry. Further, he attempts to break out of the narrow constraints of the 
legal theoretic paradigm by suggesting the methods of philosophy of education. But he is 
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ultimately trapped in the legal theoretic paradigm by his selection of topics. Sagi broadens the 
topics of philosophy of halakha, allowing the inclusion of ta’amei ha-mitzvot and the grounding 
of halakhic-legal authority, but restricts its method to phenomenology, which forecloses the 
possibility of normative assessment. A critical philosophy of halakha is necessary for productive 
reflection on the justification of religious norms and authority. This study aims to develop such a 
critical approach with the further goal of contributing to the broader discussion concerning 
religious norms and authority. It takes as its starting point reflection on the reasons for the 
commandments in Jewish thought and its relation to halakhic-legal practice. It thus critically 
analyzes the nexus of ta’amei ha-mitzvot and theory of halakha.  
C. Ta’amei ha-Mitzvot in Jewish Thought 
A comprehensive review of attempts at ta’amei ha-mitzvot in Jewish thought is beyond the 
scope of this study. In the following, a few episodes in that history are reviewed to assemble its 
central features and problematics. First, the presence of reasons for the commandments in the 
Hebrew Bible itself is discussed to dissolve objections stemming from the supposed opposition 
of reason and revelation (1). Second, some discussions of the reasons for the commandments in 
rabbinic literature are briefly surveyed to mark three important issues: its relation to halakhic-
legal practice, misgiving about offering reasons for the commandments, and the division of the 
commandments into two categories with different degrees of accessibility to reason (2). Third, 
features of Moses Maimonides’ account of the justification for commandments in the Guide of 
the Perplexed are discussed: the emergence of ta’amei ha-mitzvot as a distinctively philosophical 
project, its potentially antinomian consequences, and its separation from halakhic-legal practice 
   . Lastly, Moses Mendelssohn’s account of the reasons for halakhic norms in Jerusalem, or on 
Religious Power in Judaism, is examined to show the persistence of a basic problematic—its 
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relation to halakhic-legal practice—into modernity and to draw out the project’s significance for 
modern Jewish thought (4).  
1.  The Bible: Reasons in Revelation 
Reflection on the reasons for the commandments is an intellectual tradition the roots of 
which extend as far back as the commandments themselves. Despite facile as well as 
sophisticated attempts in modern Jewish thought to harden the opposition between reason and 
revelation,
25
 the Bible itself, the purported datum of revelation, does not seem to recognize this 
distinction. In his work Midrash, Mishnah, and Gemara: The Jewish Predilection for Justified 
Law, David Weiss  alivni documents the presence of “motive clauses” in the Bible and argues 
that they evidence a “preference for law that is expressly reasonable, that seeks to win the hearts 
of those to whom the laws are addressed.”
26
  
Motive clauses are phrases which give the reason or motivation for a law.
27
 Berend Gemser 
divides those found in the Bible into four types: explanatory, ethical, religious and historical.
28
 
Halivni adds that sometimes these are reasons that apply to particular commandments, while 
other times they are more general, “serving as an overall justification for God to issue 
commandments,”
29
 such as God’s role as creator or redeemer from Egyptian bondage. For 
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example, in the Decalogue (Ex. 20: 1-17), the exemplar of revelation, Halivni counts three 
instances of motive clauses, which are each marked by the word “ki”  for : “You should not bow 
down to [idols] nor serve them for I am the Lord your God”  “You should not take the name of 
the Lord your God in vain, for the Lord will not hold them guiltless”  “The seventh day is the 
Sabbath…for in six days the Lord made  eaven and earth.”
30
  
The first instance prohibits the worship of other gods because of the exclusive relationship 
between God and the children of Israel. The second instance offers a prudential motivation for 
not vainly swearing in God’s name. The third seems to establish a cosmological or symbolic 
relation between God’s creation of the world in six days and the prescription to observe the 
Sabbath on the seventh. To appreciate the prevalence and significance of motive clauses, it is 
important to have a broad understanding of justification. The issue at this point is not whether 
modern readers should accept the Bible’s justifications for the commandments but the fact that 
they were offered at all, that justifying its commandments was seen as legitimate and perhaps 
even necessary. According to Halivni, this was not the case in other ancient Near Eastern law 
codes. Thus, he argues, “biblical law is not categorically imperative…it seeks to justify itself, 
though the justification is sporadic and sometimes logically not very tight.”
31
 
2. Rabbinic Literature: Legal and Normative Justifications 
The predilection for justified law continues into rabbinic literature, where an important 
distinction between exegetical motives and normative justifications emerges. Exegetical motives 
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support a norm by showing how it follows from an authoritative text.
32
 Though, as Halivni notes, 
they are present even within the Bible, they become the centerpiece of rabbinic literature. Indeed, 
they are paradigms of legal justifications, which substantiate norms by showing how they follow 
from the pronouncements of legal authorities or elements of a legal system, whether canonical 
texts, precedents, or assumptions. They are the basic components of general legal practice and 
halakhic-legal practice. Such justifications are the focus of  alivni’s further discussion of the 
“Jewish predilection for justified law.” But legal justification can be opposed to “extra-legal” or 
normative justifications.
33
 A legal justification attempts to substantiate the validity of a norm 
given the validity of the legal system or the legal authority. A normative justification attempts to 
substantiate the validity of the norm all-things-considered.
34
  
The relation between these types of justification becomes significant within rabbinic 
literature and is an important concern of this study. Indeed, a way of posing the issue under 
investigation is to what extent normative justifications ought to be “extra-legal.” For such a 
justification need not necessarily prescind the norm from the legal system of which it is a part or 
the legal authority that pronounces it, but if it does examine the norm within those contexts, the 
legal system or the legal authority themselves must be independently grounded. Similarly, the 
legal application of a norm is relevant to its normative justification, for the former could result in 
consequences that undermine the latter. Thus, the relation between normative justification and 
legal practice is pertinent for assessing a norm’s all-things-considered justification.  
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Alongside the legal justifications that are characteristic of rabbinic literature, there are 
attempts to offer normative justifications for the commandments. Isaac Heinemann, in his classic 
study, The Reasons for the Commandments in the Literature of Israel, divides them into three 
categories: proportionality, symbolic, and behavior-influencing. The latter is further separated 
into mystical, utilitarian, and educational.
35
 While a comprehensive review of such justifications 
is beyond the scope of this study, three issues that develop in rabbinic literature are significant: 
debate about the relation between justifications for the commandments and halakhic-legal 
practice (a), misgivings about offering reasons for the commandments (b), and the division of the 
commandments into two categories with different degrees of accessibility to reason (c).  
The first two features are apparent in a discussion of the laws of the king in BT Sanhedrin 21. 
It is written in the Bible (Deut. 17:16- 7 : “[The king] shall not keep many horses or send people 
back to Egypt to add to his horses, since the Lord has warned you, ‘You shall not go back that 
way again.’ And he shall not have many wives, lest his heart go astray  nor shall he amass silver 
and gold to excess.” This is an example of motive clauses in the Bible. The first sentence 
exegetically substantiates the prohibition of the king amassing horses or sending traders to Egypt 
for horses. The second sentence justifies the prohibition of marrying many women in view of 
their likelihood of leading the king’s heart astray  it also similarly justifies the prohibition of 
amassing excess gold and silver, though elliptically.  
(a) In discussing the prohibition of marrying many wives, the Mishnah presents three views 
on the relation between the reasons for the commandments and halakhic-legal practice.
36
 The 
first position, that of an anonymous sage, does not take the reason given by the Biblical text into 
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account and merely stipulates that the number of wives permitted to the king is eighteen. Though 
he generally does not deduce reasons for the commandments and lend them legal application as 
evidenced by debates elsewhere, Rabbi Judah, the proponent of the second position, focuses on 
the explicit manner the reason is given in the Bible in this case. He argues that the king may 
marry more than eighteen women so long as they do no lead his heart astray. In contrast, Rabbi 
Simeon, the proponent of the third view, maintains that the king may not marry even one woman 
if she will lead him astray. Rabbi Simeon holds that one must always deduce the reasons for the 
commandments and lend them legal application, even when no reason is given in the Bible. 
Thus, when the Bible does supply a reason for its commandment it must be adding a further legal 
detail. In this case it is adding that though the prohibition is to marry many women, even one 
woman is prohibited if she will lead the king’s heart astray.
37
 In sum, three positions on the 
relation between justification and halakhic-legal practice are given in this pericope: there is no 
relation even when a justification is provided by the Bible (i); there is only a relation when the 
justification is provided by the Bible (ii); and there is always a relation even when the 
justification must be independently deduced (iii).  
David Novak claims that, with a few exceptions, the justifications for the Biblical 
commandments given in the Talmud are normatively inert: They do not influence their halakhic-
legal application. Though he claims that reflection on the reasons for the commandments is the 
starting point for practical Jewish philosophy, it takes the Biblical commandments as its basic 
data for interpretation and so cannot undermine them. He does note that teleological reasoning 
plays a role in the halakhic-legal practice of certain rabbinic sages but only in the establishment 
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of rabbinic enactments as opposed to the interpretation of Biblical law.
38
 However, Ephraim 
Urbach in his The Sages: Their Concepts and Beliefs notes that the justification of the 
commandments often fulfills a practical need in the Talmud.
39
 An example that he offers is that 
of the prosbul, a document which transforms private debts into public debts to avoid their 
cancellation during the sabbatical year.
40
 The reason given for this enactment is to avoid the 
withholding of loans in the years prior to the sabbatical year. If creditors knew their loans would 
not likely be returned they would be reticent to extend them and would thus violate the 
prohibition of withholding charity.
41
 While such teleological reasoning certainly eventuates in a 
rabbinic enactment, in the process it circumvents what is arguably a Biblical commandment. 
Novak’s neat distinction between teleological reasoning in interpreting Biblical law and rabbinic 
enactment is thus untenable. 
(b) Nevertheless, the impulse to ignore the reasons for the commandments found in the 
anonymous opinion in the Talmud finds expression in more generalized misgivings about efforts 
to offer reasons for the commandments. Indeed, in the Talmud’s discussion of the Mishnah 
described above, Rabbi Isaac is quoted as claiming, 
Why were the reasons of [some] Biblical laws not revealed? — Because in two verses 
reasons were revealed, and they caused the greatest in the world [Solomon] to stumble. Thus 
it is written: He shall not multiply wives to himself,
 
whereon Solomon said, ‘I will multiply 
wives yet not let my heart be perverted.’ Yet we read, When Solomon was old, his wives 
turned away his heart. Again it is written: He shall not multiply to himself horses; concerning 
which Solomon said, ‘I will multiply them, but will not cause [Israel] to return [to Egypt].’ 
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Rabbi Isaac is concerned about the consequences of offering reasons for the commandments. If 
one knows the reason for a commandment, one might come to devalue the commandment itself. 
However, even he does not reject the claim that there are reasons for the commandments. He 
could hardly do that given that the reasons he is discussing are provided by the Bible, and the 
results he fears are just those that the Bible explicitly sought to prevent. Rather, he expresses 
misgiving about the result of knowledge of the reasons for the commandments.  
(c) Other sages expressed greater misgivings about offering reasons for the commandments, 
retrojecting concealment of the reasons for at least some of the commandments into the Bible. 
The Sifra records the following exegesis: 
‘My commandments [mishpatai] shall you do….’—this refers to matters in the Torah that 
had they not been written, reason would have dictated that we should write them, such as [the 
prohibitions of] stealing, the forbidden sexual relationships, idol worship, blasphemy, and 
murder…. ‘and My statutes [huqqotai] you shall observe’—these are commandments 
concerning which the evil inclination, as well as idol worshippers, argue against—such as 
[the prohibition of] eating pork, wearing linen and wool together, and the release of the 
levirate wife, purification of the leper, the red heifer, and the scapegoat ritual. The verse 




A distinction is drawn between two classes of commandments: misphatim and huqqim. 
Mishpatim are the commandments the reasons for which are transparent. Even had God not 
commanded them, human beings could have derived them on their own and established them as 
norms. The reasons for huqqim, in contrast, are less clear. They provide an opening for both 
internal and external enemies to question the rationality of the commandments. This distinction, 
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though not drawn in the Biblical text, becomes central for both proponents and adversaries of 
ta’amei ha-mitzvot. Even proponents of offering reasons for all the commandments recognize 
that some commandments are easier to justify than others; often they suggest a special 
explanation for the opacity of the reasons for the huqqim. In contrast, the Sifra takes a strongly 
negative line; the opacity of the reasons for the huqqim means that they are justified for humans 
solely by God’s authority, and thus one is forbidden to question them. Still, it only claims that 
some of the commandments are opaque to reason. Further, it does not claim that the huqqim do 
not have any justification at all, only that their reasons are not known to humanity. 
3. Maimonides: The Project and its Problematics Emerge 
Indeed, it is difficult to find examples of those who completely reject the justification of the 
commandments, except as figures in the writings of its proponents. Maimonides (1138-1204) 
writes, “[t]here is a group of human beings who consider it a grievous thing that causes should be 
given for any law; what would please them most is that the intellect would not find a meaning for 
the commandments…. What compels them to feel thus is a sickness that they find in their 
souls….”
44
 Maimonides’ nameless adversaries believe that the greatness of God is better 
expressed by laws that transcend reason. Apparently, if reasons could be found for the 
commandments, it would imply that they were the creation of mere human minds. Maimonides 
rejects this view and presents a comprehensive approach to justifying the commandments: 
But He is far exalted above this; the contrary is the case – the whole purpose consisting in 
what is useful for us, as we have explained on the basis of its dictum: For our good always, 
that he might preserve us alive, as it is at this day [Deut. 6: 24]. And it says, Which shall 
hear all these statutes [huqqim] and say: Surely this great community is a wise and 
understanding people [Deut. 4: 6]. Thus it states explicitly that even all the statutes [huqqim] 
will show to all the nations that they have been given with wisdom and understanding. Now 
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if there is thing for which no reason is known and that does not either procure something 
useful or ward off something harmful, why should one say of one who believes in it or 
practices it that he is wise and understanding and of great worth? Rather things are 
indubitably as we have mentioned: every commandment from among these six hundred and 
thirteen commandments exists either with view to communicating a correct opinion, or to 
putting an end to an unhealthy opinion, or to communicating a rule of justice, or to warding 
off injustice, or to endowing men with a noble moral quality, or to warning them against an 
evil moral quality. Thus all [the commandments] are bound up with three things: opinions, 




Maimonides claims that all the commandments, even the huqqim, have reasons. Indeed, the verse 
he cites to support the reasonability of the commandments specifically uses the term “huqqim” to 
describe them. He also attempts to substantiate this claim, devoting approximately twenty-five 
chapters of the Guide of the Perplexed to describing the reasons for the commandments, 
especially those traditionally identified as huqqim.
46
  
Further, he maintains that the reasons given for the commandments can be appreciated even 
by those outside of Judaism. The “other nations” who hear of the laws of the Jewish people will 
proclaim their wisdom. The commandments thus have universal validity even if other nations are 
not bound by them. This is because, according to him, the commandments cohere into a unified 
framework with one overarching goal: the benefit of the human being. The human being is able 
to achieve perfection through halakhic practice. This results from the commandments’ three 
functions: teaching proper opinions, establishing good morals, and regulating social conduct. 
Elsewhere, Maimonides explains how the commandments have a first intention, the instruction 
of proper opinions, and a second intention, social and political organization. While the first 
intention is of greater importance since it directly allows for human perfection—intellectual 
achievement, it depends on the second intention—social and political stability—for its 
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 Maimonides’ justification of the commandments is thus embedded in an 
overarching account of human flourishing. For him, reflection on the reasons for the 
commandments is not an ad-hoc attempt to substantiate Jewish practice but an element of moral, 
social, and political philosophy. Ta’amei ha-mitzvot thereby becomes a distinctively 
philosophical project.  
While Maimonides can thus be described as the initiator of the philosophical project of 
ta’amei ha-mitzvot,
48
 he is also the originator of two of its major problems. These two problems 
cut in opposing directions: one threatens to undermine established halakhic practice, while the 
other illicitly protects it. First, Maimonides introduces the problem of antinomianism, for, as 
Josef Stern points out, the reasons he offers for the huqqim function more as explanations than 
justifications. Since Maimonides describes many of the huqqim as serving to undermine the 
idolatrous practices of Ancient Israel’s neighbors, the reasons he offers for them demonstrate 
why it made sense for those norms to have been instituted in that context. However, it is not clear 
how such reasons justify the practice of these norms to individuals without such idolatrous 
neighbors, such as Maimonides’ contemporaries and those who succeeded him.
49
  
Second, while Maimonides’ dedicated focus to providing reasons for the commandments in 
The Guide of the Perplexed signals the emergence of ta’amei ha-mitzvot as a distinctively 
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philosophical project in Jewish thought, it also separates it, at least rhetorically, from halakhic-
legal practice, which leads to concerns about apologetics. Maimonides creates two distinct 
genres for the discussion of the commandments: the philosophical genre of the Guide of the 
Perplexed and the halakhic-legal genre of the Mishneh Torah. The relation between the former 
and the latter is a vexed issue in terms of interpretation, philosophy, and law. Discussion of these 
crucial topics is beyond the scope of this study.
50
 What is significant for it, however, is the 
legacy of this separation, for it proves to be an enduring feature of the relation between the 
project of ta’amei ha-mitzvot and halakhic-legal practice. Even those Jewish thinkers who both 
offer accounts of the reasons for the commandments and engage in halakhic-legal practice often 
deny any connection between the two endeavors. This seems to undermine both the 
philosophical seriousness of the project of ta’amei ha-mitzvot and the justifiability of abiding by 
halakhic norms. If the reasons offered for the commandments do not influence how they are 
applied in halakhic-legal practice, then nothing is really at stake in ta’amei ha-mitzvot. Any 
reason at all can be offered for the commandments so long as it silences the questioner. And even 
if the reason is not persuasive, halakhic practice remains unchanged. Ta’amei ha-mitzvot thus 
devolves into apologetics. Similarly, if halakhic-legal practice is not guided by the reasons that 
justify the commandments, the application of the commandment may lead to consequences that 
the justification did not encompass. Halakhic practice will then be unjustified.   
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4. Mendelssohn: Voluntarism, Universalism, and the Limits of Surmises 
Maimonides may have been unconcerned or unaware of the apologetic implications and 
antinomian potential of his approach to ta’amei ha-mitzvot. While the former question can only 
be clarified by a detailed study of the Mishneh Torah, Maimonides’ disregard for the antinomian 
potential of his account is understandable in view of his context. In the medieval period the 
Jewish community possessed autonomy and coercive power. Halakhic practice was obligatory 
for all members of the Jewish community whether or not they thought it justified. The threat of 
antinomianism was therefore not a pressing issue for him. Modernity and the end of Jewish 
autonomy present unique challenges to halakhic practice that raise the stakes for the project of 
ta’amei ha-mitzvot. Like many of the themes of modern Jewish thought, its newfound 
importance is evident in the writings of Moses Mendelssohn (1729-1786). 
Mendelssohn’s Jerusalem has two parts: The first uses natural law arguments to contend that 
religious institutions, like churches, synagogues, and mosques, do not possess coercive authority, 
and the second presents a philosophy of Judaism. While the proximal impetus for this work was 
an anonymous letter challenging Mendelssohn’s commitment to Judaism given his rejection of 
religious coercion, Arnold Eisen persuasively argues that the broader context is Jewish civil 
emancipation. If the Jews achieved emancipation, an event that was beginning to seem likely to 
Mendelssohn, then they would no longer be part of the autonomous Jewish community and 
subject to its coercive powers. New possibilities for identity and practice would open to them, 
allowing individuals to decide how to worship religiously, if at all. Halakhic practice would 
become voluntary. Under these conditions of halakhic voluntarism, Eisen argues, “[t]a’amei ha-
mitzvot… become[s] of unprecedented importance. Unless there were sound reasons for 
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observing commandments, Jews were unlikely to maintain such observance voluntarily.”
51
 Thus, 
in the second part Mendelssohn offers a justification for the commandments. In addition to 
explaining why obedience to halakhic norms should be voluntarily assumed, this account aims to 
navigate the tensions between universalism and particularism: It explains both why Jewish 
practice is justified and why it is only for Jews.  
Mendelssohn maintains that Judaism does not claim exclusive access to saving truths. 
Exclusive revelation of saving truths is not in keeping with God’s goodness. In fact, he claims, 
“According to true Judaism all the inhabitants of the earth are destined to felicity….”
52
 All the 
truths necessary for human salvation are eternal truths of reason, which can be gained from 
ordinary human experience or, if necessary, philosophical reflection.
53
 Indeed, Mendelssohn 
attempts to demonstrate the existence of God, the immortality of the soul, and the basis for moral 
obligations in his own writings of philosophical theology.
54
 Instead of revealed truths, the Jews 
have been granted revealed legislation. The norms that comprise this legislation do not mandate 
any beliefs; rather, they command actions that aid in the education, communication, and 
preservation of eternal and saving truths: “All laws refer to, or are based upon, eternal truths of 
reason, or remind us of them, and rouse us to ponder them.”
55
 Thus, just as Maimonides embeds 
his reasons for the commandments within a moral, social, and political philosophy, Mendelssohn 
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fixes his justification for halakhic norms within a broader philosophy of religion. He thus 
continues the distinctively philosophical project of ta’amei ha-mitzvot.  
Still, the Jewish people have not been privileged with this revelation only for their own 
benefit. They are meant “to be a priestly nation  that is, a nation which, through its establishment 
and constitution, through its laws, actions, vicissitudes, and changes was continually to call 
attention to sound and unadulterated ideas of God and his attributes.”
56
 For Mendelssohn idolatry 
is a constant threat even within the context of religion and especially when it possesses a written 
Scripture. As a “living script” halakhic practice is an aid in educating, communicating, and 
preserving the truths of religion while countering the threat of idolatry.
57
 But more widespread 
observance of halakha is not necessary. Just as not everyone need be a teacher, only one nation 
need observe the divine legislation. Mendelssohn thus aims to explain how halakhic practice 
promotes a universal aim while only obligating the Jewish people. This can be contrasted with 
Maimonides’ approach. While he too justifies the commandments in view of a universal goal—
human perfection, he did not feel it necessary to explain why the means for this perfection was 
only revealed to the Jewish people.  
Mendelssohn offers another reason why only the Jewish people should practice halakha: 
Only they were commanded by God. While he offers a justification for the commandments in the 
context of practical halakhic voluntarism, that is, on a practical level relinquishing halakhic 
observance is now an option for Jews, he maintains that, as Jews, they are still bound to observe 
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it. Moreover, this obligation establishes a boundary between reflection on halakha and halakhic-
legal practice. Mendelssohn writes,  
I cannot see how those born into the House of Jacob can in any conscientious manner 
disencumber themselves of the law. We are permitted to reflect on the law, to inquire into its 
spirit, and, here and there, where the lawgiver gave no reason, to surmise a reason which, 
perhaps, depended upon time, place, and circumstances, and which, perhaps, may be liable to 
change in accordance with time, place, and circumstances—if it pleases the Supreme 
lawgiver to make known to us His will on this manner, to make it known in as clear a voice, 
in as public a manner, and as far beyond all doubt and ambiguity as He did when He gave the 
law itself…. [R]everence for God draws a line between speculation and practice which no 




While Jews can now disobey halakhic norms in practice without risk of human penalties, they 
are still bound by them. Halakha still possess normative force. Further, Mendelssohn establishes 
a sharp separation between the project of ta’amei ha-mitzvot, which he describes as offering 
“surmises,” and halakhic-legal practice. Modification of halakhic norms on the basis of 
independently adduced reasons for the commandments would only be permissible after a new 
revelation of God’s will. Thus, although operating in a different context of halakhic voluntarism 
and universalism, Mendelssohn turns what is rhetorically implied in Maimonides’ thought into a 




This brief sketch of the project of ta’amei ha-mitzvot in Jewish thought has noted a number 
of its features and problematics that are important for this study: Despite stereotyped views of 
the opposition of reason and revelation and with the recognition that there are strains within 
Judaism that have misgivings about it, there is a continuous tradition of inquiry within Jewish 
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thought concerning the reasons for the commandments. Thinkers like Maimonides and 
Mendelssohn turned this tradition into a distinctively philosophical project of justifying the 
commandments by embedding their accounts of the reasons for the commandments within larger 
philosophical frameworks. Nevertheless, there is a persistent attempt, even by thinkers like 
Maimonides and Mendelssohn, to isolate this project from halakhic-legal practice. Lastly, in 
modernity it becomes of even greater significance as halakhic practice becomes voluntary in 
Jewish life and the tension between universalism and particularism becomes acute within Jewish 
thought.  
This study fixes on one of these features of the project of ta’amei ha-mitzvot, while keeping 
the others in view: It explores the relation between the reasons for the commandments and 
halakhic-legal practice. It takes for granted that justification of the commandments is important, 
while recognizing that there are strains within the Jewish tradition that have reservations about it. 
Further, it examines the reasons for the commandments with an interest in their philosophical 
dimension; it is less interested in the specific reasons offered for commandments than in the 
accounts of justification that anchor those reasons. Lastly, it is self-consciously modern, both in 
taking twentieth-century figures as its focus and in its commitment to the value of human 
autonomy and to negotiating the tension between universalism and particularism without 
denying either of their legitimate claims.  
D. The Study of Ta’amei ha-Mitzvot 
Research on ta’amei ha-mitzvot has largely taken a historical approach, though some 
philosophical investigations have been conducted. In order to further situate the methods of this 
study, the historical studies are reviewed (1), before turning to the philosophical investigations, 
which provide its more immediate context (2). 
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1. Historical Approaches 
The classic study of ta’amei ha-mitzvot remains Isaac  einemann’s The Reasons for the 
Commandments in Israeli Literature. Heinemann works historically. In the first volume he 
begins with the Hebrew Bible as well as rabbinic and Hellenistic literature and then moves on to 
examine medieval figures, including Saadia Gaon, Bahya ben Joseph ibn Pakudah, Judah ha-
Levi, Abraham ibn Ezra, Abraham ibn Daud, Moses Maimonides, Levi Gersonides, Hasdai 
Crescas, Joseph Albo, and Don Isaac Abravanel. The second volume surveys the views of Moses 
Mendelssohn, Samuel David Luzzatto, Samson Raphael Hirsch, Zacharias Frankel, and Franz 
Rosenzweig.  einemann’s work is monumental in the range of figures it covers, spanning the 
ancient, medieval, and modern periods. Additionally, in charting attempts at ta’amei ha-mitzvot 
through history, it implicitly constructs these efforts as a tradition of inquiry. He also identifies 
emancipation as a crucial juncture in the history of the tradition. But it is deficient in three 
respects: its character as a history with pedagogical intent, lack of philosophical analysis, and 
want of attention to the relation of ta’amei ha-mitzvot to halakhic-legal practice.  
Heinemann aims to explore the history of the reasons for the commandments in order to 
unearth lessons for present day Jews struggling with the value of halakhic practice. His goal is to 
discover what answers given in the past can still speak to moderns.
60
 His concern is less with 
philosophical assessment than with pedagogical applicability. He often merely collects and 
categorizes the type of reasons for the commandments offered by individual thinkers as opposed 
to reconstructing the structure of their justifications. Neither does he fit the reasons into the 
thinkers’ larger philosophical frameworks. Indeed, this is of little concern for him because he 
ultimately concludes that most Jewish thinkers offered reasons for the commandments for 
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apologetic purposes or to deepen religious experience.
61
 He claims that the types of reasons 
given by different thinkers derive from their diverse characters: Some were intellectuals, while 
others were men of action or emotionally oriented.
62
 He also does not reflect in depth on the 
relation between this project and halakhic-legal practice. Indeed, one suspects that he constructs 
the history of ta’amei ha-mitzvot in view of his own pedagogical interests: A major lesson that he 
draws from this history is that different reasons must be offered to individuals of different 
character types.
63
 His work is indispensable for its summaries of views on the reasons for the 
commandments; but philosophical analysis of this tradition of inquiry and its connection to 
halakhic-legal practice is necessary.  
Eisen expands on his examination of Mendelssohn’s approach to ta’amei ha-mitzvot in 
Rethinking Modern Judaism: Ritual, Commandment, Community.
64
 Though drawing on 
 einemann’s work, Eisen focuses on the modern period and broadens the perspective to include 
theories of religion, modernity, and ritual as well as those of intellectual and social history. He 
also expands the definition of mitzvah (commandment) to include Jewish practices that are not 
found in any halakhic code. Eisen’s goal is to “reopen the simplest questions about what modern 
Jews have done, ‘religiously’ and ‘ethnically,’ and why.”
65
 His work provides important 
historical and sociological context to understand halakhic observance or any attempt at justifying 
the commandments in the modern period. However, his focus is more on comprehending Jewish 
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practice and its interpretations than analyzing the cogency of its justifications. Moreover, his 
expanded focus comes at the cost of attention to the varieties of justifications found in 
philosophical accounts of ta’amei ha-mitzvot. After Mendelssohn the only such figure he 
analyzes is Samson Raphael Hirsch, whose symbolic approach Eisen takes to be paradigmatic for 
the modern period.
66
 But philosophers of halakha like Leibowitz, Soloveitchik, and Berkovits 
eschew symbolic approaches to Jewish practice. And while Eisen explores the relation between 
actual Jewish practice and its interpretations, he does not examine their more direct connection 
through halakhic-legal practice.   
A number of studies discuss the reasons for the commandments in the thought of specific 
thinkers or groups of thinkers. Urbach describes the reasons for the commandments in rabbinic 
literature. His work also collects and categorizes the different reasons offered.
67
 Importantly, he 
notes that there was sometimes a practical, or halakhic-legal, motive for exploring the reasons for 
the commandments.
68
 However, aside from presenting instances where the reason for the 
commandment influenced its application, he does not analyze this relation. As noted above, 
Novak too discusses the reasons for the commandments in rabbinic literature, though he focuses 
exclusively on the Talmud. In contrast to Urbach’s approach, Novak has a philosophical interest 
in the material. He insightfully points out that reflection on the reasons for the commandments is 
the starting point for practical Jewish philosophy. However, he hastily concludes that it is 
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 Detailed research on the relation between the justification of the 
commandments and halakhic-legal practice is necessary, especially in modernity.  
 Isadore Twersky and Stern both focus on Maimonides. In his important Introduction to the 
Code of Maimonides, Twersky devotes over a hundred pages to the relation between law and 
philosophy in Maimonides’ thought. Significantly, he notes and analyzes instances of reflection 
on the reasons for the commandments in the Mishneh Torah, thus deconstructing the separation 
between ta’amei ha-mitzvot and halakhic-legal writing that Maimonides implicitly established.
70
 
Still, Twersky does not examine the philosophical structure of Maimonides’ justifications of the 
commandments. That task is undertaken by Stern in his Problems and Parables of Law: 
Maimonides and Nahmanides on the Reasons for the Commandments, in which he compares and 
contrasts Maimonides’ approach with that of Moses Nahmanides (1194-1270). Stern’s analysis is 
philosophically sophisticated and provides a number of useful distinctions, including between 
reasons that explain the origin of the commandments and reasons that justify their performance.
71
 
He fixes on the problem of antinomianism, which arises from a disjunction between these two 
types of reasons.
72
 Stern does not, however, discuss the relation between justifying the 
commandments and halakhic-legal practice. His study also does not concern the modern period. 
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2. Philosophical Investigations 
While Stern’s work is philosophically sophisticated, it main goal is a better understanding of 
the thought of Maimonides and Nahmanides. As a work with primarily philosophical interests, 
Daniel Rynhold’s Two Models of Jewish Philosophy: Justifying One’s Practices provides the 
most immediate context for the present study.
73
 It combines advanced discussions of the 
accounts of the reasons for the commandments of Maimonides and Soloveitchik with an attempt 
to construct a new approach to justifying the commandments. Rynhold does not merely detail the 
types of reasons offered by Maimonides and Soloveitchik; he examines their assumptions about 
the nature of justification. Further, in the constructive stage of his project Rynhold does not offer 
specific reasons for the commandments but presents what he takes to be a philosophically sound 
approach to justification in general. This work is significant for injecting a distinctively 
philosophical orientation into the study of Jewish thought, both as it studies figures from the past 
and engages in original argument.  
While Rynhold is mindful of the connection of ta’amei ha-mitzvot to moral philosophy, he 
does not thematically explore its link to philosophy of law nor does he examine the halakhic-
legal writings of his subjects. Additionally, while he legitimately reads Soloveitchik’s writings in 
view of his own philosophical concerns, a more contextual interpretation of Soloveitchik’s 
views, which draws from a wider reading of his philosophical influences and halakhic-legal 
writings, has the potential both to advance understanding of his thought and to provide important 
material for discussions of the justification of religious norms and authority. Turning to 
Rynhold’s own constructive approach to the justification of religious norms, he fails to 
appreciate the role that authority might play in the justification of norms. Moreover, his 
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contextualism neglects the commitment to context-transcendent validity implied by justification 
in general and Jewish normative claims in particular. This results in the blunting of the critical 
potential implicit in its claims to justification. In an overly post-modern move Rynhold 
overdraws Jewish particularism. 
In addition to his discussion of ta’amei ha-mitzvot in the Talmud, Novak has offered a 
constructive approach to justifying the commandments in his Natural Law in Judaism.
74
 In 
contrast to Rynhold’s contextualism, he offers a modern natural law theory, which more 
adequately negotiates the tension between universalism and particularism in justifying the 
commandments. Though he is an astute reader of halakhic texts, Novak does not explicitly link 
his discussion of the justification for the commandments to an analysis of its implications for 
halakhic-legal practice. He also neglects the role that authority might play in justification. 
Further, there are elements in Novak’s account that make it susceptible to apologetics.
75
 
III. Method: History, Philosophy, and Three Senses of ‘Critical’ 
This study combines the historical approach with philosophical investigation: it examines the 
thought of twentieth-century philosophers of halakha with a view to developing a critical 
philosophy of halakha. While these examinations are motivated by and aimed at resolving 
philosophical questions concerning the justification of religious norms and authority, they are 
also meant to be contributions to the study of the thought of Leibowitz, Soloveitchik, and 
Berkovits. Insight into their thought is gained by delving into their less well-known writings and 
appreciating their philosophical influences. Contemporary philosophical literature is also 
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adduced to clarify their views  yet, their writings are not simply “raided” for a philosophical 
investigation external to their own concerns. Additionally, their writings are read with charity. 
An attempt is made to see how their views could fit together, even if they did not make all the 
connections. This does not mean that contradiction or incoherence is denied. Indeed, this study 
focuses more on the deficiencies of their views than their strengths.  
Drawing on these evaluations, the second part develops a critical philosophy of halakha 
focused on the issue of the justification of halakhic norms and authority. Its critical orientation is 
manifest on three levels, which correspond to three senses of “critical”: The first sense simply 
means evaluative. It is already evident in the first part and informs the examinations of 
Leibowitz, Soloveitchik, and Berkovits. Studies of Jewish thought often have the character of 
uncritical doxographies. This is even more the case when thinkers like Soloveitchik and 
Berkovits, who are still influential within religious communities, are the object of study. A 
critical orientation is expressed by undertaking both understanding and assessment of their 
thought, filling them out in view of their context in order to evaluate their cogency.  
The second sense of “critical” derives from the Kantian tradition. In describing the method of 
the Critique of Pure Reason, Immanuel Kant writes that it undertakes “the mere estimation of 
pure reason, of its sources and boundaries, as the propaedeutic to the system of pure reason. Such 
a thing would not be a doctrine…and its utility in regard to speculation would really only be 
negative, serving not for the amplification but only for the purification of our reason, and for 
keeping it free of errors, by which a great deal is already won.”
76
 Kant’s goal is not to make 
substantive claims about reality but to determine the constraints on human reason, which then 
does have consequences for the types of claims that can legitimately be made about reality. 
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Similarly, critical philosophy of halakha is a “method, not a system of science itself.”
77
 It neither 
attempts to justify the commandments nor halakhic-legal authority; rather, it is concerned with 
constraints on, and consequences of, their justification. Critical philosophy of halakha is thus a 
second-order form of inquiry; it ascertains what types of justifications could legitimately be 
offered for halakhic norms and authority and details the consequences of failures of justification 
for halakhic-legal practice.  
The third sense of “critical” derives from Critical Theory, which has been described as a 
“kind of reflection that is aware of its social roots as well as its practical context of 
application.”
78
 This modifier applies to critical philosophy of halakha in a two-fold manner:  
First, critical philosophy of halakha recognizes that the first-order efforts of practitioners of 
ta’amei ha-mitzvot arise out of social contexts and practical concerns. The attempt to provide 
reasons for the commandments does not derive from a timeless desire or obligation to justify 
halakhic norms. Jewish thinkers attempted to justify the commandments because of challenges to 
them from within and without the Jewish community. Further, the justifications they offered 
were influenced by both the Jewish tradition and the intellectual framework they shared with 
their interlocutors. More broadly, inspired by the work of Habermas, critical philosophy of 
halakha recognizes that justification is always an attempt by someone to justify something to 
somebody. Correspondingly, it adopts a contextualist account of justification, which consists of 
intersubjective and pragmatic features. The justification of a norm is not antecedently required 
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but only becomes necessary when it has been challenged. Justification is not a two-place relation 
between a norm and principle that justifies it; rather, it is a three-pace relation between the norm, 
its proponent, and an audience to whom it must be justified. But appreciation of the social roots 
and practical context of application of attempts to justify norms in general and halakhic norms in 
particular need neither dissolve their philosophical import nor deny rational constraints.  
Second, the social roots and practical context of application of this study itself is significant. 
Its philosophical interest in the justification of religious norms and authority stems from social 
conflicts over religious norms and authority. It aims to make progress on a means of resolving 
them. This does not entail, however, that philosophical analysis is sacrificed to instrumental 
concerns. Methodologically, this study aims to unite theory and praxis in a manner that does 
justice to both philosophical integrity and practical commitment.   
IV. Contributions: Jewish Thought, Philosophy of Religion, Practice 
A number of this study’s contributions have been signaled in the foregoing. They can be 
classified into three categories: Jewish thought in its constructive, critical, and historical modes 
(1), philosophy of religion (2), and practice (3).  
(1) The main contributions of this study are to Jewish thought through the development of a 
critical philosophy of halakha. All three senses of “critical” are significant: Jewish thought often 
restricts itself to historical understanding of earlier thinkers; this study focuses on evaluation. 
With important exceptions Jewish thought on this topic seldom engages in second-order 
reflection; this study directly engages in such analysis. Philosophy of halakha, for its part, often 
oscillates between the historical paradigm that entirely contextualizes its object and the legal 
theoretic paradigm that tends towards conservatism; this study recognizes the importance of 
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social context and practical applicability for its questions without denying their philosophical 
import or the possibility of critique.  
This study also aims to add to the scholarship on twentieth-century Jewish thought through 
its analyses of the philosophies of halakha of Soloveitchik, Leibowitz, and Berkovits. 
Soloveitchik has been the object of a number of studies; but because of his influence within the 
modern orthodox Jewish community they seldom engage in evaluation. Additionally, his thought 
has yet to be fully assessed in view of the philosophical influences on him and his posthumously 
published writings. This study rectifies both of these lacunae by drawing on these influences and 
writings to understand and evaluate his thought. Leibowitz has received attention in Israel and 
some notice in the United States. However, his ardent political views and polemical manner of 
pronouncing his religious positions have detracted from sober analysis of their philosophical 
presuppositions. This study focuses on these philosophical bases and also explores an 
underappreciated element of his thought—his forays into halakhic decision-making. Berkovits is 
mainly known in the American context as a post-holocaust thinker. Study of his halakhic thought 
has recently commenced in Israel, though these works do not engage in assessment. They also 
occasionally succumb to significant errors of interpretation. Thus, while conducted with a 
contemporary philosophical and practical aim, the examinations of these thinkers expand and 
deepen the study of twentieth-century Jewish thought, especially philosophy of halakha.  
(2) Though recently philosophy of religion has begun its own “practical turn” informed by an 
appreciation of the philosophical tradition of American Pragmatism,
79
 to a large extent the 
central issues of the field are still determined by its origin in Christian Theology and the latter’s 
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focus on individual belief.
80
 It can thus benefit from the input of perspectives from other 
traditions. This would redeem philosophy of religion’s implicit claim to study religion and not 
simply Christianity. This would also strengthen philosophy of religion’s links to other areas of 
philosophy, including moral and legal philosophy. This study contributes to both these efforts. It 
brings important issues in Jewish thought to the attention of philosophy of religion and, 
simultaneously, expands the boundaries of philosophy of religion to include moral and legal 
philosophy.  
(3) Lastly, though it cannot be assured, it is hoped that the dialogue created in this study 
between philosophical reflection and the Jewish tradition aids in the resolution of social conflicts 
over religious authority and norms. In addition to considering what types of justifications may be 
offered for different claims and the consequences of failures of justification, it aims to call 
attention to religious believers’ commitments to hold themselves accountable to their faith and to 
other individuals. In concluding, then, it suggests a possible theological interpretation of these 
commitments, which aims to integrate them.  
V. Chapter Summaries 
 In Part I the accounts of the justification of halakhic norms and authority and their relations 
to halakhic-legal practice in the thought of Leibowitz, Soloveitchik, and Berkovits are analyzed. 
Chapter One examines Leibowitz’s theocentric philosophy of halakha. Leibowitz claims that 
halakhic practice is exclusively devoted to service of God. Despite his explicit rejection of 
ta’amei ha-mitzvot, he does offer a justification for the commandments. There is only one valid 
reason for them: service of God. Further, on the basis of metaethical and axiological arguments, 
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he contends that this reason cannot be further justified; it is a value decision, and like all such 
decisions it derives from an arational act of the human will. Yet, this “decisionist” account of 
justification is inadequate as an account of normativity. Moreover, it renders Leibowitz’s theory 
of halakha inadequate. Indeed, in Leibowitz’s forays into halakhic-legal practice he struggles to 
abstain from ascribing other reasons to halakhic norms.  
Chapter Two analyzes Soloveitchik’s attempt to make philosophy of halakha the foundation 
for Jewish thought. When he addresses the project of ta’amei ha-mitzvot he privileges the 
validity of halakhic norms by using them as the basis for their own justification. But it is unclear 
how this approach could actually justify norms. An alternative justification of the 
commandments that underwrites Soloveitchik’s more apparent approach is evident when the 
philosophical influences on him and his posthumously published writings are considered. This 
account conceives of the commandments as the objectified expression of collective Jewish 
consciousness’s affective cognition of objective values. Correspondingly, by engaging in 
halakhic practice, the individual Jew disciplines her emotions to respond appropriately to reality 
and achieve value perception. This approach influences Soloveitchik’s halakhic-legal practice, 
which incorporates consideration of the values underlying halakhic norms. While the structure of 
this justificatory approach is more understandable, it rests on dubious metaphysical 
presuppositions. 
Chapter Three focuses on Berkovits’ teleological philosophy of halakha. For him the 
commandments and halakhic-legal practice are media for the transformation of the world into the 
Kingdom of God, an ideal moral state characterized by sedeq, the union of justice and equity. 
Sedeq both justifies the commandments and guides halakhic-legal practice. This direct 
connection of ta’amei ha-mitzvot and halakhic-legal practice presents a robust justification of 
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halakhic practice. But on the basis of a problematic account of normativity, Berkovits insists that 
only revelation makes sedeq or any other moral value normative. Berkovits’ theory of halakha, 
for its part, is susceptible to conflicting interpretations, each with its own difficulties. The most 
important difficulty derives from the very robustness of his justification of halakhic practice: 
norms require normative justification, but normative justification threatens to make authority 
superfluous.  
In Part II questions raised in the preceding chapters about the justification of norms and 
authority are analyzed to develop a critical philosophy of halakha. Chapter Four focuses on 
normative justification. The shared foundationalist features of the philosophies of halakha of 
Leibowitz, Soloveitchik, and Berkovits are detailed and criticized on the basis of the Pragmatic 
philosophical tradition. Then an alternative contextualist, that is, pragmatic and intersubjective, 
account of justification is offered by drawing on the thought of Habermas. This approach does 
not undertake the hopeless effort to identify a basic source of normativity. Yet, on the basis of a 
communicative conception of rationality, it articulates the rational constraints on, and practical 
consequences of, justification. This account is then applied to the justification of halakhic norms, 
and in the process it is modified to more accurately conceptualize “religious” discourse.   
Chapter Five focuses on authority. It aims to resolve the competitive relation between 
normative justification and legal authority that becomes apparent through the examination of the 
thought of Leibowitz and Berkovits. Beginning with the structure of Soloveitchik’s grounding of 
halakhic-legal authority while recognizing its limitations, it then deploys Raz’s service 
conception of authority to model halakhic-legal authority. For Raz legal authority is justified by 
showing that one is more likely to comply with one’s preexisting reasons for action by relying on 
its directives than by depending on one’s own deliberations. But once a legal authority is 
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grounded, it provides its addressees with new reasons for action. Thus, while connected to 
normative justification, the directives of a grounded authority possess uniquely legal normativity. 
Authority is thus instrumentally grounded, and it mediates between normative justification and 
legal justification. This conception of authority is then integrated into the account of justification 
developed in the previous chapter and applied to halakhic-legal authority.  
The conclusion is comprised of closing reflections, which reconnect the detailed 
philosophical work of the previous chapters with the conflicts over religious norms and authority 
in our society that gave rise to this study. While critical philosophy of halakha provides a 
framework for delineating the legitimate boundaries of Jewish religious norms, it may be 
claimed that it is foreign to the Jewish tradition. Resonances between critical philosophy of 
halakha and the broader tradition of Jewish thought and law are thus suggested through 
reflections provoked by Emmanuel Levinas’ engagements with Biblical and rabbinic texts. In 
addition to indicating connections that are actually present, this amplifies the approach’s 




‘Service of God’ as the Value of Halakha: Leibowitz’s Theocentric 
Philosophy of Halakha 
The theocentric philosophy of halakha of Yeshayahu Leibowitz
1
 seems an inauspicious place 
to start a study of the justification of halakhic norms and authority and its relation to halakhic-
legal practice. Leibowitz explicitly rejects the project of ta’amei ha-mitzvot in favor of exploring 
the “meaning of the halakha,” which he simply identifies with service of God. Moreover, he 
contrasts a true understanding of Judaism as a “demanding religion” with false “endowing 
religions.” The latter provide a service to human beings, for God fulfills a function in the 
economy of human needs. Echoing Ludwig Feuerbach,
2
 Leibowitz claims that such religions, 
like Christianity, are veiled forms of atheistic humanism; humanity is the actual object of 
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 The former, in contrast, does not benefit humans in any manner; it simply presents 
their obligations to God.
 4
 Thus, to the extent to which ta’amei ha-mitzvot provides reasons 
beyond service of God for halakhic norms, it threatens to vitiate Judaism of religious 
significance and transform it into a form of anthropolatry. In terms of theory of halakha, 
Leibowitz was neither recognized by others nor identified himself as a halakhic-legal authority. 
In fact, when discussing halakhic issues, he often stresses that he lacks the authority to deliver 
rulings.
5
 Thus, investigating his theory of halakha does not seem promising either.  
However, such appearances are deceiving. While Leibowitz rejects traditional approaches to 
ta'amei ha-mitzvot, he does assign a reason to halakhic norms: service of God. His denunciation 
of providing reasons for the commandments and focus on the meaning of the halakha are 
attempts to distinguish his approach from those that he finds problematic; it does not announce 
an absolute difference in project. Indeed, far from rejecting justifications for the commandments, 
Leibowitz offers two such justifications with varying strengths based on specific metaethical and 
axiological premises. According to the first, commitment to service of God through obedience to 
halakhic norms cannot be further justified because it is a value decision. However, as such, it is 
on all fours with commitment to any other axiological orientation and its entailed norms, which 
can only be grounded in an individual’s arational decision. Halakhic norms are thus at least as 
justified as any other norms. According to the second, service of God is the only true value 
because only it can be willed in the radical freedom required of authentic value decisions. 
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Compliance with halakhic norms is thus more justified than any other practical decision. Yet, 
Leibowitz’s underlying metaethical and axiological positions require scrutiny.  
Moreover, despite not being a halakhic-legal authority, Leibowitz does present a theory of 
halakha, including a general description of the halakhic-legal system, an account of halakhic-
legal authority, and criteria of halakhic-legal validity. He even occasionally offers opinions on 
halakhic-legal questions. Moreover, he attempts to create a direct link between his account of 
ta’amei ha-mitzvot and theory of halakha by identifying the criterion of halakhic-legal validity 
with service of God. However, when service of God is understood in the manner Leibowitz 
requires of it, it cannot serve as a criterion of halakhic-legal validity. It is also not descriptively 
adequate of halakhic-legal practice, and even Leibowitz is unable to sustain it in his halakhic-
legal efforts.  
Leibowitz’s philosophy of halakha thus actually presents an ideal starting point for this study, 
as questions raised by his thought elicit reflection on central issues regarding the justification of 
norms and authority and the relation between it and legal practice. In the following, his 
philosophy of halakha is examined and assessed from three perspectives: First, its basic 
methodology is investigated. An attempt is made to determine the argumentative status that he 
attributes to his reflections on the “meaning of halakha.” This examination is crucial because it 
directly relates to his views on the type of justification that should be offered for the 
commandments. However, it is inconclusive and concerns about methodological consistency 
pervade the analysis of his thought. In the course of this initial discussion, his position on the 
meaning of the halakha is also briefly introduced  I . Leibowitz’s characterization and rejection 
of the traditional project of ta’amei ha-mitzvot is then explored against the background of his 
metaethics and axiology. His account of the meaning of halakha is thoroughly described, and it is 
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argued that it is amounts to a justification of halakhic norms. Some of the difficulties of his 
underlying philosophical positions are then discussed (II). Next, Leibowitz’s theory of halakha is 
examined, and it is argued that he presents a positivist conception of halakhic-legal practice, in 
which service of God functions as the criterion of halakhic-legal validity. However, it is 
contended that this theory of halakha is not sustainable, and its failure raises broader questions 
about the relation between normative justification and legal authority (III).  
I. Methodology of Philosophy of Halakha: Objective or Interpretive? 
Both this section and the next consist of a discussion of the essay “Practical Commandments 
 The Meaning of  alakha ,”
6
 which presents the best summary and introduction to Leibowitz’s 
thought since he never composed a systematic work, contenting himself with collections of 
essays. Other essays are also drawn upon to clarify and assess his claims. The first task is to 
examine his method of philosophy of halakha to ascertain the argumentative status that he claims 
for his views. However, this task is hampered by his inconsistency on this issue.  
Leibowitz initiates his discussion of halakha in “Practical Commandments” by describing his 
approach and defending his focus on Jewish law. At the outset, he makes two important 
methodological points: he will deal exclusively with the meaning of the halakha (A) and the 
halakha is the only uniquely identifying and individuating feature of Judaism (B).  
A. Philosophy of Halakha and Meaning 
Leibowitz writes that in his investigation of the practical commandments his focus will be on 
meaning as opposed to other approaches to them: 
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This essay deals with the practical commandments as an element of the living religious 
existence, that is, not as a historical or theological issue. It will not deal with the philosophy 
of the reasons of the commandments [ta’amei ha-mitzvot], rather with the meaning of the 
practical commandments for Jewish religiosity, which we are living and are capable of living 
here and now…. This essay deals not with the content of the halakha—which is the 
consolidated form of the practical commandments—rather with its meaning for the religion 




Leibowitz distinguishes his method of investigation from other sorts of inquiry. He is not 
concerned with history, theology, or ta’amei ha-mitzvot.  is concern for “the meaning of the 
practical commandments for Jewish religiosity, which we are living and capable of living here 
and now” and their “meaning…for the religious person” seems to indicate that his goal is 
interpretive; he reflects on the significance of halakha within Jewish religious life. Yet, he also 
speaks of “the meaning of the practical commandments for the religion,” which implies that the 
practices have an objective meaning that he will identify. This lack of clarity, between offering 
an interpretation of the meaning of the commandments and identifying the meaning of the 
commandments, evidences a basic inconsistency in Leibowitz’s thought: The latter claim asserts 
a type of objectivity for his view, while the former does not.  
B. Halakha and Judaism 
Leibowitz’s lack of clarity about the status of his claims becomes striking later in the essay. 
In substantiating his decision to focus on halakha, he makes a very strong claim: Judaism is 
identical with the halakha. He offers two arguments to support this statement: The first is 
presented as empirical (1), while the second is overtly philosophical (2).  
    Leibowitz’s empirical claim is that halakha is the only uniquely identifying and 
individuating feature of Judaism. He writes, 
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We define Judaism as an institutional religion—not only in the sense that it possess 
institutions, for institutions exist in all religions, rather in the sense that these institutions—
the practical commandments—they themselves for Judaism are the religion itself, and 
[Judaism] does not exist at all outside of these institutions…. We will deal with the place and 
meaning of the practical commandments in Jewish religious existence using a line [of 
argumentation] that leads from the simpler to the more difficult. As the most simple starting 
point, we will use an empirically-historically confirmed fact, which does not depend on any 
ideology, any faith, or any prior belief about the essence of Judaism: the fact that Judaism as 
a specific historical phenomenon and a subject of identity and three thousand year continuity 
is embodied in only one thing—the practical commandments, which are joined in a 
systematic structure in the form of the halakha; and only this is the objective historical-
empirical individualization of Judaism, without any subjective evaluation of this fact. 
Judaism was never defined as one unit, separated from other units, and that maintains its 




This argument is directed against the claim that Judaism is defined by the acceptance of certain 
doctrines. Leibowitz counters this assertion by contending that, in fact, throughout Jewish history 
there has been nothing upon which there has been less agreement than the principles of faith.  
Elsewhere, he extends the argument and claims that halakha is also the only way of uniquely 
identifying and individuating the Jewish people, who share no common race, territory, or 
language.
9
 As is evident, Leibowitz strongly insists on the objectivity of this judgment. Yet, this 
insistence is hard to reconcile with statements in other texts, such as his Discourses on Science 
and Values (DSV) where he claims that all areas of inquiry besides for logic, mathematics, and 
the natural sciences lack objectivity. In fact, following Karl Popper, he denies the human 
sciences, including history, objectivity.
10
 
    Leibowitz’s second and philosophical argument for the identity of Judaism with the 
halakha consists in the denial of the possibility of separating the meaning of a practice from the 
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practice itself. This argument is directed against the position that recognizes the centrality of 
halakha for Judaism but insists that halakhic practices refer, whether instrumentally or 
symbolically, to further purposes or values, which are truly essential to Judaism. He denies this 
separation: The practice and the meaning of the practice are inherently connected. He writes, 
There is a very widespread conception due to shallow rationalism that there is a distinction in 
religion between the content and the husk: between the eternal intellectual content that 
constitutes absolute value and the different external forms in which it is embodied, which are 
subject to change, and should be changed in agreement with the periods, conditions, and 
occurrences. This distinction has nothing upon which to rely: there is nothing in the content 
except what is manifested in the form. The essence of a specific content is expressed in that it 
wraps itself specifically in a particular form, while if it had a different wrapping it would not 
be the same content…. [T]he faith values of Judaism, or the faith content of it—the stance of 
man before God—are not expressed except in a specific form: in the framework of halakha. 
A person who thinks that it is possible to uphold the content and to change the halakha in 
agreement with the needs of man—his material, spiritual, or vital needs—is nothing but 
mistaken. The essence of the faith content is that it cannot be expressed in anything but the 




Leibowitz makes a general claim about the relation between content and form: they are 
inseparable. To change the form is to change the content. Indeed, another example he mentions is 
the relation between Shakespeare’s use of the form of the sonnet and the eros that he expresses. 
Correspondingly, halakha does not refer to some values or purposes outside of itself; its 
meaning—the human’s stance before God—can only be expressed in the halakha. Thus, since 
halakha and its meaning are codetermining, there is no other candidate for the essence of 
Judaism. The essence of Judaism is the halakha and its meaning: the human’s stance before God.  
In the course of arguing for the identity of Judaism with halakha, then, Leibowitz advances a 
further claim about its meaning. Just as halakha is the uniquely identifying and individuating 
feature of Judaism, the human’s stance before God is the specific meaning that the halakha 
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expresses. Thus, to the extent to which the former claim is meant to be objective, so too is the 
latter. Yet, he gives the opposite impression when discussing the very same point, writing, 
There have been disputes between researchers of religions and cultures over the issue of the 
relation between myth and ritual in primitive religions. In the time of the reign of rationalism 
in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, it was an axiom that primitive peoples created 
ritual from out of their worldview and sense of the world that was embodied in myth so as to 
make tangible their intellectual contents. In our time, there are partisans for the idea that is 
opposed to this who view ritual as the first manifestation and the myth as an attempt to 
interpret the ritual and to extract from it understanding and meaning…. Also in Judaism, in 
which the religious faith and action are attached to one another, one can ask: Are the 
practical commandments a superstructure that is erected on the bases of “religious values,” 
which are intellectual and emotional contents; or perhaps the vital and spiritual world of the 
religion of Israel is itself the superstructure raised on the basis of the religious action? The 
answer to this question is not dogmatic or normative, rather empirical: the values of the faith, 
the categories of cognition and feeling of the religion are, in the world of Judaism, 




Leibowitz claims that it is religious practice that is prior to doctrine or values and that the latter is 
merely an interpretation of the former, at least in Judaism. This point, while similar to the earlier 
one in rejecting the rationalist assumption that practices are subordinate to doctrines or values, 
differs from it because it significantly loosens the relation between practice and meaning. While 
the former view insists on the unique relation between the content and form, such that if the form 
is objective then so too is the content, here Leibowitz claims that the content is an interpretation 
of the form. This allows for the possibility that the content may shift and change over time. And, 
indeed, Leibowitz details various interpretations of halakha to show that Judaism cannot be 
defined by ideas but only by the halakha itself. While this may further support his contention that 
the halakha is the only uniquely identifying and individuating feature of Judaism, it undermines 
the status of his claim about the meaning of halakha. If it is halakhic practice that is essential to 
Judaism and everything else is interpretation, then his own claim that the meaning of halakha is 
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the human’s stance before God is not objective either. It is not the meaning of halakha but just 
another interpretation.   
In sum, Leibowitz’s methodological remarks in his programmatic essay are ambiguous about 
the status he claims for his reflections on halakha. It is uncertain whether the argument that 
halakha is the uniquely identifying and individuating feature of Judaism is meant as an objective 
empirical claim or whether it is an interpretive move within a discourse constituted by the 
religious life of halakhic Judaism. Taking it in the former sense makes it difficult to reconcile 
with his theoretical remarks on the objectivity of the human sciences. In contrast, taking it in the 
latter sense requires ignoring his insistence on the claim’s objectivity and, moreover, negates the 
claim’s persuasiveness for anyone not already committed to a “living religious existence” within 
halakha. Additionally, it is not apparent whether he claims to have identified the objective 
meaning of halakha or whether he is simply offering another interpretation of it. Much hinges on 
this distinction, for he uses this account of the meaning of the halakha to support his rejection of 
most attempts at ta’amei ha-mitzvot, his own justification of halakhic norms, and as a criterion of 
halakhic-legal validity in his theory of halakha. However, as is shown, methodological 
inconsistency plagues Leibowitz’s philosophy of halakha, rendering the status of his justification 
of the commandments and theory of halakha unclear.  
II. Service of God and the Justification of Halakhic Norms 
Regardless of whether it is understood in an objective or interpretive sense, the meaning of 
halakha is the central component of Leibowitz’s philosophy of halakha.  e claims to focus on 
the meaning of the halakha instead of ta’amei ha-mitzvot. Thus, his account of the meaning of 
halakha must be clarified in the context of his metaethical and axiological premises to understand 
his account of the justification of halakhic norms. However, when this is done it becomes 
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apparent that Leibowitz only rejects a particular kind of justification for the commandments and 
offers his own in its place  A .  owever, it is further claimed that concerns about Leibowitz’s 
methodological consistency resurface, issuing in three different interpretations of his justification 
of halakhic norms (B). Lastly, in addition to his methodological inconsistency, it is argued that 
his justification of halakhic norms suffers from number of difficulties, which stem from his 
metaethical and axiological premises (C).  
A. Metaethics and Judaism 
Metaethics is generally understood to comprise “attempts to understand the metaphysical, 
epistemological, semantic, and psychological presuppositions and commitments of moral 
thought, talk, and practice.”
13
 In this context, however, it is useful to expand its domain to 
include all practically normative “thought, talk, and practices.” This allows one to entertain the 
possibility of a position like that of Leibowitz, which does not identify what one ought to do with 
what is moral. By axiology the more specific metaethical issue of the metaphysical, 
epistemological, and psychological status of values is meant. In this section Leibowitz’s general 
metaethics and axiology are reviewed (1), before their application to halakha and Judaism is 
detailed (2). The consequences of his metaethical and axiological positions for the justification of 
halakhic norms is then assessed (3).  
1. Metaethics and Axiology 
Leibowitz’s metaethical position is first described in connection with his reflections on 
meaning, values, and the contrast between evaluative judgments and factual conclusions (a). It is 
then explicated by a comparison of his view of practical reason with that of Kant (b). 
                                                 
13




a. Meaning, Value, and Decision 
As has been shown, Leibowitz conceives of the relation between halakhic practice and its 
meaning in two ways, as both objective and interpretive. But he also uses the term “meaning” 
(mashmaut) in another sense that is closely connected with the notion of value. The central 
textual site for his discussion of this sense of meaning is DSV, in which he presents his 
metaethics and axiology. In the introduction to that work, his general conclusion is anticipated: 
There is no relation of relevance or interdependence between scientific cognition and 
axiological decision, and there is no contact or confrontation between them. Scientific 
cognition is not based on values, and the world of values is autonomous, it is not influenced 
by or in need of science, and it too does not contributed to scientific cognition and does not 
direct it. Hence, the intention of man—which is embodied in his actions—does not derive 




As an epigraph to the lectures, Leibowitz places, among others, a quote from Ludwig 
Wittgenstein that he takes to encapsulate his central contention: 
The sense
15
 of the world must lie outside the world. In the world everything is as it is and 
happens as it does happen. In it there is no value—and if there were, it would be of no value. 
If there is a value which is of value, it must lie outside all happenings and being-so….  It 




Setting aside whether this is an accurate interpretation of Wittgenstein,
17
 Leibowitz uses this 
quote to emphasize two points: the connection of sense, or meaning, with values (i), and the 
sharp separation of facts from value, and consequently of ascertaining facts, or scientific 
cognition, from evaluative judgments, or value decisions (ii). 
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(i) Leibowitz connects meaning, values, and purposes, writing that “even without 
philosophical study it is understandable that the concept of an end is connected to the concept of 
value, which is the meaning that we relate to things.”
18
 More specifically, he means ultimate 
ends and intrinsic values, which he contrasts with instrumental ends and values. Indeed, he 
writes, “one should distinguish between two possibilities—that an individual does something 
because he sees that thing as the good, or that he does it because he sees it as good for the 
attainment of something else.”
19
 He casts this distinction in the language of the halakha by 
identifying it with the contrast between “for its own sake” and ‘not for its own sake” and 
describes it as “the important dual in the world of values.”
20
  
Leibowitz also contrasts values with needs, which he describes in two different ways: needs 
given certain ends and “objective” needs. In reference to the first sense, he writes,  
It is possible to say ‘man needs to eat.’ Seemingly, we establish through this statement a fact 
grounded in natural existence; man is a creature whose biological properties necessitate him 
to eat. Despite that, even here the great distinction between the concept ‘need’ in this 
instance and the concept [in other contexts] is recognizable. For we know… there are 
circumstances in which men have sat hunger strikes until their death, thus, we must delimit 
somewhat the sentence…and express it such: ‘man, to the extent to which he wants to live, 
needs to eat.’ But it is possible that the man does not want to live, he prefers death, in which 




Given a particular end, certain actions can be described as needs because they are necessary for 
the attainment of that end. The needs can thus be described as instrumental values, while the end 
can be considered an intrinsic value. Turning to the other sense of needs, Leibowitz contrasts 
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“objective” needs and values in two conflicting ways: as itself an objective distinction and as a 
phenomenological distinction. Both of these contrasts are apparent in this passage: 
Values, not only are they things for which man has no need in the objective sense, rather they 
are things for which man is ready to pay a price. And this is what differentiates between 
values and everything else, for which man is ready to pay a price…only if that…thing 
satisfies something for him. And here, man is ready to pay a price for something for which he 




Sometimes he implies, as indicated by his mention of “objective” needs, that there are certain 
natural needs that human beings possess that they are forced to pursue. However, as indicated by 
his comments about hunger strikes, these ‘objective needs’ are only objective given the value of 
one’s life and the goal of preserving it. A better distinction between needs and values is 
expressed when he writes, “values, as opposed to the satisfaction of needs, are measured in what 
man is ready to give up for them and not by what they give to man.”
23
 Whatever an individual 
sees as demanding from her the renunciation of something else is for her a value. On this 
interpretation, the boundary between values and needs can shift for a particular individual.
24
 
More properly however, for Leibowitz that for the sake of which an individual is willing to 
sacrifice all else is for her a value, because true values demand the sacrifice of all other goods 
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without offering anything in return. Indeed, Leibowitz is what can be termed a psychological 
axiological monist: individuals can only have one true value at any given time. 
(ii) Leibowitz also contrasts value decisions with rational conclusions about facts. 
Throughout DSV, he marshals a number of arguments to establish the fact/value distinction. 
These arguments clarify his metaethical commitments and conception of rationality. 
Leibowitz identifies the adoption of values with the positing of ends. Using this terminology, 
he offers an argument similar to G. E. Moore’s “Open Question Argument” but leading to a 
significantly different conclusion. He writes, 
Every goal or end that is asserted as a conclusion necessitated by rational deliberations 
derived from the stock of knowledge immediately provokes the question: and what is the 
goal of the goal or the end of the end?—And this—ad infinitum—unless we stop at a point, a 




While Moore argues that any definition offered for the good that identifies it with a natural 
property is always open to the question of “whether it itself is good?,”
26
 Leibowitz argues that 
any end or goal that is asserted as supported by reason is always open to the question of “yes, but 
what is the goal or end of that?”. And whereas Moore offers his argument in support of the 
position that the good is a non-natural property that can be rationally intuited, Leibowitz holds 
that this shows that ends, goals, or values cannot be rationally anchored at all. They are the result 
of arational decisions. In response to the request to justify such a decision an individual can only 
remark that “this is his axiological decision.”
27
 Leibowitz thus articulates a non-cognitive 
approach to evaluative judgments.  
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In assessing the influence and cogency of Moore’s argument Darwall, Gibbard, and Railton 
argue that a move like that of Leibowitz from the “Open Question Argument” to non-cognitivism 
was a historically characteristic and philosophical understandable response. The strength of 
Moore’s argument comes from the assumption that attributions of “goodness” are linked to the 
guidance of action, or reasons/motivates internalism, and the demonstration that a “logical or 
conceptual” link is missing between the attribution of good to any state of affairs and the 
motivation to action.
28
 But once Moore’s solution of identifying the good with a non-natural, 
rationally intuitable property is questioned due to the range of disagreement in ethics or the 




The link between Leibowitz’s internalism and his non-cognitivism is made explicit in another 
argument. At the outset of DSV, he asks us to consider a group of people sitting in a room who 
have just been informed that the ceiling is about to collapse. He argues that this knowledge does 
not necessitate that they flee the room. It is quite possible that some of the individuals decide to 
leave while others stay, despite acknowledging the same facts. Only the desire to live, which is 
the acceptance of the value of her life by an individual, will cause anyone to flee the room.
30
 A 
similar point is expressed by Wittgenstein in his early “Lecture on Ethics,” where he writes, 
“The absolute good, if it is a describable state of affairs, would be one which everybody, 
independent of his tastes and inclinations, would necessarily bring about or feel guilty for not 
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bringing about. And I want to say that such a state of affairs is a chimera.”
31
 Both Leibowitz and 
Wittgenstein are committed to a form of judgment reasons/motives internalism, according to 
which the judgment that one has reason to perform an action issues in the motivation to do it.
32
 
The problem with descriptive or factual claims is that they do not have the required action-
guidingness for value decisions; they cannot, by themselves, provide reasons for action.
33
 
Leibowitz concludes that judgments about value must not be cognitive at all but completely 
conative and thus arational. 
 Lastly, Leibowitz supports the fact/value distinction by appealing to the objectivity of 
conclusions about facts in science in contrast to the subjectivity of judgments about values. This 
comparison clarifies his approach to rationality. His description of science is scattered 
throughout his writings. He portrays modern science as prescinding from metaphysical claims 
and restricting itself to the establishment of functional relations between phenomena. It attempts 
to see how far inquiry can proceed based only on the notion of efficient causality,
34
 bracketing 
the Aristotelian notion of the final end.
35
 This is because the final end is merely “the relation of 
our consciousness to the given matter,” or the meaning of facts for us. In contrast, science only 
provides ‘information.’
36
 Further, it suffices with only an instrumental conception of truth;
37
 the 
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laws of nature are “generalizations and principles according to which we succeed, in our dealing 
with nature and portions of nature, to make conclusions and achieve successes. The meaning of 
the laws of nature is applied, and their truth is in their effectiveness.”
38
 
Leibowitz discusses the objectivity of scientific cognition in two different ways that are not 
distinguished: as resulting from a type of psychological coercion and as merely describing the 
fact that a consensus has been achieved in a certain area of inquiry. In terms of the former, he 
writes, “scientific cognition…forces itself from a psychological perspective on anyone that 
understands it.”
39
 Yet, he also writes, “the concept of objectivity does not correspond to the 
concept of the truth. Objectivity is expressed in that on the basis of shared knowledge every 
person comes to the same conclusions; though it is possible for the knowledge [sic] to be 
mistaken.”
40
 There may be a connection between the first and second positions: If in a certain 
domain of inquiry conclusions are forced on the researchers, then ipso facto there would be 
consensus among them. But there need not be this connection as Richard Rorty has shown.
41
  
Leibowitz contrasts the subjectivity of evaluative judgments with the objectivity of scientific 
conclusions in both these ways. On the one hand, he simply notes the recalcitrance of axiological 
disagreement; the inability to come to a consensus over values as compared to the more uniform 
nature of scientific investigations.
42
 On the other hand, he writes,  
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One of the greats of our time,  eidegger says “die Wissenschaft nicht denkt”  science does 
not think), for scientific thought is forced on man. Philosophy thinks; science does not think, 
but merely operates its method. The thought of scientific man is acted upon; the method and 
the facts force upon him certain cognitions and conclusions. In this the world of science is 
distinguished from the world of values and from all fields of thought that man establishes and 
in which he thinks, that is to say, that in them he acts, and is not acted upon…. Science does 




The objectivity of science and the subjectivity of values are connected to the passivity of the 
inquirer in the former and the activity of the agent in latter. The activity of evaluative judgments 
is described in two ways: it results in human action and the decision itself is a form of human 
activity. Leibowitz moves from the first point to the second: 
Values have a motivational meaning: values are not a certain understanding of reality, but a 
certain motivation regarding reality…. [V]alues are among the things that have no basis in 
reality. If something is based in reality, then it has the force of coercion, and there is no 





Science is objective while value decisions are subjective because the same conclusions are 
forced on all inquirers but human beings are free to choose their own values. The fact/value 
distinction is thus grounded in the coercion of facts and the freedom of values.  
b. Leibowitz contra Kant: Freedom, Reason, and the Will 
Indeed, freedom is central to Leibowitz’s philosophical anthropology and axiology. 
According to him “only the autonomous creature is worthy of the name man.”
45
 Further, 
decisions are of axiological significance if, and only if, they are made freely. This is because he 
holds that only decisions that are freely made are attributable to an individual. In Faith of 
Maimonides (FM), he writes, 
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All of man’s actions…are not worthy of being counted as his own deeds unless they originate 
from him alone, as distinct from any sentiment or behavior which comes about on account of 




This is not a novel idea; indeed, the connections among axiological significance, autonomy, and 
attributability are central to Kantian ethics. In fact, one way to understand Leibowitz’s 







 have noted the similarities between 
the thought of Kant and Leibowitz. Leibowitz like Kant accepts the disjunction between ‘is’ and 
‘ought’, which has been discussed under the heading of the fact/value distinction. Leibowitz’s 
psychological axiological monism corresponds to the moral rigorism which is attributed to Kant. 
Additionally, like Kant, he identifies the intention with which an action is done as the site for the 
action’s evaluation. Correspondingly, he articulates a deontological practical philosophy and 
draws the distinction between acting out of duty and merely conforming to duty.   
What is often missed in these comparisons is that though Leibowitz does accept certain 
elements of Kant’s practical philosophy, his basic move is the translation of them up a register 
from morality to metaethics.
50
 This results in a conversion of Kant’s moral “monotheism” to 
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axiological “polytheism.” The major step in executing it is a rejection of Kant’s conception of 
reason, and more specifically, practical reason, which has implications for Leibowitz’s 
conception of human freedom. Kant viewed reason in both its theoretical and practical 
employments as manifestations of human spontaneity and autonomy, that is, freedom.
51
 Indeed, 
he writes, “The power to judge autonomously—that is, freely (according to principles of thought 
in general)—is called reason.”
52
 But Leibowitz views reason as coercive and external to the 
individual and, instead, identifies the individual with the will.
53
 Thus, while for Kant autonomy 
is identical with rationality, for Leibowitz freedom must be arational.
54
 A practical judgment 
must be based on an arational decision in order for it to be attributable to the individual and of 
axiological significance. Indeed, he rejects rationalistic approaches to morality, like that of Kant, 
as attempts to evade human responsibility.
55
  
However, once practical reason is dismissed and freedom is reconceived as arational 
decision, there are no longer any connections among rationality, freedom, and morality. Every 
evaluative judgment is just as arational as any other and can be as autonomous or as 
heteronomous as any other. Thus, while Kant holds that “it is impossible to think of anything at 
all in the world, or indeed even beyond it, that could be considered good without limitation 
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except a good will,”
56
 which he then identifies with the morally good will, Leibowitz is an 
ontological axiological pluralist. Morality is just one value among many. Human beings are 
confronted with a plurality of values, to each of which they can freely commit themselves. 
Leibowitz therefore presents a relativistic axiology.  
It is at the axiological level that Leibowitz retains other Kantian ideas such as rigorism and a 
focus on intention. Since he believes that individuals can only have one absolute value, they 
must be consistent. There can be no competing values existing in tension with one another in an 
individual’s life. Further, he takes Kant’s focus on the intention with which an action is 
performed as the site of moral evaluation and translates it into the site of axiological evaluation: 
Ethics is not a program of specific behavior. Any action, in itself, is indifferent from the 
perspective of morality. In two cases a rifle is loaded, cocked, and the safety catch is off, and 
someone is in the sight and I pull the trigger, and the result is one of two occurrences—it is 
possible that in one case it will be said: this is base murder, and in a different case it will be 
said: this is an act of valor and self-sacrifice of a soldier who protects his homeland. Thus, it 
is not the action that is judged here but the intention of the action. Moral judgment relates to 
the intention of the actor. Morality is not a doctrine of proper behaviors but a doctrine of the 
pure intention of man. Intention is not a guarantor for the ‘good’ action: man is liable to err; 
the result of a ‘good intention’ can possibly be very bad. But the moral judgment does not 
relate to the result of the action, but the intention.  owever, regarding the question, ‘what is 
the pure intention and what the ‘good’ is’ there is a difference of opinion.
 57 
 
For Leibowitz the question of the “good” includes different moral theories as well as non-moral 
values. The intention with which an action is done determines the value that it instantiates and 
according to which it is judged. He thus articulates a form of agent-centered deontological 
axiology, which recognizes the distinction between acting from commitment to a value and 
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merely acting in accordance with it.
58
 In fact, this is made clear when he contrasts the axiological 
significance of the very same act done with a religious intention or a moral intention.
59
  
In addition to the connection between autonomy and the human will, Leibowitz holds that the 
different value orientations cannot be rationally adjudicated because they are incommensurable. 
After describing how the question of the color of an object can be translated into a quantitative 
question about the wavelength of light, he invokes an example that recurs throughout his works: 
In the midst of World War II Eleanor Roosevelt said in one of her speeches that this war is a 
holy war, for it is conducted for the sake of the highest human interests and values, and we 
are allowed to enlist men and send them to kill and be killed for the sake of the highest 
human interest, which is to secure the existence of a world in which a glass of milk will be 
ensured every day for every child, without regard for race, nationality, or religion; in contrast 
to the dark forces that intend to turn the world into oppressors and the oppressed, exploiters 
and the exploited. On the same day, or one of the days preceding or following it, General 
Tojo…spoke from the other end of the Pacific Ocean.  e too established that this war was a 
holy war, conducted for holy values, and thus it is permissible to enlist men and send them 
into war for the highest value, which is—to die for the sake of the Emperor and for the sake 
of honor. And now what shall we do in order to decide between Mrs. Roosevelt  and General 
Tojo by means of the scientific method?...  From the scientific perspective one cannot make 
any contribution regarding value problems, and needless to say regarding the problem of 
morality. What Tojo said was as moral no less than that which Eleanor Roosevelt said; in any 
event, I see no objective criterion to decide between the moral levels of the two. I can say, I 
want this, and that I do not want. The fact that I want this or that I do not want that is not an 





Leibowitz describes both Roosevelt and Tojo as making “moral” claims  however, it is clear that 
he means value claims: axiology. While Leibowitz does not believe that the obligation to act 
morally can be rationally grounded, he does identify a definite content to morality, which closely 
tracks that of Kantian morality. Indeed, paralleling the second formulation of the categorical 
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imperative  “So act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any 
other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means.” ,
61
 for him morality involves 
embracing humanity as the ultimate value.
62
 Thus his argument is that, as opposed to science 
where arguments can be decided by reducing data to a common quantitative unit, any attempt to 
reduce values to a common denominator begs the question about what is of ultimate value.
63
  
2. The Value of Religion, Judaism, and Halakha 
In the example of Roosevelt and Tojo two value orientations are presented, which Leibowitz 
describes elsewhere as the values of morality and fascism or ethnocentrism.
64
 While he makes no 
effort to present an exhaustive account of values, these two orientations are frequently joined by 
a third—religion. Religion, according to him, does not offer information about the world but is 
concerned with the meaning of the world and thus the value orientation that an individual takes 
towards it: “Behold the essence of the concept of religion – even if we abstract from it the 
concept of the Torah—includes within it the concepts of motive, end, and orientation.”
65
   
Leibowitz is not consistent in distinguishing the value of religion and that of Judaism. Often 
he describes the religious value as that of the human’s stance before God, or the recognition of 
God, and Judaism’s further specification of this stance as that of service of God.
66
 At other times, 
however, he identifies the value of Judaism with the true religious value and then characterizes 
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other religions, in particular Christianity, as anthropocentric and veiled forms of humanistic 
atheism.
67
 Again, such inconsistency renders it difficult to establish his methodological 
approach—does he see himself as first abstractly defining religion in general and then specifying 
Judaism or, alternatively, as explicating Jewish practice? Still, it is necessary to examine his 
view on the value of Judaism and its relation to his metaethical and axiological views to 
comprehend his justification of halakhic norms.  
Leibowitz views Judaism as a value orientation.  e writes, “the root and constitutive 
principle, of both the religious feeling and religious consciousness, is not attached to any 
knowledge that is capable or incapable of being derived from faith, but from the essence of faith 
as a demand presented to man—to serve God.”
68
 Indeed, he explicitly sets this view in the 
context of his metaethics and axiology:  
The religious stance is the decision of man to serve God in the fulfillment of the Torah and 
the commandments, because he sees this as the end of man. This is the axiological 
decision—and like axiological decisions it is not forced on man by the power of existence. 
The facts are the same in relation to all men, despite this, one decides to accept upon himself 
the yoke of the kingdom of heaven and the yoke of the Torah and commandments, while this 
one claims ‘I know not God,’ while a third ‘knows his master and intends to rebel against 
him.’ And this is the case for all axiological decisions…. Axiological decisions do not derive 
from objective facts, and therefore they are not capable of being justified…. On the basis of 
objective facts it is only possible to justify choices in the matter of appropriate means to 
achieve an end upon which one has already decided, but it is not possible to give a 




An individual must choose through a free decision to serve God as an end in and of itself for her 
choice to be attributable to her and possess axiological significance. The obligation to serve God 
cannot be derived from facts, or else it is would be forced on the individual and be of no 
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axiological significance, nor can it be justified in relation to any other end, or else it is not of 
intrinsic value. In sum, Leibowitz writes, “the root of religious faith is nothing but the decision 
that faithful man makes and the choice he takes: his obligating himself to the service of God.”
70
 
Moreover, Leibowitz claims that service of God is uniquely expressed in halakhic practice. 
In “Practical Commandments,” he writes, “what distinguishes Judaism as the religion of the 
commandment is not the fact that it has ab initio commandments of certain content, rather the 
very fact that it recognizes a structure of commandment, while the particular commandments can 
be established after the fact. Not just that Judaism has a structure of commandment; Judaism is 
manifested in its structure of commandments.”
71
 This point is emphasized when Judaism is 
compared to other religions: 
We distinguish between two types of religiosity: religion at whose base are values and beliefs 
from which actions are obliged, and religion at whose base are practical commandments 
upon whose existence are based also values and contents of consciousness. ‘A religion of 
values and beliefs’ is an endowing religion—it is an instrumental medium for man to satisfy 
spiritual needs and to relieve his vital expressions; its end is man, and God offers his service 
to man in it; one who accepts upon himself this religion is a redeemed man. ‘A religion of 
commandments’ is a demanding religion—it places upon man obligations and tasks and 
makes him an object of service for the realization of an end that is not embodied in man; the 
satisfaction that it gives is nothing but the satisfaction that man has from doing his duty; one 
who accepts upon himself this religion is the man who serves his God [with] service for its 
own sake, for  e is worthy to be served…. Therefore, what is the content and what is the 
meaning of the performance of the commandments?—the effort man makes to attain the 
religious goal. The practical commandments as a form of life, as an established and 
permanent form of human existence, prevents the conversion of religion to a means to attain 
an end: for most of these commandments there is no sense [ta’am] if they are not conceived 
as an expression of service of God…. Man will not accept upon himself this form of life 




                                                 
70
 Leibowitz, DSV, 75. 
71
 Leibowitz, JPS, 13–14. 
72
 Ibid., 22–24.  
71 
 
The meaning of the commandments is the religious value—service of God. Thus, in some sense, 
the meaning of the commandments is the commandments themselves. They do not serve as a 
means for some other goal but themselves instantiate the value of service of God. Indeed, unless 
they are understood from this perspective, most of them lack any purpose whatsoever. 
A crucial implication of Leibowitz’s deontological axiology, combined with his 
identification of the value of halakha with service of God, is that having the intention to serve 
God is a necessary condition for a halakhic act to have religious significance. He writes, 
“religious meaning is the intention to serve God, and this sentence is a tautology.”
73
 This 
agreement between Kant and Leibowitz about the locus for the evaluation of action is best 
manifested when the latter rejects any connection between religion and morality, something upon 
which the former insists. Leibowitz writes, 
Religion and morality cannot be reconciled with one another—for everything depends on the 
intention: man’s decision is religious, if his intention in this decision is for the sake of 
heaven; it is moral, if his intention is for the sake of man. It is necessary that one of these two 
intentions will be displaced by the other; in this sense only an atheist is capable of being a 
‘moral’ man, while he who accepts upon himself the yoke of heaven recognizes the 




If a halakhic act is performed because one thinks that it is the morally right action and not simply 
because it is service of God, then it is devoid of religious significance. In this case, one merely 
conforms to the halakha; one does not comply with its demands. True, Leibowitz, like Kant, 
recognizes that there is some value in merely conforming to the law; in performing the 
commandments “not for their own sake.” Still, actions of this sort possess only pedagogical 
significance; they are allowed with the hope that one will come to perform the commandments 
                                                 
73
 Leibowitz, FHV, 153. Also, see Ibid. 138.  
74
 Leibowitz, JPS, 294. 
72 
 
“for their own sake.”
75
 Leibowitz’s psychological axiological monism is also evident here. An 
individual can only have one highest value: God or humanity; if it is God, he must serve him and 
not humanity; if it is humanity, he must serve it and reject God.  
3. Service of God as the Reason for the Commandments 
Leibowitz’s metaethics, axiology, and conception of Judaism provide the background for 
understanding his rejection of traditional approaches to ta’amei ha-mitzvot (a) and proposal of 
his own account of the reason for the commandments (b).  
a. The Problem with Ta’amei ha-Mitzvot  
In characterizing and rejecting what he takes to be the project of ta’amei ha-mitzvot, 
Leibowitz writes, 
If the practical commandments are service of God and not service of man, there is no need 
for them to be directed at or intended for the needs of man. Any justification of the 
commandments by the needs of man and any grounding of them on the needs of humanity—
from any perspective of need: cognitive, moral, social, national—empty the commandments 
of any meaning: religiously. For if the commandments are an expression of philosophical 
cognition, or if they have moral content, or if they rectify society, or if they safeguard the 
Israelite nation—then those that uphold them are not worshipping God, but themselves, or 
society, or their nation, and do a good service for themselves. In any event, they do not serve 
God; rather, they use the Torah of God for their own benefit and as an instrument to satisfy 
their own needs. Thus, the reasons for the commandments [ta’amei ha-mitzvot] is a 
theological concept and not a religious-faith concept. The reason [ta’am] for the 





Leibowitz characterizes the project of ta’amei ha-mitzvot as the justification of the 
commandments by showing how they are efficient means for the attainment of particular ends. 
These ends are described as “needs,” which themselves are only necessary from a particular 
                                                 
75
 Leibowitz, FHV, 11–19. 
76
 Leibowitz, JPS, 26. 
73 
 
perspective  thus “needs” are intermediate ends and “perspectives” are ultimate ends or intrinsic 
values. All the ultimate ends that are identified as involved in ta’amei ha-mitzvot, truth, morality, 
society, and the nation, are understood by Leibowitz as “human” values. Thus, if the 
commandments are performed for the reasons offered for them by those who engage in ta’amei 
ha-mitzvot, they are service of humanity and not God. Ta’amei ha-mitzvot threatens to vitiate the 
religious significance of the commandments by providing “non-religious” reasons for performing 
them. If one performs them with these reasons in mind, one’s act has no religious significance.  
In rejecting such approaches to ta’amei ha-mitzvot Leibowitz draws an interesting connection 
among justifications, reasons for actions, intentions, and axiological significance. Justifications 
provide reasons for actions, which can then be taken up by individuals as their intentions in 
action, thereby determining the axiological significance of the action. For example, if a 
commandment is justified as a means for the attainment of a moral “need,” an act one has reason 
to do given a commitment to the value of morality, then the commandment so justified is a moral 
act. In performing the commandment for that reason, or with that intention, one is serving 
humanity and not God. So too, if a commandment is justified as a means for the attainment of 
some national “need,” an act one  has reason to do given a commitment to the value of the 
nation, then the commandment so justified is a nationalistic act. In performing the commandment 
for that reason, or with that intention, one serves the nation and not God.  
However, a proponent of such approaches to ta’amei ha-mitzvot might object that when 
moral or national justifications for the commandments are given God is still being served and not 
humanity or the nation. Of course the commandments are being performed because God 
commanded them and in this sense God is being served; but God is a perfect moral being or has 
selected the Jewish people as his chosen nation. Consequently, his commands are moral or 
74 
 
ensure the preservation of the Jewish people. However, Leibowitz would reject this argument 
and contend that humanity or the nation has surreptitiously replaced God as the ultimate value; 
God is conceived merely as a functionary who allows the attainment of what is of true value: 
morality or the nation. Service of God through the commandments is only justified because it is a 
means to attain the other ends. In contrast, according to Leibowitz, God must be served for his 
own sake, “because he is fit to be served.”
77
 This fitness, however, cannot be reduced to any 
attribute God possesses or function he fulfills. God must be served for his own sake.   
But understanding the philosophical roots of Leibowitz’s rejection of such approaches to 
ta’amei ha-mitzvot makes it evident that he is only rejecting a particular type of justification for 
the commandments. For him the danger of justifying halakhic norms in terms of human values is 
two-fold: (i) They certainly reduce religious significance to some other value orientation, and (ii) 
they may even preclude the possibility of religious or even axiological significance altogether. 
This is because human values can be presented either as resulting from axiological decisions or 
as rooted in human nature or reason. The denial of intrinsic religious significance in ta’amei ha-
mitzvot can thus take place on different levels:  
On the first, actional level, the reason offered for the commandments is that they are a means 
for the attainment of a human value and this value is conceived as autonomously willed. Thus, if, 
and only if, one has that value orientation, then one has reason to perform the commandments. 
But then the axiological significance of the commandments is that value and not service of God. 
On the second, theological level, the reason offered for the commandments is that they are 
service of God but God is seen as epitomizing the value, such as moral goodness. Still, the value 
is conceived as autonomously willed. Thus, in this case too, if, and only if, one has that value 
                                                 
77
 Ibid., 23. 
75 
 
orientation, then one has reason to serve the God who epitomizes it by performing the 
commandments. Yet, because God is merely an intermediary for the attainment of a human 
value, the true axiological significance of service of God by performing the commandments is 
this human value. On the third, philosophical level, the reason offered for the commandments is 
that they are a means for the attainment of some value but now this value is seen as rooted in 
human nature or determined by reason. Since few would recognize service of God as a value 
rooted in human nature or determined by reason, this type of argument tends to reduce service of 
God to a value that is more broadly recognized.
78
 Moreover, offering such reasons for the 
commandments entirely deprives them of their axiological significance. Since the adoption of the 
value would be coerced by nature or reason, it would not truly be a value, which must be willed 
autonomously. Indeed, Leibowitz would even reject claims that service of God is a naturally or 
rationally determined end. His rejection of ta’amei ha-mitzvot is thus limited to particular types 
of reasons: those that reduce the axiological significance of halakhic norms to human values and 
those that attempt to ground their value in nature or reason.  
b. Service of God as Intention, Reason for Action, and Justification for Halakhic Norms 
Once this is seen, however, it becomes apparent that Leibowitz himself offers a reason and 
thus a justification for the commandments. In fact, he juxtaposes the “theological” concept of 
ta’amei ha-mitzvot in terms of “human values” with the “religious-faith” concept of the 
commandments, service of God, which he does not refrain from describing as the “reason” for 
the commandments. In interpreting the commandment to love God, he writes,  
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Observance of the commandments—because their reason is neither “national,” “moral,” nor 
“social,” rather it is from the motive of service of God alone….—it itself is love of God. 
Were their reason national—their observance would be love of Israel; were it moral—their 





Leibowitz identifies the reason for the commandments with the “motive of service of God” and 
compares it with national, moral, or social reasons. He also links this with the view that the 
intention with which an action is performed determines its axiological significance. Indeed, the 
key to seeing that he offers his own reason and justification for the commandments is two-fold: 
recognizing that he aims to protect service of God both as “religious” and as a “value,” which 
was just reviewed, and fully understanding the connection among intentions, reasons, and 
justifications, to which Leibowitz himself hinted.  
While the issues concerning action and intentions have proliferated in contemporary 
philosophical literature, this case represents a small subset of these concerns.
80
 Leibowitz takes 
for granted that performance of the commandments in the optimal case will be intentional 
actions, actions undertaken with intention. He specifies that not only must the halakhic action be 
done intentionally but that it must be done with a particular intention: The individual must 
perform the action mandated by the halakhic norm with the intention of serving God. This is 
what has been identified as “intentions with which.” Donald Davidson, in his essay “Actions, 
Reasons and Causes,” describes such intentions as follows: 
The expression ‘the intention with which James went to church’ has the outward form of a 
description, but in fact is syncategorematic and cannot be taken to refer to an entity, state, 
disposition, or event. Its function in context is to generate new descriptions of actions in 
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terms of their reasons  thus ‘James went to church with the intention of pleasing his mother’ 




Descriptions of actions in terms of the intentions, then, describe the actions in terms of their 
reasons. According to Carlos Moya, Davidson’s conception of intentions has two components: 
(1) it identifies the cause of the action; and (2) it rationalizes or justifies the action.
82
 There can 
be many reasons for performing a particular action; however, the reason for action upon which 
one actually does act is one’s intention. Reasons, however, are not normatively inert, and thus 
when the cause of the action is described as a reason it also justifies the action. Consequently, 
intentions, reasons for action, and justifications are closely related to one another, such that to 
restrict the type of intention and reason for action that an individual may have in performing an 
action is to restrict the type of justification that she can offer for her action. Correspondingly, to 
restrict the type of justification that an individual can offer for her action is to restrict the type of 
intention and reason for action that she can have. 
With this background in place it is apparent that Leibowitz’s view about intention is also a 
view about justification. He claims that the only valid intention that an individual can have when 
performing the commandments in order for the performance to have religious significance is 
service of God. But this is to say that the only legitimate reason for action that an individual can 
have in performing the commandments is service of God. Thus, when he claims that the only 
intention that an individual can have in performing a commandment is service of God, he 
establishes that service of God must be the individual’s reason for action. And, if reasons for 
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action justify actions, then in restricting the reasons for action that an individual can validly have 
in performing the commandments, he limits the legitimate justifications that can be offered for 
them. In this way, it is evident that far from completely rejecting the project of ta’amei ha-
mitzvot, Leibowitz actually claims something more specific: There can only be one reason and 
justification for each and every commandment—service of God. 
B. The Justification of Service of God 
For Leibowitz the reason for the commandments is service of God. Service of God is 
therefore the justification for halakhic norms. But what is the justification of service of God, 
such that one is obligated to the norms that it ostensibly entails? Without a justification of this 
value, the halakhic norms may be explained in terms of service of God but they still lack 
normative force. Leibowitz’s discussions of the justification of service of God fall into two main 
categories: The first follows the position on values presented earlier, in which service of God is a 
value orientation that must willed in freedom, while the second exploits connections among his 
axiology, theology, and philosophy of halakha to argue that service of God is the only true value.  
Despite these differences, these two accounts can be described as foundationalist 
justifications because they justify service of God and halakhic norms by tracing them back to a 
basic source of normativity: the human will. However, a non-foundationalist interpretation of 
Leibowitz’s account of justification that has been advanced must also be evaluated    , before 
these accounts can be examined (2-3). The former evaluation increases concerns about his 
methodological consistency, while the latter examinations allow the assessment of his main 
approach to justification.  
79 
 
1. The Circular Relation between Halakha and Service of God: System and Practice 
Sometimes, Leibowitz appears to eschew claims of objectivity for his views about the value 
of halakha and instead seems to reflect on the value of the halakhic form of life from within it. 
As has been shown, some of his methodological remarks in his programmatic essay manifest this 
approach. Encapsulating this view, he writes, “the halakha is based on faith, however, it itself is 
the base for this faith…. [T]he Jewish religion creates the faith upon which it is based. This is a 
logical paradox, but not a religious paradox.”
83
 If “faith” is identified with service of God, this 
statement suggests that Leibowitz believes that there is a circular relation between halakha and 
its justification. There are two ways to take this claim: as a structural claim about the relation 
between the halakhic system and the particular value it embodies (a), or as a philosophical claim 
about the relation between halakhic life, or any social-practice, and its justification (b). Both of 
these interpretations, however, are problematic. 
(a) The structural interpretation of this claim is offered by Asa Kasher. Kasher aims to clarify 
and resolve the logical paradox identified by Leibowitz. He argues that it involves four claims, 
from which both a conclusion and its contrary can be deduced: 
i. (Initial Premise) The Jewish religion creates its faith. 
ii. (Initial Premise) The Jewish religion is based on its faith. 
iii. (General Premise) If x creates y, x is prior to y. 
iv. (General Premise) If x is based on y, then y is prior to x. 
v. (From i and iii): The Jewish religion is prior to the faith of Judaism. 
vi. (From ii and iv) The faith of Judaism is prior to the Jewish religion.84  
 
The paradox is created by the assumption that two things cannot both be prior to each other, 
while here it is asserted both that the Jewish religion is prior to the faith of Judaism and that the 
faith of Judaism is prior to the Jewish religion. However, Kasher concludes that there is actually 
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no paradox in this case because halakha is not a system of regulative rules but of constitutive 




Constitutive rules, in contrast to regulative rules, do not order a preexisting area of behavior 
but establish an area of practice. Traffic laws and the rules of chess are example of regulative and 
constitutive rules respectively. Traffic laws regulate the movements of vehicles, which is a 
preexisting behavior with its own purpose that must be properly ordered for this purpose to be 
accomplished. Abstracting from issues of legality, which are discussed below, these laws are 
valid if they properly fulfill this antecedent purpose. The rules of chess, in contrast, do not 
regulate preexisting behavior by fulfilling an antecedent purpose. Rather, they establish the goal 
of check-mating one’s opponent and institute the moves that are permissible to achieve it. This 
goal has a form of internal validity. Thus, while on the one hand, the rules validate the purpose 
by establishing it, on the other hand, the purpose validates the rules by endowing them with a 
point. In this case, while halakhic norms identify the value of service of God as their purpose, 
this value is the meaning of halakha and governs the validity of halakhic norms. Premise (i) 
therefore means that the halakha determines the content of the Jewish faith as the “the demand… 
presented to man to serve God.”
86
 It does this is by identifying the texts that comprise the 
 ebrew Bible, which, according to Leibowitz, express this demand. Premise  ii  means that “the 
halakha is the partial realization of the value presented by its  oly Scriptures.”
87
 Halakhic norms 
must express service of God to be valid. 
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Kasher’s point that a system of constitutive rules, including perhaps halakhic norms, can 
establish a novel purpose and be governed by internal validity is apt. However, this analysis 
leaves out the central issue of all-things-considered normativity. Granted that the rules of chess 
establish the goal of check-mating one’s opponent and the moves that are valid to achieve it, this 
does not establish that one ought to play chess. Similarly, granted that service of God is the value 
of the halakhic system, this leaves unanswered whether one ought to engage in halakhic practice. 
That the halakha identifies a value that serves as its internal standard of validity establishes 
nothing about whether anyone should accept that value. Indeed, this point is made by Leibowitz 
himself in response Kasher.  e writes, this “closed circle… does not exhaust the vital reality of 
the religious faith in Judaism, because this whole cognitive framework depends on a conative 
factor that is outside of the circle: the willful decision of man to serve God…. Only this decision 
brings man into the circle…and this decision, that is ‘faith.’”
88
  
 b  Rynhold offers a different interpretation of the same “paradox” and directly engages with 
the question of normativity.  e glosses Leibowitz’s claims as follows: 
i. Faith is defined as, or constituted by, halakhic practice. 
ii. Faith, defined as halakhic practice, is the basis of faith in the practice.89 
 
(i) is an interpretation that gives centrality to Leibowitz’s statement that “for Judaism, faith is 
nothing but its system of mitzvoth, which was the embodiment of Judaism,”
90
 which Rynhold 
interprets as meaning that “the concept [of faith] is exhausted by the performance of mitzvoth.”
91
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Indeed, he maintains that for Leibowitz faith is contracted to a behavioral definition. (ii), in turn, 
means that engagement in halakhic practice precedes any discursive justification of it “such that 
one’s commitment is not based on that [justification] in any meaningful sense. At the point at 
which we are able to reflect thoughtfully about our commitment to our practices, we are already 
implicated and formed by them.”
92
  
However, for Leibowitz, according to Rynhold, such precommitment does not undermine the 
validity of practices and their justifications, for no commitment can be completely discursively 
justified. Drawing on Leibowitz’s skepticism about practical reason, Rynhold claims that he 
holds that practices “are not rational all the way down.” Instead, justification is always a matter 
of reflecting on practices to which one is already committed. Such reflection cannot and does not 
aim to convince a non-participant to engage in the practice because only the experience of 
engaging in the practice itself can justify it: “The practice is persuasive in a way that the circle of 
justification is not.”
93
 Thus, according to Rynhold, Leibowitz offers a phenomenology of Jewish 
faith, which arises from an antecedent commitment to halakhic life.  
While Rynhold’s interpretation presents a useful critique of foundationalist approaches to 
justification and offers an interesting practice-based approach in its place, it too cannot be 
correctly attributed to Leibowitz. Leibowitz is skeptical about ultimate justification for human 
actions; but this is because actions are ultimately based on value decisions, which must be 
radically autonomous to be attributable to the person and possess axiological significance. This 
excludes Rynhold’s interpretation, for, according to Leibowitz, if one’s commitment to halakhic 
norms stems from habituation to their practice, then one has not adopted service of God as a 







value. More generally, Rynhold’s claim that Jewish faith is exhausted by halakhic practice does 
not reckon with Leibowitz’s position on the necessity of the intention to serve God.  
 owever, neither Kasher’s nor Rynhold’s interpretation is entirely unfounded. Both notice 
the interpretive strain in Leibowitz’s thought, in which he does seem to be reflecting on the 
halakhic form of life from the inside. However, this approach is in tension with the dominant 
objectivist strand. These two approaches are set alongside one another when Leibowitz writes, 
I do not see in religious faith a conclusion that one derives but a value decision that one 
decides, and like all axiological content in man’s consciousness it does not derive from 
knowledge that is provided or given to him, rather it is an obligation through which man 
obligates himself…. Therefore, it is not possible to teach faith: what is possible is to present 




Religious faith is a value decision that must be the result of free decision. Yet, Leibowitz also 
describes himself as depicting faith to those who do not have it in order to introduce them to it. 
He seems to allude to some form of determination intermediary between coercive rationality and 
radical freedom which results from a type of description that is persuasive but allows individual 
choice.
95
 However, once again, this interpretive strain conflicts with the dominant objectivist 
approach which is manifest in two different ways in his discussions of the justification of service 
God. 
2. Value Decisions and Religion: A Polytheistic Axiology 
Most frequently, Leibowitz discusses the justification of service of God by connecting it to 
his metaethics and axiology. It is most clearly evidenced when he writes, 
Nobody needs to accept upon himself the yoke of the kingdom of heaven and the yoke of the 
Torah and the commandments…  It is impossible to indicate any need in the objective sense 
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that the acceptance of the yoke of the kingdom of heaven and the yoke of the Torah and the 
commandments come to satisfy.96  
 
The normativity of service of God cannot be justified by being shown to fulfill a natural or 
rational need, for, as has been shown, either its religious significance or general axiological 
significance would thereby be destroyed. Only the individual’s arational decision grants 
normative force to service of God. 
A corollary of this account is a complex relation between authority and autonomy. On the 
one hand, Leibowitz presents a strongly heteronomous approach to the commandments and 
starkly asserts divine authority. No appeal is made to human reason; one must simply perform 
the commandments out of service to God. Neither is God’s worthiness to be served justified: 
If God is not a pagan god or the Christian God, rather the ‘God who is God’…without 
description or image—there is no other content to the faith in God and the love of God but 
the acceptance of the yoke of his kingship, which is the yoke of the Torah and the 
commandments. God is the giver of the Torah, and the faith in him is man's recognition of 




On the other hand, Leibowitz embraces human autonomy by identifying service of God as a 
value decision. In this vein he writes, 
[J]ust like the moral man, for whom morality is the highest value, grounds the validity of this 
value on his own decision, which establishes that it is the ultimate value, and just like the 
political man who takes a certain position on questions involved in the relationships between 
individuals grounds his position…on his decision that a certain relationship in social reality 
is what he see as the good, just so religious faith…is grounded on man seeing his stance 




The human being is confronted by a variety of competing values: morality, political expedience, 
religion. She is free to accept or reject any one of them, including service of God. Only an 
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autonomous decision to accept upon herself the heteronomous yoke of the kingdom of heaven 
obligates her to service of God through halakhic norms. The authority of God is thus absolute but 
only for the individual that recognizes it. Indeed, Leibowitz describes religious faith as “an 
obligation through which man obligates himself.”
99
 
Crucially, while this approach does not establish that service of God possesses normative 
force in the sense that an individual is obligated by it as opposed to other values, it does establish 
that service of God is on all fours with any other value. It and its entailed norms are at least as 
justified as any other value and its consequent norms. The human will is the source of 
normativity and it is unconstrained in the value that it adopts. Leibowitz therefore presents a 
relativistic account of values and normativity. There is no good that everyone is required to 
pursue, only competing value orientations. However, in contrast to the preceding interpretations, 
Leibowitz assumes an objectivist philosophical position in presenting this relativist axiological 
account. He stands outside each of the values and makes the second-order point that value 
decisions cannot be grounded. He has embraced service of God; but his own will is the source of 
that value’s normativity. Others may adopt other values, thus rendering them normative for them. 
3. Negative Axiology: Service of God as the Most Valuable Value  
However, sometimes Leibowitz does argue that service of God is the most fitting value to 
adopt, despite his commitment to the arationality of evaluative judgments. In contrast to the 
preceding approach, in these instances he seems to express an objective view about what is truly 
valuable and thus normative. On this approach, service of God is the most valuable value. Still, 
this is not because there is some hierarchy of values in which service of God holds the highest 
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place; rather, it results from the way in which Leibowitz conceives of freedom, God, and service 
of God, so that only service of God fully expresses freedom. 
The view that only service of God fully expresses human freedom is evident when Leibowitz 
writes, “[the] man that lives in the world of halakha…[h]e is free…the establisher of the laws of 
his life, and only the autonomous creator is deserving of the name ‘man.’”
100
 The strongest 
statement of this position is when he writes, 
Faith is the ultimate, and perhaps the only, expression of man’s free choice. Man can accept 
upon himself the yoke of the kingdom of heaven and yoke of the Torah and the 
commandments, and he can refuse to accept them, and there is no method in the world that is 
capable of directing this decision and choice. There is also nothing in the world that can 




Leibowitz claims that service of God is the fullest expression of human freedom because its 
adoption depends entirely on an individual’s decision in contrast to other values; but elsewhere 
he identified other value orientations as resulting from free decision as well. Indeed, that is 
constitutive of their status as value orientations.  
Without denying the contradiction between these two positions, once again Leibowitz’s view 
can be understood when put into a dialogue with elements of Kant’s philosophy, in particular the 
relation between freedom and morality. In the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant claims that 
“freedom and unconditional practical law reciprocally imply each other.”
102
 According to Henry 
Allison, this means that Kant subscribes to the “Reciprocity Thesis”: “Freedom of the will is not 
                                                 
100
 Leibowitz, JPS, 60–61. 
101
 Leibowitz, FHV, 11.  
102
 Immanuel Kant, “Critique of Practical Reason,” in Practical Philosophy, ed. Mary J. Gregor (Cambridge UK & 
New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 5: 29. 
87 
 
only a necessary but also a sufficient condition of the moral law.”
103
 The claim that freedom of 
the will is a necessary condition for moral activity is a clear tenet of Kant’s thought. An 
individual must act autonomously for an action to be attributable to her. But that suggests that 
one can act autonomously immorally as well as morally. The claim that freedom of the will is a 
sufficient condition for acting morally goes further in that it means that when one acts freely one 
ipso facto acts morally. Thus, in its sufficiency condition the reciprocity thesis claims that a free 
will can only act according to the moral law as expressed in the categorical imperative.  
The rationale for this claim is that Kant’s conception of free will is not only practical—the 
ability for an individual to act on the basis of imperatives which ultimately derive from her own 
nature—but also transcendental, which requires “complete independence from anything 
empirical and hence from nature more generally.”
104
 The categorical imperative uniquely 
satisfies this condition because it, especially in its first formulation  “Act only in accordance 
with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law” , is 
comprised merely of the form of legality itself.
105
 Consequently, it abstracts from any desire and 
incentive that an individual might possess. Any imperative that incorporates material elements 
appeals to such desires and incentives and therefore cannot be willed in transcendental freedom. 
The only law that can be willed in this manner is the contentless moral law. 
Similarly, Leibowitz argues that there is a reciprocal relation between freedom and the 
religious value: freedom is not only a necessary but also a sufficient condition for the religious 
value. That freedom is a necessary condition for a value decision in favor of serving God is 
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consistent with a plurality of values. Freedom is necessary for any decision to be attributable to 
an individual and thus of axiological significance. However, that freedom is a sufficient 
condition for the religious value is a new claim, which denies the axiological significance of 
other purported value decisions as such. The only thing that can be chosen freely, and is thus a 
value, is service of God.  
Leibowitz’s strategy for arguing for a reciprocal relation between freedom and service of 
God is two-fold: he pursues it at the level of theology and the level of philosophy of halakha. In 
both approaches he shows how the religious value is a purely formal value. It simply signifies 
the notion of valuing something “in and of itself” or “for its own sake.” It appeals to no human 
desires or interests, indeed it negates them, and thus its adoption is the only way to fully manifest 
one’s freedom. 
Leibowitz espouses a radically negative theology. Naomi Kasher identifies two basic 
statements about God in Leibowitz’s oeuvre.
106
 The first is purely negative: “Nothing in the 
World is God.” It is evidenced in statements like the following: “There is no more typical pagan 
approach than seeing holiness in natural existence…. This is typical paganism, for it makes the 
world as it is into God.”
107
 The second, while seemingly positive, actually functions negatively: 
“God exists beyond objective existence and his Godliness is in and of itself and not in His 
relation to the world.” It is manifest in statements like the following: “the living God, who is 
beyond nature and beyond the world”
108
  and “the Godliness of God is in and of itself and not in 
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 is relation to the world.”
109
 This statement, while logically positive, functions negatively 
because by placing true value outside of the world it denies absolute value to anything in it.  
This theology has both epistemological and axiological sources. Kasher claims that the 
background for understanding Leibowitz’s view is Kantian epistemology. While this is 
somewhat true, his description of rationality as coercive is more in keeping with positivism than 
Kantianism. In fact, it is the axiological motives that are more significant, for there is a 
remarkable congruence between Leibowitz’s axiological and theological views. In FM, while 
describing Maimonides’  in Leibowitz’s interpretation  and his own view of God, he writes, 
[I]n a religious hymn which has achieved great popularity, and is to be found in all Jewish 
prayer books, we say: ‘He is the Lord of the world, who reigned ere any creature was yet 
formed.’ But ere any creature yet was formed, over what did  e reign? That is to say, God’s 
royalty is not like that of the king of a country, who is not a king if he has no country over 
which to reign….  But God’s royalty is his essence and is not functional. God is king in 
Himself, and His Kingship is in no way dependent on the existence of anything over which 
He reigns. Thus does Maimonides explain the Divine name “El Shaddai”  usually translated 
as God Almighty : “That it is sufficient  she-dai) Himself, for He is content with His own 




The divinity of God is not an attribute that is dependent on a relation to the world or a functional 
role he plays in human life. God’s divinity is not relative but absolute.  
Similarly, in an essay devoted to explicating the trials of Abraham and Job, Leibowitz writes 
that they were both tested to determine whether “they fear God because He is God, cleaving to 
whom and serving whom are the end of man…or perhaps they only fear  im because of certain 
properties or functions attributed to him as the overseer and supervisor of man and the satisfier of 
his needs?”
111
 God tested Abraham and Job to discover whether they fear him as an end in and of 
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itself or, as a result of ascribing certain properties to him, as a means to attain rewards or avoid 
punishments. That is, whether they view God and service of God as intrinsic or instrumental 
values. The ascription of any attributes or functions to God threatens to render these attributes or 
functions of intrinsic value and God and service of God as mere instruments for their attainment.  
The same condition that is necessary to ensure the theological absoluteness of God is thus 
also necessary for service of God to be an intrinsic value: God’s divinity must be viewed as 
irreducible to a relation or functional role, and God must be served for its own sake. In fact, 
Leibowitz writes that the God of Israel is not even the creator of the world but “the God who is 
to be served.”
112
 After rejecting any factual statement about God, all that remains is his 
axiological significance.  
In addition to emptying the object of religion of any content in his theology, Leibowitz also 
drains the practice of religion of any content in his philosophy of halakha. He writes, 
The problem of the practical commandments, which have no psychological, philosophical, or 
sociological reasons, and which are not necessitated by man’s intellect, feelings, or will, 
because of that, combines with the problem of the freedom of man. One who accepts upon 
himself the Torah and the commandments, what is his standing as an autonomous being? It is 
known that there are many that claim…that one who accepts upon himself the yoke of the 
Torah and the commandments is enslaved. But the concept of enslavement and also the 
concept of freedom require semantic analysis…. If the world has a custom and lawfulness—
man is part of it, and he is subordinated to the entire framework of natural existence that 
includes not just his body but also his soul: he is subordinated to it from both a physiological 
and psychological perspective. According to this, what is the freedom of man? The 
acceptance of a form of life that does not derive from his nature means freeing man from his 
enslavement to the crude natural bonds…. [T]here is no freedom from the bonds of nature 
except as a result of the acceptance of the yoke of Torah and the commandments…and that is 
what is meant by ‘there no freeman except one who is involved in Torah’: he is a freeman 
from servitude to nature since he lives in action a life contrary to this nature, both in its 
general manifestation and in its manifestation in man himself. Therefore, there is no need—
from either a religious or a philosophical perspective—to bring the practical commandments 
to man’s conceptual world or the world of his interests  precisely in their foreignness lies 
their strength. Attempts to rationalize the commandments and investigations after ‘the 
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Leibowitz confronts a common view, famously held by Kant, according to which observance of 
the commandments is a base form of heteronomy,
114
 and he instead claims that only one who 
observes halakha is autonomous. In doing so, he articulates a position on autonomy that not only 
requires practical and transcendental freedom but also freedom from reason. To be autonomous 
one must be free from desires, interests, and reasons. Correspondingly, one must choose 
something purely for its own sake, without any desire, interest, or reason to choose it. And, 
according to him, halakhic practice uniquely fulfills this requirement because halakhic norms 
satisfy no natural or rational human concern. Halakhic practice can be performed for its own 
sake because in terms of those concerns it is contentless. By deciding to serve God through the 
performance of halakhic norms the individual sets herself against any desire, interest, or reason 
that she may have, will have, or could have. Indeed, Asa Kasher argues that service of God, 
when understood according to Leibowitz’s negative theology, should be interpreted as the 
negation of the worship of anything in the world.
115
 Halakhic practice is thus a form of negative 
praxis. The decision to serve God just is the decision to be free of human desires, interests, and 
rationality: it is simply the decision to will freely.  
Kant claimed that transcendental freedom reciprocally implies the moral law.
116
 Leibowitz 
radicalizes transcendental freedom: To be free one must not be determined by external or internal 
                                                 
113
 Ibid., 29–30. 
114
 Immanuel Kant, Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason and Other Writings, ed. Allen W. Wood and 
George Di Giovanni (Cambridge UK & New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 6: 125–126. 
115
 Asa Kasher, “Tsalilym The’ologhyym [Theological Shadows],” in Sefer Yeshayahu Libovits [Yeshayahu 
Leibowitz Book], ed. Asa Kasher and Jacob Levinger (Tel-Aviv: Agudat ha-Studentim, 1977), 69–75. 
116
 In fact, Kant himself undergoes a movement similar to Leibowitz—but in reverse—from the Groundwork of the 
Metaphysics of Morals and The Critique of Practical Reason to Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason. 
92 
 
nature or even by reason. Consequently, he proposes a negative axiology: the only thing that can 
be chosen freely is something for which one has no desire, interest, and reason to choose. 
Conceived in this manner, freedom can only be fully achieved by willing something that negates 
all desires, interests, and reasons. Indeed, it must be entirely contentless. For him, God and 
service of God uniquely satisfy this requirement. God is simply the God is who is to be served, 
and the reason for the commandments is simply service of God. Service of God is thus the most 
valuable value because it most paradigmatically instantiates the formal features of being a value. 
It can be adopted simply for its own sake, for there could be no motivation or reason for 
committing to it.
117
 This connection is made clear when in an interview with Michael Shashar, in 
response to the question of whether man’s obligation to serve God is really the only true value, 
Leibowitz responds, “Yes, if in truth one bases oneself on the theoretical analysis of the concept 
of a value, then that is the value.”
118
 Because of their lack of content, God and service of God 
uniquely fulfill the formal properties of a being a value: only they can be truly chosen for their 
own sake; only they can be valued in and of themselves.  
This justification of the value of service of God shares certain features with each of the 
preceding approaches. Like the first approach, Leibowitz decidedly champions commitment to 
the service of God. He does not just set out the values that one might adopt and rule out the 
possibility of rationally deciding among them; he argues that service of God is the only true 
value. However, like the second approach, he takes up an objectivist philosophical position. He 
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does not offer an interpretation of the meaning of halakhic practice from within it; rather, he 
offers an argument that stems from philosophical premises about the unique axiological and 
justificatory status of service of God. In sum, despite comments that imply a more interpretive 
approach, Leibowitz offers two objectivist approaches to the justification of the value of service 
of God. Further, both of these accounts are foundationalist justifications, which identify the 
human will as the source of normativity. Yet, while on the first approach he endorses axiological 
relativism, on the second approach he claims that service of God is the most valuable value. 
C. Normative Difficulties  
Before proceeding to discuss the connection between Leibowitz’s theocentric account of 
ta’amei ha-mitzvot and his theory of halakha, difficulties in his justification of halakhic norms 
must be noted. These include his methodological consistency (1) and philosophical positions (2).  
    Leibowitz’s thought manifests an inconsistency about the methodology of philosophy of 
halakha. This inconsistency is evident in his identification of the meaning of the halakha with 
service of God and, as just noted, in his discussion of the normativity of that value. Questions 
remain about whether he offers an interpretation of halakhic practice to appeal to those already 
committed to it or makes objective arguments about its value. Further, if the latter, it is unclear 
whether these arguments establish the parity of service of God with other values or its 
axiological superiority. Moreover, he also gives service of God a central role in his theory of 
halakha. The status of this claim thus determines the overall status of his philosophy of halakha. 
(2) While perhaps attractive for the austerity of its devotion to service of God and correlative 
rejection of all worldly absolute values, Leibowitz’s justification of halakhic norms and service 
of God depends on specific metaethical and axiological positions that encounter a number of 
94 
 
philosophical problems. These can be grouped into two categories: general metaethical problems 
(a) and problems resulting from his negative axiology, theology, and halakhic praxis (b).   
(a) While Leibowitz subscribes to metaphysical axiological pluralism, he is a psychological 
axiological monist. But it is not clear that the latter is actually a plausible moral psychological 
position, for individuals do not seems to have such organized axiological schemes. Aviezer 
Ravitzky points out that one can maintain the notion of intrinsic value without subscribing to 
such monism. Individuals can recognize a number of intrinsic values. Often there might not be a 
conflict among them. And when they do conflict one value need not prevail over the others; 
rather, an accommodation among them can be achieved. Further, even if one value does win out, 
this does not nullify the intrinsic nature of the other values. They do not become merely 
instrumental to the attainment of the highest value.
119
 This monism underlies many features of 
Leibowitz’s thought. If one can have only one value, then the choice is clear: one can serve God 
or humanity for example. But pluralism allows for the possibility that one might be committed to 
other values alongside service of God without it becoming an instrument for them.  
Leibowitz draws a strict distinction between scientific cognition and facts, on the one hand, 
and axiological decisions and values, on the other. However, he inadequately conceptualizes 
both of these phenomena. Indeed, he presents caricatures of both, in which there is too much 
coercion and objectivity in science and too much freedom and subjectivity in values. Yemima 
Ben-Menahem points out a number of difficulties with Leibowitz’s approach to evaluative 
judgments. She argues that a sense of coercion is present in the adoption of evaluative judgments 
as well as scientific conclusions. Individuals’ do not experience themselves as free in relation to 
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the obligations that follow from their values, such that they could simply revise their values and 
change their obligations. For example, most people feel that they simply must not harm the 
innocent not that they have chosen not to harm them. Indeed, ordinary language, both Hebrew 
and English, usually does not allow the use of the word “chose” in moral matters. For example, 
while it is common to say “I chose to live in New York,” it usually indicates cynicism to say “I 
chose to believe in democracy.” She also notes that the process of revision is not all that different 
in the area of values than in the domain of beliefs. For example, one can be persuaded to 
relinquish an evaluative judgment upon realizing that it conflicts with another value decision one 
has made or noticing an implication of it that one had not previously detected.
120
  
Moreover, Leibowitz describes individuals as responding to requests for their justification for 
a value decision by bluntly responding “this is my will,”
121 
but this seems more the exception 
than the rule. In most cases, individuals do offer reasons for their evaluative judgments. 
Consistent with his axiological view, Leibowitz equates value decisions with aesthetic 
evaluations. But the way in which individuals respond to normative disagreement differs from 
disagreements of taste. While even in the latter individuals still do give reasons for their 
evaluations of an artistic work, in the former the discussion seems to be guided by a 
presupposition that there ought to be consensus.
122
 His account does not capture the motivation 
for, or character of, normative argumentation. 
Leibowitz occasionally articulates an error theory of practical reasoning. He writes that in 
non-scientific areas “man never derives conclusions, even though sometimes he deceives himself 
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that he does so.”
123
 For him it might not matter that his account of evaluative judgments does not 
accurately capture our intuitions or adequately describe our practices of normative argument; 
however, for one who does believe that an accurate account should capture these phenomena this 
tells against his view. Moreover, Leibowitz himself takes the presence of moral disagreement as 
evidence in support of his error theory. He should not ignore the fact that such disagreement 
often leads to attempts at resolution.  
Leibowitz also clearly overestimates the degree of consensus found in the scientific 
community at any given time. Indeed, his positivist account of science is not descriptively 
adequate. He underestimates the role that higher-order theories play in even the interpretation of 
the results of the simplest experiments, and the role that methodological values, like 
conservatism or parsimony, play in the selection of such theories. While these values are not 
moral or religious, they certainly are not the type of things that he considers rational.
124
  
Leibowitz might respond that in the scientific domain the overriding value that guides 
investigators is that of objectivity, or bringing their observations and theories into 
correspondence with reality. This shared commitment differs from the diverse and 
incommensurable values that individuals embrace in their evaluative judgments. Having the 
same goal of “getting the facts right” unifies the scientific community and regiments their 
deliberations. And indeed, some of his comments do support this view.
125
 But this is equally true 
of evaluative judgments as evidenced by normative deliberation and debate. Individuals’ argue 
about what is right and wrong, what is good and bad, because they presuppose that there is a 
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“right” answer. If this approach is taken, our intuitions and practices regarding values cannot be 
dismissed. If they are robust enough to regiment practice, then a certain form of objectivity could 
emerge in the normative domain as well.
126
   
Leibowitz is right that there is a distinction between facts and values and between scientific 
conclusions and evaluative judgments. Any theory of values should incorporate this insight. 
Though there is not complete disagreement over values and totally uniformity in facts, there does 
seem to be greater consensus about facts than values. Further, evaluative judgments do seem to 
have a closer relation to motivation than factual conclusions, even though factual conclusions are 
not always conatively neutral.
127
 Neither of these points entail that evaluative judgments are 
entirely arational, however. The presence of disagreement over values is qualified by the 
motivation for, and practice of, normative argumentation. And while the connection between 
reasons and motivation is complex, it should not be denied without argument that reasons can 
motivate without being coercive.    
 b  A second set of problems relate to Leibowitz’s conception of autonomy, intention, and 
reasons for action, especially when he identifies service of God with the “most valuable value.” 
Beginning with his conception of autonomy, it is unclear whether the type of radicalized freedom 
that he requires is really plausible. Kant’s conception of transcendental freedom is problematic  it 
is doubtful that an embodied being can distance herself to that extent from external or internal 
nature. Leibowitz goes further in requiring that the subject abstract from reason as well. But it 
                                                 
126
  abermas, “Richard Rorty’s Pragmatic Turn.” 
127
 See for example Philippia Foot, “Moral Beliefs,” in Virtues and Vices (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
  78   and John McDowell, “Value and Secondary Qualities,” in Moral Discourse and Practice: Some 
Philosophical Approaches, ed. Stephen Darwall, Allan Gibbard, and Peter Railton (Oxford UK & New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1997), 201–14. 
98 
 
does not seem possible for a human subject to be entirely undetermined by both desires and 
reasons.  
Additionally, even if it was possible, it is unclear that such freedom should be characterized 
as autonomy and its result a decision in favor of a particular value. As was shown, Leibowitz 
connects autonomy with attributability, but it is dubious that such arational decision could be 
distinguished from mere caprice. As Naomi Kasher points out, viewing an individual as having 
no desire or reason for performing an action is more often an argument for exculpating her from 
responsibility for her behavior than attributing it to her. Similarly, an individual who claims that 
she does not know why she did something seems to indicate the disavowal of an action rather 
than an endorsement of it.
128
 The same should hold for the adoption of values. Lastly, it is 
unclear in what sense such a choice should be described as the selection of a particular 
intentional object, in this case one value as opposed to another; it was not made on the basis of 
any desire for or reason in favor of it. Leibowitz insists that values must be chosen for their own 
sake; but how can a particular intentional object be identified and distinguished from others if 
not in terms of its properties? But once these properties enter the picture, the individual is 
choosing the value on the basis of some desire or reason.  
Leibowitz insists that one value is radically contentless enough to measure up to the 
standards of freedom that he sets: service of God. But this just makes his conception of the 
religious value more problematic. Despite its connection to the tradition of negative theology, it 
is questionable whether this contentless value can bear the semantic weight of “service of God,” 
which does seem to have some positive connotations. More importantly, service of God, like all 
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values, does double duty for Leibowitz: It is a value that is adopted, but it also serves as the 
necessary intention for an action to be of religious significance; it must be the reason for the 
individual’s action. But when a value is conceived as entirely contentless, it is unclear how it can 
be an intention with which a particular action is done. It is necessary that there should be at least 
some perceived connection between the intention with which an action is done and the type of 
action that is performed for that intention to serve as the reason for that particular action. But in 
order for there to be such a connection there must be some content to the intention.  
In contrast to Leibowitz, Kasher argues that “important ingredients for one’s feeling that a 
particular action can be attributed to him are the understanding why he chose to do that particular 
action, what the reason for that choice is, what is the deliberation that is at its base, and also the 
awareness that the action was indeed chosen on the basis of those [considerations].”
129
 On this 
account, reasons link the individual to the action she performs. Rationality does not compete 
with freedom. Indeed, it is crucial for a decision to be traceable to the reasons for which one 
made it for it to be one’s own. Reasons for action connect the individual to her decisions and 
actions. Thus, far from ensuring autonomy Leibowitz’s axiology severs the connection of the 
individual to her choice and the link between intention and action.    
Consequently, in addition to the questions about its methodological consistency, there are 
intractable problems with the metaethics and axiology that underlie Leibowitz’s justification of 
halakhic norms. The root of his mistake seems to be his conception of reason. He holds a 
constricted conception of rationality that makes it the realm of coercion, leaving arbitrariness the 
only type of human freedom possible. A fuller conception of rationality, and in particular 
practical reason, could avoid some of the problems that have been exposed in his thought. 
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Practical rationality could respond to what J rgen  abermas calls “the unforced force of the 
better argument.”
130
 This conception might still be able to answer some of Leibowitz’s central 
concerns, including the distinction between facts and values, the relation between reason and 
motivation, and recognize service of God as an irreducibly religious value.   
III. Theocentric Theory of Halakha 
Leibowitz aims to provide a unified philosophy of halakha centered on service of God. Just 
as his justification of the commandments identifies service of God with the reason for halakhic 
norms, his theory of halakha recognizes service of God as the criterion of validity for halakhic-
legal decision-making: A halakhic-legal decision must be for the sake of service of God to be 
valid. This attempt to connect the reason for halakhic norms and halakhic-legal practice through 
service of God has two major advantages: First, consonant with an important thread in the Jewish 
tradition it conceives of halakhic-legal practice itself as a commandment. Thus, it too must be 
performed with the intention of serving God. Second, it attempts to clearly ground halakhic-legal 
authority, for valid halakhic-legal decisions are based on the same reason that the individual has 
to perform halakhic norms—service of God.  
However, this attempt fails. Service of God, as Leibowitz understands it, cannot govern 
halakhic-legal deliberation and seems to rule out any other considerations. Thus, it cannot be the 
criterion for halakhic-validity. Indeed, when Leibowitz offers more detailed reflections on theory 
of halakha and engages in halakhic-legal practice himself, he offers more substantive 
considerations as the basis for halakhic-legal decisions. There is consequently a gap between the 
reason an individual has for performing a commandment, or the commandment’s normative 
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justification, which must be service of God, and the actual reason that determines the content of 
that norm, or its legal justification. Leibowitz thus does not ground halakhic-legal authority.    
In the following Leibowitz’s theory of halakha is first characterized as a form of positivism 
(A), and his account of halakhic-legal authority is sketched (B). The central argument of the part 
is then presented: It is contended that he attempts to make service of God the criterion of 
halakhic-legal validity, even while he recognizes alternative considerations in his other halakhic-
legal writings (C). Lastly, the problems encountered by his theory of halakha are detailed (D).  
A. Halakhic-Legal Positivism  
This section explores Leibowitz’s theory of halakha through the lens of legal positivism. 
First, it is argued that he problematizes the connection between service of God and halakhic 
practice by denying the revelatory status of the Torah and the commandments but that his 
halakhic-legal positivism aims to reestablish that connection on a new basis (1). A rough sketch 
of legal positivism is next offered     as a basis for an analysis of Leibowitz’s general legal 
theory and his basic theory of halakha (3). The details of his theory are then examined using 
 .LA.  art’s conception of law as a comparison    .  
1. Revelation and Service of God 
Sagi aptly notes that in his mature reflections on halakha Leibowitz reorients the divinity of 
the Torah and halakhic norms from their origin to their purpose.
131 
In his early works he does 
indicate that halakha has a divine source. In the first version of “Practical Commandments,” he 
writes that his object is “Torah and the commandments as things that are holy, whose origin, 
                                                 
131
 Avi Sagi, Tradition vs. Traditionalism: Contemporary Perspectives in Jewish Thought. (Amsterdam & New 
York: Rodopi, 2008), 59. 
102 
 
meaning, and purpose are transcendent.”
132
 However, this statement disappears from the later 
version. Moreover, while he writes that “God was revealed neither in nature nor in history—he 
was revealed in the Torah,”
133
 the content of the Written Torah is completely determined by the 
Oral Torah, or human halakhic-legal practice.
134
 The Oral Torah, in turn, “expresses the 
understanding and cognition of men who intend to realize the regime of the Torah.”
135
 More 
explicitly, he writes, “the entire Oral Law is the creation of men, who established the halakha in 
agreement with their understanding of what the Torah obligated.”
136
 Instead of a divine origin, 
the Torah and the commandments are divine because they are oriented to the service of God.  
The significance of this claim for Leibowitz’s theory of halakha is that a direct connection 
between service of God and halakhic practice is denied: One does not serve God through 
halakhic norms because God has literally expressed that it is through them that he wants to be 
served. Still, halakhic norms must be performed in order to serve God. It is argued that 
Leibowitz attempts to maintain a connection between halakhic practice and service of God by 
construing halakha-legal practice as a form of positivism and recognizing service of God as the 
criterion for halakhic-legal validity: A halakhic-legal action must be for the sake of service of 
God in order to be valid.  
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2. Legal Positivism: A Rough Sketch  
Recent decades have seen interminable debates among legal positivists, natural lawyers, and 
legal post-positivists. Each party to the debate has clarified and slightly modified their position to 
the point that it is often unclear what their essential features are and what distinguishes the 
positions from each other. This is particularly the case with legal positivism. This debate will not 
be engaged nor is it necessary for the purpose of using legal positivism as a framework for 
examining Leibowitz’s theory of halakha. A rough sketch of legal positivism is sufficient. More 
features and varieties of positivism are explored in subsequent chapters. 
Jules L. Coleman and Brian Leiter identify two central beliefs held by all legal positivists:   
1) Social Thesis: what counts as a law in any particular society is fundamentally a matter of 
social fact or convention. 
2) Separability Thesis: there is no necessary connection between law and morality.137  
 
The first thesis is central. It establishes that criteria of legal validity, what identifies a law as a 
law in a given society, consist of social facts or conventions. Andrei Marmor glosses this thesis 
as that in any society that has a legal system “there are conventional rules of recognition, namely, 
social conventions which determine certain facts or events that provide the ways for the creation, 
modification, and annulment of legal standards.”
138
 He also shows that the separability thesis is a 
negative implication of the social thesis: Since there is no necessary connection between social 
facts or conventions and morality, and if the conditions for legal validity consist entirely of social 
facts or conventions, then there is no necessary connection between law and morality.
139
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Ronald Dworkin attributes another thesis, the essentiality of which to positivism is disputed, 
though it too seems to be entailed by the social thesis: 





Neither the polemical history of this thesis nor its essentiality to positivism need be examined 
here, though the role of discretion in legal practice is explored in subsequent chapters. While not 
all positivists hold that laws are determinate rules, Leibowitz certainly does. Suffice it to note 
here that if one maintains that all law must be positively enacted and that laws are determinate 
rules, then it is possible in principle for there to be gaps in the law and for judicial legislation, or 
“strong” discretion, to be necessary.   
3. Leibowitz’s Positivist Conception of Law 
Leibowitz presents a positivist conception of law in general and Jewish law in particular. His 
conception of law is presented in the course of reflection on the notion of national “rights”: 
‘Right’ is a legal category, and this concept has no authority except in regard to an 
institutional reality defined by law and adjudication, which was established by men….What 
is my right to this watch strapped to my wrist?... There are a number of causes for this, and 
all of them are necessary conditions for the existence of this right.     I and other men…live 
together in the framework of a society that established the legal institution of private 
ownership…and which organizes the relationship among individuals from the perspective of 
property or assets.     ‘I’ as an entity defined from an objective perspective and existing as a 
‘personality,’ that is, as a legal unit defined in the framework of this legal system. (3) My 
right to this watch as my property is based on criteria of ownership, which are established by 
this system….     If doubts arise regarding this right, and if there arise claimants for it, there 
is an authorized institutional authority, accepted and recognized, to decide on this matter: the 
judge, who rules in accordance with his understanding of the valid law.
141
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Leibowitz’s commitment to both the social thesis and separability thesis are evident in this 
passage. Legal statuses only exist as components of a legal system. The legal system itself is an 
institution established by society, presumably by some social practice or convention. The legal 
system authorizes certain institutions to adjudicate conflicts, and, one assumes, establish new 
laws and revise old ones. From his description it is apparent that there is no necessary connection 
between these legal statuses and morality. Indeed, the context of this discussion reinforces this 
view, as Leibowitz himself was an outspoken moral critic of the Israeli occupation of the 
Palestinian territories, yet he denies that a legal case could be made for their national “right.” 
Since there is no international legal system based in social facts or convention, the concept of 
national rights is meaningless. 
Leibowitz does not abstractly reflect on his conception of halakha. However, his positivist 
view is evident from his general conception of law, along with his claim that halakha is a human 
creation. If halakha is a form of human law, then he should conceive of it according to his 
general schema for law. Further, in response to the question of what the halakha is, Leibowitz 
answers that it is simply “What is accepted as halakha among the nation who intend to accept 
upon themselves its yoke  the yoke of Torah and the commandments .”
142
 Now, he certainly 
does not subscribe to the view that halakha just is whatever practices are regularly performed 
among the halakhically observant community, for the notion that the halakha must be performed 
as service of God is central to his thought. Hart, in his classic of legal theory, The Concept of 
Law (CL), which exposits the basis for contemporary positivism, uses the distinction between a 
mere regularity of behavior and an instance of following a rule to preliminarily identify the 
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genus of action to which law belongs.
143
 Regularities of behavior have no normative 
significance; in contrast, rules provide reasons for action for those that follow them.
144
 Laws can 
be provisionally identified as a subset of those behaviors in a society that are conducted by 
following a rule. Similarly, Leibowitz must identify the halakha as that which is practiced as a 
rule for the purpose of serving God by the community that considers itself bound by the halakha.  
Leibowitz also holds the separability thesis as regards halakha. That halakha need not 
conform to morality is a point upon which he consistently insists. Indeed, even when halakha and 
morality agree on the normative status of a particular behavior, he is adamant that the obligation 
possesses uniquely halakhic normativity and must be performed for that reason to have religious 
significance. Exemplifying this approach, and also reinforcing his generally positivist view, 
when asked whether halakha has an internal logic, he replied that it has “the logic possessed by 
any legal framework, which begins with certain postulates from which it derives conclusions. 
The whole world of halakha is very rational, but its premises are postulates.”
145
 Even when the 
halakha outlaws the same practices as those forbidden by morality, within the halakha these 
prohibitions are normative because of their statuses within the halakhic-legal system and not 
because of their moral content. 
Lastly, Leibowitz also maintains the discretion thesis. In a number of debates, which are 
explored below, he insists that contemporary reality presents novel circumstances, which cannot 
be adequately handled by the codified halakha even if the usual casuistic reasoning is used. He 
insists that in these cases halakhic-legal adjudication is not sufficient, and that instead the need 
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for halakhic-legal legislation must be recognized.
146
 In effect, he argues that there are gaps in the 
halakha and halakhic-legal decisors must legislate anew. Since he does not view halakhic norms 
as having a reason beyond service of God, he is drawn to regard them as determinate rules, 
which either apply or fail to apply to circumstances. When new circumstances confront halakhic-
legal decisors, the preexisting norms cannot be interpreted based on their reasons and applied to 
the circumstances; rather, new norms must be legislated.  
4. Halakhic Positivism: Primary and Secondary Rules  
Having established that Leibowitz holds a positivist conception of law and halakha, more 
specific aspects of his theory of halakha are analyzed using this framework. In particular,  art’s 
conception of law as a union of primary and secondary rules is used to explicate and assess 
Leibowitz’s conception of halakhic-legal authority and validity. It is not claimed that Leibowitz 
was influenced by  art  indeed many of Leibowitz’s writings on halakha predate CL) or 
subscribes to an identical view. Rather, this comparison is offered as a means for understanding 
his theory of halakha in the service of assessing its relation to his justification of halakhic norms.  
Hart defines law as a union of primary and secondary rules. In describing these primary and 
secondary rules, he writes, 
Under rules of the one type which may well be considered the…primary type, human beings 
are required to do or abstain from certain action, whether they wish to or not. Rules of the 
other type are in a sense parasitic upon or secondary to rules of the first; for they provide that 
human beings may by doing or saying certain things introduce new rules of the primary type, 
extinguish or modify old ones, or in various ways determine their incidence or control their 
operations. Rules of the first type impose duties; rules of the second confer powers, public or 
private. Rules of the first type concern action involving physical movement or changes; rules 
of the second type provide for operations which lead not merely to physical movement or 
change, but to the creation or variation of duties or obligations.
147
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To simplify, primary rules are laws about actions, whereas secondary rules are laws about laws. 
Hart identifies three types of secondary rules: rules of recognition, change, and adjudication. The 
rule of recognition “specif[ies] some feature or features possession of which by a suggested rule 
is taken as conclusive affirmative indication that it is a rule of the group to be supported by the 
social pressure it exerts”  it is “a rule for conclusive identification of the primary rules of 
obligation.”
148
 The notion of legal validity arises from the rule of recognition; the rule of 
recognition identifies what are valid laws. Rules of change allow for the addition or deletion of 
primary rules; they are closely connected to the rule of recognition, since for rules of change to 
exist the rule of recognition must make reference to institutions and procedures by which rules 
can be validly modified. Rules of adjudication “empower individuals to make authoritative 
determinations of the question whether…a primary rule has been broken.”
149
  
Whether the rule of recognition should actually be considered a law about laws is unclear. 
Legal validity is described by Hart in the following manner:  “To say that a given rule is valid is 
to recognize it as passing all the tests provided by the rule of recognition and so as a rule of the 
system. We can indeed simply say that the statement that a particular rule is valid means that it 
satisfies all the criteria provided by the rule of recognition.”
150
 But since the rule of recognition 
provides the criteria for legal validity, it itself cannot be legal grounded. For example, accept for 
the purposes of illustration that the Constitution is the rule of recognition in the legal system of 
the United States; it establishes that passage by majorities of the House of Representatives and 
the Senate, along with the approval of the President, is necessary for a bill to become a valid 
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 But what grounds the legal validity of the Constitution? The Constitution establishes the 
procedure for its ratification, but it is unclear what makes that procedure legally valid.
152
  
Hart provides reasons for thinking of the rule of recognition as both a law and a non-legal 
social fact. Hans Kelsen, with whom Hart engages in a sustained debate in CL, maintains that the 
rule of recognition or, as he referred to it, the Grundnorm must be presupposed as legally valid 
by those who accept the legal system in order to anchor the system’s validity.
153
 However, 
Marmor argues that it is more consistent with  art’s philosophical program to hold that the rule 
of recognition is a social fact. It is simply that which is appealed to by members of a given 
society as the ultimate standard for justifying and criticizing laws.
154
  
This background is helpful to understand Leibowitz’s view on the relation between the 
Written Torah and halakhic-legal practice and to lay the foundation for discussion of his 
conceptions of authority and validity. He views the Written Torah as the rule of recognition of 
the halakhic-legal system. He writes, “the halakha of the Oral Law, which is a human creation, 
derives its authority from the word of the living God that is in Scripture,”
155
 indicating that the 
Written Torah serves as the source of the validity of the institutions and procedures of halakhic-
legal practice. But the Written Torah possesses this authority because halakhic-legal practice 
treats it as having this authority. This is what Leibowitz implies when he claims that the Written 
Torah is one of the institutions of the Oral Law.
156
 He casts this view in language that is more 
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reminiscent of Kelsen than Hart, writing, “the meaning of the occasion of Mount Sinai is the 
recognition of the command that we have been commanded.”
157
 Revelation at Sinai, or the 
Written Torah, stands as the Grundnorm that must be presupposed to anchor the validity of the 
halakhic-legal system.  owever, this presupposition can also be understood in  art’s language 
of social practice as that which is ultimately appealed to by participants in halakhic-legal practice 
to justify or criticize halakhic-legal claims. Indeed, understanding Leibowitz’s view in terms of 
social practice is more consistent with his identification of halakhic practice with Judaism. 
However, more important than the details of Leibowitz’s position on rules of recognition are his 
conceptions of halakhic-legal authority and validity. 
B. Two Types of Halakhic-Legal Authority  
Beyond the most rudimentary forms, legal systems must establish institutions with the 
authority to modify, interpret, and apply laws. A rule of recognition must identify those 
institutions that are authorized to perform these functions for their actions to be legally valid. In 
terms of halakha it is natural to think of rabbis as having the authority to modify, interpret, and 
apply halakhic norms. And indeed, as Sagi notes, while Leibowitz does not present a full-fledged 
theory of halakhic-legal authority, he does believe that rabbis have this authority. He identifies 
the rabbis as the historical framework for the life of Torah.
158
 Further, for Leibowitz rabbis “have 
authority that derives from Sinai,”
159
 thus again indicating the relation of halakhic-legal 
institutions to their rule of recognition. The necessity of rabbinic authority for halakhic-legal 
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rulings is also evident from Leibowitz’s discussions of halakhic-legal questions, where often he 
demurs from offering a formal opinion because he is not a halakhic-legal authority.
160
  
However, Leibowitz also offers another conception of halakhic-legal authority, which vests 
the power of modifying, interpreting, applying, and even legislating halakhic norms with the 
Jewish people. He sets out this view in the context of a debate in the religious Zionist community 
about the need for and possibility of a Torah-State, or a state governed according to the halakha. 
He claims that it is crucially important as a matter of intellectual and religious honesty for the 
religious Zionist community to present a plan for such a state instead of merely attempting to 
secure the possibility of its members individually abiding by halakha. His general view on the 
problems and opportunities confronting the Jewish people and the halakha as a result of the 
establishment of the State of Israel is evident when he writes,  
The working-up and realization of this program are not possible according to an approach 
whose essence is merely conservatism…. This program depends on the religious self-
initiative of the religious community: it is not possible except on the background of new 
halakhic decisions in those areas of public life, which were not dealt with in the existing 
halakha because they were not included in the framework of life that this halakha envisioned, 
but now they are included in the framework of religious…problems by the historical act of 
the national-statist revival in this time—before the coming of the messianic redemption. 
These halakhic decisions require considerable deviations from that behavior and religious 
form of life that consolidated when there was a lack of political independence and civil 
responsibility…. The subject of the religious-halakhic decisions of our generation can only 
be the organized religious community, which carries in action the yoke of the duties of the 
state and society and which accepts upon itself their responsibilities and feels in its heart and 
soul the religious-halakhic problems that derive from them. Do not expect any action in this 
area from the official religious institutions of instruction, since they are bound by the 
psychological bonds of their tradition of generations, during which the political and social 
regime of the Jewish people was not given in their hand to form—to uphold or to change; 
therefore they were absolved of the necessity of new religious legislation according to their 
decision and self-responsibility, and they became accustomed…to establish religious 
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decisions on precedent alone….  owever, our generation undertook an act without precedent 
in our history and unexpected from the perspective of that religious consciousness, which 
accepted the rule of foreigners upon us as a given reality which one does not question at least 
in the framework of history. Upon the decisive religious questions of our generation it is 
impossible to rule according to the halakha, rather one must legislate halakha…. Currently, 
the responsibility and obligation for decisions at this time, returns and descends on the first 
religious authority, which is the Torah-observant community as a whole, for all the 




The halakha as it has been received by the contemporary Jewish community was developed in 
the Diaspora, where Jews were not sovereign and did not have the responsibilities entailed by 
self-government. Consequently, it does not concern itself in a realistic, that is, non-messianic, 
manner with political issues and those that relate to society at large. Many of its norms are 
premised on the supposition that certain tasks and responsibilities, such as waging war and 
providing services that need continuous labor, are carried out by non-Jews. Leibowitz thus insists 
that any feasible halakhic plan for a sovereign Jewish state requires wholesale revisions of 
currently accepted halakha. However, he does not believe that the rabbinic establishment is up to 
this task; they are wedded to a conservative form of halakhic-legal practice, which only utilizes 
casuistic reasoning, relating ‘new’ cases to ‘old’ cases. But the new cases presented by Jewish 
sovereignty are novel and therefore require original legislation.  
More broadly, Leibowitz argues that due to their failure to cope with the new situation the 
rabbinic establishment has lost its authority, which has returned to its original possessor—the 
Jewish community. He thus presents an alternative theory of halakhic-legal authority, according 
to which the power of validly changing and adjudicating halakhic norms originally rests with the 
halakhically observant community, which it can then delegate to rabbis.
162
 In practice, Leibowitz 
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is not certain whether the rabbinic institution should be completely dissolved. He clearly rejects a 
governmental post, such as the chief rabbinate, while entertaining the possibility that the 
community will decide to re-devolve its authority on rabbis that are rooted in the community.
163
  
Leibowitz thus presents two models of halakhic-legal authority. The first invests authority in 
rabbis, while the second places it originally in the Jewish community. In either account, it is a 
necessary condition for halakhic-legal validity that a potential halakhic norm be recognized by 
the rabbinic establishment or the Jewish community or both. Still, it is not sufficient. 
C. Criteria of Halakhic-Legal Validity 
Enactment by authorized institutions is a necessary but not sufficient condition for legal 
validity in many legal systems. Recall the example of the United States’ legal system. Passage by 
the houses of Congress, along with the approval of the President, is a necessary condition for 
legal validity, but it not sufficient: A law can still be found unconstitutional and, thus, invalid. 
The Bill of Rights establishes conditions that restrict the substance of laws. For example, a law 
cannot establish religion, restrict free speech, or violate due process or equal protection.
164
 
Leibowitz similarly claims that there are substantive criteria of halakhic-legal validity in addition 
to enactment by authorized halakhic-legal institutions. In the following, the criteria of halakhic-
legal validity that he suggests are described and evaluated. He offers three such criteria: service 
of God (1), immanent halakhic principles (2), and various other factors (3). It is argued that these 
criteria conflict and have different relations to his justification of the commandments.  
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1. Service of God: Prayer 
As was discussed, Asa Kasher interprets Leibowitz’s claim that “the halakha is based on 
faith, however, it itself is the base for this faith” to mean that the Written Torah and the halakhic-
legal system stand in a reciprocal relation of “granting validity” to one another: The halakha 
recognizes the Written Torah as one of its institutions and the Written Torah determines the 
value of the halakhic system. When conceived as a claim about halakhic-legal validity, as 
opposed to all-things-considered normativity, this claim is unproblematic and consonant with 
Leibowitz’s legal positivism. The Written Torah is recognized by halakhic-legal practice as 
being the rule of recognition that grants legal validity to the rest of the halakhic system; it 
determines the criteria of validity for halakhic-legal practice. In fact, Kasher correctly identifies 
the value of the Written Torah, according to Leibowitz, as service of God. He also points out that 
this means that “when halakhic legislation is needed for the sake of an institutional solution to 
new problems, it must create a further realization of this same value.”
165
 Leibowitz thus 
identifies being an expression of service of God as the criterion of halakhic-legal validity: For a 
halakhic-legal decision to be valid it must be an expression of service of God.  
In “Practical Commandments” Leibowitz makes this clear and educes some of its 
implications:  
The intention is what distinguishes between the forming of the halakha by the teachers of 
guidance in the Oral Law and those changes by the men of the reform: the former adjudicate 
according to considerations that seems to them as obligatory by the halakha or from 
necessary needs for the existence of halakha itself, while the latter—from considerations and 
pressures whose source is not from the understanding of halakha itself.166 
 
                                                 
165
 Kasher, “Paradox - Question Mark,”    . 
166
 Leibowitz, JPS, 14. 
115 
 
Just as it is exclusively the intention to serve God that makes the performance of the 
commandments service of God, so too it is exclusively the intention to serve God that makes 
halakhic-legal actions valid. There is no difference in content between the invalid changes of 
“reformers” and the valid changes of the “teachers of guidance”  it is merely the intention with 
which their halakhic-legal practice is conducted. According to Nathan Rotenstreich, for 
Leibowitz “[t]he absolutism of intention ...is the writ of authority for halakhic innovation.”167 
Indeed, here Leibowitz, following the rabbinic tradition, seems to construe halakhic-legal 
practice as itself a type of halakhic practice: Just as intention determines the religious 
significance of halakhic practice, so too intention determines the validity of halakhic-legal 
practice. But since the intentions of the participants in halakhic-legal practice are not accessible, 
the intention must be translated into the purpose of the halakhic norm. It is this that functions as 
the criterion of halakhic-legal validity, which can be expressed as follows: “All halakhic norms 
must be for the purpose of serving God.” A proposed halakhic innovation that is not for the 
purpose of serving God lacks validity.168  
Leibowitz demonstrates his commitment to this criterion in his essay “On Prayer.” Prayer is a 
halakhic practice that he often cites to emphasize that an action only has religious significance if 
it is done with the intention of serving God. He aims to reinforce that the intention to fulfill any 
other interest, even spiritual edification, invalidates the religious significance of the act. He 
extends this line of thought from the act of prayer to the formulation of the content of prayer: 
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Indeed, we certainly know that the text of the prayer…is not from heaven and it in and of 
itself has nothing of holiness: it was arranged, organized, and established by men like us 
according to their deliberations and decisions about what seemed to them the appropriate and 
pleasing expression for the fulfillment of the commandment of prayer, and any holiness of 
the text of the prayer only comes from this halakhic decision. In this prayer is not 
distinguished from any other religious institution or practice, which was established by the 
halakha according to the principles of the Oral Torah and the authority of this Torah, and 
there is no doubt that with this authority it is possible to change the text as well—if this 
change is seen as necessary by the congregation of observers of the Torah and the fulfillers of 
its commandments, who sincerely believe that this innovation…is required by the Torah, just 
as the creators and developers of the Oral Torah believed in every generation. This belief is 
the legitimization of the Oral Torah, and it changes the human halakhic decision into the 
word of the living God. The opposite is the case for any change of the prayer or the order of 
the prayer out of any interest in this change—to make the prayer more appetizing for the 
supplicant, to make it agree with the spirit of the time, to the moral or aesthetic values 
reigning at that time, etc. A change such as this is not fixing prayer but destroying it as a 
religious act, and the request for such changes is not an expression of a religious compulsion, 
but removal of the yoke of the kingdom of heaven.169 
 
The purpose of the modification distinguishes valid halakhic-legal changes from those that are 
invalid. If it is for the purpose of service of God then any particular change is valid, whereas if it 
is for the purpose of any other interest or value then it is invalid.  
This criterion of halakhic-legal validity has an important benefit: It directly connects the 
legal justification for the halakhic norm with the reason for action of the individual performing it. 
The reason why the halakha norm is what it is is the same reason that the individual possesses for 
performing it. It is thus clear why the individual should obey a halakhic-legal authority if she 
wants to serve God: Service of God is the purpose that guided the authority’s establishment of 
the norm. The norm’s normative and legal justifications are identical with one another. This 
criterion thus unifies Leibowitz’s philosophy of halakha: The reason for the commandments is 
also the governing principle of halakhic-legal practice.  
However, it is unclear how halakhic deliberation is possible if service of God, when it is 
understood as Leibowitz insists that it must, is recognized as the criterion of halakhic-legal 
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validity. It cannot be interpreted positively, for that would require some positive knowledge 
about God and how he wishes to be served. This is ruled out by Leibowitz’s negative theology. It 
seems more likely, then, that it should be interpreted negatively. Guided by a suggestion by Asa 
Kasher about theological statements, the criterion would then read “No halakhic norm can be for 
the purpose of serving man,” or slightly more perspicuously “No halakhic norm can be for the 
purpose of human needs or values.”
170 
This reading is supported by Leibowitz’s statement that 
“the halakha cannot—and even need not—be in agreement with the natural interests and needs of 
man.”
171
 But this seems to leave nothing at all to guide halakhic deliberation. As Noam Zohar 
writes, “[i]t is not clear what is appropriate to enter into halakhic deliberation, for all human 
purposes, spiritual and material, interested and moral alike—are foreign to the essence of 
halakha as ‘the service of God’  once the halakhic action is linked to any of these purposes, it 
immediately… becomes profane.”
172
 Thus, if service of God is the criterion of halakhic-legal 
validity, it is not clear how halakhic-legal deliberation is possible. For this purpose seems to rule 
out any other consideration and cannot itself guide halakhic deliberation. Further, as is shown 
below, it is not descriptively adequate and would render many existing halakhic norms invalid.  
2. Immanent Principles: Autopsies  
In response to this problem Sagi suggests that though service of God functions as a criterion 
of halakhic-legal validity for Leibowitz, halakhic-legal deliberations are guided by other 
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 This allows him to maintain service of God as a negative 
criterion of halakhic-legal validity, which excludes all “external” interests and values from 
halakhic-legal deliberation, while still possessing some positive content to guide it. He first 
presented these principles in the debate over the Torah-State and restated them years later:
174
  
Is such innovation of the halakha within the framework of the Torah and in agreement with 
the legitimate halakha possible? This innovation is possible, even obligatory, as a legitimate 
religious action. There are immanent principles of halakhic legislation, without which it is 
not possible at all to offer the halakha as a realistic law for the state, and if the struggle175for 
the establishment of “a state according to the Torah” is recognized as a religious task and 
obligation—then these principles allow for the criticism of the existing consolidated halakha. 
What is spoken of is internal criticism and not external criticism. Regarding religion only 
religious judgment and religious deliberation have force. Religion and its manifestations do 
not stand under psychological, moral, sociological, political, or national criticism…. Religion 
does not stand under the judgment of political or social interests, but religion stands under the 
judgment of religion: that is to say, halakha stands under halakhic judgment: One can check 
whether it is proper from the perspective of halakha, or whether it contradicts itself. 
Moreover, the halakha needs to stand under the halakhic test, that is, the test of the principles 
that stand as the fundaments of halakha.176 
 
Some of these principles serve as criteria of halakhic-legal validity. But since they are contentful, 
they can also guide halakhic-legal deliberation. The principles are as follows:  
(1) The social-political-cultural existence desired by the halakha cannot be dependent and 
conditioned on existential premises that are not established by the halakha….177  
     alakhic instruction or…adjudication is not legitimate except to the extent that the 
possibility of fulfilling them and the means of their operation belong…to functions organized 
by halakha.178  
(3) Religious-Torah law for the state is law de jure [le-hathila] and not law de facto [be-
de’eved].179 
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(4) A decision about the general annuls all the problems about the particulars.180  
(5) Any religious request or guidance, whether prescriptive or prohibitive, is intended to be 
fulfilled by every Jewish person.181  
(6)  Folklore is not religion and religion is not folklore.182 
 
Leibowitz applies these criteria in a number of places, including in the context of the observance 
of the Sabbath in Israel. However, the most explicit employment of them is in his discussion of 
autopsies, which are halakhically problematic due to concerns about delaying burial and the 
desecration of the dead [nivul ha-met].
183
 He presents his view on autopsies in a series of journal 
articles collected under the heading “On the Problem of Surgery after Death.”
184
 He enters this 
discussion as a scientist, doctor, philosopher, and Zionist, for the question of the halakhic status 
of autopsies arose in Israel with the development of medical training programs in the fledgling 
state. He argues that modern medicine is premised on the regular conduct of autopsies to verify 
diagnoses, thus improving their reliability and adding to the stock of medical knowledge. He 
does not offer his own final opinion on what the halakha should be but merely presents a stark 
opposition: Upholding the ban on autopsies means negating modern medicine, while permitting 
modern medicine means nullifying the ban on autopsies.  
A number of Leibowitz’s immanent halakhic principles are at work in this judgment. The 
way that he creates a stark opposition between alternatives reflects premise (4): If modern 
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medicine is permitted (the general), then questions about autopsies (the particular) cease to be 
relevant. There is no question for him of modern medicine being permitted and autopsies being 
allowed under restricted conditions. He also dismisses religious objections to the performance of 
autopsies on account of the ‘holiness’ of the corpse, for from the perspective of the halakha a 
corpse is the most impure object. This is congruent with premise (6): Folklore is not religion. 
More centrally, he also invalidates the possibility of observant Jews practicing medicine and 
benefiting as patients from the practice of medicine, while autopsies are performed by and on 
non-Jews and non-observant Jews. This is in keeping with principles (1), (2), and (5). Being 
premised on forbidden practices invalidates other practices that would, in and of themselves, be 
valid. He also rejects attempts to base the permission to perform autopsies on the legal principle 
of “saving lives” (pikuah nefesh), which he understand only to refer to emergencies. This reflects 
principle (3); rulings that conceive of everyday affairs as states of emergency are invalid.  
In this example, the halakhic principles function both as guides to halakhic-legal deliberation 
and as criteria for halakhic-legal validity. They both guide the modification of the halakha and 
rule out certain decisions as invalid. The introduction of these principles does not mean that 
Leibowitz has relinquished service of God in its negative sense as a criterion of halakhic-legal 
validity. He is still committed to the exclusion of other values and interests from halakhic-legal 
practice. But recognition of these substantive and immanent principles allows him to claim that 
halakhic norms can be modified when they fail to conform to the principles of halakha itself. 
They must be modified to be brought into conformity with these principles.  
 owever, Zohar aptly criticizes Leibowitz’s position both on the true immanence of these 
principles and as to whether he adequately describes the type of deliberation that takes place in 
the halakhic-legal process. First, he questions the source of these principles in the halakha and 
121 
 
their consistency within the framework of Leibowitz’s philosophy of halakha.  e wonders where 
in the halakha Leibowitz has derived them, in particular conditions (1), (2), and (5). If they stem 
from actual principles discussed in halakhic literature, such as “benefiting from that which is 
prohibited” or “lack of integrity,” then a halakhic discussion relating these principles to the case 
of autopsies is necessary. If they stem from a moral principle regarding honesty, then, on 
Leibowitz’s own terms, it is problematic to impose them on halakhic-legal deliberations. They 
are not really immanent but arise from human interests and values.
185
 
 Second, and focusing on his discussion of autopsies, Leibowitz reduces this halakhic 
question to the bare opposition of the unequivocal ban on autopsies and the advancement of 
modern medicine. However, this is merely a result of his conceiving of halakhic norms as simple 
rules, without underlying values and purposes beyond that of service of God. Actual halakhic-
legal practice is not conducted in this manner. Indeed, Zohar shows that the traditional halakhic-
legal deliberations concerning autopsies involve ascertaining the individual purposes and values, 
such as “saving lives” or the “honor of the dead,” standing behind halakhic norms to determine 
their application and limits. This deliberation is evidenced as early as the Mishnah, for, as Zohar 
notes, the question of the halakhic status of autopsies has its roots in two rabbinic sources, one 
related to delaying burial, the other to impinging on the corpse. The Mishnah prohibits delaying 
the burial of a corpse unless it is for the “honor of the dead,” implying that the reason that burial 
must be performed immediately is for the same reason.
186
 Elsewhere, the Talmud notes that one 
may not impinge on the corpse so as to cause it to be disgusting.
187
 Zohar argues that this rule is 
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just the obverse of the earlier ruling, as evidenced by a point made by the Rabbi Shlomo ben 
Aderet, a medieval commentator (1235-1310), that one may cause a corpse to degrade, if one 
thereby fulfills a wish of the deceased. This is because an individual’s will is his honor.
188
 This 
type of discussion continues in halakhic literature to the present day. Indeed, Zohar concludes 
that “the continuing formation of the halakha is bound together with the reasons for its laws, 
which is to say in different values—moral and religious—that constitute their purposes.”
189
 
Leibowitz’s immanent principles and criteria of halakhic-legal validity are thus not consistent 
with his own exclusion of human interests and values from halakhic-legal practice. Moreover, 
they are not descriptively adequate of halakhic-legal deliberation, which touches on the specific 
values and purposes that underlie halakhic norms, some of which, like “honor of the dead” seem 
to be human interests and values. Thus, Leibowitz’s attempt to unify his philosophy of halakha 
by making service of God both the reason for the commandments and the criterion of halakhic-
legal validity fails.    
3. Halakhic-Legal Practice: Women, Euthanasia, and Abortion  
Indeed, Leibowitz’s engagement in halakhic-legal practice shows that even he appeals to 
considerations about the values and purposes of halakhic norms besides service of God. There is, 
as Rosenak points out, a disjunction between Leibowitz’s theory and praxis of halakha,
190
 or his 
theory of halakha and actual halakhic-legal practice. In these cases, he introduces an additional 
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immanent criterion of halakhic-legal validity, which allows for the unrestricted introduction of 
other values and purposes into halakha-legal practice. Moreover, he suggests that there are other 
reasons for the commandments besides service of God that should influence halakhic-legal 
practice. Lastly, his own philosophical commitments undercut his theory of halakha by 
occasionally leading him to call for the revision of halakhic norms on their basis. 
a. Metahalakha: Women and Halakha  
In an article entitled, “The Status of Women in Judaism:  alakha and Metahalakha,” 
Leibowitz weighs in on a significant issue confronting contemporary Orthodox Judaism—the 
halakhic status of women—and, in the process, offers two additions to his theory of halakha. He 
summarizes his argument as follows: 
The existence of the Jewish people and Jewish society in the past generation is an existence 
that the thought of the halakha consolidated in the historical tradition of Judaism did not 
expect and did not think of at all. Similar to the political and economic problems of our day, 
the problem of the place of women in our social, economic, and cultural life is among the 
things that the halakhic decisions that are in our hands do not comprehend…, for they do not 
relate at all to our existence. All our social, economic and political problems require—
precisely from the perspective of the community that accepts upon itself the form of life 
according to the Torah and its commandments—renewed halakhic legislation from the 
perspective of [its] understanding of the premises that are the fundaments of halakhic rulings, 
the metahalakha—and they are not capable of being solved by relying on the consolidated 




Traditionally, women are recognized as possessing a different set of halakhic obligations, 
permissions, and prohibitions than men. It is a halakhic principle that women are not obligated to 
perform positive commandments that are time bound. Though there may be as many exceptions 
to this principle as there are instantiations of it, significant examples of its application are 
women’s lack of obligation to don tzitzit, bind themselves with phylacteries, or eat in a sukkah on 
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 For different reasons women are not obligated to learn Torah
193
 and are 
excluded from holding various positions of authority.
194
 
Leibowitz approaches this halakhic issue from the standpoint of the contemporary status of 
women in general society. The Jewish community that observes halakha “belongs to a society 
whose culture is a culture of men and women together, and this is the form of our Jewish 
existence.”
195
 The problem created by the clash between a discriminatory halakha and the 
egalitarianism that prevails in general society, along with the impossibility of ameliorating it 
through the usual casuistic methods, “threatens the essence of the continuing existence of the 
Judaism of Torah and the commandments in our world.”
196
 He thus suggests a metahalakhic 
principle to the effect that halakhic changes that are necessary for the preservation of the 
halakhic system itself are valid.
197
 With this principle Leibowitz allows halakhic changes, while 
still maintaining that the source of these changes is the halakha itself. However, as Sagi notes, in 
practice this radically exposes the content of halakhic norms to what Leibowitz could only 
describe as human interests and values.
198
 Halakhic-legal practice will ultimately be guided by 
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values and interests like egalitarianism, which Leibowitz could only see as “human.” This 
proposal consequently undermines a central component of his theory of halakha. 
This proposal is also problematic for his justification of the commandments because 
Leibowitz distinguishes among halakhic norms in terms of their status and purpose. Despite his 
calls for new halakhic legislation on the basis of metahalakhic principles, he does not think that 
all halakhic norms should be made egalitarian. He makes two distinctions, which do not 
necessarily overlap with each other. He differentiates between commandments which only have 
meaning as commandments to serve God and those that have further meanings as well as 
between commandments de jure (le-hathila) and commandments de facto (be-de’eved).  
Beginning with the first distinction, Leibowitz claims that for some commandments “all of 
their meaning only comes from the Torah having established them as obligations…  without this 
obligation they would be devoid of meaning. In other words, these actions are only service of 
God to the extent that the Torah obligates man to do them. Thus, if a man who is not obligated 
by them fulfills them of his own volition, there is nothing in it of service of God, rather 
something like sport.”
199
 Examples of these commandments include donning tzitzit, binding 
oneself with phylacteries, and eating in a sukkah. He holds that egalitarianism in these areas is 
misguided at best and religiously compromised and halakhically invalid at worst. In contrast, he 
thinks that men and women must have equal obligations in terms of the commandment to study 
Torah, for it “in addition to its meaning as the fulfillment of a commandment—[it] makes the 
Jewish person a partner in the cultural heritage of Judaism and its spiritual matters; one is almost 
able to say—makes him a partner to the indwelling of the Divine presence among the Jewish 
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people. Distancing the study of Torah from women…is the negation of a principle Jewish right 
from her:  er ‘Jewishness’ is made lighter than that of a man.”
200
  
Turning to the second distinction, Leibowitz takes issue with women’s exclusion from 
positions of religious, political, and communal authority and norms about modest dress. He 
argues that these norms were only de facto halakhic prohibitions, which resulted from 
historically widespread cultural views about women. In these cases the halakha codified “what 
was in practice” and not “what ought to be.” In contrast, he argues that halakhic norms related to 
sexual prohibitions and family purity are halakhic norms de jure, which are not dependent on 
their cultural context, and which must be accepted as “absolute demands that reflect ‘the yoke of 
the kingdom of heaven.’”
201
 
Tamar Ross criticizes Leibowitz’s division of the commandments into those that are de jure, 
timeless, and which must be observed as absolute commands, and those that are merely de facto, 
cultural conditioned, and which are subject to change. She argues that this is not an authentic use 
of halakhic terminology and claims that Leibowitz is using it to license his historicization of 
halakhic norms. Further, she argues that this historicization is selective in a manner that cannot 
be sustained; the sexual prohibitions and laws of family purity can be shown to be cultural 
conditioned as well. Ross speculates as to what drew Leibowitz to such an inconsistent position, 
including his religious philosophy in general, recognition of historical change, and tendency to 
create dichotomous categories.
202
 A factor she does not include, however, is moral convictions 
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about women’s equality. Doubtless, these commitments as well influenced this intervention in 
halakhic-legal practice.   
In this connection, Leibowitz’s first distinction is inconsistent with his account of ta’amei ha-
mitzvot, for, as Rosenak notes, it indicates “that that this commandment is counted not only as a 
deontic divine commandment, but it carries…some function that deals with personal and cultural 
identity.”
203
 Thus, whereas in his justification of the commandments Leibowitz insists that the 
only reason for every commandment is service of God, here he supplies a specific purpose for 
the commandment to study Torah: It enfranchises individuals to the Jewish people and culture. 
Further, deploying this purpose in halakhic-legal deliberations conflicts with the original 
criterion of halakhic-legal validity proposed by Leibowitz; personal and cultural identity is a type 
of value and purpose that should be excluded by the requirement that all halakhic norms be for 
the purpose of serving God. Leibowitz might argue that halakhic norms are not changed because 
of external values or purposes but because the disenfranchisement of women in an era of 
egalitarianism threatens the continued existence of the halakhic form of life. However, the 
introduction of a purpose served by the study of Torah supports Zohar’s contention that halakhic-
legal practice requires engagement with the substantive purposes of the commandments. Only 
with such purposes in view can one determine the application and limits of halakhic norms. In 
this case, only by reflecting on the purpose served by the commandment to study Torah could 
Leibowitz realize that women were not simply freed from an obligation by not being commanded 
to study Torah but that they were being disenfranchised from the Jewish people and that this 
undermines the continuity of halakhic practice.  
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b. Metaethics: Euthanasia and Abortion   
Leibowitz’s use of a specific purpose for the commandment to study Torah evidences a 
disjunction between his justification of the commandments and his halakhic-legal practice. Some 
of his other forays into halakhic-legal practice demonstrate continuity between his general 
philosophical views and his halakhic-legal practice, while still violating his philosophy of 
halakha. Though the positions he advocates violate his stricture against assigning additional 
reasons for the commandments, the rationale for his advocacy of those positions stem from his 
general philosophical commitments. The two areas where such influence is apparent are in his 
writings on abortion and euthanasia. Leibowitz discusses both of these issues in his essay 
“Medicine and the Value of Life,” which begins by analyzing the case of Karen Ann Quinlan, an 
American woman who had fallen into a persistent vegetative state and whose parents sued for the 
right to remove her artificial life-sustaining mechanisms. Leibowitz moves from this case to a 
broader discussion of the notion of an individual’s right to live: 
Does a man have the right to live? We have already said that rights derive from an 
institutional framework, and therefore—who or what acquires for man the right to live? It 
seems, if I do not recognize a rational basis for this right, why is it prohibited for me to 
behave towards a man like I behave towards an inanimate object or a vegetable or another 
living being? The answer to this… question is that: Indeed, there is no rational basis for this 
[right], however this is a postulate that has been accepted upon us. Why? Because we have 
accepted it upon ourselves, and this is the secret of its validity. It is forbidden to take a man’s 




Leibowitz’s view of status of the right to live derives from his metaethical position. The right to 
live cannot be rationally grounded; it is either itself an ultimate value decision, perhaps identical 
to that of morality, or it follows from a different value decision, like service of God. For 
Leibowitz certain practical consequences follow from his metaethical position: “The right of man 
to live is a non-rational principle. And since it is not rational—it is not capable of rationalization, 
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that is, it is not possible to establish for it boundaries and limits…. And to say: Until here is its 
validity and from here and onward it has no validity.”
205
 Further, since he holds on the basis of 
his philosophy of biology that life is a continuous phenomenon with no absolute boundary both 
at its origin and its conclusion, abortion and euthanasia are prohibited to those who accept the 
postulate that one must not take another human’s life.
206
  
Leibowitz recognizes that his view contradicts the accepted position of the halakha. He notes 
that Rabbi Moshe Isserles (1520-1572), the Ashkenazi glossator of Rabbi Joseph Karo’s    88-
1575) legal code the Shulhan ‘Aruk, ruled that there is a distinction between actively bringing 
about death by directly causing one of the necessary functions of the body to cease and passively 
causing death by removing an external mechanism that is maintaining life. Leibowitz notes, 
however, that “he is not satisfied with this conclusion,” and tries to assimilate Isserles’ position 
as an instance of “a halakha that should not be taught” (halakha ve-‘ayn morin keyn). He is also 
aware that the halakha, in fact, does distinguish between different stages of development in 
utero,
207
 and thus tries to draw the distinction between culpability in human court versus 
culpability in heavenly court.
208
 Leibowitz is dissatisfied with his contradiction of the established 
halakha and tries to reconcile his conclusions with it; but these efforts are not successful.  
More important than the success or failure of these efforts is the source of these conflicts in 
Leibowitz’s general philosophical commitments.  is view that life is a continuous phenomenon 
derives from his general views in the philosophy of biology. Thus, the latter led him to revise 
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halakhic norms. Moreover, his view that the right to live is an arational postulate generates the 
conflict in the first place, for if the right to live had a rational basis, its limit and applicability 
could be determined as they are in the established halakha. His metaethics thus also leads him to 
revise halakhic norms. Leibowitz rejects a halakhic position for a reason that does not stem from 
the halakha itself but from philosophy, while still maintaining that there cannot be reasons for the 
commandments. His halakhic-legal practice contradicts his account of the reason for the 
commandments and conforms to his general metaethical views.  
D. Legal Problems 
Leibowitz attempts to unify his philosophy of halakha through service of God: Service of 
God is both the reason for the commandments and the criterion of validity for halakhic-legal 
practice. The normative and legal justifications of halakhic norms are thus identical. This 
unification would have two related advantages: It would connect the justification for halakhic 
norms with halakhic-legal practice, which would ensure that halakhic practice would track its 
justification. Relatedly, the reason for which an individual must engage in halakhic practice 
would be the same reason that determined the content of halakhic norms. This would render 
perspicuous why one should follow halakhic-legal authorities if one decides to serve God.  
 owever, Leibowitz’s identification of service of God with the criterion of validity for 
halakhic-legal practice fails. It rules out any other substantive considerations and cannot itself 
guide halakhic-legal deliberation. Not surprisingly then, it does not accurately describe actual 
halakhic-legal practice. Indeed, when he engages in halakhic-legal practice, he recognizes other, 
more substantive considerations. Still, he insists that halakhic norms must be performed 
exclusively for the reason that they are service of God. Consequently, halakhic-legal authorities 
pronounce norms that must be followed as service of God, while there are actually other reasons 
131 
 
for each halakhic norm. There is a gap between normative justification and legal justification. 
Halakhic-legal authority is therefore “opaque”  it generates norms for which its addressees have 
reason to act but without it being apparent how these particular norms relate to that reason.  
This raises a more general question about the relation between normative justification and 
legal authority. Law as a unique form of normative discourse and practice requires two features 
that must be reconciled: On the one hand, it is essential to law that legal authorities command, 
that is, that they do not merely recommend that their subjects perform an action or remind their 
subjects of their preexisting commitment to perform an action. A legal subject must perform an 
action because it’s the law. This insight stands behind early legal positivist views such as John 
Austin’s command theory of law, where the law is the command of the sovereign backed up by 
threats.
209
 But, on the other hand, as Raz has pointed out that the law always at least claims to be 
a legitimate authority; it therefore needs to appeal to its subjects’ reason and not just issue 
commands and threats.
210
 Recast in the language of reasons for action, on the one hand, authority 
aims to provide new reasons for action by issuing commands, but, on the other hand, it needs to 
appeal to the preexisting reasons for action of its subjects to show why it should be obeyed.  
Resolving these two features seems to involve showing how the legal authority’s directives, 
or the new reasons for action it provides, connects with the reasons for action that its addressees 
already possess. In this case, it would involve showing how following the dictates of a halakhic-
legal authority allows one to achieve one’s goal of serving God. But ultimately for Leibowitz 
halakhic norms are determined by reasons entirely different from, and seemingly unconnected to, 
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the reason for action that its subjects possess. Leibowitz’s philosophy of halakha is a 
paradigmatic case for this problem because he exclusively designates one valid reason for action, 
which cannot guide legal deliberation. Therefore, it is not clear why even individuals committed 
to service of God should follow the directives of halakhic-legal authorities.   
A suggestion, which is unique to Leibowitz’s thought, is that he could claim that for Jews the 
only way to serve God is to practice halakha as it has been developed by halakhic-legal 
authorities. But this is not because of any unique property of the halakhic norms they have 
commanded. Rather, it is for the simple reason that for a Jew to choose to serve God in any other 
way would require her to reject these halakhic norms and select another form of service that she 
thinks is more fitting. But both this rejection and selection would depend on her interests and 
values. To the objection that these halakhic norms themselves contain features that are based on 
such interests and values, Leibowitz might respond that it is not necessary that these features of 
halakhic norms be the reasons of one’s accepting them; however, when one rejects a framework 
and accepts another it will always be for some reason or another. Thus, a framework that one did 
not choose or fashion oneself is the best way to serve God. It is the givenness of halakhic norms 
for Jews that makes it appropriate service of God. In this vein, Leibowitz writes, “anyone who is 
not capable of coming to religiosity except through the channels of Judaism, or who is not 
interested and does not want to come to religiosity except through its Jewish manifestation, 
encounters against his will the practical commandments in the world of halakha”
211
 However, 
this suggestion once again raises concerns about Leibowitz’s methodological consistency, for he 
would be arguing from within a position of preexistent commitment to halakhic practice.  
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IV. Conclusion: Issues and Insights 
Leibowitz thus presents a theocentric philosophy of halakha, in which service of God is both 
the reason for the commandments and the criterion of halakhic-legal validity. He explicitly 
rejects traditional approaches to ta’amei ha-mitzvot. However, when situated in the context of his 
metaethical and axiological positions, it is evident that this is not a rejection of the justification 
of halakhic norms but a denial of specific types of justifications. Indeed, he claims there is one 
valid intention and reason for performing the commandments—service of God—and offers a 
justification for that value. Indeed, he offers two justifications with varying strengths: According 
to the first, commitment to the value of service of God through obedience to halakhic norms is 
on all fours with commitment to any other axiological orientation and its entailed norms. 
Halakhic norms are thus at least as justified as any other norms. In contrast, according to the 
second, service of God is the only true value because of its unique capacity to be willed in 
radical freedom. Hence, halakhic norms are more justified than any other normative system. 
 owever, Leibowitz’s account of justification is problematic, for it presents caricatures of both 
evaluative judgments and factual conclusions, overdraws the fact/value distinction, and misses 
the link between rationality and attributability. Moreover, in its more radical form where only the 
contentless value of service of God can be willed with the requisite freedom, the connection 
between an individual and her action is severed. Indeed, once the will is disconnected from 
reason, it becomes no different than pure caprice and both the individual who possesses the will 
and the value the will selects become contentless. 
In his theory of halakha Leibowitz attempts to link the justification for the commandments to 
halakhic-legal practice though service of God. The reason for the commandments is also the 
criterion of halakhic-legal validity. However, service of God cannot play this role in halakhic-
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legal practice. Indeed, halakhic norms will always be determined by other substantive reasons. In 
his own engagement in halakhic-legal practice he adverts to considerations besides service of 
God, including immanent halakhic principles, substantive reasons for the commandments, and 
his own general philosophical positions.  
While Leibowitz’s justification for the commandments and theory of halakha are 
problematic, they also contain insights. Sometimes, he embraces an always-already engaged 
starting point for reflection on halakhic practices. While it unlikely that justification can remain 
in this purely internal perspective, it is preferable to the unrealistic view that demands that 
individuals reflect on their practices entirely from the outside. There is no point outside of any 
and all practices from which a specific culture’s practices can be judged  any claim to do so 
usually involves surreptitiously privileging one culture’s practices as “objective” and “neutral,” 
when in fact they are just as “parochial” as the practices being evaluated.  
Additionally, in keeping with this internal point of view, Leibowitz conceives of halakha 
primarily as a social practice and only secondarily as a discursive system of norms. While this 
cannot be the entire story—the practices are initially justified by the norms, it indicates the 
complex relation between practices and both their normative and legal justifications. Further, 
once halakha is conceived of as a social practice and only secondarily as a discursive system of 
norms, recognizing lay halakhic-legal authority becomes plausible, for practitioners are 
ultimately the arbiters of their practice. Institutions of halakhic-legal authority may emerge, but 
they depend on being recognized as such by practitioners.   
Moreover, while it ultimately fails, Leibowitz’s attempt to unify his philosophy of halakha 
though service of God is well-intentioned: It indicates that his attempted justification of the 
commandments possesses practical consequences; it is not mere apologetics. It also tries to 
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connect the reason an individual possesses for performing the commandments with the reasons 
that determine the halakhic norms themselves, thus providing a robust grounding of halakhic-
legal authority. Lastly, his focus on service of God, though problematic in many ways, resists the 
reduction of religious practice to other concerns, whether they are sociological, nationalistic, or 
moral. While it is unlikely that halakha possesses a single aim or value, it is just as improbable 





‘The Objectifying Instrument of Religious Consciousness’: Soloveitchik’s 
Construction of Halakha as Affective Expression and Emotional Discipline 
Referring to the title of his well-known work, Joseph Soloveitchik
1
 has been described as the 
“halakhic man.”
2
 Taken strictly this description is dubious. The identification of Soloveitchik 
with the protagonist of this work is uncertain. More charitably, the implication of this description 
is that he is the modern philosopher of halakha par excellence. In this sense the description is 
apt: Soloveitchik was a renowned Talmudist, a halakhic decisor, and his philosophical writings 
are centered on halakha. However, the connection between philosophy and halakha in his 
thought is complex. In fact, he presents two approaches to this relation: At the close of The 
Halakhic Mind (HaMi), he makes the programmatic assertion that “out of the sources of 
 alakhah a new world view awaits formulation.”
3
 He declares the aim to develop a Jewish 
philosophy out of halakha. Let us call this the halakhic philosophy approach. However, in that 
same work he offers a philosophical account of halakha.  e describes it as “the objectifying 
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instrument of our religious consciousness.”
4
 Let us call this the philosophical account of 
halakha. Soloveitchik thus describes halakha as both the source and object of philosophy, while 
he depicts philosophy as both emerging from and accounting for halakha.
5
  
This complex relation engenders an intricate account of ta’amei ha-mitzvot and its 
connection to halakhic-legal practice. In fact, corresponding to the two approaches, Soloveitchik 
presents two accounts of the justification of the commandments, each of which has a distinct 
relation to halakhic-legal practice. When he directly discusses the project of ta’amei ha-mitzvot 
he argues that the reasons for the commandments must be autonomously generated from the 
halakhic norms themselves. They are the basis for his proposed halakhic philosophy. 
Consequently, the justification for the commandments is subordinated to the results of halakhic 
legal-practice and cannot issue in the revision of codified norms. Let us call this ta’amei ha-
mitzvot1. However, he also provides a more substantive theory of the ends of halakhic norms that 
emerges from his philosophical account of halakha. Drawing on a realist phenomenology, this 
second account conceptualizes halakha norms as the expression of collective Jewish religious 
consciousness’s affective cognition of objective values. In engaging in halakhic practice the 
individual Jew disciplines her emotions to respond appropriately to these values and eventually 
achieve cognition of them. Let us call this ta’amei ha-mitzvot2. 
The two accounts of ta’amei ha-mitzvot do not merely sit side-by-side. Ta’amei ha-mitzvot2 
is more fundamental: It underwrites ta’amei ha-mitzvot1, illuminates Soloveitchik’s 
concentration in his theoretical halakhic analyses on a specific type of commandment, and 
grounds significant features of his halakhic-legal practice. An epistemological corollary of his 
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philosophical account of halakha entails the main feature of the methodology of ta’amei ha-
mitzvot1: the justification of a specific halakhic norm must emerge out of reflection on the norm 
itself. Yet, only ta’amei ha-mitzvot2 delivers a justification of halakha’s normativity. 
Additionally, only it explains Soloveitchik’s invention of and preoccupation with the category of 
experiential mitzvot, the fulfillment of which requires the presence of specific emotional states. 
And though both accounts cohere with his halakhic conservatism—on neither account do the 
justifications of halakhic norms provide leverage for modifying the codified halakha, they relate 
to his theory of halakha in distinct ways: Ta’amei ha-mitzvot1 is subordinate to halakhic-legal 
practice; ta’amei ha-mitzvot2 warrants that subordination. Lastly, only ta’amei ha-mitzvot2 
grounds elements of his theory of halakha: its account of authority and decision-making. Yet, 
Soloveitchik does not sufficiently support the premises of his philosophical account of halakha, 
thus undermining his justification of halakhic norms. There are also independent problems with 
his theory of halakha. 
A number of controversial claims have been telegraphed in the preceding paragraphs. In the 
following they are supported by first presenting Soloveitchik’s discussions of the nature of 
halakha, two accounts of ta’amei ha-mitzvot, and view of normativity (I); then, his theory of 
halakha and its connection to his philosophical account of the halakha and justification of 
halakhic norms is discussed (II). As in the previous chapter, outstanding problems concerning 
normative justification and legal-authority arising from his view as well as the strengths of his 
approach are detailed in the conclusion (III).
6
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I. A Halakhic Philosophy or a Philosophical Account of Halakha? 
 The main focus of this analysis of Soloveitchik’s philosophy of halakha is the account given 
in HaMi. One might object that this is to neglect a more important source—Halakhic Man 
(HaMa).
7
 Thus, the priority of the description of halakha given in HaMi over that in HaMa is 
first argued, and a brief exposition of the former’s argument is offered  A . The main contention 
of the chapter is then introduced: the two accounts of the reasons for the commandments found 
in Soloveitchik’s work are presented, and their relation to each other is assessed. Executing this 
argument involves reinterpreting HaMi by connecting it to its philosophical sources and 
Soloveitchik’s other writings, including posthumously published manuscripts and halakhic 
analyses (B). Following that, his view of normativity is discussed by drawing on the 
posthumously published work The Emergence of Ethical Man (EEM) and the previously 
published essay And From There You Shall Seek (YSS) (C). Lastly, it is argued that 
Soloveitchik’s views are beset with epistemological and metaethical difficulties  D .  
A. The Nature of Halakha 
1. Halakhic Man or Halakhic Mind 
In HaMa Soloveitchik presents a phenomenology of the Lithuanian Talmudist-virtuoso. An 
ideal type foreign to philosophers of religion, he claims, the halakhic man is a tense synthesis of 
two other ideal types: “cognitive man” and “homo religiosus.”  owever, as Rotenstreich notes, 
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because the center of halakhic man’s life is the halakha, an analysis of that is also central to the 
discussion.
8
 In his most detailed comments on halakhic man’s object, Soloveitchik writes, 
Halakhah has a fixed a priori relationship to the whole of reality in all of its fine and detailed 
particulars. Halakhic man orients himself to the entire cosmos and tries to understand it by 
utilizing an ideal world which he bears in his halakhic consciousness. All halakhic concepts 
are a priori, and it is through them that the halakhic man looks at the world…. [ alakhic 
Man’s] world view is similar to that of the mathematician: a priori and ideal. Both the 
mathematician and the halakhist gaze at the concrete world from an a priori, ideal standpoint 
and use a priori categories and concepts which determine from the outset their relationship to 
the qualitative phenomena they encounter. Both examine empirical reality from the vantage 
point of an ideal reality. There is one question which they raise: does this real phenomenon 
correspond to their ideal construction? And when many halakhic concepts do not correspond 
with the phenomena of the real world, halakhic man is not at all distressed. His deepest desire 
is not the realization of the Halakhah but rather the ideal construction which was given to 




Lawrence Kaplan notes correctly that Soloveitchik uses neo-Kantian concepts and terminology 
in his description of halakha: Soloveitchik describes the halakha as an ideal and a priori 
cognitive-normative or theoretical-normative system.
 10
 He explains that in describing halakha as 
a system Soloveitchik means that halakhic categories represent a “network of interweaving 
relationships” that are only meaningful in terms of one another.
11
 He also provides a charitable 
interpretation of Soloveitchik’s description of halakha as a priori and ideal that avoids some of 
its more obvious problems.
12
 By “a priori” Soloveitchik does not mean to identify halakhic 
categories with the Kantian categories of the understanding.  e is aware that Kant’s categories, 
unlike those of halakha, are necessary conditions for the possibility of experience; rather, 
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halakhic categories could be considered a priori in a Neo-Kantian sense similar to the view of 
Ernst Cassirer. They serve as classificatory schemes for empirical reality that constitute a domain 
of culture or area of investigation: They provide the criteria for categorizing empirical objects in 
halakhic life and inquiry. Similarly, the halakha could be described as ideal because empirical 
objects only approximate satisfaction of the halakhic categories into which they fall.
13
  
Soloveitchik not only deploys this conception of halakha in his phenomenology of halakhic 
man; he also endorsed it is as his own view. In correspondence he writes, 
The Halakhah (I have developed the fundamentals of this theory in my thesis [Halakhic 
Man]) is an a priori ideal system. In other words, it postulates a world of its own—an ideal 
one, which suits its particular needs. The subject matter of the Halakhah is not the primitive 
datum, apprehended by our senses, but an actus, a creative performance which results in the 
emergence of pure halakhic constructs…. In this regard, the halakhic approach is analogous 




In another essay, “ ow is Your Beloved Better than Another?  “Beloved” , he provides a similar 
articulation of this conception of halakha and explicitly connects it to the Brisker method of 
Talmud study, of which he was one of the foremost practitioners. The Brisker method, now the 
dominant traditionalist approach to Talmud study,
15
 was founded by Soloveitchik’s paternal 
grandfather Hayym Soloveitchik (1853-1918), who was the rabbi of the town of Brest-Litovsk 
(Brisk).
16
 Articulating the main result of the approach, he writes: 
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The halakha was changed into a fully deductive method…. The halakha is not a jumbled 
collection of laws, but a method, an approach, which creates noetic unity, a fully organic 
unit. There is a hierarchy of ideas, and they are all a work of phenomenal architectonic, 
whose base is rooted in the ground, in daily life, and whose top reaches heaven, to the zenith 





Instead of a viewing the halakha as an assortment of norms, the Brisker method takes it as a 
postulate that halakha embodies a conceptual system. In Talmud study one tries to understand 
how the details of halakhic norms derive from abstract halakhic concepts.
18
  
Soloveitchik describes the results of this approach by comparing the achievements of Hayym 
Soloveitchik to those of Kant: 
Kant in his time declared the independence of pure reason of scientific-mathematical 
cognition. R[abbi] Hayym fought the war of independence of halakhic reason and demanded 
complete autonomy for it. The psychologization or historicization of halakha are the 
assassins of its spirit, just as an attempt like this would destroy mathematical thought. If 
halakhic thought were to be dependent on spiritual factors, it would then lose all of its 
objectivity and would fall to the level of subjectivity that has no concreteness. The rooting of 
halakha in its own domain, the establishment of its striking signs and its classification 
regarding the types of cognition of other disciplines—these are among the attainments of 
R[abbi] Hayym. He provided unique methodological instruments for the halakha, produced a 
framework of halakhic categories, and arranged a priori premises according to the manner of 
pure postulatization. His doctrine emphasizes and then reemphasizes, that one cannot grasp 
the world of halakha through the tools of other types of thought, even those closest to it. Not 
only is the halakha not interpreted through historical-political or sociological thought, but 
also not in moralistic or pietistic types of thought. The impulses of general moral pietists are 
not decisive in halakhic questions. The expressions and thoughts of the halakha are turned 
towards the ideal that is particular to it. Its tools and methods are originary to it, and its does 
not borrow tools and measurements from its neighbors.
19
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The conceptualization of halakha as an ideal and a priori system buffers it from extra-halakhic 
factors and modes of inquiry. Halakha is not affected by reality but solely by the workings of its 
own constitutive categories. Additionally, the halakhic system certainly does not originate in 
empirical reality. Indeed, while Kantian categories originate in human reason, Soloveitchik 
leaves it to his reader to determine in whose mind halakhic categories originate.  
In HaMi Soloveitchik draws more explicitly on Neo-Kantian philosophy to describe halakha. 
In a proposal for the work he states its topic as “[t]he Neo-Kantian conception of subjectivity and 
objectification of the act and its application to the analysis of the ta’amei ha-mitzvot problem.”
20
 
However, his depiction diverges from the ideal and a priori system described in HaMa, 
“Beloved,” and his correspondence. Instead of taking mathematics as his comparison, he uses 
empirical science as understood by the Neo-Kantian philosopher Paul Natorp. The details of this 
comparison are discussed below. Briefly, according to Natorp, knowledge of reality as given in 
pre-reflective experience is impossible: Qualitative reality is intrinsically subjective. Scientific 
inquiry involves the construction of a parallel, quantitative model that allows for objectivity. 
Soloveitchik maintains that, similarly, religious experience is initially completely qualitative and 
subjective. This experience objectifies itself, however, and is expressed as religious doctrines, 
norms, and practices. Summarizing this description, he writes, “ alakhah is the act of seizing the 
subjective flow and converting it into enduring and tangible magnitudes…. In short,  alakhah is 
the objectifying instrument of our religious consciousness…. Rabbinic legalism…is nothing but 
an exact method of objectification, the modes of our response to what supremely impresses us.”
21
 
Thus, in HaMi halakha is described as the objectified expression of religious consciousness.  
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This description differs from that of HaMa in a number of important ways. First, instead of a 
priori and ideal categories for cognizing reality, halakhic categories arise from interaction with 
reality. Second, instead of a logically coherent system, as is shown below, halakhic norms reflect 
the variegated nature of religious experience. Third, instead of implying that halakha originates 
in divine reason, there is a strong insinuation that it originates in human activity.
22
  
There are a number of reasons to prefer the account of halakha given in HaMi over that in 
HaMa as Soloveitchik’s primary position. Despite Kaplan’s charitable interpretation, problems 
remain in conceiving of the halakha as an a priori and ideal system. Kaplan himself points out 
that halakhic texts invoke moral considerations that are not strictly defined by the halakha. 
Similarly, Tzvi Zohar points out that as opposed to mathematical language, halakhic discourse 
incorporates natural language, or terms not defined by the halakha. This occurs not only in 
descriptions of the circumstances of application of halakhic norms but even in the constitution of 
halakhic categories.
23
 Thus, it seems more likely that Soloveitchik, in keeping with his 
phenomenological stance in HaMa, is describing the halakhic man’s experience of the halakha 
rather than asserting that the halakha is actually a priori. Indeed, it is doubtful that Soloveitchik 
means to offer the view in HaMa as his own comprehensive view of halakha. Both the epigraph 
of the work
24
 and its closing paragraph
25
 indicate that the work is a phenomenology of someone 
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other than the author. Indeed, it has been pointed out that the halakhic man would not have 
written a work of philosophy like HaMa.
26
 Consequently, while the halakhic man may view 
halakha as an a priori and ideal system, this is not Soloveitchik‘s only perspective on it. He is 
able to occupy both the view of halakhic man, as evident in his correspondence and engagement 
in the Brisker method, and the “external” viewpoint described in HaMi. In effect, in HaMa 
Soloveitchik presents the view of a participant in halakhic-legal discourse, while in HaMi he 
takes up the position of a philosopher of religion. A number of scholars have claimed that HaMi 
functions as the prolegomenon or epistemological prelude to Soloveitchik’s other works.
27
 As 
such it can hardly fail to exert a significant influence on other areas of his thought. Indeed, as is 
shown below, its “external” philosophical perspective is not inert relative to Soloveitchik’s 
account of ta’amei ha-mitzvot and theory of halakha. Indeed, it is central. 
2. HaMi: Prolegomenon to any Future Jewish Philosophy   
Having established the priority of the account of halakha given in HaMi, it is necessary to 
sketch Soloveitchik’s argument in that work. In this sub-section, the four basic stages of the 
argument are exposited (a-d). This establishes a baseline for different interpretations of 
Soloveitchik’s account of ta’amei ha-mitzvot and flags two central difficulties. In the next 
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section, a new interpretation of the argument is offered, which resolves these difficulties and, in 
the process, reveals Soloveitchik’s overarching strategy for justifying halakhic norms.  
(a) Soloveitchik contends that epistemological pluralism is warranted. He argues that 
developments in early twentieth-century science and philosophy of science demonstrate, contra 
positivism, that natural science is not the only approach to the world that grants knowledge of 
reality. Far from presenting a unified account of reality, methodological and conceptual 
heterogeneity has been discovered within science itself. Mechanistic explanation has been found 
insufficient in biology and psychology. Similarly, basic categories, like substance, are defined 
and deployed differently in diverse sciences. For example, while physics reduces substance to 
quantitative mass, chemistry preserves the qualitative features of substances. Soloveitchik also 
points to developments in theoretical physics, such as relativity theory and the Heisenberg 
uncertainty principle, as indicating that science itself utilizes various symbolic frameworks to 
conceptualize reality. But if pluralism is recognized within science itself, he argues, there is no 
ruling out other non-scientific cognitive approaches to reality.  
Crucially, in arguing for epistemological pluralism, Soloveitchik rejects “methodological 
pluralism.” Instead, he insists on realist pluralism, writing, “in the final analysis pluralism is 
founded on reality itself…. [T]he object reveals itself in manifold ways to the subject.”
28
 
Jonathan Sacks criticizes this element of the argument.  e claims that “the very force of the 
argument suggests that reality can be sliced up and interpreted in infinitely many ways. And if 
reality corresponds to each of them, is it significant to say that it corresponds to any?”
29
 To him 
Soloveitchik’s pluralism eo ipso sacrifices its claim to being episteme or to being cognitive. 
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Pluralism must be anti-realist. The next stage of the argument only deepens the puzzle about the 
realism of Soloveitchik’s pluralism. 
 (b) After establishing, at least to his satisfaction, that epistemological pluralism is warranted, 
Soloveitchik turns to demonstrate that religion in particular offers knowledge of the world. His 
aim is to substantiate the claim that “[r]eligion too has a cognitive approach to reality. Religious 
experience is not only of an emotional or ethical essence, but is also deeply rooted in the noetic 
sphere. Indeed, the urge for noesis is of the very essence of religion.”
30
 Commensurate with his 
rejection of merely methodological pluralism, he is committed to demonstrating the realistic 
nature of religious experience. However, the execution of the argument is disappointing and 
reinforces Sacks’ criticism. Soloveitchik appears to eschew arguments establishing the external 
existence of the objects of religious cognition in favor of simply analyzing the purely immanent 
intentional objects of religious mental acts. This seems evident from the way he sets up what 
must be accomplished by the argument: “If and when an eidetic analysis discerns the cognitive 
components of the religious act, then the theory of cognitive pluralism will substantiate the claim 
of religion to theoretical interpretation.”
31
 But in the phenomenological method introduced by 
Edmund Husserl eidetic analysis only concerns itself with the object of consciousness, 
bracketing out the issue of the actual existence or non-existence of the object.
32
 In fact, 
Soloveitchik acknowledges this directly. He maintains that the theory of intentionality delivers a 
positive response to the cognitive nature of religion because 
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[t]he modern philosophy of religion has found an affirmative answer to the quid facti 
question in the theory of intentionality [, which] states that every psychical act is intentional 
in its character. By intentionality we understand an act coordinated with an object…. [E]very 
logical act predicates either the existence or non-existence of the object with which it is 
correlated…. No psychical act can be performed without coordinating it with an object  the 




Thus, according to Soloveitchik, “every intentional act is implicitly a cognitive one,”
34
 including 
those that are emotional, volitional, or religious. If this argument is meant to establish merely 
that religious mental acts purport to refer to reality, then it is well taken. However, this would 
not prove that religion is a valid cognitive approach to reality alongside that of science. As Sacks 
points out again, according to Soloveitchik’s reasoning, since all mental acts are intentional, they 
are all cognitive.
35
 But perhaps the objects of religious “cognition” are mere fancy, referring 
falsely to reality. Why not an “error theory” of religious cognition? Soloveitchik’s argument for 
religious cognition seems to upset the expectations of realism he established.   
 (c) In any case, after establishing in his view that religion is cognitive in nature, Soloveitchik 
contends that the modern scientific method of theory construction, or reconstruction, should be 
emulated to access the contents of religious cognition. In the process, he presents a theory of 
religious experience. His argument here involves a debate with the Christian phenomenologist 
Max Scheler. Scheler, like Soloveitchik, maintains that religion is an autonomous cognitive 
approach to reality. However, he also claims that the object of religious mental acts is God or the 
Absolute (i) and that the object of philosophy of religion should be the contents of these religious 
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cognitions of the divine (ii).
36
 The philosopher of religion must use phenomenological intuition 
to access these contents. Soloveitchik rejects Scheler’s views and holds that the objects of 
religious cognition are everyday phenomena (i) and that the contents of immediate religious 
experience are inaccessible and thus not the objects of philosophy of religion (ii).  
 i  Soloveitchik rejects Scheler’s view on the objects of religious experience on empirical and 
epistemological grounds:  
The central theme of the religious experience, however, is not the Absolute, but the 
immediate and phenomenal reality in all its variegated manifestations. Universal knowledge 
of the Absolute is possible only after the “world of shadows” has been thoroughly explored. 
In order to find the ultimate grounds, religion must begin with the sensible world; otherwise 
its quest for the transcendental is futile. Man is bound fast to temporality, is incapable of 
tearing himself loose from the moorings of his sensuous environment. He beholds infinity 
and eternity as reflected in finitude and evanescence…. The aboriginal religious experience, 
whether related to God in or beyond the world, always conceives of him from the purview of 
his relation to reality. The white light of divinity is always refracted through reality’s “dome 





Soloveitchik claims as a matter of fact that homo religiosus is directly concerned with the world 
and not the absolute; he also raises doubts about whether finite man could cognize the absolute. 
He does not deny that religious cognition concerns God but insists that he is conceived through 
the prism of the world.  
 ii  Soloveitchik rejects Scheler’s view on the objects of philosophy of religion for two 
reasons: one practical and the other theoretical. From a practical perspective, Soloveitchik 
identifies a reliance on phenomenological intuition with a rejection of reason in favor of 
“emotional approaches to reality.”
38
 “Emotional approaches to reality” seems to be an oblique 
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reference to Scheler’s notion of the emotional a priori, according to which the initial objects of 
cognition are not the ordinary objects of experience but values. Values are intuited through acts 
of emotional value-perception. The intentional objects of feelings are values. This does not mean 
that value-perception is subjective. According to Scheler, there are correct and incorrect ways to 
feel and perceive values.
39
 Nevertheless, Soloveitchik claims that such views are responsible for 
catastrophes, such as the  olocaust: “When reason surrenders its supremacy to dark equivocal 
emotions, no dam is able to stem the rising tide of the affective stream.”
40
 From a theoretical 
perspective, he argues that such approaches illicitly move from epistemological pluralism to the 
claim that non-scientific approaches can directly grasp “the core of nature.”
41
  
In contrast, Soloveitchik argues that the object of philosophy of religion should be religion’s 
objective forms, that is, its doctrines, norms, and practices. He presents the debate between 
Kantians and Neo-Kantians regarding the relation of receptivity and spontaneity, or subjectivity 
and objectivity, in experience. While Kant maintained that experience requires both, Neo-
Kantians reduced receptivity and subjectivity to postulations of spontaneity and objectivity. 
From a methodological perspective at least, he sides with the Neo-Kantians.
42
 He argues that 
immediate experience is subjective and not an object of knowledge. Experience must become 
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objective to be knowable: “It is impossible to gain any insight into the subjective stream unless 
we have previously acquired objective aspects.”
43
 
Soloveitchik draws on Natorp’s philosophy of science, according to which scientific 
knowledge of qualitative reality is not possible and the scientist constructs a quantitative model 
of reality to take as his object. However, this is not the end of scientific inquiry. Recent scientific 
developments have shown that quantification alone cannot fully account for reality—structural 
models are necessary. These models are stated in qualitative terms and not quantitative formulae. 
Further, the qualitative nature of reality is not introduced by returning to the given experience but 
by reconstructing it out of the quantitative data. Soloveitchik recommends this reconstructive 
approach, as opposed to Scheler’s direct approach, for philosophy of religion: “We may gain 
access to religious knowledge of reality with its unique structural aspects in a two-fold way: First 
by coordinating two series in the religious sphere, the subjective and the objective; and, second, 
by reconstructing the former out of the latter.”
44
 The contents of religious consciousness cannot 
be apprehended directly; rather, they must be reconstructed out of their objectifications.   
 Soloveitchik explains that, similar to objectification in scientific cognition, there is a process 
of objectification in “the realm of inwardness,” including ethics, aesthetics, and religion: 
Religion, which is perhaps more deeply rooted in subjectivity than any other manifestation of 
the spirit, is also reflected in externalized phenomena which are evolved in the objectification 
process of the religious consciousness. The aggregate of religious objective constructs is 
comprised of ethico-religious norms, ritual, dogmas, theoretical postulates, etc. There is a 
definite trend towards self-transcendence on the part of the spirit. It strives to escape its 
private inwardness and infiltrate the concrete world encompassed by space and pervaded by 
corporeal forms…. The objectifying process consists of two incongruous parts. The first 
remains within the world where subjective and objective aspects are rooted in purely 
qualitative strata, differing only as to their degree of distinctness and as to their proximity to 
the psychophysical border. The second is an act of emergence of “spiritual” reality into 
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outward tangible forms…. Religious subjectivity, for example, finds its correlate in a certain 
norm which, though remaining within spiritual bounds, strives towards the mysterious 
junction of psyche and physis. The norm is much nearer to the outer fringes of externality 




Religious consciousness expresses itself into the doctrinal, normative, and practical forms that 
constitute religion. Scheler too claims that religious experience objectifies into doctrine, norms, 
and worship.
46
 The difference is that for Soloveitchik immediate religious experience is not 
available as an object for philosophy of religion. Instead, philosophy of religion’s object must be 
these objectified expressions of religious consciousness out of which it may reconstruct religious 
subjectivity. 
 (d) In the final step of the argument, Soloveitchik’s theory of religious consciousness and 
approach to philosophy of religion is applied to halakha and Jewish philosophy. He claims: 
Objectification reaches its highest expression in the Halakhah. Halakhah is the act of seizing 
the subjective flow and converting it into enduring and tangible magnitudes. It is the 
crystallization of the fleeting individual experience into fixed principles and universal norms. 
In short, Halakha is the objectifying instrument of our religious consciousness, the form 
principle of the transcendental act, the matrix out of which the amorphous religious hylo is 
cast. Rabbinic legalism, so derided by theologians, is nothing but an exact method of 




Halakha is the objectified expression of collective Jewish religious consciousness. It expresses 
the contents of Jewish religious cognition in the form of doctrines, norms, and practices, which 
provide the only means for accessing the contents of Jewish religious cognition. 
Consequently, Soloveitchik argues that the reconstructive method should be applied to 
halakha. In this way it can contribute to solving “the most perplexing problem…of the 
                                                 
45
 Ibid., 67–68. 
46
 Scheler, On the Eternal in Man, 249; 264. 
47




rationalization of the commandments ( מצוותטעמי ה ).”
48
 He cautions, however, that reconstruction 
must be modified to be serviceable for philosophy of religion. It must eschew the “how” question 
and causal-genetic explanations: “the reconstructive method is recommended, but it cannot 
generate a causal explanation of religion.”
49
 Soloveitchik’s application of reconstruction to 
ta’amei ha-mitzvot is set within a critique of Maimonides’ approach in the Guide of the 
Perplexed.  is principal complaint is Maimonides’ reliance on the causalistic method, the result 
of which is that “religion no longer operates with unique autonomous norms.” Rather, “in 
rationalizing the commandments genetically Maimonides developed a religious 
‘instrumentalism.’ Causality reverted to teleology…and Jewish religion was converted into 
technical wisdom.” As a result, “the specific religious content and meaning [was] supplanted by 
a principle of foreign extraction.”
50
  
Instead of this explanatory causal-genetic “how” question, Soloveitchik insists that 
philosophy of religion, or philosophy of halakha, should focus on the “what” question of 
“descriptive hermeneutics.”
51
 This approach was employed by Maimonides in the Mishneh 
Torah, where he   
does not pursue the objective causation of the commandments, but attempts to reconstruct its 
subjective correlative…. It would seem that the Maimonides of the  alakhah was not 
intrigued by the “how” question.  e freed himself from the genetic purview and employed a 
descriptive method of expounding the content and symbolic meaning of the religious norm. 
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Soloveitchik describes the “what” question as interpretive and focused on the symbolic aspects 
of norms.
53
 As a consequence, “descriptive reconstruction” does not operate with necessity  it 
cannot establish that a norm was the only way to express its subjective counterpart.
54
  
Still, Soloveitchik claims that “by continuous observation and analysis of the objectified 
forms of the religious act, the general tendencies and trends latent in religious consciousness may 
be grasped.” Through descriptive reconstruction “the philosopher of religion may glean some 
hints regarding the basic structure of the most basic cognitive concepts.”
55
 This method thus also 
allows the development of an authentic Jewish philosophy. Instead of subordinating Jewish 
practice to alien philosophical systems, descriptive reconstruction of Jewish practices could 
expose the worldview within the halakha. In an implicit rejection of  ermann Cohen’s Religion 
of Reason out of the Sources of Judaism, which focused on prophetic literature, Soloveitchik 
proclaims, “[o]ut of the sources of  alakhah a new world view awaits formulation.”
56
  
B. Two Accounts of the Justification of Halakhic Norms 
The nature of the Soloveitchik’s realism and its compatibility with epistemological pluralism 
was left unresolved in the foregoing discussion. Additionally, the method of reconstruction and 
how it justifies the commandments was intentionally left vague. Now the nature of 
reconstruction is explored. It is argued that appreciating Soloveitchik’s realism is essential for 
understanding reconstruction’s limited justificatory role as well as for comprehending his more 
fundamental justification of halakhic practice.  
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1. Ta’amei Ha-Mitzvot1: Descriptive Reconstruction 
Kaplan and Rynhold offer two different interpretations of descriptive reconstruction. While 
the former focuses on the scientific analogy with which Soloveitchik introduces the method (a), 
the latter fixes on the hermeneutic language that emerges when he applies it to halakha (b).  
a. Kaplan’s Quasi-Scientific Interpretation 
Following Soloveitchik’s lead, Kaplan contrasts his reconstructive approach to justifying the 
commandments with that of Maimonides in the Guide of the Perplexed. Both of them are 
interested in rationalizing the commandments and draw on the model of scientific explanation of 
their day. Maimonides, following Aristotle, views explanation as revealing final causes and 
presents a teleological account of the commandments. In contrast, Soloveitchik operates with a 
modern conception of science, which rejects final causes. Modern science utilizes a subsumptive 
model of explanation, according to which “to explain a physical phenomenon means to 
understand it in light of a general, abstract formal-mathematical equation that will account for 
the largest variety of physical phenomena possible and that will be integrated with other such 
abstract mathematical principles to form a unified coherent system.”
57
 In reconstruction 
Soloveitchik offers a classificatory model of rationalizing halakhic norms, according to which 
“to explain commandments means first and foremost to subsume halakhic rulings under highly 
general, abstract halakhic concepts and principles, concepts and principles of which the specific 
rulings will be concrete particularizations.”
58
 The rationality of the halakha is thus not the 
instrumentalism of a means for achieving an end but the immanent rationality of systematicity.  
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Rynhold explains Kaplan’s interpretation. First, he notes the similarities between this account 
of reconstruction and the Brisker method of Talmudic learning.
59
 Second, he shows how it does 
not offer a causal account of the commandments  it neither explains them in terms of God’s 
antecedent intentions nor their purposes.
60
 Most importantly, he notes the similarity between 
Soloveitchik’s description of reconstruction and the method of reflective equilibrium in theory 
construction. Just as the scientist begins with his observational judgments to construct a theory 
and then returns to reinterpret the observations in view of the theory, in providing reasons for the 
commandments one begins with the halakhic norms to construct a unifying framework and then 
returns to reinterpret the norms in view of the framework. He provides a number of examples of 
Soloveitchik’s utilization of this method in his halakhic writings.
61
 In each, the halakhic norms 
and their details are explained by being unified into a system of abstract concepts. This 
systematization is autonomous; the halakhic norms are explained by categories that emerge out 
of their analysis.
62
 Halakha is not made into a handmaiden to non-halakhic purposes.  
Rynhold raises two questions about Kaplan’s quasi-scientific interpretation. He notes first 
that Soloveitchik’s employment of the method of reflective equilibrium is truncated. In scientific 
theory construction there is a readjustment of both the observational judgments and the theory. 
Similarly, in John Rawl’s application of reflective equilibrium to the normative domain, although 
the theorist begins with her considered judgments about justice, these judgments can be revised 
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in view of the emergent theory of justice.  owever, in Soloveitchik’s scheme the adjustment is 
one-sided: The norms never get modified as a result of the halakhic theory.
63
 Rynhold further 
questions whether even full-fledged reflective equilibrium could provide the sort of validity that 
is required for justification.  e argues that “it seems that all we are doing is systematizing our 
own existing judgments, even if some of them might be revised subsequent to the formation of 
principles.”
64
 But, how can mere systematization be justificatory? It seems that the norms are 
being privileged without warrant.  
b. Rynhold’s  ermeneutic Interpretation  
Rynhold views these criticisms as an opening to offer what he considers a more 
philosophically plausible reading of Soloveitchik’s account—one that is hermeneutically 
oriented.  e interprets Soloveitchik’s comparison of Maimonides’ rationalization methods in the 
Guide of the Perplexed and the Mishneh Torah as centered on the issue of meaning. Soloveitchik 
rejects a causal-genetic account of the commandments because it destroys their semantic content 
or meaningful nature. He also rejects an intentionalist account of meaning in favor of a 
hermeneutic account. The intentionalist account conceives of meaning as the preexisting contents 
of the author’s intention, thus it too is a form of causal-genetic explanation. In contrast, the 
hermeneutic account, which stems from the work of Hans-Georg Gadamer, conceives of 
meaning as created in the confrontation between an interpreter and the object of interpretation. 
On the hermeneutic account of justification the goal is to  
show [our] imaginary interlocutor how the meaning that we have given to a commandment 
coheres with the system of meanings of which it is a part. We can therefore take him on an 
interpretive journey through the system showing him how it all fits together. But if he is not 
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party to the system in which all the various meanings are implicated, then no appeal to other 
parts of the system is going to convince him. We cannot get beyond our own hermeneutic 




Justification thus involves reflecting on practices to create a system of meaning that exposes the 
significance of the norms. This significance is not expected to resonate with everyone or to 
convince them to engage in halakhic practice but only those who have already been inducted into 
the universe of meaning constituted by halakhic norms. However, Rynhold notes that this 
hermeneutic approach is also vulnerable to questions about the validity of its interpretations. The 
issue is two-fold: First, there is the possibility of competing interpretations. Second, there is the 
problem of justification. It is not evident how hermeneutic description is supposed to justify a 
system of norms. Once again, the norms seem to be illicitly privileged.
66
  
While Rynhold insists that he is engaged in a reconstruction of Soloveitchik’s thought rather 
than a historical interpretation of it, it is unclear whether it is a particularly accurate or 
philosophically plausible reconstruction.
 
He claims that Soloveitchik inherits the shift from the 
“how” to the “what” question from Wilhelm Dilthey, despite there being no reference to him.
67
 
Soloveitchik also does not seem concerned with the negation of meaning or semantic content; he 
is worried about the reduction of validity to causal history and religion to other cultural domains.   
Soloveitchik charges the causal-genetic approaches with committing something like the 
genetic fallacy in the realm of religion. He writes, 
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The reconstructive method is recommended, but it cannot generate a causal explanation of 
religion…. The truth of the matter is that the genetic background of a certain method does 
not in the least affect its cogency and validity…. The task of the logician and the philosopher 
is not to survey the cognitive act from a causal, but from a normative and descriptive 
perspective…. Unfortunately, while neither the mathematician nor physicist are troubled by 
the history of their disciplines, the philosopher of religion is still a slave to genetics. In 
contrast with genetic methodology, a philosophy of religion, following a retrospective 
procedure—from the objective to the subjective realm—does not eliminate its own object. 
The method of reconstruction yields more than relational explanatory exposition. It offers a 




In the same way that genetic explanations of beliefs often, though not always, reduce 
epistemological questions about their validity to psychological questions about their origins, 
Soloveitchik is concerned that the genetic method eliminates the object of philosophy of religion 
by reducing religious beliefs and practices to their psychological and historical pedigrees.  
Soloveitchik is also concerned about the reduction of religion to other cultural domains 
through causal-genetic accounts:   
[W]henever the causal question is raised, the philosopher must transcend the boundary line of 
religion in order to find his answer which lies beyond the religious domain. Both the 
mechanistic and teleological concepts of causality explain the effect through the existence of 
an alien factor…. Thus, religion cannot be interpreted under immanent aspects but must avail 
itself of foreign elements. The net result of Maimonides’ rationalization is that religion no 
longer operates with unique autonomous norms, but with technical rules, the employment of 
which would culminate in the attainment of some extraneous maximum bonum. In 
rationalizing the commandments genetically, Maimonides developed a religious 
“instrumentalism.” Causality reverted to teleology  the Aristotelian concept of causa finalis) 
and Jewish religion was converted into technical wisdom. For example, should we post the 
question: why did God forbid perjury? The intellectualist philosopher would promptly reply, 
“because it is contrary to the norm of truth.” Thus, he would explain a religious norm by an 




The problem with causal-genetic accounts of religious norms is not that they deny the latter’s 
meaningfulness or semantic content; rather, they deny the autonomy of religion as an area of 
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 Soloveitchik describes the reduction of religion to ethics as well as 
to hygienic techniques and aesthetic expression.  
Furthermore, as regards the specific claim that Soloveitchik rejects an intentionalist account 
of meaning in favor of a hermeneutic one, his comments comparing the “what” question of 
reconstruction to the “how” question of psychology are instructive: 
The only difference between the psychologist and the philosopher is that, while the 
psychologist, guided by the “how” question coordinates subjective religious aspects with 
those of the mundane cultural consciousness, the philosopher, searching for the “what,” 





Once again, Soloveitchik is concerned with the autonomy of religion more than anything else. 
Rynhold’s contention that he articulates an interpretive account of reconstruction due to concerns 
with meaning or semantic content is not sustainable.
72
   
2. Ta’amei Ha-Mitzvot2: Halakha as Expression and as Discipline   
More important than whether Soloveitchik is concerned with preserving the semantic content 
of halakhic practices or articulates a hermeneutic account of meaning is Rynhold’s criticism that 
Soloveitchik illegitimately privileges the halakhic norms. Both a quasi-scientific (whether 
construed as truncated or full reflective equilibrium) and a hermeneutic account seem to take 
them as a starting point for justification without warrant. Neither of them seems to ground the 
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presumption of normativity granted to halakhic norms. Rotenstreich points out that mere 
systematization of a system of norms neglects the crucial questions of whether they ought to be 
observed.
73
 The rationality of systematization underdetermines normativity. Similarly, as 




Is it true, though, that Soloveitchik does not give any argument for the independent rational 
justification of the halakhic norms? In fact, when his view about reconstruction is set in the 
broader context of the argument of HaMi this criticism is exposed as misguided. Understood 
properly, the philosophical account of the halakha given in the earlier stages of the work aims to 
warrant the privileging of the halakhic norms.
75
 To appreciate this, however, the philosophical 
account must be reinterpreted in view of Soloveitchik’s philosophical sources and other writings. 
These other texts resolve the first interpretive difficulty in HaMi—Soloveitchik’s realism—and, 
in the process, explain the second—his seeming privileging of the halakhic norms. Indeed, they 
show how his philosophical account provides a two-fold justification of halakhic practice. The 
duality of this justification hinges on two senses of objectification: expression and discipline. 
Halakha is justified as an expression of accurate religious cognition of reality (a) and as a 
discipline for training oneself to respond appropriately to reality (b).  
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a. Objectification as Expression 
There are two steps to understanding how the philosophical account of halakha justifies 
halakhic norms as expressions of religious cognition of reality: recognizing the realism of 
Soloveitchik’s pluralism  i  and identifying the type of content he attributes to religious 
cognition (ii . Both steps require appreciating Scheler’s influence on Soloveitchik’s thought.  
i. Realism  
Contrary to the halakhic constructivism expressed in HaMa and the implication of Sacks’ 
criticisms, Soloveitchik’s view of religious cognition in HaMi is robustly realist: 
Our pluralistic cognitive approach is warranted by…ontological heterogeneity…. 
Methodology…is determined not only by ontological aspects but also by axiological and 
teleological considerations presented by Being itself. Modern axiology plays a major role in 
this respect. Every system of cognition strives to attain a distinct objective. Systematic 
knowledge means the understanding and grasping of the universe in consonance with a 
definite telos. It is interested primarily that reality reveal itself in a fashion which is suited to 
a final noetic goal; the telos is the determining factor in the methodological construction 
employed by the scientist and philosopher. Teleological heterogeneity, however, does not 
invalidate the cognitive act, for, in the final analysis, pluralism is founded on being itself…. 
[E]pistemological pluralism does not deny the absolute character of Being. On the contrary, 
it is ontologically conscious of, and reserves a central position in its perspective for, absolute 
reality. Pluralism asserts only that the object reveals itself in manifold ways to the subject, 




Contra Sacks, Soloveitchik does not claim that reality can be cognized from any perspective 
whatsoever  rather, he maintains that “there are many keys to the ontological kingdom.”
77
 Being 
corresponds, in some sense, with each cognitive approach to reality. Further, “reason leads the 
physicist, psychologist, philosopher, and homo religiosus to a pluralism of viewpoints. The 
heterogeneity of knowledge, however, is not based on a manifold of methods employed by 
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theoreticians, but upon a plurality of the objective orders they encounter.”
78
 There are many 
ways to approach reality; but they are finite and determined.  
Soloveitchik recognizes a few allies in his argument for epistemological pluralism, including 
Absolute Idealism, Pragmatism, and Neo-Kantian Critical Idealism. However, he rejects them 
because they are not realist enough. In fact, while much has been made of his influence by Neo-
Kantianism, a better way of describing Soloveitchik’s philosophical oeuvre is as a struggle to get 
out of the grips of that school.
79
 His concern with epistemological realism and disagreement with 
Neo-Kantianism is evident as early as his dissertation. Entitled The Pure Thought and the 
Constitution of Being according to Herman Cohen, it argues that Cohen’s epistemology is 
inadequate on account of its idealism. While Kant recognized that cognition requires both 
intuitions and concepts,
80
 Cohen, according to Soloveitchik, denies intuition any epistemological 
standing. Pure thought is entirely immanent, generating being out of itself. The thing-in-of-itself 
is a posit of thought and constantly recedes from it. Thus, he argues, Cohen’s epistemology never 
actually makes contact with reality. Symptomatic of this is its enthroning natural science and 
quantification as the paradigms of cognition, rejection of the cognitive claims of other areas of 
experience, like emotions and religion, and avoidance of the qualitative nature of reality.  
Munk points out that in rejecting Cohen’s “generative” epistemology, “Soloveitchik is of the 
opinion that thinking is a process of ordering reality by abstracting the general out of the 
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historical, or form out of matter.”
81
 His epistemology is more Aristotelian than Neo-Kantian. In 
fact, Soloveitchik argues that matter, or the qualitative element of experience, attests to the 
insufficiency of Cohen’s epistemology, being that transcends thought, and the cognitive nature of 
other mental acts besides science. Soloveitchik summarizes his objections to Cohen as follows: 
That Being only amounts to judgments-of-objects is a matter of course according to a 
consistently idealistic view, however that no longer entitles us to equate the concepts with 
one another. Certainly, the specific character of the judgment-of-object consists in its 
establishment of actuality; however, in order to form an object, one must already consider the 
category of “being” given. Otherwise we would lack the peculiarity and characteristic in the 
judgment of object. For all the psychic functions, not only the cognitive judgments, are 
intentional acts, which are directed at an object. Feeling [and] willing refer to volitional and 
affective objects. Emotional thought as an intentional act performs objective formation. The 
singularity in the judgment of object persists even in its complete claim on Being. Therefore, 
Being must be considered as an original datum of thought, which first justifies the judgment-





This paragraph overlaps with a number of themes from the discussion of intentionality in HaMi 
and provides new details. There is the claim that other mental acts, in addition to the scientific, 
are intentional and directed towards objects. But there is also a focus on specific—emotional and 
volitional—mental acts. Most importantly, there is the connection between the givenness of the 
object and its particular qualitative features. The qualitative nature of experience attests to the 
receptivity of human reason to a reality that transcends it. Indeed, this is a recurring claim in 
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Soloveitchik’s work: Autonomous reason run up against the brute givenness of qualitative 
reality. Color, textures, smells, and sounds signal human receptivity.
83
 
Soloveitchik’s teacher and dissertation advisor  einrich Meier stimulated his quasi-
Aristotelian epistemology. However, there is also a great deal of influence from Scheler. 
Scholars have noted Scheler’s influence on Soloveitchik’s thought, in particular his conceptions 
of time and repentance.
84
 Attention to his use of Scheler’s epistemology has been neglected. This 
is regrettable, for in addition to the negative comments about Scheler in the body of HaMi the 
footnotes reveal a more ambivalent relationship in which certain elements of Scheler’s thought 
are rejected, while others are accepted. Indeed, Soloveitchik writes, “One of the foremost 
proponents of autonomous religious knowledge and of unique epistemology of religion was Max 
Scheler, to whose [On the Eternal in Man] this work is indebted in several important points.”
85
 
Scheler articulated what has been described as a realist phenomenology,
86
 which thus also 
serves as an epistemology. As mentioned, Husserl maintained that in phenomenological analysis 
the investigator brackets out the existence in the external world of the objects he describes.
87
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Scheler rejects this characterization of phenomenology and writes that phenomenological 
reduction is 
totally independent of the epistemological antithesis of idealism-realism…. What remains 
after the deactualization of the world is indeed the “ideal” world of essence, but not 
something that can be automatically considered merely immanent to consciousness. 
 usserl’s assertion, that ‘immanent essence’ precedes ‘transcendent essence’ and that 
therefore the laws of the ‘consciousness’ of something must also be the laws of the objects of 
consciousness…in no way follows from the procedure of reduction. It is an epistemological 
standpoint which comes from elsewhere and follows from the well-known principle, first 
expressed by Descartes, that every given is originally immanent to consciousness. We have 




Herbert Meyer explains that for Scheler the objects of phenomenological analysis are not 
immanent to consciousness  rather, they are “essences of autonomous realities” that “do not have 
their origin in the activity of the subject.”
89
 Scheler writes that in analysis “the ontological and 
value contents of the world reveal itself, and the difference between ‘thing in itself’ and 
‘appearance’ falls away.”
90
 While phenomenological analysis is an analytical standpoint, it has 
only the contents of everyday consciousness with which to work. The objects of ordinary mental 
acts are thus also not merely immanent to consciousness but contain elements given by reality. If 
Soloveitchik’s arguments about the cognitive nature of religious mental acts are interpreted along 
these lines, the basis for his realism is evident. Since they are intentional acts directed at the 
qualitative world, religious mental acts apprehend real objects that transcend consciousness.   
 This does not rule out the possibility that mental acts, religious ones included, misdescribe 
their object. Scheler does not grapple with this problem, for according to his philosophy of 
religion the object of religious mental acts is the absolute, and he holds that everyone—no matter 
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their religious proclivities—intends some absolute object.
91
 And while one can erroneously 
perceive the absolute, Scheler’s goal is not to establish its accurate perception.  owever, 
Soloveitchik explicitly rejects this position and claims that the object of religious cognition is the 
finite world. Indeed, this is the crux of his critique of Scheler’s philosophy of religion.
92
 
Nonetheless, he is silent on what warrants the adequacy of particular religious cognitions. He all 
but rejects justifying the accuracy of specific contents of religious cognition and is impatient 
with attempts to secure the accuracy of religious cognition a priori. Instead, he encourages the 
articulation of a religious description of reality.
93
 Yet, he still insists on the realistic claims of 
religious cognition in general, marshaling as evidence the historical clashes between the church 
and science as well as the certainty with which religious experience is held.
94
   
This seems to be due to his view regarding the inaccessibility of the immediate contents of 
religious cognition. While from an epistemological perspective he agrees with Scheler, against 
Neo-Kantianism, that there is givenness in cognition, he agrees from a methodological 
perspective with Neo-Kantianism, against Scheler, that these contents are inaccessible except 
through their objectifications. But if the contents of religious cognition are inaccessible directly, 
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there is no direct way to assess their correspondence to reality. Instead, one should focus on 
understanding their objectifications. He may also agree with E.W. Lyman, whom he cites,
95
 that 
the coherence of religious notions into a worldview attests to their correspondence to reality. 
96
   
ii. The Content of Religious Cognition 
There is another feature of Scheler’s thought that Soloveitchik adopts—the affective content 
of religious cognition. While he is adamant in HaMi that the specific contents of religious 
cognition cannot be accessed directly, in stray comments there and in his posthumously 
published essay “Theory of Emotions” he indicates the type of content contained in religious 
cognition.  
Soloveitchik’s passing, negative comment about Scheler’s notion of the emotional a priori 
has been noted. However, a closer look at his sole example of the process of objectification 
exposes certain Schelerian elements: 
To illustrate, we may analyze the God-man relation: first, the subjective, private finitude-
infinity tension; second, the objective normative outlook; and third, the full concrete 
realization in external and psychophysical acts. A subjective God-man relation implies 
various contradictory states. These are wrath and love, remoteness and immanence, repulsion 
and fascination (on the part of divinity), tremor and serenity, depression and rapture, flight 
and return (on the part of man), etc. This subjective attitude in man is in turn reflected either 
in the form of logico-cognitive judgments or ethico-religious norms, e.g., God exists…. He is 
vengeful…. You shall love God  You shall fear  im…. These judgments and norms lying on 
the immediate proximity of the psychophysical threshold tend to externalize themselves. 
They find their concrete expression in articles of faith, in prayers, in physical acts of worship, 
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The earliest (in a non-temporal sense) elements of religious cognition that can be articulated are 
affective states: tremor, serenity, depression, rapture, flight, and return. Soloveitchik would 
disagree with Scheler about the means of accessing them, but he seems to agree with him about 
their priority.  
This impression is verified by the essay “Theory of the Emotions,” where Soloveitchik 
articulates a robustly realist phenomenology of the affects. Indeed, his discussion of affects 
parallels in significant ways the analysis of religious cognition in HaMi. Given that the 
dissertation, which foreshadows the argument of HaMi, used affects as an example of non-
scientific cognition of reality, this should not be surprising.  e claims that “[t]he affective act...is 
an intentional experience, having reference to an object; in other words, it is correlated with 
something…. The same challenge to which the intellect responds with a noetic performance, is 
also encountered by feeling-consciousness. The latter, in meeting this challenge, naturally 
employs intentional acts of feeling that are directed upon the challenging realia.”
98
 And while he 
recognizes that particular affective mental acts may fail to correspond to reality,
99
 he insists that 
they are directed at intentional objects that transcend consciousness. 
More surprising is the explicitly Schelerian view about the specific nature of this intentional 
object. He continues: “The objective reference inherent in the affective experience is of a 
twofold nature: theoretical cognitive predication and axiological assessment….  Emotions are the 
media through which the value-universe opens up to us.”
100
 And further, “Judaism believes that 
the emotional experience is suffused with ethico-moral meaning. Axiological structures and 
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moral ideas are intuited through our emotional experiences.”
101
 Like Scheler, for Soloveitchik 
values are the intentional objects of affective mental acts. Values are perceived through feelings. 
Crucially, feelings and their axiological perceptions are not just an individual’s idiosyncratic 
evaluations. Soloveitchik too claims that there are normative standards for feelings: “In view of 
the underlying noesis and valuation of our affective life, feelings may be classified as meaningful 
or degrading depending upon the correctness and truthfulness of the noetico-axiological 
judgments which form the base of these attitudes.” There is such a thing as “an axiological 
error,” a misperception of value, which “results in unwarranted emotional activity.”
102
 
The criteria of adequacy for affective perceptions of value that Soloveitchik articulates are 
robustly realist.  e writes, “The value judgment about the worth of a particular affect 
depends…on the feeling-event-relatedness, on the commensurability or incommensurability of 
the objective content of the message and its inward decoding, on the correspondence between 
impressions pouring in from the outside and the interpretations the person gives to these 
impressions.”
103
 For Soloveitchik there are no intrinsically good or bad affects, just as there are 
no intrinsically good or bad perceptions. What matters is the correspondence of an affect to its 
axiological object. An affective response must be appropriate to the value it perceives.  
Soloveitchik also discusses religious affects, which are distinguished from other affects by 
their object: 
Since the religious experience…is an all-inclusive affair (its objective reference extends to 
the totality of being, to finitude as such in its relationship to the Infinite), it must respond not 
only to one event, but to an unlimited multiplicity of occurrences. It must encounter a 
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multifaceted reality which can be interpreted only by a strange diverse experience, in 




The object of religious affects is “the totality of being.” This characterization of the object of 
religious affect seems to violate Soloveitchik’s stricture in HaMi that the object of religious 
cognition must be the “here and now reality” and not the absolute.  owever, in HaMi 
Soloveitchik never denied that religious cognition aspires to cognize the absolute; he only 
insisted that it must be seen from the perspective of everyday reality. Similarly, here he identifies 
the objective referent of religious affects with “the totality of being,” but also with “finitude in its 
relationship to the Infinite.” The object of religious affects is the totality of reality as given in 
human experience. Still, this experience must be understood realistically; human experience 
represents reality as it is.  
But, according to Soloveitchik, “the totality of being” or “finitude in its relationship to the 
Infinite” is not homogenous and does not call for a uniform affective response. Reality is 
multifarious and calls for antithetical affective responses. Again, he is not simply stating that 
human beings experience and respond to reality in different ways; rather, he claims that there are 
real features of being that require diverse affective responses. Additionally, recall that these 
affective responses are acts of value-perception. There are thus a plurality of values that must be 
recognized and responded to appropriately. In sum, accurate religious cognition involves 
veridical value-perception and apt affective responses. These diverse axiological evaluations and 
affective responses then objectify themselves into different religious doctrines, norms, and 
practices. 
Consequently, when viewed from the perspective of the whole arc of HaMi, and when his 
realist commitments are appreciated, it becomes apparent that Soloveitchik privileges halakhic 
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norms because he believes they express accurate religious cognition of reality in an objectified 
form. He discusses ta’amei ha-mitzvot under the rubric of reconstruction because that is the only 
method to access the specific contents of particular halakhic norms. However, what justifies the 
norms, making them fit objects for reconstruction in the first place, is his realist philosophical 
account of halakha. Therefore, the philosophical account of halakha underwrites the method of 
reconstruction, or ta’amei ha-mitzvot1. Indeed, it constitutes a broader justification of halakhic 
norms,  ta’amei ha-mitzvot2, which is more fundamental than ta’amei ha-mitzvot1.  
 owever, one might object that this is to neglect Soloveitchik’s rejection of causal-genetic 
methods in philosophy of religion. Similarly, one might argue that it is to deny his concern with 
meaning, and, more specifically, hermeneutic meaning. There are two responses to these 
objections: The first questions the completeness of Soloveitchik’s rejection of causal-genetic 
methods and commitment to a hermeneutic account of meaning. As has been shown, he seems 
more concerned with the reduction of religion to other areas of consciousness and culture than 
with a complete rejection of causal-genetic accounts. In addition, his warnings against causal-
genetic accounts are more focused on the process of transformation from subjectivity to 
objectivity than with the norms’ original source.
105
  
The second response maintains that even if Soloveitchik intends ta’amei ha-mitzvot1 as a 
stand-alone justification for halakhic norms, and even if this approach is motivated by concerns 
about causal-genetic explanations and intentional approaches to meaning, he simply was 
mistaken about the force of his argument or the way it fits together. As Rynhold points out, 
barring revisionist claims about practical rationality, it is not clear how descriptive reconstruction 
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alone can be justificatory. Moreover, causal or genetic explanations for beliefs are not always 
irrelevant for the assessment of their justification. Causal accounts of doxastic justification 
require that a belief be caused “in the right way” by its object in order to be justified.
106
 For 
example, on some accounts, for my belief that my cellphone is on my desk to be justified, the 
belief must be caused in some way by my cellphone being on my desk. Soloveitchik has 
similarly provided a causal account of halakha, which describes it as originating in religious 
cognition and eventuating in halakhic norms. Appealing to this causal history to justify halakhic 
norms does not commit any fallacy. In fact, it is necessary for the cogency of the approach.  
b. Objectification as Discipline  
However, even granting this account, two related questions remain: First, why should 
halakhic practice be normative, for if Soloveitchik’s account is correct, should it not simply be 
an individual’s immediate response to reality? Second, why should anyone engage in halakhic 
practice? Why not simply access religious cognition through reconstruction, thus gaining a new 
type of knowledge? The answers to these questions expose another element of Soloveitchik’s 
justification of halakhic norms: objectification as discipline. To understand this sense of 
objectification, and thus the more directly normative component of ta’amei ha-mitzvot2, it is 
necessary to explore two other issues: the subject of religious cognition (i) and experiential 
commandments (ii). 
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i. The Subject of Religious Cognition  
In HaMi Soloveitchik does not identify the subject of religious cognition and experience with 
the individual but with the historically evolving collective consciousness of a community. He 
writes, “It is not only the individual ego…but the entire community that meets God. Revealed 
religion rests upon the idea of a charismatic social ego that is the living incarnation of the 
faith…. The objective religious order is identical with the psychophysical religious act in which 
the living historical religious consciousness comes to expression.”
107
 It is the objectification of 
this collective consciousness’s religious cognition and experience that constitutes the forms of a 
religion. The Jewish people as a whole engage in religious cognition that expresses itself as the 
halakha. The individual Jew might not cognize reality in this way and respond with the 
appropriate emotions, value-perceptions, and behaviors.  
The fact that it is the community that engages in religious cognition and objectification and 
not the individual somewhat clarifies Soloveitchik’s peculiar combination of realism with 
particularism. One might think that since religious cognition is realistic, it should deliver the 
same contents to every subject. However, he insists on the diversity of religious experiences, 
cognitions, and practices. In the essay “Confrontation,” he argues that differences in religious 
practice and thought are witness to the incommensurable religious experiences of historical faith 
communities: “The logos, the word, in which the multifarious religious experience is expressed 
does not lend itself to standardization or universalization.... It reflects the numinous character 
and the strangeness of the act of faith of a particular community which is totally 
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incomprehensible to the man of a different faith community.”
108 
The subject of religious 
cognition is not the individual that confronts generic human experience and universal reality, but 
a particular community that confronts those universal elements and its historical experience. 
Lastly, Soloveitchik holds that the participation of the entire community in religious activity 
results in the further development of religious forms: “The history and psychology of religion 
will attest to the fact that the force and effectiveness of religion grows commensurately with the 
increasing participation of the entire society in the religious drama, with continuing 
embodiments of its formless subjectivity and with the expansion of its objectified form and 
symbol.”
109
 As will be shown, this position has an influence on Soloveitchik’s theory of halakha, 
especially in his conceptualization of authority. However, at least initially the individual member 
of a religious community confronts the religion’s norms as external to her; they are simply 
actions to be done.  
ii. Experiential Mitzvot   
But why should the individual actually do them? An answer is suggested by Soloveitchik’s 
theoretical halakhic analyses.
110
 A number of commentators have noted that he devoted 
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significant effort to studying one type of halakhic norm.
111
 In fact, Aaron Lichtenstein credits 
him with inventing this type.
112
 The medieval Jewish philosopher Bahya ben Joseph ibn Pakuda 
(11
th
 century) divides the commandments into two categories: obligations of the body and 
obligations of the heart.
113
 Soloveitchik recognizes these categories and adds a third—
experiential norms. In describing them, he writes, 
The Halakhah enters a new dimension of human life, that of subjectivity and inwardness. In 
contrast, to the actional mitzvot, the experiential mitzvot postulate a way not of doing but of 
experiencing as well. The Halakhah attempts to regulate not only the body but also the 
soul….  alakhic examination reveals the primary characteristic of that group of mitzvot 
which finds expression in parallel action. It is that in each mitzvah we must carefully 
discriminate between ma’aseh ha-mitzvah (the piecemeal process of actual execution) and 
kiyyum ha-mitzvah, compliance with the norm. Ma’aseh ha-mitzvah denotes a religious 
technique, a series of concrete media through which the execution of the mitzvah is made 
possible, while kiyyum ha-mitzvah is related to the total effect, to the achievement itself, to 




Experiential norms require certain physical acts (ma’asim) but the latter are not sufficient for 
their fulfillment (kiyyum); rather, they are only fulfilled when the individual experiences a 
specific emotional state. The physical act is referred to as the ma’aseh ha-mitzva, while the 
emotional state is referred to as the kiyyum ha-mitzva. The precise nature of each and their 
relation require analysis. 
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 reading the Torah,
117
 mourning, and rejoicing on the festivals.
118
 
Mourning and rejoicing are particularly instructive examples because he discusses them in 
connection with one another, and this discussion shows what purpose this distinction serves in 
his halakhic analyses. They are discussed in a lecture entitled “Mourning,” which was part of an 
annual series in memory of his father.
119
  
Some background is necessary: There is a commandment to mourn the death of one’s close 
relatives, including one’s parents, spouse, children, and siblings.
120
 There are several stages of 
mourning beginning with the period from the time of death until burial (aninut), the seven days 
following the burial (shiva), thirty days following the burial (shloshim), and for a parent the 
twelve months following the burial (shneim asar hodesh). During shiva, a number of activities 
are forbidden, among them cutting one’s hair, laundering clothing, washing oneself, anointing 
oneself, sexual intercourse, wearing leather footwear, working, and learning Torah (aside from 
certain portions).
121
 There is also a commandment to rejoice on festivals, including Passover 
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(pesah), Tabernacles (sukkot), and Pentecost (shavuot).
 122
  Rejoicing on the festival primarily 
involved offering a peace sacrifice (korban shelamim) during the time of the Temple. However, 
Maimonides adds that in the post-Temple period each type of person must rejoice in his or her 
own manner, children with nuts and other delicacies, women with new clothing and ornaments, 
and men with meat and wine.
123
  
Soloveitchik raises a number of questions concerning Maimonides’ position on the laws of 
mourning and their relation to other areas of halakha.
124
 It would be an undue detour to 
recapitulate this discussion. Suffice it to note that in attempting to resolve difficulties he is led to 
reflect on the reason why the obligation to rejoice on festivals seems to supersede the obligation 
to mourn, in that the mourning practices of avelut are suspended on festivals. It is not readily 
apparent that this should be the case. The Sabbath does not supersede the obligation to mourn in 
the same way, since then only public mourning practices are suspended. Moreover, the practices 
required by the obligations to mourn and to rejoice seem compatible. For example, one could 
refrain from sexual relations and still eat meat.  
He argues, however, that the obligation to mourn is not comprised simply of the various 
prohibitions described above: 
[A]velut entails, in its very essence, carrying out the positive commandment to mourn; and it 
encompasses in the first instance, not the observance of prohibitions but the affirmative 
kiyyum of mourning as a phenomenon…. [T]hese prohibitions are merely the mechanism for 
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realizing the state of avelut, the concrete means by which the commandment to mourn is 




In addition to the individual prohibitions, there is a positive commandment to mourn. Achieving 
the inward state of bereavement is the kiyyum, or fulfillment, of the obligation. The prohibitions 
are “merely the mechanism” for realizing this emotional state. Similarly, in reference to rejoicing 
he writes, 
Notwithstanding the ways in which we have been commanded to fulfill the mitzvah of 
rejoicing on a festival…it is plainly-clear that this mitzvah in fact entails a joyful heart in the 
simplest sense, requiring the individual to be joyful on the festival. The specific norms 
pertain only to how the commandment is to be carried out in a technical sense, but the 
essence of the commandment, it is clear, pertains to the person’s inner state on the festival. In 





The obligation to eat from the sacrificial offering during the time of the Temple or for men to eat 
meat and drink wine in the present is not the “essence” of the commandment. The actions are 
simply the way in which the joy is to be “carried out in a technical sense” or “actively affirmed.” 
Achieving the emotional state of joy is the fulfillment of the commandment.  
Now the reason why the obligations to mourn one’s relatives and to rejoice on festivals are 
incompatible becomes apparent: 
This then is the meaning of the… determination that a mourner does not follow the mourning 
practices on a festival because the community’s positive commandment to rejoice on the 
festival displaces the individual positive commandment to mourn. Mourning and festival 
rejoicing are mutually exclusive; the kiyyum of one cancels that of the other and the two 
cannot be achieved simultaneously. The external actions, to be sure, can co-exist, and one 
could practice outer, concrete expressions of mourning while eating sacrificial meat. But 
these actions were intended merely as expressions of psychological states, as means for 
effecting the kiyyum of inner mourning or inner rejoicing, and one commandment is 
displaced by the other.
127
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Further reflecting on these obligations and their interaction with other laws, Soloveitchik 
connects each with a different experience: “[J]oy is…an emotional expression of the human 
experience of standing before God,”
128
 while mourning is the expression of “distancing before 
God.”
129
 Each of these emotional states thus reflects diverse human experiences: closeness to 
God and estrangement from God.  
Alex Sztuden offers a broad discussion of Soloveitchik’s argument regarding the relation 
between the kiyyum and the ma’aseh of the commandments by focusing on this particular 
discussion.
130
  e correctly connects Soloveitchik’s view on experiential commandments with the 
philosophical account of halakha as objectification in HaMi and offers a number of criticisms of 
this view from psychological, philosophical, and halakhic perspectives. The adequacy of 
Soloveitchik’s halakhic analysis is not of concern presently. Sztuden’s psychological criticism is 
that Soloveitchik builds implausible expectations into the basic obligations of halakhic norms. If 
the basic fulfillment of the norm of rejoicing on festivals requires one to be joyful, which is 
incompatible with mournfulness, then an individual who has recently sustained the loss of a 
loved one is required to reject her feelings of bereavement. Sztuden believes that this demanding 
view is inconsistent with Soloveitchik’s position, expressed elsewhere, that halakhic observance 
is accessible to the average person.
131
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Sztuden rightly notes that Soloveitchik identifies the ma’aseh ha-mitzvah with objectivity 
and the kiyyum ha-mitzvah with subjectivity. The ma’aseh is an objective act; the kiyyum is a 
subjective state. However, he argues that Soloveitchik describes their relation inconsistently. 
Indeed, in the citations above, the ma’aseh is described variously as the “piecemeal process of 
actual execution,” “religious technique,” “concrete media through which the execution of the 
mitzvah is made possible,” “merely the mechanism for realizing the state,” “how the 
commandment is to be carried out in a technical sense,” “active affirmation,” “simply the means 
for concretizing the goal,” “merely as expressions of psychological states,” and a  “means for 
effecting” psychological states. The kiyyum is described as the “compliance with the norm,”  
“total effect,” ” achievement itself,”  “structural wholeness of the norm realization,” “positive 
realization,” “goal,” “essence,” and identified with the commandment itself. Sztuden finds four 
basic descriptions of the relation between ma’aseh/objectivity and kiyyum/subjectivity:  
1) Objective act triggers subjective state  Outer act is a ‘means’  not part of the kiyyum. 
2) Objective act expresses subjective state  Outer act is ‘integral’ but secondary-essential 
component of the kiyyum, while inner state is primary-essential component. 
3) Objective act shapes subjective state; Both outer and inner states are equally essential 
parts of the kiyyum…. 





Sztuden specifically rejects the first relation because he thinks that it runs afoul of Soloveitchik’s 
critique of Maimonides’ approach to rationalizing the commandments in the Guide of the 
Perplexed. He argues that it turns halakhic norms into mere instruments for the attainment of 
something else.  owever, as contended above, Soloveitchik‘s actual problem with Maimonides’ 
approach is the reduction of religion to another realm of consciousness or culture and not 
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instrumentalism per se. But in this relation the action is conceived of as the means for triggering 
specifically religious emotions. It is thus compatible with HaMi. 
More broadly, Sztuden argues that the first three relations subscribe to a form of dualism of 
inner experience and outer deed or, alternatively, that the means can be specified without 
reference to the end.
133
 However, Soloveitchik does not hold that there is such a separation. First, 
the ma’aseh ha-mitzvah is nearly always necessary (except in derivative and parasitic cases) for 
the fulfillment of the commandment. Second, Soloveitchik does not think that the external 
actions and internal states are unconnected: festival joy is nearness to God, which corresponds to 
certain specific behaviors; mourning is distance from God, which also corresponds to certain 
specific behaviors. The specific actions and the particular emotional states are codetermining.  
Moreover, Sztuden takes an overly static view of halakhic practice and does not recognize 
the two different subjects and senses of objectification. Conceptually and historically, halakha is 
initially the objectification of collective Jewish consciousness’s religious cognition of reality, 
including such occurrences as nearness and distance from God. This cognition is originally 
affective, including joy and bereavement, and directed at values, which Soloveitchik does not 
identify; but it expresses itself as halakhic norms, such as mourning and rejoicing practices. 
Temporally, for the individual experiential halakhic norms are initially actions that aim to trigger 
certain emotional states: Mourning and rejoicing practices attempt to stimulate the emotions of 
bereavement and joy, respectively. However, halakha is practiced over a lifetime and through 
continuous engagement in halakhic practice the individual’s subjectivity is shaped by the norms. 
She comes to experience the appropriate emotions and perceive the correct values without the 
practices needing to trigger them. This is the sense of objectification as discipline. Indeed, 
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halakhic practice can be described as a form of bildung, in which an individual is formed by and 
eventually appropriates ways of seeing, feeling, and acting. Thus, once this discipline is 
complete, the halakha becomes expression once again: It expresses the individual’s subjectivity 
that has been shaped under its influence. Sztuden is correct that there is a fourth relation in which 
the actions fully realize the internal state and there is no longer any dichotomy between internal 
state and external action; there is now a parts/whole relation between the emotion and the 
practices.  owever, this is only achieved after a process in which the individual’s actions are 
guided and emotions are shaped by the practice.  
Consequently, Sztuden’s criticism of Soloveitchik’s approach because of its psychological 
implausibility also fall way. Soloveitchik is clear in his essay “Catharsis” that “[t]he Torah…has 
also tried to control the inner life of man. Laws such as ‘thou shalt not covet,’ ‘thou shalt not 
hate thy brother,’ are as integral a part of the Halachic normative system as are those related to 
human external action. In a word, the Halacha thinks there is an ethic, not only of action, but of 
feeling, as well. Man is master over his own emotional world, capable of disowning feelings or 
emotions, however compulsive or powerful, if they seem to be disruptive; and, conversely, of 
assimilating redemptive emotions into his personality.”
134
 Elsewhere, he writes, “Freedom of 
will, according to Judaism, is not limited to external action. Its application extends to the inner 
life of man. Man freely forms his living experience by selecting ennobling and worthwhile 
emotions out of a pile of unorganized and amorphous moods, and molds them into a great 
experience, endowed with constancy and directedness.”
135
 Doubtless, this seems to demand an 
impossible task if one takes a static perspective. However, if one views halakha as a discipline in 
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which an individual is gradually trained by halakhic practice, the task of responding with the 
requisite emotions does not seem quite as difficult.
136
 
Returning to the wider issue of ta’amei ha-mitzvot, recall that for Soloveitchik halakha is not 
simply a practice but the expression of cognition of reality. There is then a specifically normative 
justification of halakhic practices for the individual: Through engaging in halakhic practice as a 
discipline she is trained to have apt affective responses to and veridical value-perceptions of 
reality, including the ultimate reality, the human experience, and the specific historical 
experience of the Jewish people. Indeed, Soloveitchik writes, “If Judaism has construed ethical 
norms with regard to the emotional life, the basic moral criterion by which Judaism has been 
guided in the formulation of a normative system consists in the need for a relationship of 
congruity between reality and emotional attitudes.”
137
 In keeping with his methodological 
strictures one can still only reconstruct the specific affective responses and value-perceptions 
underlying a norm out of the norm itself; however, the reason to perform the practice mandated 
by the norm is to attain these apt emotional states and to achieve accurate value perception. 
One might object that the experiential commandments comprise a small number of halakhic 
norms, and so Soloveitchik’s account of them should not be extrapolated to a global approach to 
the commandments. However, there is evidence that he views the experiential commandments as 
prototypical norms, the features of which are evident though not fully instantiated in other 
norms.
138
 In fact, he attempts to extend the ma’aseh/kiyyum analysis and thus this wider 
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normative justification of the halakha to include all interpersonal commandments and all 
negative commandments.  
Regarding interpersonal commandments, in a letter on the topic of the commandment to 
“Love thy neighbor as thyself,” he writes, 
All interpersonal commandments (at least the overwhelming majority) correspond to internal 
emotional instincts that operate in the consciousness of the human being, and were they not 
given [as commands] they would have been worthy to have been given and we would have 
derived them from the natural world which surrounds and envelops us, and from our internal 
world….  owever, when the Jewish people were commanded regarding the rational 
laws…[t]he normative field of operation was expanded and deepened and reached the depths 
and farthest bounds of idealism, which are unknown to the psychological instincts and 
predilections. For example, the natural love of the members of one's group is simply a feeling 
of solidarity that emerges from a shared sense of history and fate. In truth, this love is really, 
in its uniqueness, self-love….  owever, the command “Love thy neighbor as thyself”  in all 
its meanings, which as per Hillel the elder in its negative sense, or in its positive meaning as 
formulated in [Maimonides’] Code… , demands of the individual non-egotistical love toward 




All interpersonal commandments correspond to internal states. These states are instinctual in that 
they could have been derived from internal or external nature. However, as commandments, 
they, among other transformations, require an altruistic form of love and concrete actions. 
Indeed, in the section of the Mishneh Torah that Soloveitchik cites, Maimonides codifies a 
number of interpersonal norms, including comforting mourners and rejoicing with a bride, as 
derived from the Biblical commandment to “Love they neighbor as thyself.”
140
 In a halakhic 
lecture Soloveitchik comments on that passage and claims that, as least from one perspective, 
“Love thy neighbor as thyself” is the kiyyum ha-mitzvah, while the specific actions are the 
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 All interpersonal commandments thus correspond to internal states and a 
vast number of them correspond to altruistic neighbor-love.
142
  
Soloveitchik’s description of many, if not all, negative commandments manifest a similar 
structure, in which a specific prohibition is imposed, but the essential element is the formation of 
a particular type of subject, possessing certain emotional states and desires. While halakha may 
forbid specific actions, like eating non-kosher food, laboring on the Sabbath, or engaging in 
various types of sexual intercourse, the crucial point is an individual’s recoiling or withdrawing 
from particular desires. It is not that these desires are negative in and of themselves, but it is 
necessary that an individual engage in self-formation by renouncing some of them. Soloveitchik 
describes this process as cathartic and as serving to sanctify or redeem desires.
143
 It is an instance 
of self-creation, in which one imitates God’s act of self-limitation (or tzimtzum) to make 
“ontological space” for the creation of the world.
144
     
Soloveitchik is not consistent as to the reason this cathartic redemption or sanctification is 
necessary. Often he adopts Kantian language in which the obligation is ideal and imposed on 
reality. The human being becomes an ethical personality through the ability to impose constraints 
on his desires.
145
 However, other times, he uses language that intimates that such self-limitation 
aligns an individual’s behavior and self-perception with the reality of the human condition. 
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Though he may have delusions of infinitude, the individual is finite.
146
 There is thus a realistic 
dimension to this act. The difference between these negative commandments and the 
prototypical experiential commandments is that here the connection between the internal process 
and the external action is more tightly linked. Soloveitchik assumes that these are desires that 
everyone possesses, and thus by abiding by the prohibition one ipso facto recoils or withdraws 
from the drive. The possibility of performing the actions without the corresponding internal state, 
present in the case of the experiential norms, is absent here.
147
  In any event, Soloveitchik 
sometimes even suggests that all halakhic norms function in this manner,
148
 at least at an early 
stage of an individual’s induction into halakhic practice.
149
 Before an individual has learned to 
allow the halakhic norms to trigger emotional states, they serve as an exercise in self-formation 
through self-limitation. In fact, he claims that the telos or ideal of the halakha is the attainment of 
holiness,
150
 which he identifies with self-creation through self-limitation.
151
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Whether or not these extensions of the strategy are successful, it is clear that Soloveitchik 
recognizes experiential commandments as prototypical halakhic norms. This is because they 
precisely fit his philosophical account of the halakha and make clear its normative implications. 
By engaging in halakhic practice one participates in a discipline in which one’s actions are 
guided and subjectivity is shaped. It is training for religious cognition, allowing one to perceive 
values veridically and respond affectively aptly. Consequently, ta’amei ha-mitzvot2 is 
Soloveitchik’s basic justification of halakhic norms. It undergirds his more apparent approach, 
explains his preoccupation with experiential commandments, and justifies the normativity of 
halakhic practice.   
C. Normativity and the Ultimate Telos of Halakha  
On the basis of the previous discussion, Soloveitchik’s general account of normativity can be 
extracted and, in the process, some of his more tentative remarks about the ultimate telos of 
halakhic practice can be introduced. He describes at least two experiences of normativity, which 
correspond to two different levels in an individual’s moral and religious development.   
As has been shown, Soloveitchik holds a realist epistemology of values in which the latter 
are perceived through affective responses. He thus holds an objectivist conception of values: 
values inhere in reality. Normativity is founded in reality itself, as opposed to deriving from 
human reason or will. In his major work that discusses normativity, EEM, Soloveitchik does not 
use the terminology of values but of laws. Still, he conceives of these laws realistically, as 
natural laws, inherent in reality and the nature of man. This work contains, in the words of 
                                                                                                                                                             
something fascinating are painful events. Because of the passional character of these experiences they represent the 




Michael Berger, Soloveitchik’s “religious anthropology,”
152
 in which he describes the nature of 
the human as an ethical being, called to moral responsibility but tempted to be derelict. It is an 
interpretation of Genesis’ depiction of the creation of Adam and his sin as well as the stories of 
Abraham and Moses. The creation and fall of Adam describes the human being’s essential nature 
as well as the prerequisites for ethical existence and normativity. The stories of Abraham and 
Moses describe two types of moral character and their respective experiences of normativity. 
Soloveitchik describes all living beings, the human being included, as consisting of a polarity 
of freedom and constraint.
153
 The human being has the ability to transform and transcend her 
current state over and above that of the plant and the animal world, yet she still has certain 
limitations, both those that are physically unsurpassable and those that she transgresses to her 
own detriment. She has certain natural possibilities and opportunities; sin is overstepping these 
boundaries. In describing the human being’s essential nature, Soloveitchik writes, 
As it was intended in the primeval scheme of creation, man appeared as a harmonious being, 
not torn by inner strife; his consciousness was his conscience as well. His theoretical 
consciousness, which expressed itself in cogito ergo sum…was at the same time the ethical 
conscience, asserting itself in the awareness of ethical need and necessity. The same 




Ideally, the human being’s biological urges are immediately congruent with the moral law. Such 
a being is not an ethical being, however, for there is no possibility of transgression. To become 
capable of ethical action, the human being’s immediacy to her natural drives must be broken. 
Soloveitchik delineates three prerequisites for the emergence of normativity and with it the 
ethical being. The central necessary criterion for an ethical act is that it be motivated by “the 
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pressure of a normative feeling.” The human being must feel the pull of the moral norm and be 
free to comply with it or to reject it. However, for that to be possible she must undergo two 
related experiences: She must recognize her separateness from nature and enter into coexistence 
with another human being. Empirical cognition causes the human being to recognize her 
distinction from the rest of nature, while encountering another human constitutes the human 
being’s self-consciousness. After these transformations, in addition to being beholden to the 
inescapable laws of physics, the human being confronts “the ethical imperative [which] is 
experienced as both a must and as something that may be resisted or ignored.”  She now has the 
capacity either to consciously stay within natural and legitimate bounds or to overstep them:
155
 
“[N]aturalness is moral, unnaturalness is sin.”
156
 To consciously stay within natural boundaries is 
to act ethically, to transgress them is to sin. 
Soloveitchik uses the story of Adam’s fall to elucidate his conception of sin.  e casts the 
serpent as a counter-man, one who recognizes his separateness from nature but rejects his ethical 
potential. Counter-man is esthetic man: He instrumentalizes his biological urges in pursuit of the 
maximal amount of pleasure without respect for boundaries.
157
 Ethical man in contrast strives to 
maintain his desires within their natural bounds. “It is true that the biological law and the ethical 
imperative are identical, yet this is the ideal…not [the] starting point. First man must experience 
the specific unique ethical norm and attain all the attributes of personality-existence. Only then is 
he able to re-experience his biological reality as an ethical telos.”
158
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Soloveitchik identifies two types of moral characters with different experiences of 
normativity: Abraham and Moses. Abraham discovers the moral law: 
The moral law is revealed to him by God, who is at once friend, comrade, and master, and 
who speaks from beyond and within his own personality. The source of the law is the 
mahazeh, the prophetic vision, not the royal decree. The charismatic person discovers the 
ethos himself. As a free personality, he goes out to meet the moral law with his full collected 
being; he chances to find it in himself and to consciously adopt it. He is not overpowered by 
an unforeseen element. There is a free act on his part in dedicating himself to a universal 
natural morality. His sovereign freedom has not been restricted. Only later does he find 




Abraham discovers the moral law by seeing it in the world and within his self. It is revealed to 
him by God only in the sense that he created the world and human capacities. Soloveitchik 
insists that human conscience does not represent the special intervention of God but human 
nature. Abraham finds God only through morality. Morality is therefore something that he 
accepts in complete freedom. He recognizes it as something in reality that is commensurate with 
his nature and thus desirable.  
Abraham sets to work realizing the moral law, that is, reconciling the ethical and the esthetic 
by redeeming his biological drives. This has two results: Abraham enters into a covenant with 
the God of morality, and he founds an ethical community dedicated to the moral ideal: 
By discerning the moral law and with it the God of morality, the charismatic person realizes 
that the realization of the moral goal is not to be found within the bounds of an individual life 
span. The individual may contribute a great deal to the fulfillment of the ethical ideal, yet he 
can never attain it. A moral telos is gradually realized in a historical process. This is why the 
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Soloveitchik also alludes to other responsibilities and obligations that accrue as a result of the 
history of the covenant,
161
 but he implies that the ultimate goal of Jewish practice is the 
reconciliation of the ethical with the natural. The telos is complete redemption, which is “the 
great miraculous act of rendering human reality commensurable in all of its manifestations…. In 
other words, we will witness the triumph of the ethical over the esthetic.”
162
 
Moses shares the goal of Abraham.  e “must reconcile both opposing forces and emerge as a 
harmonious personality…. The dual personality, consisting of genuine ethical existence and 
adopted orgiastic one, must be raised to the level of harmony. Cosmic law and moral law become 
identical as originally intended: ethical designs are woven into the cosmic texture, and natural 
existence is the background against which the ethos should be seen.”
163
 But Moses does not 
discover the law in the world or his self  he is already a member of Abraham’s ethical 
community. The law presents itself to him as already in force. Soloveitchik thus describes Moses 
as confronted by the apocalyptic and numinous command, which demands that he be “re-
educated, re-trained, and re-formed.” In contrast to the founder, he “subjected himself to a 
covenantal historical reality and actually forced his natural existence into a pre-arranged scheme 
of things.”
164
 While Abraham experiences the normativity of the moral law as freedom, Moses 
initially experiences it as coercion. Because of this, he has an additional task: he must 
reappropriate the moral mission as his own. Soloveitchik writes, “Yisrael denotes the triumph of 
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man over the numinous moment in his relationship with God, his victory over the antithetic 
phase in his communion with his Creator…. [A]t dawn he emerges hero, winning the battle by 
reforming himself….”
165
 What is first confronted as coercion must be reaccepted in freedom.  
The two different experiences of normativity are also discussed in YSS, though there they are 
not identified with these figures and are described in terms of religious experience as opposed to 
ethical experience. Soloveitchik is also more explicit that he is discussing ideal types and not 
actual individuals or approaches. This discussion is helpful because it elaborates on Abraham’s 
vision and Moses’ initial experience and later reappropriation of that vision.  
The work is a philosophical interpretation of the Song of Songs. Soloveitchik characterizes 
that text as depicting the mutual love between the creator and creation or God and Israel.
166
 He 
describes two basic types of religious experience: natural consciousness and revelational 
consciousness.
167
 Natural consciousness is evident in all areas of culture and involves the human 
being seeking the Absolute in order and lawfulness.
168
 It is characterized by freedom.
169
 When it 
is explicitly religious, God is conceived of as the Hidden Intellect,
170
 and his attributes are mercy 
and love.
171
 Revelational consciousness, in contrast, involves God’s search for the human being 
and his disclosure in the “obscure and incomprehensible.”
172
 God is conceived as the Divine 
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 and his attributes are justice and fearsomeness.
174
 The individual to whom God reveals 
himself encounters the force of necessity.
175
 Soloveitchik argues that both of these experiences 
are initially mere sublimations of natural drives: the desire for self-preservation and fear of 
punishment, respectively. However, they eventually mature into types of ontological 
consciousness. Natural consciousness becomes ontological eros: a love for the root of being, 
which he describes using kabbalistic terminology as “running towards.” Revelational 




Soloveitchik claims that while they are opposed, they are both necessary and “constitute the 
root of halakhic religious consciousness.”
177
  owever, he also notes that the “religious 
individual,” perhaps as opposed to the founder of a religion, must always begin with revelational 
consciousness;
178
 he confronts revelation as already disclosed. A reconciliation of natural and 
revelational consciousness is attempted through the concept of imitatio dei, where the necessity 
of revelation is appropriated as a type of freedom: By imitating God the individual partakes in 
some sense in divine freedom. However, this only internalizes the conflict and creates an 
unstable oscillation between total subjugation and liberation. The individual constantly runs 
toward and then runs away, as it were.
179
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Ultimately, the consciousnesses can be reconciled by “cleaving,” which is distinct from 
unification and is characterized by pure love. Soloveitchik also describes it as sanctification and 
the climax of the Jewish worldview. It involves a double (or possibly quadruple) employment of 
the Aristotelian and medieval notion of the identity of the knower and the known: God’s 
cognition of the world is perfect and as such the divine intellect is identical with the world. 
Additionally, since God is completely unitary, there is an identity between his knowledge, will, 
and action. While human cognition is not constant like that of God, when it is actualized there is 
an identity between the human intellect and its object. Human intellect can also become identical 
with the world. Therefore, the individual can cleave to God by cognizing the world, which is 
identical with the divine intellect. But for the cleaving to be complete, the individual too must 




At this point in the text there is a puzzling development. The object of cognition, through 
which the individual cleaves to God, switches from the world to the halakha. Now it is by 
studying expressions of revelation that the individual cleaves to God.
181
 Ravitzky attributes this 
switch to epistemological concerns: Soloveitchik does not think actual knowledge of reality is 
possible, thus identity with God through empirical cognition is impossible.
182
 Appreciating 
Soloveitchik’s epistemological realism, however, allays such concerns. A better explanation is 
that the polarity of natural consciousness and revelational consciousness is retained somewhat 
even at the level of cleaving due to individuals’ differing starting-points and thus perspectives. 
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Soloveitchik writes, “Judaism declares the only difference between the revelational system of 
laws and the ontological law is one of perception. The ontological law, which is manifested in 
the created reality, is revealed to man in the form of the revelational moral command…. [For] the 
moral law is, in essence, the law of existence, and moral action is action interwoven with the 
drama of the great creation.
183
 A unique individual (Abraham) may be able to discover the 
ultimate religious and moral reality by cognizing the world, but most individuals encounter that 
reality already expressed in texts, norms, and practices. Such individuals (like Moses) find 
themselves already within a normative system. Their task is to reappropriate this coercive 
revelation and transform it into freedom.
184
  
Soloveitchik describes three ways that Judaism enables the reappropriation of revelation as 
nature. First is the rule of the intellect in theoretical and practical Torah study, through which 
revealed law becomes interwoven with human thought. Second is the elevation of the body. 
Revelation does not leave natural processes behind but seeks to redeem them through the 
performance of the commandments. Third is the perpetuity of God’s world through the 
transmission of the oral law.
185
 Through all of these processes, “[t]he revelational law is 
transformed into an “existential law,” which is received by the mind and blends with it in its bold 
free flight…. The heavy weight of laws and regulations is transformed into an intensely 
attractive force that raises the individual from the mire of impenetrable reality to an existence 
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full of purpose and yearning…”
186
 Soloveitchik thus describes two experiences of normativity: 
desire and coercion. Desire corresponds to the discovery of the laws or values that inhere in 
reality; coercion corresponds to the initial state of one who already finds himself in an ethical 
community. This individual must be disciplined by the commanding norm to re-experience the 
normative claim as freedom. 
Soloveitchik’s account of normativity as well as normative experience and character is 
mainly consistent with the justificatory strategy of ta’amei ha-mitzvot2, though there are 
differences. It is grounded in the same realist epistemology. Despite the identification of the 
subject of this cognition with a specific individual in EEM, Soloveitchik writes more 
typologically than historically and eventually identifies Abraham with the Jewish community. 
Additionally, while there is no discussion of objectification as expression, significant emphasis is 
placed on objectification as discipline: The individual Jew must be shaped by halakhic practice 
to experience her normative obligations according to their true nature. The one significant 
difference is Soloveitchik’s discussion of the overall goal of halakha. While in HaMi 
Soloveitchik aims to maintain the autonomy of religion from, inter alia, ethics and in his 
halakhic writings focuses on experiential commandments, in EEM and YSS he intentionally 
conflates them and concentrates on ethical duties. Indeed, he identifies the telos of halakha with 
ethics and only notes in passing other historical obligations accrued by the Jewish community.  
This lack of clarity about the relation between religion and morality is endemic to 
Soloveitchik’s oeuvre, and a number of scholars have attempted to systematize his view. 
Commensurate with his metaethical realism, he seems to be skeptical of attempts to ground 
morality in human reason. He also questions its ability to successfully apply moral norms or 
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motivate moral action. In general, it seems that he is committed to the view that God is the 
supreme moral being, even if his commands seem to violate “mere” human morality.
187
 Halakha 
thus cannot conflict with true morality, though it should not be reduced to the latter.
188
 
D. Normative Difficulties 
Before proceeding to discuss the connection between Soloveitchik’s account s  of ta’amei 
ha-mitzvot and his theory of halakha, the difficulties in his justification of halakhic norms must 
be noted. He attempts to justify halakhic norms by arguing that they are expressions of accurate 
affective cognition of values and a discipline to attain appropriate emotional responses and to 
achieve value perception. Halakhic practice is both an appropriate response to real features of 
existence and an effective means to come into contact with that existence. His justification is 
thus foundationalist since it aims to ground halakhic norms in reality. 
It has been noted that the initial subject of religious cognition is not the ordinary individual 
but either a founder with unique insight or a collective religious consciousness. Both of these 
options are problematic: It is possible to think of a cultural system, and by extension the 
collective bearer of a cultural system, as attaining knowledge. However, this is merely shorthand 
for a description of the accumulated cognitive attainments of discrete individuals. For example, 
one can speak of the scientific attainments of Europe during the modern period, but in doing so 
one is a referring vaguely to the specific achievements of men like Galileo, Newton, and 
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Einstein. That is not to say that these individuals worked in a social vacuum, but it means that 
one can specify more precisely the cognitive subjects. Soloveitchik does identify at least one 
specific subject of religious cognition—Abraham. But his account of Abraham’s religious 
cognition requires further articulation. It is unclear whether Abraham should be thought of as 
attaining intuition into some supra-sensible reality or, in keeping with the general naturalism of 
EEM, as apprehending more naturalistic insights. The former provokes questions regarding the 
nature of Abraham’s uniqueness and the reality he accessed. The latter raises the more 
significant query of why such cognition is unavailable without halakhic discipline.  
Soloveitchik’s epistemology is problematic in and of itself and when combined with the 
claim that it is, on the one hand, directly available to specific individuals and, on the other hand, 
only more widely available after formation by halakhic practice. Soloveitchik is unclear about 
the status of the transcendent elements of experience. He insists that it is unproduced by thought. 
It is the “matter” of experience and resistant to conceptualization.  e also claims that its 
presence in religious experience attests to the latter’s cognitive nature and realism. But these 
claims are incompatible. If it resists conceptualization, it is not possible to have knowledge of it. 
Soloveitchik seems to be beholden to the “myth of the given” identified by Wilfrid Sellars and 
the contradictions he exposed.
189
 The transcendent elements of religious experience must be both 
immediate and non-conceptual but also able to anchor conceptual claims. Soloveitchik is on 
firmer epistemological footing when he claims that training in halakhic practice is necessary to 
access religious reality, but then he needs a new argument, given his realist commitments, for the 
cognitive nature of the experience granted by halakhic discipline.  
                                                 
189
 Wilfrid Sellars, Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1997), 132. 




Soloveitchik’s epistemology is normatively oriented. Religious cognition of reality grants 
access to objective values or natural laws. His description of this perception as affective bridges 
the fact/value dichotomy, for affects can be conative. In the most basic cases, desire can 
stimulate pursuit and fear can provoke aversion. In this limited sense, Soloveitchik’s view is 
similar to sentiment theorists of value, such as David Hume.
 190 
However, he, markedly unlike 
 ume, claims that values and laws actually do exist in reality and are not the result of “merely” 
human responses to it. But now the ontological “queerness” of these values and norms become 
apparent: In what way is their existence similar to the existence of ordinary objects of 
experience? It may be accurate to describe Soloveitchik as articulating a cognitivist “fitting 
attitude” theory of value, in which values are analyzed “in terms of evaluative attitudes endorsed 
as fitting…or appropriate.”
191
 Indeed, Soloveitchik’s view could be aided by comparison with 
another cognitivist fitting attitude approach—John McDowell’s sensibility theory of values and 
“no-priority” view on whether values are the result of human projection or real features of the 
world.
192
 Still, it is unclear whether this ambivalent ontology would satisfy Soloveitchik’s 
robustly realist commitments.  
Further, Soloveitchik does not provide a clear account of the lack of intersubjective 
agreement about these values. Once again, the dual claim that such cognition is directly 
accessible to unique individuals while training is necessary for others is relevant as is the 
universality and particularity of these values and laws. If they do exist in reality, why are they 
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not available more widely and why are the norms which result from them not more broadly 
obligatory? By drawing on some of his fleeting comments, it is possible to reconstruct a 
plausible view for Soloveitchik. Natural laws, which as has been shown relate to morality in the 
strict sense, correspond to features of reality and the human experience that are universally 
accessible. Values, which seem to be more closely related to religion, correspond to the historical 
experience of a particular community. These values are exclusively “accessible” to this 
community because it only makes sense for them to respond in certain ways to particular events. 
This does not mean, however, that these events did not occur or exist in reality but only that they 
exist in their “value-ladenesss” exclusively for them. For example, a husband and wife celebrate 
an anniversary, say on January 20
th
. Defined either naturalistically in terms of the position of the 
Earth or conventionally in terms of a widely accepted calendar, January 20
th
 exists. However, it 
only “exists” as an anniversary, with all the opportunities and obligations that that entails, for the 
husband and wife.
193
 But this is a significant weakening of Soloveitchik’s realism, and it is 
unclear whether he would accept it, especially given his pervasive ambiguity about the relation 
between religion and morality.  
Nevertheless, Soloveitchik’s description of the experience of normative force is an attractive 
feature of his account. Individuals experience obligations as having a claim on them that they did 
not impose and that cannot be changed by an act of their will. Indeed, individuals often 
experience such obligations as deriving from the nature of a situation, as inherent in reality itself. 
All the same, individuals know that they can violate norms in a way that they cannot violate 
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physical laws. Whether this experience can be philosophically vindicated is another question, 
one to which Soloveitchik has not provided an adequate response.  
II. Theory of Halakha: Ta’amei ha-Mitzvot2 and Halakhic-Legal Practice 
Before the relation between ta’amei ha-mizvot2 and Soloveitchik’s approach to halakhic-legal 
practice can be assessed, his actual theory of halakha must be ascertained. This is accomplished 
by putting his previously published and posthumously published writings into dialogue with 
contemporary legal theory. It is argued that while Soloveitchik’s previously published works 
articulate a formalist conception of halakha and halakhic-legal practice, his other writings, 
including halakhic responsa, manifest a non-formalist approach that is not easily categorized (A). 
The influence of Soloveitchik’s justification of halakhic norms on this non-formalist theory of 
halakha is then analyzed. It is argued that it accounts for certain features of the latter, including 
its conceptions of halakhic-legal authority and decision-making as well as its general 
conservatism (B). Lastly, some problems with his theory of halakha are detailed (C).  
A. Formalism or Non-Formalism? 
Soloveitchik’s writings manifest two conceptualizations of halakhic-legal practice: formalism 
(1) and non-formalism (2). The former is found in HaMa and allied texts. The latter is intimated 
in a number of previously published works but is fully expressed in only recently published 
documents. While the formalist approach is consonant with the Brisker Talmudic methodology 
and characterizes his approach to theoretical halakhic inquiry (lomdus), the non-formal approach 




1. Halakhic Formalism 
Previous studies have discussed the Brisker Talmudic methodology in connection to legal 
theory. Norman Solomon compares the views of the Analytic movement, as he labels its 
adherents, to legal positivism, which was introduced in the previous chapter. He notes five 
features of legal positivism, including that (a) laws are the commands of human beings; (b) there 
is no necessary connection between law and morality; (c) the analysis of legal concepts is 
intrinsically worthwhile and is distinguishable from moral or political evaluations of the law; (d) 
legal systems are closed systems; and (e) non-cognitivism in ethics. Analogously, the Analytic 
movement held (a) that halakhic laws are commands of God; (b) it is thus pointless to inquire 
into their ethical basis; (c) that the analysis of halakhic concepts is intrinsically worthwhile and 
distinguishable from any external evaluation; (d) that halakha is comprehensive and separate 
from morality; and (e) a skeptical view of human morality.
194
 While the five features that 
Solomon notes go well beyond the necessary and sufficient conditions for legal positivism 
discussed in the previous chapter, they describe characteristics prevalent among positivist writers 
and serve to highlight the affinity between legal positivism and Brisk as intellectual 
movements.
195
 Solomon also notes that this movement’s focus on halakhic analysis and 
understanding each side of halakhic debates contributed to a hesitancy to make practical 
decisions. Indeed, despite their positivist conception of law, he claims that when the Briskers did 
decide on practical halakhic matters “non-legal” considerations were influential.
196
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Chaim Saiman notes this reluctance to engage in actual halakhic-legal practice as well. He 
identifies the Brisker view on the basic ground of the law with positivism: the fundamental 
authority of the halakhic system resides in divine command. However, he offers a more fine-
grained analysis than Solomon and notes the affinities between Brisk and German legal 
classicism or conceptualism.
197
 Legal classicism was a movement that aimed to excavate the 
legal concepts that underlie ancient Roman or German law. Saiman thus implies that Brisk 
combined a positivist conception of the law’s basic justification with a formalistic conception of 
legal reasoning. As Ross notes, while formalism is often thought to be a subset of positivism, 
they can and should be distinguished. In a narrower sense, positivism relates to “law’s essentially 
grounding,” or basic justification, while formalism describes “law’s nature and its process of 
deliberation.”
198
 This leaves open the basic justification of the law. Indeed, Suzanne Stone notes 
that one of the foremost contemporary proponents of legal formalism holds a view on the law’s 
basic ground that is more akin to a natural law perspective than positivism.
199
 In any event, 
neither Solomon nor Saiman focus directly on Soloveitchik himself, though they do draw on 
HaMa for a philosophical articulation of the Brisker movement.  
While legal formalism is a slippery concept, more often used as a label of abuse than a 
positive identification,
200
 Ernest Weinrib advances a sophisticated articulation of it.
201
 He writes, 
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“Formalism postulates that law is intelligible as an internally coherent phenomenon.”
202
 Law can 
be understood in terms of itself. More specifically, “Formalism…proffer[s] the possibility of an 
immanent moral rationality.”
203
 Each of these terms is significant: “Rationality” “expresses the 
formalist conception of law negatively through a contrast with political justification”  
“immanent” “characterizes the law’s distinctiveness affirmatively through the claim that the 
content of the law is elaborated from within”  “moral” “ascribes normative force to its 
application.”
204
 The relation among these elements is also crucial. Immanent moral rationality is 
an “integrative notion”
205
: “Its rationality, for instance, consists in its being immanent to the 
normative relationships that it orders. Similarly, the law’s normativity is a function of its success 
in embodying in its doctrines and institutions the rationality inherent in it.”
206
  
These features directly contrast with both legal positivism and instrumentalism. For a 
formalist, a legal reality follows from conceptual relations between legal forms and not an act of 
will by a sovereign or the social practices of a community. For example, the specific obligations 
and responsibilities of an individual creditor and an individual debtor derive from the conceptual 
relation between these two legal categories and not simply because of certain conventions. 
Similarly, legal justification is in terms of the “the conceptual structure of legal arrangements” 
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and not the attainment of some extra-legal goal.”
207
 It is an act of cognitive creativity, yet 
“adjudication [is] conceived more as discovery than the making of law.”
208
 Besides findings of 
fact, legal justification and adjudication involves arranging legal considerations “into internally 
coherent justificatory structures, so that the components of any single such structure partake of 
whatever normative force gives life to the structure in its entirety.”
209
 Legal reasoning, including 
justification and adjudication, thus makes use of purely legal categories and their relations and 
strives to articulate a coherent structure.  
In HaMa and allied texts, including “Beloved” and the correspondence discussed above, 
Soloveitchik does articulate a formalist conception of halakha. In terms of its structure he claims 
that halakha is an a priori and ideal normative system.
210
 Recall that according to Kaplan this 
means that halakhic categories represent a “network of interweaving relationships” that are only 
meaningful in terms of one another.
211
 Further, Soloveitchik identifies halakhic-legal justification 
with establishing coherent conceptual relations. Recall that, according to him, as a result of the 
introduction of the Brisker method “[t]he halakha was changed to a fully deductive method…. 
The halakha is not a jumbled collection of laws, but a method, an approach, which creates noetic 
unity, a fully organic unit.”
212
  e describes halakhic adjudication similarly: “Phenomena are 
psychological impulses that push pure thought on to its path. But at the moment that it begins to 
move on its particular path it operates it movements not in subordinance to the phenomena, but 
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rather in obedience to its normative-ideal lawfulness that is particular to it.”
213
 The human 
significance of halakhic problems is merely the stimulus for the halakhic-legal decisor; they do 
not impinge on halakhic-legal practice itself. Soloveitchik offers an example: When presiding 
over the case of an agunah, a woman abandoned by her husband and “chained” to a failed 
marriage due to her inability to validly divorce him, the decisor concerns himself only with the 
relations between halakhic norms and halakhically significant facts and not his emotional 
response to the case.
214
 The legal justification of his ruling results from its coherence with other 
legal forms and relations.  
On the basis of statements like these some scholars and halakhic-legal practitioners have 
identified Soloveitchik’s theory of halakha with formalism. Sagi identifies three characteristics 
of his theory of halakha: (a) Halakha is a human creation in that while God is its legislator, he 
gives human beings wide authority to develop it. Sagi concludes, however, that this grant of 
creative license is restricted to theoretical halakha, while Soloveitchik’s view of halakhic-legal 
practice is better characterized as the discovery of preexisting legal relations. (b) Halakha is a 
closed system. It is not influenced by historical changes or extra-halakhic considerations but only 
operates according to its own internal logic.  c   alakha is a “pure and abstract conceptual 
system.”
215
 While Sagi casts doubts about the adequacy of Soloveitchik’s theory of halakha as a 
description of actual halakhic-legal practice, he characterizes it as formalist.  
Ross recognizes that Soloveitchik’s claims in HaMa may be phenomenological but ascribes 
formalism as an asserted view to his disciples and attributed to him by them. They “portray…the 
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validity of any religious act and experience as determined only by formal halakhic categories.”
216
 
This view comes in two varieties: a maximalist position and a “softer” application. Maximalists 
“view…the scope of formal halakha as all-encompassing, acknowledging the possibility of legal 
lacunae only with regard to questions of application and not with regard to substance. Ideally, 
every action, decision, judgment, and evaluation…is subjected to the prism of the internal, 
metahistorical conceptual categories for ultimate validation and justification.” “Softer” formalist 
approaches adopt a distinction between “pure” halakha and public policy. In the realm of pure 
halakha they agree with the formalists, while recognizing situations and concerns that are not 
governed by formal halakha.
217
 Still, both of these views endorse formalism and attribute it to 
Soloveitchik in the areas they identify as belonging properly to the halakha. While Ross herself 
expresses doubts about attributing either type of halakhic formalism to Soloveitchik, she does not 
substantiate these doubts. 
2. Halakhic Non-Formalism  
In fact, Ross is correct to hesitate in attributing a formalist theory of halakha to Soloveitchik. 
As before, the views described in HaMa and “Beloved” are contained in phenomenological 
investigations of the Brisker talmudist, who is not identical with Soloveitchik himself. He 
intimates as such in HaMa, and “Beloved” is a eulogy for his uncle, Rabbi Yitzchok Zev 
Soloveitchik (1886-1959). And while he seems to endorse the view in his letter, there he 
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discusses theoretical halakhic inquiry (lomdus) as opposed to halakhic-legal practice (psak),
218
 
and even then certain non-formalist elements are evident.
219
  
Moreover, when his own halakhic-legal practice is examined, non-formalist elements are 
evident. Among Soloveitchik’s recently published correspondence are letters that contain 
responses to halakhic-legal queries; they are halakhic-legal responsa that demonstrate his actual 
engagement in halakhic-legal practice. While some of the details of the rulings are discussed 
below, at this point the methodological remarks that introduce two of the responsa are of central 
concern for they illuminate his theory of halakha. 
The first case concerns the permissibility of the depiction of human images on stained glass 
windows in a planned interfaith chapel at Cornell University. An Orthodox Jewish faculty 
member on the planning committee of the chapel wrote to Soloveitchik to determine his view.
220
 
In introducing his responsum, Soloveitchik writes,   
The subject matter must be analyzed under both a formal and a philosophico-halakhic aspect. 
Since the problem has arisen under unique social circumstances, halakhic formalism and 
syllogism will not suffice to solve it. Certain historical realities with their deep-seated 
philosophical meaning must be taken into account. Such an approach is not a novelty in the 




In contrast to the view expressed in HaMa and other texts, Soloveitchik here distinguishes 
between two modes of halakhic analysis: formal and “philosophico-halakhic.” The former does 
not suffice for problems that arise under unique historical and social conditions. In these cases an 
approach that comprehends the philosophical import or meaning of these conditions must be 
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employed. The nature of this other approach and its connection to Soloveitchik’s justification of 
halakhic norms is explored below, but clearly he recognizes that formalism is inadequate in 
halakhic-legal practice. 
The non-formal elements of his halakhic-legal practice are even more apparent in another 
case. This question was addressed to Soloveitchik by Dr. Samuel Belkin, then president of 
Yeshiva University. Written during the Korean War, it concerns the permissibility of establishing 
a lottery to select rabbinic students to serve as military chaplains. Non-compliance with the 
lottery would be met with professional sanctions. The halakhic issue concerns both the 
permissibility of an individual putting himself in a situation, such as a military theater, where he 
will likely be forced to violate halakhic norms and compelling an individual to enter such a 
situation. In introducing his halakhic-legal analysis, Soloveitchik writes, 
I have undertaken the research into the halakhic phase of this problem, which is fraught with 
grave political and social implications on the highest level of public relations, with utmost 
care and seriousness. Yet, I cannot lay claim to objectivity if the latter should signify the 
absence of axiological premises and a completely detached emotional attitude. The halakhic 
inquiry, like any other cognitive theoretical performance, does not start out from the point of 
absolute zero as to sentimental attitudes and value judgments. There always exists in the 
mind of the researcher an ethico-axiological background against which the contours of the 
subject matter in question stand out more clearly. In all fields of human intellectual endeavor 
there is always an intuitive approach which determines the course and method of the 
analysis. Not even in the exact sciences (particularly in their interpretive phase) is it possible 
to divorce the human element from the formal aspect. Hence this investigation was also 
undertaken in a similar subjective mood. From the outset I was prejudiced in favor of the 
project of the Rabbinical Council of America and I could not imagine any halakhic authority 
rendering a decision against it. My inquiry consisted only in translating a vague intuitive 




Soloveitchik rejects a mode of halakhic-legal analysis that does not include emotions and values; 
halakhic-legal practice does not abstract from emotional reactions and axiological judgments. He 
does not cast off objectivity as such, only an objectivity that purports to exclude these elements. 
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He claims that in this it is no less objective than the exact sciences, though he qualifies the claim 
to their “interpretive phase,” which may refer to the stage of reconstruction. Recall that it is this 
stage of scientific inquiry that involves the reintroduction of qualitative elements. He describes 
his task as the translation of an “intuitive feeling” into the terms of halakhic discourse. Again, the 
nature of this halakhic intuition is discussed below, here it is enough to note the incongruity of 
emotionally tinged and axiologically oriented intuition with halakhic-legal formalism.  
In addition to recognizing the role of emotions and values in the initial phase of halakhic-
legal practice, Soloveitchik recognizes a further stage in rendering a halakhic decision that he 
explicitly describes as transcending formalism: 
Secondly, I have examined the problem in a double perspective. (A)  I employed the method 
of pure halakhic formalism which abstracts from all exigencies of practical life and places 
the problem on an ahistorical conceptual frame. (B) I availed myself of the method of applied 
Halakhah which transposes abstractions into central realities, theory into facts. No halakhic 
investigation would be true [to] itself save as a practical organon. Under this aspect I gave 




Halakhic formalism is insufficient for halakhic-legal practice and must be transcended to deliver 
halakhic-legal decisions.  
Soloveitchik’s approach to halakhic-legal practice therefore cannot be characterized as 
halakhic formalism. In recognizing the role of affective and axiological intuition, an 
understanding of the “philosophico-halakhic import” of historical realities, and a gap between 
the formal halakha and its application, non-formal elements are introduced. Indeed, Blidstein 
writes that these responsa provide a counter-point to the position that “Soloveitchik viewed the 
halakhah as the realm of the a priori, impervious to social reality, and as subject to a method 
partaking more of mathematics than of the human sciences,”
224
 which was based on HaMa. On 
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the contrary, “one can sometimes find in these documents a constructive interaction between 
halakhic positions and extra-halakhic values and concepts.”
225
 Whether these are, in fact, “extra-
halakhic” values and concepts is discussed below. And while Blidstein hesitates over whether 
this is merely in Soloveitchik’s explanation of his rulings as opposed to their substance, his 
methodological remarks are clear that these elements should be operative in halakhic-legal 
practice. Thus, while he may articulate halakhic formalism in his descriptions of the approach of 
Brisk and in his own theoretical halakhic inquiries, when he expresses his approach to halakhic-
legal practice it is decidedly non-formalist. Some features of this halakhic non-formalism and its 
connection to his justification of the halakha are now discussed. This allows another attempt to 
describe Soloveitchik’s theory of halakha in terms of contemporary legal theory.  
B. Halakhic Non-Formalism and Halakhic-Legal Practice 
Ta’amei ha-mitzvot2 and the philosophical account of halakha upon which it is based play a 
significant role in Soloveitchik’s non-formalist theory of halakha. This influence can be seen in 
two areas: his two-tiered account of halakhic-legal authority, which includes his view of 
decision-making, (1) and his general halakhic-legal conservatism (2).  
1. Halakhic-Legal Authority and Decision-Making 
The supposition that Soloveitchik holds a formalist conception of halakha obscures his 
complex position on halakhic-legal authority and decision-making. In fact, he recognizes two 
subjects of halakhic-legal authority: rabbis, or rabbinic bodies, and the Jewish people. Rabbinic 
authority derives from three sources and, correspondingly, the decision-making of rabbis 
operates according to diverse procedures. 






The first source of rabbinic authority is intellectual authority. In HaMa, Soloveitchik writes 
that the halakhic man “recognizes no authority other than the authority of the intellect….”
226
 
This view of authority is not alien to the formalist conception of halakha: rabbis have authority 
by virtue of their knowledge and proficiency in discovering the relations among halakhic 
concepts. However, as noted above, Soloveitchik also introduces the notion that intuition plays a 
role in halakhic-legal decision-making. In connection with the permissibility of religious Zionist 
cooperation with secular Zionist groups, he claims that “there exist problems for which one 
cannot find a clear-cut decision in the Shulchan Aruch (code of Jewish law); one has to decide 
intuitively.”
227
 Halakhic-legal decision-making does not involve merely operating formal 
halakhic relations and it is not simply a matter of discursive knowledge. But what is the basis for 
such intuition’s authority and how is it achieved?  
Soloveitchik hints at an answer in “Beloved,” an otherwise formalist text. He describes his 
uncle, the subject of the eulogy, as a man who not only learned Torah but who was wed to it: 
When the division between man and Torah shifts entirely from its place not only do the forty 
nine gates of halakhic thought and cognition open before him, but also the forty nine gates of 
halakhic vision and feeling. Not just the intellectual soul, but also the soul possessing 
halakhic vision is given to him by God. The logical halakhic thought is provisioned from the 
pre-intellectual vision and prophecy, which bursts in a storm from the depths of his 
personality, which the holy presence washes over him. This mysterious intuition is the source 
of halakhic creation and innovation. The strict intellect, the master of precise definition and 
enlightening formula, only thinks what the visionary soul provides it. The man of halakha to 
whom the Torah is wed and joined “sees” halakhic contents, “feels” halakhic ideas like they 
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Halakhic intuition results from a profound internalization of the Torah. Surely the process by 
which the Torah is internalized involves intellectual study. But it also requires engagement in 
halakhic practice as a discipline. As a result, the individual is granted the ability to “feel” and 
“see” halakhic ideas. One who is wed to the Torah feels the affective responses encoded in it and 
perceives the values to which it grants access. He is thus able to draw on its emotional and 
axiological content to arrive at new halakhic-legal decisions. Thus, the rabbinic decisor, as a 
result of his formation by halakhic discipline, possesses the capacity to intuitively make 
authoritative halakhic-legal decisions. 
Soloveitchik also uses the subjective component of halakhic norms to justify his own 
halakhic decisions. Recall that he claimed that besides the formal aspect, “central historical 
realities with their deep-seated philosophical meaning must be taken into account”
229
 when he 
introduced his view on human images on stained glass windows in an interfaith chapel. 
Soloveitchik then reviews the “formal halakhic viewpoint.”  e notes that the Talmud records 
that the scholars Rav, Shmuel, and Levi worshipped in a synagogue in which a statue of the 
Babylonian king was erected, while they prohibited the placement of an image in a private 
house.
230
 In the medieval period, however, the position was reversed: Human images were 
allowed in the home, while “the tradition as such…rejected them” in the synagogue. 
Soloveitchik upholds the medieval view.  e then justifies the medieval rabbis’ and his own 
deviation from the Talmudic ruling as follows: 
In order to find an adequate answer we must place the problem in a philosophical and 
historical perspective. The human figure as a decorative motif in the synagogue conflicts 
with the very essence of prayer. The latter expresses the creature-consciousness—i.e., the 
awareness of absolute dependence on and surrender to God. The feeling of centrality of man 
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is superseded by one of helplessness, worthlessness and wretchedness. Since any 
anthropomorphic emblem in the synagogue conveys an anthropocentric idea—it places 
emphasis on the unique role that has been assigned to man—such a design was ruled out. In 
the case of the Babylonian synagogue, the king's effigy served as a mere political symbol 
placed, in all probability, by a royal edict and did not constitute an aesthetic or decorative 
pattern designed to introduce the motif of axiological supremacy of man into the religious 
experience—and that is the reason why the Rabbis did not raise any objection to the display 
of the statue. However, there is a more cogent reason which explains the deviation of practice 
from Talmudic theory, and this is to be sought in historical circumstances which necessitated 
such a change. The icon in the Christian world is a typical ecclesiastical motif that suggests 
to us the Christological idea of God-man which is associated according to Christian faith 
with the very act of worshipping, deus absconditus being too remote and transcendent to be 
approached through the medium of worship. Hence, the unequivocal iconoclastic attitude of 
Judaism toward the display of human images in the house of worship. To what our sages in a 
non-Christian Babylonia did not object, our forefathers in Christian countries were very 
susceptible. I wish to emphasize that this was not merely a medieval addendum to the law but 
it expresses its very spirit. As I have emphasized before, the law prohibits the representation 
of any figure or form which only alludes to a cultic motif, and the human figure in the 




In addition to Soloveitchik’s recognition of the role of historical change in halakhic-legal 
development, the most significant feature of this position is that it uses the values and affects 
embedded in halakhic norms to justify a halakhic-legal decision. The essence of prayer is 
“creature-consciousness,” which includes the feelings of “helplessness, worthlessness and 
wretchedness” and the axiological subservience of man to God. Unless a human image has an 
alternate purpose, such as a political statement, it conflicts with the essence of prayer because it 
asserts the axiological supremacy of man and expresses emotions like power, worth, and 
majesty. Soloveitchik prohibits the depiction of human images in synagogues because it conflicts 
with the affective and axiological content of Jewish prayer. Presumably, he determined these 
contents through either halakhic intuition or discursive reconstruction. In either case, his account 
of the justification of halakhic norms has a direct influence on his halakhic-legal practice.  
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Soloveitchik recognizes a third source of rabbinic authority: representation. In a lecture on 
“Recalling the New Month and the Intermediate Festivals” he discusses the nature of rabbinic 
authority to declare a new month. Some background is necessary: When the Sanhedrin was 
active new months were declared when it received two valid witnesses attesting to the advent of 
a new moon. Since the dissolution of the Sanhedrin, however, a pre-calculated solar-lunar 
calendar is followed. The point of departure of Soloveitchik’s discussion is certain liturgical 
issues relating to the service for a new month and the basis for declaring the new month without 
the Sanhedrin.  e claims that even during the time of the Sanhedrin, “though the essence of the 
sanctification was done by the court, the court did not sanctify with a doctrine of independent 
authority, but in the name of all of Israel, and the true sanctifiers are all of Israel in all their lands 
of habitation, who establish the month by accepting the sanctification of the month….”
232
 The 
Sanhedrin only had authority in this matter because it represented the Jewish people. Now that 
the former no longer exists, the authority to establish new months reverts to the latter. Elsewhere, 
Soloveitchik describes this representational authority as accounting for those aspects of the 
authority of contemporary rabbis that extend beyond the strict domain of halakha.
233
  
However, if rabbinic authority is based, at least to a certain extent, on its representation of the 
Jewish people, the Jewish community itself possesses halakhic-legal authority. Despite generally 
being a vigorous defender of rabbinic prerogatives,
234
 Soloveitchik thus recognizes a role for lay 
authority.
235
  Significantly, in the lecture on the new month he claims that the community’s 
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authority was manifested in its practice of recognizing the declarations of the Sanhedrin in the 
past and, currently, of following the fixed calendar.  
The division between the intellectual, intuitive, and representational authority of the 
rabbinate and the practical authority of the people is made explicit in Soloveitchik’s lecture 
“Two Types of Tradition.”  Soloveitchik’s discussion is complex and concerns certain claims 
made by Maimonides about halakhic norms that the latter holds derive from Sinai and which are 
thus not subject to dispute.  owever, it is difficult to interpret Maimonides’ claim of their origin 
literally, and the Talmud itself records disputes about them. Soloveitchik explains: 
There are two traditions: A) One tradition is entirely related to the tradition of learning, 
argument, give and take, and intellectual instruction, that one says this and this one says that, 
this one gives a reason for his view and that one gives a reason for his view, and they take a 
count, just as the Torah describes in the case of the rebellious elder. B) A practical tradition 
of the behavior of the Jewish community in the fulfillment of the commandments and this is 





Beyond the well-known claim that the Jewish tradition is dual, comprised of a Written Law and 
an Oral Law, Soloveitchik argues that it is comprised of both an intellectual and practical 
tradition. The intellectual tradition is one of argumentation, where positions are transmitted 
discursively. In principle, it is open to alteration because halakhic positions are accompanied by 
their justifications, which can be challenged, defeated, and revised by succeeding generations. 
An authorized view is adopted by majority vote, though if later argument swings the balance 
another view can be adopted. The participants in this tradition are those with the intellectual 
capacities and knowledge to contribute to it: the members of the rabbinate. In contrast, the 
practical tradition is one of action, where behaviors are transmitted mimetically. Practices are 
transmitted without their justifications and cannot be revised. The participants in this tradition 
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are the entire Jewish people, whose collective practice establishes certain behaviors as 
authoritative. The relation between these two traditions is not static. Norms that had once been 
part of the intellectual tradition can be incorporated into the practical tradition as a result of being 
accepted in practice by the Jewish people. In this case, even positions whose discursive 
“justifications” are known no longer derive their authority from them  rather, they are authorized 
by the practice of the Jewish people. Indeed, following Maimonides, Soloveitchik explains the 
indefeasible authority of the Talmud—a corpus of intellectual argumentation—as deriving from 
its acceptance in practice by the Jewish people.    
Elsewhere, Soloveitchik introduces a seemingly different duo of traditions: an intellectual-
moral and an experiential tradition. He identifies them, respectively, with the instruction of the 
father and demonstration of the mother. In his “Tribute to the Rebbetzin of Talne,” he writes, 
People are mistaken in thinking that there is only one [tradition] and one [tradition] 
community; the community of the fathers. It is not true. We have two massorot, two 
traditions, two communities, two [chains of reception]—the [tradition] community of the 
fathers and that of the mothers.… What is the difference between those two massorot, 
traditions?... Father teaches the son the discipline of thought as well as the discipline of 
action. Father’s tradition is an intellectual-moral one. That is why it is identified with mussar, 
which is the Biblical term for discipline…. What kind of a Torah does the mother pass on? I 
admit that I am not able to define precisely the [traditionary] role of the Jewish mother. Only 
by circumscription I hope to be able to explain it….  Most of all I learned…that Judaism 




The “intellectual-moral” tradition is clearly identical with the intellectual tradition discussed 
above; it is the heritage of halakhic-legal argumentation. Correspondingly, it is reasonable to 
conclude that the practical and the experiential traditions are identical with one another, though 
Soloveitchik does not claim this explicitly.
238
 Not only are authoritative practices transmitted 
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mimetically but their corresponding experiences are as well. The practical tradition of the Jewish 
people is composed of objective practices and subjective states.   
The authority of the Jewish people and its specifically practical-experiential nature is rooted 
in Soloveitchik’s philosophical account of the halakha and ta’amei ha-mitzvot2. The authority of 
the Jewish people corresponds to Soloveitchik’s recognition of the charismatic social ego as the 
subject of religious cognition and objectification. The practical nature of this authority correlates 
with his view that the process from cognition to expression into norms and practices does not 
take place in an individual’s consciousness and may not be discursively accessible or even 
reconstructable. The notion that this practical tradition is not static but dynamic agrees with his 
view that “the force and effectiveness of religion, grows commensurately with the increasing 
participation of the entire society in the religious drama, with continuing embodiments of its 
formless subjectivity and with the expansion of its objectified form and symbol.”
239
 The practice 
of the Jewish people thus plays a central role in the development of halakha. Lastly, the 
experiential component of the practical tradition coheres with his conception of halakha as a 
practice that both expresses affects and disciplines emotions.   
A significant feature of Soloveitchik’s conceptions of halakhic-legal authority and decision-
making is that they are directly connected to the justification of halakhic norms, at least in the 
case of the intuitive basis for rabbinic authority and the practical authority of the Jewish people. 
If the reason for performing halakhic practice is to discipline oneself to respond appropriately 
emotionally and to perceive values accurately, then it is crucial that halakhic-legal authorities are 
actually in touch with this reality and formulate norms accordingly. Rabbinic intuition just is 
accurate affective cognition and the practice of the Jewish people is supposed to express it in 
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action. Thus, if one accepts Soloveitchik’s justification of the halakha, it is evident that these 
authorities should be followed.  
2. Halakhic Conservatism 
Another area in which Soloveitchik’s justification of halakhic norms influences his halakhic-
legal practice is its generally conservative approach. Soloveitchik is known as one of the most 
prominent halakhic decisors of modern Orthodox Judaism. One might thus expect that he holds a 
somewhat progressive approach to halakhic change, and, in fact, he argues for some of the 
signature positions that distinguish modern Orthodoxy from more rigid varieties of Orthodoxy, 
including endorsing secular studies, support for religious Zionism, and promotion of intensive 
Jewish education for women.
240
 Despite these innovations, he practices a rather conservative 
form of halakhic-legal practice. This halakhic-legal conservatism is manifested in ta’amei ha-
mitzvot1 in that reconstruction begins with the codified halakhic norms and cannot revise them. 
But the basis for this is the philosophical account of halakha that comprises ta’amei ha-mitzvot2.  
This is made clear in HaMi. Soloveitchik moves quickly from his philosophical account of 
halakha to an attack on “religious liberalism.”  e writes, 
The basic error of religious liberalism is to be discerned less in its ideology than in its 
methodical approach. Liberalism has travelled the wrong direction—from subjectivity to 
objectivity—and in so doing has misconstrued both. Religious liberalism is based upon a 
very “simple’ methodological principle. Subjective religiosity...is subordinated to the 
omnipotent authority of time and change…. Let us admit that modern religious subjectivism 
is indeed incommensurable with the objective order sanctioned by tradition. One is still 
tempted to ask how the fathers of contemporary liberalism intend to mould a modern 
religious act out of the “new” chaotic mass of subjectivity? The method of objectification is, 
of course, at their disposal. They may project subjective flux upon externality and create a 
new artificial objective order. But this very method is fallacious…. The fallacy of this 
movement lies in its utter lack of methodology. Where is the assurance that the philosophers, 
while exploring modern religious subjectivism, have not erred and strayed?... The liberals of 
today, instead of religious subjectivity, plunge mistakenly into some other subjective 
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“order”—the moral or aesthetic. There being no boundary line in the subjective sphere, 




 “Religious liberals” are historicists and claim that religious subjectivity is influenced, if not 
determined, by historical developments. They further claim that the objectified forms of the 
halakha are not consistent with the religious subjectivity of the modern individual. Soloveitchik 
grants for the sake of argument their first contention. However, he questions how they could 
determine the content of contemporary religious subjectivity besides using the method of 
reconstruction. They may attempt to express religious subjectivity anew, but then they risk 
tapping into other areas of consciousness besides the religious, for example the moral or the 
aesthetic. This argument evidently depends on the account of religious consciousness and its 
expression that also underlies Soloveitchik’s justification of halakhic norms.  
This dependence is also expressed in a lecture entitled “Korah and the Commonsense 
Rebellion against Torah Authority.”
242
 Here the connection between halakhic-legal practice and 
halakhic discipline is made central. In Soloveitchik’s telling, “Korah...posited that any intelligent 
person could interpret halakha using common sense; that halakhic analysis was an exoteric 
competence derived from empirical experience.”
243
 Korah was a proponent of halakhic 
egalitarianism and questioned the need for halakhic-legal authority. According to Soloveitchik, 
“This is a view echoed by modern day ‘ritual committees’ or the ‘responsa commissions’ of 
those unlearned in the intricacies of the halakha. They call their approach ‘creative halakha.’”
244
 
In truth, in a manner similar to science, halakhic norms are not directly derivable from empirical 
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experience; rather, they are the objectification of religious experience. One must know how to 
operate the objectified relations to be a master of halakha. Korah, however,  
was arguing on behalf of religious subjectivism, proclaiming that faith, the inner emotional 
experience as paramount…. According to this approach, the mitzva, the outer deed, is 
secondary to the inner feeling. It has value only insofar as it reflects or stimulates or 
otherwise relates to one’s inner mood…. [T]he mitzva lacks its own integrity and sanctity, 
and is no more than a useful tool for eliciting an inner experience. What follows from this 
reasoning is that the mitzva form should be modified in accordance with the changing times 
and even in accordance with the varying subjectivities of different individuals. Is this not 
precisely the argument of the deviationists today who are ready to reinterpret, provide 
substitutions for, or entirely discard mitzvot, presuming some higher moral objective under 
the guise of Rahmana liba ba’i [the Merciful One desires the heart]? They use ‘common 
sense’ to gauge the utility, relevance, and ‘therapeutic value’ of each mitzva…. Logically 
Korah was right, if, and this is crucial, the only purpose of the deed is to reflect the 
experience. Actually, however, it is the external mitzva, not the inner experience which is 
primary. The Torah acknowledges a tension between objectivity… and subjectivity…. The 
mitzva is the realized experience, and the emotion itself, a reflection of the mitzva. It is the 
external act which is primary, while the emotion itself seeks to interpret and reflect the act. 
The only solid reality is the mitzva, whose integrity and dimensions the halakha can control. 





Korah and contemporary religious liberals believe that religious practices must either directly 
reflect or immediately stimulate emotional experiences. Thus, religious norms must be altered 
either to accurately mirror modern individual’s religious subjectivities or to evoke the religious 
feelings that resonate with them. In contrast, Soloveitchik argues that halakhic discipline must be 
primary for the individual. Her emotions must be formed by the norms and practices instead of 
determining them.
246
 Soloveitchik does not reject the connection between commandments and 
religious experience itself, just the direction of that connection for the individual. His 
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justification of halakhic norms thus supports his general halakhic conservatism by arguing that a 
direct return to religious subjectivity both misses its aim and negates halakhic discipline.
247
  
C. Legal Problems 
Despite its coherence with his justification of halakhic norms, there are a number of 
problems with Soloveitchik’s theory of halakha. First, besides ruling out a strictly formalist 
conception of halakha and halakhic-legal practice, it is difficult to determine the precise nature of 
his halakhic non-formalism. His recognition of the role of values in halakhic-legal decision-
making makes it compatible with inclusive legal positivism, natural law, and the post-positivist 
approach associated with Ronald Dworkin. Inclusive legal positivism conforms to standard 
definitions of positivism in that it claims that laws are constituted by human practices (the social 
thesis), and therefore there is no necessary connection between law and morality (the separability 
thesis). But it also recognizes that legal systems may incorporate moral values into its laws. 
Conformity with these values could then determine the validity and interpretation of laws. 
However, the basis for the authority of these values within the legal system is not because of 
their extra-legal significance but because of their having been positively incorporated.
248
 Natural 
law, in contrast, grants standing to moral values in the validation and interpretation of laws 
regardless of whether the legal system has recognized them. There is thus an “essential 
 conceptual, logical, necessary  connection between law and morality.”
249
 Post-positivism is 
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difficult to locate. It recognizes that judges must work within their tradition of jurisprudence to 
render a decision but claims that at the same time they must offer interpretations of that tradition 
that justifies it morally.
250
 There is thus a combination of positivist and natural law features.  
Inclusive legal positivism does not cohere with Soloveitchik’s basic justification of halakhic 
norms. The values encoded in the halakha are authoritative for him because they correspond to 
objective values. Indeed, Soloveitchik seems to subscribe to a “classic” version of natural law 
theory, in which “the moral order is part of the natural order—moral duties being in some sense 
“read off” from essences or purposes fixed  perhaps by God  in nature.”
251
 However, a natural 
law approach does not resonate with his reluctance to allow explicitly “external” moral values to 
play a role in halakhic-legal argumentation. For him the values operative in halakhic-legal 
practice must be halakhic values. Correspondingly, while natural law is congruent with 
Soloveitchik’s basic justification of halakhic norms, it fails to account for his theory of halakha. 
Post-positivism may provide the requisite balance to account for both of these elements. 
Additionally, its interpretive approach to adjudication fits with Soloveitchik’s recognition of 
non-deductive elements in halakhic-legal decision-making, such as intuition. However, it does 
not establish a causal or ontological connection between values and legal norms in the way 
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Soloveitchik’s approach does nor does it explain legal authority and decision-making in terms of 
this connection.  
Additionally, Soloveitchik’s conception of halakhic-legal authority is problematic. First, his 
identification of the authority of the rabbinate as deriving from intellect, intuition, and 
representation should commit him to a meritocratic approach to rabbinic authority. It should be 
open to anyone with the requisite knowledge and training that is recognized by the community. 
However, this conflicts with current Orthodox halakhic norms that restrict the privilege of 
rabbinic ordination and significant halakhic-legal decision-making to men.
252
 While Soloveitchik 
does not comment directly about the possibility of women rabbis as a practical matter,
253
 his 
general opposition to halakhic gender egalitarianism seems to preclude recognition of them. 
When forced to explain women’s different set of halakhic privileges and obligations, 
Soloveitchik takes refuge in diverse strategies. Sometimes he combines positivist and formalist 
approaches, writing that women’s “exclusion from the public, political realm emerges out of the 
unique halakhic structure which has an esoteric justification not subject to commonsense 
evaluation…. Rather, it is a derivation from a unique conceptualized structure which operates on 
its own imperatives.”
254
 Other times, his approach is more metaphysical. In explaining a legal 
assumption about the desire of women to be married that contributes to the halakhic difficulty of 
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dissolving failed marriages, he claimed that it derives from “permanent ontological principles 
rooted in the very depth of the human personality—in the metaphysical human personality—
which is as changeless as the heavens above.”
255
 There is thus a conflict between the egalitarian 
implications of Soloveitchik’s conception of rabbinic authority and his likely response to women 
rabbis.   
Moreover, Soloveitchik’s diverse justifications of rabbinic authority are in tension with one 
another. They express different basic conceptions of authority and the relation between 
authorities and their subjects. The representational dimension of rabbinic authority is democratic: 
Rabbis possess authority because they represent the Jewish people. Indeed, Soloveitchik, 
following Maimonides, argues that certain types of rabbinic enactments lack validity if not 
accepted by the Jewish people.
256
 The intellectual dimension of rabbinic authority is in principle 
egalitarian, even if not in practice. Though the intellectual attainment requisite for authority may 
be the achievement of the few, decisions reached through discursive reasoning are accessible 
even to those who could not have reached the conclusions themselves. Such an authority can be 
called upon to rehearse his reasoning to those who are not his intellectual equal and justify his 
decision to them. Still, in the final analysis, the rulings of this authority do not depend on its 
acceptance by its subjects. Soloveitchik recognizes that in halakhic-legal rulings that depend on 
expertise with Biblical and rabbinic texts communal acceptance is irrelevant for validity.
257
 In 
contrast, the intuitive dimension of rabbinic authority is entirely unegalitarian. Intuition, even 
when identified with a capacity resulting from training and not mystical insight, seems to 
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preclude justification. Invocations of privileged intuition are elitist and render authority 
unaccountable. Indeed, Kaplan, an otherwise sympathetic interpreter of Soloveitchik, charges 
him with complicity in the development of the ideology of da’at torah, which gives unbounded 
authority to Torah scholars who are not answerable to the Jewish community.
258
 Soloveitchik’s 
theory of halakha thus encompasses conflicting stances on the relation of authorities to their 
subjects.   
Soloveitchik also illicitly creates an overly rigid and one-way relation between the 
intellectual tradition and the experiential-practical tradition. According to him, elements of the 
intellectual tradition can be incorporated into the experiential-practical tradition. They then no 
longer need discursive justification and, indeed, become irrevisable. The notion that ongoing and 
unproblematic practices do not require discursive justification is a cogent point that recognizes 
the pragmatic nature of justification. However, the claim that this renders these practices 
incorrigible goes too far. A fully dynamic and two-way relation is more plausible, in which 
behaviors can also fall out of practice for any number of reasons, including technical or moral 
problems. They would then require discursive justification for their claim to normativity to be 
vindicated. As it stands, the relation between the intellectual and experiential-practical traditions 
only allows for more halakhic norms to become indisputable. It thus expresses Soloveitchik’s 
generally conservative orientation to halakhic-legal change.  
As has been shown, this orientation, along with other elements of his halakhic-legal practice, 
depends on ta’amei ha-mitzvot2. This is a positive conclusion insofar as it demonstrates that there 
is an underlying, though not obvious, coherence between his justification of halakhic norms and 
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theory of halakha. However, as argued above, a number of epistemological and metaethical 
problems plague this justification. Indeed, Soloveitchik’s philosophical account of halakha, upon 
which ta’amei ha-mitzvot2 is based, includes a number of premises that have not been 
sufficiently supported. Consequently, in addition to the difficulties with his theory of halakha 
itself, to the extent to which his philosophical account of halakha is unpersuasive the latter is 
even more problematic.     
III. Conclusion: Issues and Insights  
Soloveitchik presents two approaches to the relation between philosophy and halakha: the 
halakhic philosophy approach and a philosophical account of halakha. These, in turn, correspond 
to two accounts of the reasons for halakhic norms: ta’amei ha-mitzvot1 and ta’amei ha-mitzvot2. 
The former involves the method of reconstruction, however that is interpreted, and is meant to 
provide the basis for an autonomous Jewish philosophy out of the sources of halakha. The latter 
derives from the philosophical account of halakha and justifies halakhic norms as both 
expressions of Jewish collective consciousness’s affective cognition of reality and a practice that 
disciplines the individual to perceive values veridically and respond appropriately emotionally.  
These two accounts do not compete with one another: Ta’amei ha-mitzvot2 is more 
fundamental. It explains why reconstruction is necessary as a method for deriving the reasons for 
specific halakhic norms: Despite the realism of Soloveitchik’s epistemology, the subjective 
correlates of halakhic norms are inaccessible directly. Moreover, only it justifies the normativity 
of halakhic practices through its realistic epistemology and conception of halakhic practice as a 
discipline. This explains Soloveitchik’s focus on experiential halakhic norms and the way they 
serve as prototypical commandments for him. Lastly, while ta’amei ha-mitzvot1 is subordinate to 




elements of Soloveitchik’s non-formalist theory of halakha, including his conceptions of 
halakhic-legal authority, view of halakhic decision-making, and halakhic conservatism.  
Nevertheless, difficulties remain in Soloveitchik’s positions, which raise more general 
questions about justification and authority. He provides an accurate phenomenology of 
normativity: norms and values are experienced as strictures that can be violated but that ought 
not be. However, he does not philosophically vindicate this experience. He appeals to a form of 
normative realism, in which values and norms exist as objective values and natural laws. But the 
ontological “queerness” of these axiological and moral facts and the lack of intersubjective 
agreement about them are not adequately addressed. Various strategies to support his view have 
been noted, including distinguishing between halakhic values and moral laws and assimilating 
his view to a fitting attitude theory of values. It is unclear whether his view can tolerate such 
dilutions of its realism; however, they may be the best candidates for accounting for the diverse 
types of obligations included in normative discourse with varying (universal and particular) 
scopes and the unforced force of normative obligations.     
As mentioned, Soloveitchik also seems to recognize the pragmatic nature of justification. 
Practices do not stand under an a priori requirement of justification; when they are part of the 
practical tradition they are in order as they are. He also rightly notes that norms can transition 
from requiring justification to no longer requiring it; norms can become part of the practical 
tradition. However, he does not recognize a reverse process, in which practices that had 
previously not required justification are rendered problematic and now require it. This provokes 
questions about justification: it seems correct that practices do not initially require defense, but 




Additionally, Soloveitchik’s theory of halakha is directly connected to his justification of 
halakhic norms. Thus, any problem with his justification of halakhic norms undermines his 
approach to halakhic-legal practice. Lastly, there is a tension among Soloveitchik’s justifications 
of rabbinic authority, each of which describes a different relation between the authority and its 
subjects. Sorting out this relation is a desideratum for any account of legal authority. It must be 
ascertained whether the authority is a representative, an expert whose reasoning is in principle 
though perhaps not in practice accessible to everyone, or a possessor of intuition, whose insights 
are only available to the initiated.  
Despite these problems, there are elements of Soloveitchik’s philosophy of halakha that are 
insightful and should be preserved in any account of the relation between the justification of 
halakhic norms and halakhic-legal practice. First, when both the true nature of his justification of 
halakhic norms and his theory of halakha are uncovered, it becomes evident that they are 
strongly linked: The justification for the halakhic norms also explains their content. Normative 
justification and legal justification are thereby linked. Second, at least some forms of halakhic-
legal authority and decision-making clearly track the justification of halakhic norms. It is thus 
clear why following halakhic-legal authorities allows one to achieve the aim of halakhic practice. 
Third, the conception of halakha as a discipline, the aims of which cannot be attained in one 
action, is rich and deserves further elaboration. Lastly, Soloveitchik seems to recognize the 
mixed nature of halakhic norms, including both particularistic halakhic values and universal 
moral laws. He does not adequately disentangle these strands, but this heterogeneity itself ought 
to be retained. Halakha contains both imperatives about what Jews ought to do and what 
everyone ought to do. Making sense of the nature of, and bases for, these different claims is 





‘The Wisdom of Torah Implementation’: Berkovits’ Halakhic Teleology 
Eliezer Berkovits
1
 rejects a predominant characteristic of modern Jewish thought: the 
reduction of Judaism to a private ‘religion’ modeled after Protestant Christianity.
2
 Indeed, he 
claims that “Judaism is not a religion but a comprehensive religious civilization.”
3
 Moreover, for 
him Jewish civilization has one goal: to establish the world as the Kingdom of God. This means 
constructing an order that embodies the ideal of sedeq, a unity of justice and equity. This is the 
telos of the commandments and, consequently, halakhic-legal practice. Indeed, Berkovits 
articulates a teleological philosophy of halakha:
4
 The commandments mandate actions for the 
achievement of this religious-cum-moral ideal.  alakha, in turn, is “the wisdom of Torah 
implementation.”
5
 Halakhic-legal practice is the implementation of the commandments to ensure 
that their purpose is advanced under changing circumstances. In the context of ta’amei ha-
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mitzvot, the commandments themselves are justified as means for achieving this end. The actions 
mandated by the commandments, however, have more complex relations to this end: Some are 
mere means, while others advance the order of sedeq by being themselves acts of sedeq.  
Berkovits’ justification of the commandments involves philosophical inquiry into the sources 
of moral normativity and motivation. Though he describes sedeq as morally attractive, he 
maintains that its normativity derives from God’s command. In fact, he argues that only the 
divine will can ground unconditional moral obligation. He rejects human autonomy as a source 
of normativity in favor of “theonomy.” Nevertheless, in his theory of halakha he claims that 
autonomy is redeemed in halakhic-legal practice. The Torah is “not in heaven.”
6
 Its realization is 
humanity’s responsibility:  uman beings must implement the Torah so as to achieve its purpose. 
In this, they are guided by halakhic principles which direct the implementation of the 
commandments. Halakhic-legal practice is guided by the goal of establishing the world as the 
Kingdom of God and realizing the ideal of sedeq. Berkovits thereby constructs a direct 
connection between the justification of the commandments and halakhic-legal practice, which 
results in a robust justification of halakhic practice. Yet, his theory of halakha is susceptible to 
two interpretations, which have different implications for the share of autonomy in Judaism, the 
relation between ta’amei ha-mitzvot and halakhic-legal practice, and Jewish philosophy.  
In the following, Berkovits’ justification of the commandments and its relation to his theory 
of halakha is examined. It is first argued that he presents a teleological justification of the 
commandments. However, it is also contended that, among other problems, this justification 
relies on a controversial view of moral normativity (I). It is then contended that he presents a 
teleological theory of halakha as well. This creates a direct connection between the justification 
                                                 
6




of the commandments and halakhic-legal practice, thereby presenting a robust justification of 
halakhic practice. However, it is further contended that his theory of halakha is susceptible to 
two interpretations. Some of the different implications of these interpretations are then explored 
and their adequacy is assessed. Lastly, difficulties with his theory of halakha are catalogued. The 
most important of these problems results from the very same feature of his approach that is 
responsible for the robustness of his justification of halakhic practice and raises a general 
question about the relation between normative justification and legal authority (II).
7
  
I. The Telos of the Commandments 
In his major English work of philosophy of halakha, Not in Heaven: The Nature and 
Function of Halakha (NFH), Berkovits writes, 
Halakha is the bridge over which the Torah moves from written word into the living deed. 
Normally there is a confrontation between the text, which is set, and life, which is forever in 
motion….  ow to face the confrontation between the text and the actual life situation, how to 
resolve the problems arising of this confrontation, is the task of the Torah she’baal Peh, the 
Oral Law. This second Torah…accompanies the Torah she'be’Ktav, the Written Word, along 
its journey of realization in the innumerable concrete situations through which the Jewish 
people passes in the course of its history. It is the wisdom of Torah implementation in the 
daily life of the Jewish people. It renders Torah into Torat Hayyim, living teaching and 




Berkovits draws a distinction between the Written Torah and the Oral Torah, and he identifies 
the halakha with the latter. However, the halakha is not a text or body of knowledge but a certain 
type of “wisdom,” a wisdom of implementation. It is a practice the purpose of which is the 
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realization of the Written Torah in the world. Thus, to understand Berkovits’ philosophy of 
halakha it is necessary to comprehend his view of the Written Torah. In the following, a brief 
description of his approach to religious and philosophical inquiry is offered, which allows an 
initial interpretation of the status of his claims regarding the Torah and the halakha and which 
provides background for understanding many of his other positions (A). Then his account of 
ta’amei ha-mitzvot is examined, beginning with his view on revelation and the highest good (B), 
and proceeding to the way the commandments advance that good (C). The first part concludes 
with an evaluation of his justification of halakhic norms and of his general view on normative 
justification (D).  
A. Philosophical and Religious Positivism: David Hume and Judah ha-Levi 
Berkovits embraces positivism in both religious and philosophical inquiries. He claims that 
experience directly yields knowledge without the need for human contribution. This has 
consequences for his methodological approach to Jewish philosophy (1) and his philosophical 
and religious positions (2).  
1. Methodological Positivism 
Berkovits’ methodological positivism determines what he takes to be one of the two criteria 
of adequacy for Jewish philosophy. In his Major Themes in Modern Philosophies of Judaism 
(MT), a collection of essays devoted to the evaluation of the thought of twentieth-century Jewish 
philosophers, he concludes that they have failed to articulate adequate Jewish philosophies. He 
claims that “at this time we have neither a theology nor a philosophy of Judaism that does justice 
to the essential nature of Jewish teaching about God, man, and the universe as expressed in the 




validity…. Judaism is awaiting a reformulation of its theology and philosophy. It will, however, 
be accomplished by means of an intellectual strength that draws its creative inspiration as well as 
its contents from the classical sources of Judaism—Bible, Talmud, and Midrash.”
9
 Jewish 
philosophy must have contemporary philosophical validity, but it must also correspond to the 
classical literature of Judaism.   
In his own examinations of Jewish texts and practices, Berkovits gives the impression that 
his approach involves simple description. In Man and God: Studies in Biblical Theology (MG), 
he undertakes a thorough analysis of key Biblical words and phrases. He claims thereby to be 
able to answer theological questions, like “What is the faith, what is the message of the Bible…? 
What is the biblical teaching and testimony about God?”
10
 His remarks about his method are 
meager, consisting only in an argument for reading the Bible as a single document.
11
 Beyond 
this, the text need only be read with care to reveal “the message of the Scripture as a whole.”
12
 A 
similar method appears to characterize his study of the halakha. In introducing the rationale and 
method of NFH, he writes, “It is essential that  alakha regain its original nature and function. As 
a contribution toward that end, we have undertaken this study as an attempt to define the nature 
and purpose of classical Halakha. On the basis of what we have found, we have also given some 
indication of the direction in which we believe it is incumbent upon us to move in the present 
situation.”
13
 Berkovits advocates changes to contemporary halakhic-legal practice; however, he 
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sees these changes as restorative. He aims to return halakhic-legal practice to its “authentic” 
state. To do that, he must first present an accurate description of the original nature and function 
of halakha. Anticipating the attacks his project would receive from more conservative Orthodox 
thinkers, he protests, “in…my work I was determined to be guided exclusively by the traditional 
halakhic material as I found it and as I have learned to understand it over the years.”
14
 He thus 
appears committed to the view that the nature and function of the halakha are antecedently given 
facts accessible through methodical investigation. The aim of Jewish philosophy and philosophy 
of halakha is simply to describe Judaism and halakha as found in their literary sources.
15
 
2. Epistemological and Religious Positivism 
Though Berkovits’ methodological positivism is more of an implicit tendency than an 
explicit position, his positivism is clearly articulated in his epistemological and religious 
positions. The most extreme expression of this approach is his statement that “facts enjoy the 
privilege of not having to conform to logic.”
16
 More cautiously, he maintains that reason only 
operates a posteriori on the deliverances of experience. This epistemological position was 
influenced by a particular reading of David Hume’s philosophy.
17
 In fact, he wrote his 
dissertation, entitled Hume and Deism (HD , on  ume’s philosophy of religion. While it is 
mainly a work of history of philosophy, Berkovits argues that Hume was the first modern 
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philosopher of religion and endorses his approach.
18
 In his telling, Hume criticized deists like 
John Locke and John Toland for confusing philosophy with religion and thereby discovered the 
“inherent nature of religion and work[ed] out an appropriate research method.”
19
  
 ume’s philosophy is based on what Berkovits describes as “critical positivism.” The critical 
element anticipates that of Kant, in that it “investigates the nature of understanding, its capacities 
and limits.”
20
 But on the basis of this investigation it comes to “positivist” conclusions rooted in 
a “theory of human nature.”
21
 The validity of certain concepts, like causality and morality, are 
identified with psychological propensities in human nature to respond in specific ways to certain 
events, like the habit of associating conjointly recurring events with one another
22
 and the feeling 
of sympathy
23
 respectively. Similarly, Berkovits identifies Philo’s arguments in the Dialogues on 
Natural Religion with  ume and interprets them as “show[ing] that it is impossible to base 
religion on reason alone.”
24
 But this skeptical claim is only to clear the ground for other sources, 
which are explored in the Natural History of Religion. There Hume reflects on religion on the 
basis of his “theory of human nature”
25
 and locates its root in religious inclination or feeling.
26
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The motivation for religion is not rational inquiry about the First Cause but the affectively 
impelled quest regarding God’s relationship to humanity and the world.
27
 Further, Hume claims 
that though the religious inclination is innate, it requires certain experiences to actuate it. His 
attention is thus drawn to historical religions, which for the deists had merely served as foils to 
true philosophical religion.
28
 Nevertheless, Hume restricts himself to exploring the common 
experiences of fear and hope that initially trigger the religious inclination, for he is interested 
only in “exposing the motivating forces that lead man to religiosity.”
29
 Berkovits maintains that 
this query is separate from the question of the validity of religion, which can only be verified by 
particular historical experiences. 
In Berkovits’ major work of Jewish philosophy, God, Man, and History (GMH), he draws on 
 ume’s critical positivism in the areas of theoretical philosophy  a , practical philosophy  b , 
and philosophy of religion (c) in order to ground the validity of Judaism on the basis of a unique 
historical experience. 
 a  The core of  ume’s critical positivism is his empiricist conception of reason. As 
articulated in An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding this is the claim that ideas derive 
only from external and internal experience and from reflection on these experiences. Reason is 
not originative: It can only operate on ideas that derive from experience
30 
and is concerned only 
with matters of fact or relations between ideas.
31
 Thus, causal relations, the basic element of 
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theoretical knowledge, cannot be known with certainty. Belief in a causal relation between two 
events only arises from a habit to associate them after experiencing their constant conjunction. 
Purported laws of nature cannot be known with certainty, for they are simply based on the fact 
that they have not been violated yet.
32
 Later in the work, however, Hume offers two related 
arguments against accepting testimony regarding the occurrence of miracles.
33
 The first is based 
on the concept of a law of nature and its evidentiary weight relative to testimony about a miracle, 
and the second is based on the credibility of most reporters of miracles.  
Berkovits marshals arguments drawn from  ume’s empiricism in support of the possibility 
of the miracle of revelation to respond to  ume’s own arguments against miracles.
34
 First, he 
exploits the fact that  ume’s argument is only aimed against accepting miracle reports. For the 
participants in God’s revelation, however, “[t]he event itself brought the awareness of its own 
certitude.”
35
 Berkovits recognizes that this proves nothing for those who did not undergo the 
experience and thus undertakes to show both the possibility of the event and the credibility of 
testimony supporting it. His basic strategy is to assert the priority of experience over the claims 
of reason. He divides the question into two sub-questions: revelation’s logical possibility and its 
practical possibility. As regards the former, he argues that a priori conceptions of God or the 
human being that rule out the possibility of revelation have no weight because the only 
knowledge that can be acquired about God or the human being derives from experience. And 
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revelation is a type of experience.
36
 Likewise, he argues that there is nothing in other experiences 
that could exclude its practical possibility, for “there cannot be anything in our experience that 
may exclude a priori the possibility of the emergence of some utterly unexpected event.”
37
  
However, this is not something Hume would have denied. Perhaps aware of this, Berkovits 
extends the argument beyond what  ume’s empiricism would support. He contends that 
predictions based on probability only compare like cases to like cases. But the Bible claims that 
revelation is sui generis. First, the event only occurred once. Second, its character as a personal 
encounter between a human being and God places it outside of the boundaries of possible 
scientific knowledge. Evidence in support of it can only come from personal testimony.
38
 He 
then turns to  ume’s second argument and focuses on his claim that miracles are never attested 
by a group of men of “good sense,” “integrity,” and “credit and reputation” but by “ignorant and 
barbaric nations.”
39
 Berkovits demurs and claims that from what we know of the prophets’ lives 
and messages the possibility they were lying or mistaken is so slight that admitting it would cast 
doubt on the very existence of honesty or verity.
40
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 b   ume’s empiricist conception of reason also rejects its originative role in human action 
and morality. In the A Treatise of Human Nature, he writes, “Reason is, and ought only to be the 
slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them.”
41
 
Reason can operate instrumentally once a passion or desire is given; but it cannot originate 
actions. Further, Hume identifies the source of morality with the natural feeling of sympathy that 
is common to human beings.
42
 While Berkovits does not adopt this positive position, he agrees 
about the lack of connection among reason, obligation, and action.  e writes, “Reason as such 
may neither command nor induce action ….The source of all obligation is a will, and the 
motivation of a will is a desire.”
43
 For Berkovits, like Hume, reason cannot create obligations nor 
motivate actions. These can ultimately only derive from desire.
44
  
(c) Berkovits also embraces what he takes to be  ume’s positive position on the nature of 
religion.  e writes, “the foundation of religion is not the affirmation that God is, but that God is 
concerned with man and the world, that, having created this world, he has not abandoned it….”
45
 
For Berkovits, like  ume, religion is about God’s relationship to humanity and the world. While 
 ume’s opponents were English deists, Berkovits’ adversaries are rationalist Jewish 
philosophers like Saadia Gaon (882-942) and Moses Maimonides, though Hermann Cohen 
(1842-1918) lies just in the background.
46
 Berkovits claims that they too make the mistake of 
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identifying religion with philosophy. This issues in three problematic consequences: living in 
accordance with the commands of the Torah is subordinated to intellectual comprehension; 
revelation is rendered essentially unnecessary; and the God of religion is replaced by the First 
Cause of Aristotle.
47
 While these are mainly religious as opposed to philosophical difficulties, in 
the last case he maintains that religious rationalists have illicitly smuggled attributes of God into 
the conception of the First Cause.
48
  
Berkovits styles himself as following in the footsteps of Judah ha-Levi (c. 1075-1141) “in 
recognizing the independence of the religious realm, while nevertheless maintaining a healthy 
respect for the faculty of reason in its own domain…. Revelation and reason do not conflict…but 
neither has reason a chance to absorb revelation, nor need revelation defame the intellectual 
faculty of man… to establish its own validity.”
49
 Religion originates in the experience of 
revelation. Because reason only operates a posteriori, revelation and reason do not conflict. 
Experience delivers new truths that could not be known through reason; thus revelation is not 
absorbed by reason. Furthermore, according to Berkovits, the content of revelation is not 
information that could be known from any other experience. Revelation proclaims God’s 
relationship to humanity and the world by preforming it. Berkovits claims, “We can be aware of 
the relationship with God and man only by having had a share in such a relationship.”
50
 The 
encounter with God reveals that he is concerned about human beings and the world.
51
 But 
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B. Revelation, Creation, and Sedeq 
 God’s expression of concern for the world and humanity in revelation discloses the nature of 
the world and humanity. It is also charged with normative significance. In revealing the nature of 
the world and humanity, it unveils their shared telos, towards which the Jewish people is 
commanded to work. These elements of Berkovits’ thought are examined sequentially, beginning 
with his description of revelation and its relation to creation (1), and then turning to their shared 
feature—sedeq (2). Lastly, the normative implications of this view are examined (3). 
1. Revelation and Creation 
Berkovits is not clear about the content of revelation. Sometimes he indicates that it is a non-
discursive experience,
53
 while other times he argues that it must possess determinate content, 
namely commandments, in order to save humanity from moral relativism.
54
 But he is 
unequivocal about the experience of revelation, which involves dichotomous movements by God 
and ambivalent reactions by the human being.  
In revelation God both discloses himself and hides himself. He discloses himself because that 
is the only way to make known his concern for humanity and the world. Yet, his presence 
endangers the human being both ontologically and morally. Since God is the source of being, the 
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exposure of his presence threatens to collapse being into himself. Since God is the human 
being’s creator, revelation threatens to destroy her freedom. Exposed to God’s presence, the 
human being would be compelled to obey him. But that would negate the purpose of revelation 
because “[w]ithout freedom, the relationship would be of no value for man would cease being a 
person. The encounter is significant because it happens between God and a person who is free to 
be himself.”
55
  God desires to have a relationship with an other, not to collapse the other 
ontologically or morally back into himself. Thus, to enter into relationship with humanity he 
must disclose himself as a “hiding God.”
56 
Correlative to God’s dual movement of disclosure and 
concealment, the human being responds in an ambivalent manner, which corresponds to her 
nature as a creature of God. Being a creature of God entails antithetic characteristics: one is 
dependent on God yet independent of him. One is dependent on God insofar as one’s existence 
derives wholly from him. One is independent of God because one was brought into being as a 
separate entity.
 
This dual nature is expressed through the concept of creation.
57 
In fact, Berkovits argues that revelation and creation must be understood in connection with 
each other. Creation only realizes its full meaning in the context of revelation; creation is the 
origin viewed through the prism of revelation.  e writes, “Understanding by means of the 
encounter that man and his world are God’s own, man understands the religious idea of creation. 
Creation, as the unsevered bond between existence and its divine origin, is the prime 
manifestation of God's concern, which we found in the encounter.”
58
 Revelation and creation 
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both express God’s concern for humanity and the world as well as reflect on their nature. 
Creation “necessarily involves God in the destiny of the world,”
59
 for conceiving of the universe 
as having been brought about through creation “introduces the concept of value and purpose into 
the very core of reality.”
60
 Because they were brought into being by an act of God, the world and 
humanity have a value and purpose. They are directed towards the goal that God intended for 
them in creating them. But the value and purpose of creation cannot be known from creation. 
Since creation can only be understood through revelation, it is only in revelation that creation’s 
value and purpose can be discovered. Further, since God both discloses and hides himself in 




In describing revelation in this way, Berkovits references the Biblical story about Moses’ 
request to “see God’s face.” God denies this request for “no man can see my face and live.” 
 owever, in response to Moses’ further request to know God’s ways, he shelters Moses in the 
cleft of a rock and allows him to see “his back”  Ex.   :   -23). Berkovits, like many 
commentators before him, offers an interpretation of the types of knowledge of God that can and 
cannot be revealed to humanity. The human being cannot apprehend God’s “face” or absolute 
essence; this is the element of God that is hidden from humanity in the encounter.
 62
 But like 
other biblical commentators, he focuses on the proximity of this story to the revelation of God’s 
thirteen attributes of mercy (Ex. 34: 6-7). The only knowledge of God that humanity can possess 
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is knowledge of God’s moral dispositions.
63
 The knowledge of God disclosed in revelation is 
moral. Consequently, creation must have moral value and purpose.  
2. The Highest Good: Sedeq versus Tohu 
Berkovits discusses the purpose and value of creation in MG, where he draws further 
connections between creation and revelation. Indeed, he introduces the idea of the highest good 
as the common feature of the two events. The occasion of this discussion is a prophesy of Isaiah:  
For thus said the Lord that created the heavens, He is God; That formed the earth and made 
it, He established it, He created it not tohu…,  e formed it to be inhabited: I am the Lord, 
and there is none else. I have not spoken in secret…. I said not unto the seed of Jacob: ‘Seek 




These verses correlate creation and revelation through the opposition of sedeq and tohu, the 
primordial chaos. God’s command to the Jewish people is declared not to be tohu but sedeq. 
Creation is explicitly proclaimed not to be tohu, and it is implied here and stated explicitly 
elsewhere that it is also sedeq.
65
 Both creation and revelation are not tohu, formless, worthless, 
or without purpose; rather, they are acts of sedeq.  
Berkovits nowhere gives a definition of sedeq. In fact, he claims that Western civilization 
lacks the concepts to fully express the idea, for it often opposes sedeq’s various constituents, like 
justice and equity, to one another.
66
 He describes sedeq inductively as follows: 
It would seem that sedeq is the most comprehensive concept for that which is right. It is the 
idea of the Good. It subsumes mishpat [justice], s’daqah [charity], emunah [faithfulness] or 
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emeth [truth], and y’shu’ah [redemption]. All these are aspects of sedeq.… Sedeq is not a 
legal concept, but the highest moral good. It is for this reason that mishpat [cannot] be 
defined in purely legal terms. As an expression of sedeq it continually tends to merge with 




Sedeq is the summum bonum, and as such it is undefinable. It can only be understood as the 
union of lower order values, in particular the immediately subordinate values of mishpat and 
s’daqah. Berkovits defines the former, which is ordinarily translated as “justice,” as “balancing 
the claims of two parties against each other.”
68
 In contrast, the latter “represents a bond 
between…two [beings] that motivates the one to act toward the other with kindness and 
charity….”
69
 It also refers to actions that manifest this bond. Normally, these two attributes are 
opposed to one another;
70
 however, they are united in sedeq. Thus, as the union of mishpat and 
s’daqah, sedeq is a good that unites impartial justice with concern for the other, charity or equity. 
Additionally, according to Berkovits, sedeq is not simply a moral or legal ideal  it allows “the 
earth to be inhabited.” It contributes to human flourishing.
71
 
Indeed, according to Berkovits, sedeq is the “very principle of creation” and God’s 
continuing “ways with the world.”
72
 However, the world is not currently governed completely by 
sedeq. This deficiency is inherent in creation, for God alone is perfectly good, realized sedeq. 
Creation means the bringing into being of something separate and outside of God. By definition, 
then, creation cannot be perfectly good; it must retain elements of tohu. Nevertheless, sedeq is 
                                                 
67
 Ibid., 331.  
68
 Ibid., 332. 
69
 Ibid., 295.  
70
 Ibid., 151. 
71
 Ibid., 335. 
72




the telos of the world. It must be transformed from tohu to sedeq. This cannot occur at the end of 
days with the passing away of the created world, for then God’s intention in creating the world 
would be denied. The reign of sedeq must be accomplished in history: God’s goal is not 
immediate duplication of his own goodness but the emergence of sedeq out of tohu.
73
 In 
Judaism: Fossil or Ferment (JFF) Berkovits invokes the daily Aleinu prayer and describes this 
goal as the establishment of the Kingdom of God. In comparing it with the Christian idea of the 
Kingdom of God, he stresses that it must be accomplished in this world through human effort.
74
 
The transformation of tohu to sedeq is accomplished in history by humanity.   
3. Revelation: Imitatio and Command 
While Berkovits places responsibility for the telos of revelation with humanity, its origin 
remains in God. Revelation reveals God’s purpose for the world to human beings and recruits 
them to its advancement. God’s own acts of sedeq and its subordinate values “are archetypes of 
values” for human beings.
75
 In revelation the human being comes to know that “in imitation of 
God, [she] should strive in sedeq.”
76
  In disclosing God’s moral attributes, revelation has 
normative significance for the human being. Berkovits describes this significance in two 
interconnected ways: as model and as law. He summarizes their relation in comments on a verse 
from Jeremiah: “[I]n this should one glory  In his earnest devotion to Me. For I the Lord act with 
kindness [hesed], justice [mishpat], and equity [s’daqah] in the world; For in these I delight”    : 
   . Berkovits explains that God’s behavior manifests mishpat and s’daqah because he desires 
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their realization. They thus become law for the human being. Just as God acts towards creation 
according to these values, the human being must act according to them in her relationships. She 
is obligated to imitate God.
77
 But now recall that sedeq is the union of mishpat and s’daqah. 
Thus, the human being is obligated to relate to the world in sedeq and to strive to realize sedeq in 
it. For Berkovits, “The Kingdom of God is established by man’s imitation of God. “
78
 
Berkovits’ account of revelation raises a number of questions: First, how exactly does one 
imitate God? Concern for the other and even the thirteen moral dispositions are highly vague 
directives. And his description of sedeq, while denoting a unity of justice with equity, is not very 
informative as to its content and manner of achievement. Second, recall that in addition to these 
values, Berkovits identifies God’s revelation with the commandments of the Torah. But how do 
these commands relate to these values? Even if some commandments can be interpreted as 
expressions of concern, the thirteen dispositions, or sedeq, it is not obvious how others fit into 
this rubric. Berkovits’ position seems too abstract at the same time as it is too concrete. Further 
determination of sedeq and its subordinate values as well as an explanation of how the 
commandments manifest and advance them are needed. Third, Berkovits moves quickly from 
God’s presentation of a model for humanity to imitatio dei being its law; however, it is not 
obvious how this connection is substantiated. Berkovits does describe God’s dispositions and 
their aim as morally attractive. Yet, he writes of imitation becoming a law for the human being 
because it is the expressed desire of God. He thus seems to imply that it is God’s command that 
makes these actions and their telos normative. However, the account of normativity that lies 
behind this claim is not at all obvious. 
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C. Ta’amei ha-Mitzvot and Moral Philosophy 
Berkovits’ response to these questions appears in his discussion of ta’amei ha-mitzvot in 
GMH, where he offers a teleological justification of the commandments. That is, he offers a 
justification of the commandments in terms of their purpose. The proximal purpose of the 
commandments consists in their being acts of concern for the other or part of a regimen for the 
creation of dispositions of concern for the other. The distal purpose of the commandments is the 
creation of a world wholly permeated with concern for others or, stated otherwise, regulated and 
organized by sedeq. The telos of the commandments is therefore the establishment of the world 
as the Kingdom of God. In addition to connecting the particular commandments to moral ideals 
and messianic goals, this teleological account elucidates the content of these ideals and goals. 
Just as connecting actions with an end justifies them, so linking an end with the actions that 
advance it renders it more determinate. Further, as part of justifying the commandments, 
Berkovits engages in moral philosophical analysis: He presents accounts of moral normativity 
and motivation as well as grapples with questions about autonomy and heteronomy.  
Berkovits introduces a number of complications into his account of ta’amei ha-mitzvot, such 
as relativizing the validity of his claims about the purposes of the commandments and 
distinguishing between their moral and religious purposes. Beneath these complexities, however, 
lies a unified justification of the commandments in terms of one religious-cum-moral purpose. In 
order to reveal this account some reconstruction of his arguments is required. Thus, in the 
following, his preliminary remarks about the project of ta’amei ha-mitzvot are analyzed (1), 
before turning to his accounts of the “ethical”     and “religious”     purposes of the 
commandments. Lastly, the process by which halakhic practice operates through history to create 




1. Ta’amei ha-Mitzvot within the Boundaries of Mere Experience 
Berkovits introduces his account of ta’amei ha-mitzvot with the caveat that it is impossible to 
know the intention of God in an absolute sense. Instead, “[w]hen asking about the purpose of the 
law…we ought to consider those aspects which seem significant in the context of our human 
condition and its problems.”
79
 This may seem to introduce an element of subjectivity into the 
justification of the commandments, as if it involves mere homiletic reflection on Jewish practice. 
This interpretation is further encouraged by a remark in an essay entitled “What is Jewish 
Philosophy,” where he writes that “[t]ere can be no interpretation of the divine commandments 
that has absolute validity.”
80
  
However, recall that for Berkovits religion itself, as opposed to philosophical metaphysics, is 
only concerned with the human condition: Its object is not the Absolute but God’s relatedness to 
the human being. This qualification  thus only means that the account will not transcend the 
proper concerns of religion. Further, recall that besides transcending the bounds of religion, 
knowledge of God’s absolute essence is beyond the boundaries of human knowledge. According 
to Berkovits, knowledge can only derive from experience. But the only experience of God stems 
from the encounter with him in revelation. And in the encounter God restrained himself in order 
to relate to humanity. No wonder, then, Berkovits claims that God’s purposes can only be known 
in the context of the human condition and its problems; any other purposes he might have are 
beyond human knowledge. Thus, Berkovits’ qualifications of his justification of the 
commandments, though genuine, do not undermine the intended validity of his claims. They are 
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meant to be as rigorous as any that can be made in religion. Indeed, as is shown below, he argues 
that claims about the purposes of the commandments regulate halakhic-legal practice.  
2.  The Ethical Purpose: Concern for the Other and Sedeq 
The next qualification is the division between the “ethical” and “religious’ purposes of the 
commandments. In this sub-section, their “ethical” purpose and the philosophical positions upon 
which it is based are explored. In the next sub-section, the “religious” purpose of the 
commandments is discussed, and it is argued that it too should be described as ethical.  
a. Two Problems of Philosophy of Halakha 
Berkovits claims that the question of ta’amei ha-mitzvot is actually comprised of two related 
questions corresponding to two types of commandments. The first group is the mitzvot beyn 
adam le-havero, or “the laws that order the relationship between man and his fellow.” Let us call 
them the interpersonal commandments or, following Berkovits, the ethical commandments. The 
second group is the mitzvot beyn adam le-makom, or “those of purely ritual nature, as between 
man and God.” Following Berkovits, let us call them the ritual commandments.  e also notes 
that the commandments, especially those that are not readily identifiable as ethical, comprise a 
comprehensive normative system that aims to regulate every element of a Jew’s life.
 81
 
The interpersonal commandments and the ritual commandments present complementary 
problems relating to justification: 
Now the ethical significance of the laws affecting human relations can be readily 
acknowledged. The laws of the second group, however, the purely ritual part, present a 
serious problem of interpretation. One may accept the need for some basic ritual practices 
and yet be nonplussed by the elaborate system of Jewish ritual law. What is the purpose of 
the numerous rules and regulations that seem to suggest a purely mechanical observance?…. 
On the other [hand], the ethical code of the law regarding man and his fellow is not free of 
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problems …. [I]f the validity of the law were to depend on the arbitration of the intellect, the 
paramount importance of the revelation of the law would be abolished…. [W]e seem to be 
left with an insoluble dilemma. The validity of the law must be rooted either in reason or 
revelation. But if the law has intellectual validity, what need is there for revelation; and if the 




The first question is the classical query regarding the reasons for the commandments (ta’amei 
ha-mitzvot proper). It applies most immediately to ritual commandments like the prohibition to 
eat meat and milk together or the prescription to wear phylacteries. These commandments are 
problematic because they lack any obvious reason: Why is it prohibited to eat milk and meat 
together and required to wear phylacteries? Indeed, as Meir Roth points out, Berkovits makes 
clear his commitment to the need for justifications for the commandments here, for according to 
him, “if the law is not acceptable to reason, what use revelation?”
83
 Further, Berkovits conceives 
of reasons for the commandments in terms of their purposes. Since the ritual commandments 
seem to lack purposes, it appears “not acceptable to reason” to practice them. In contrast, 
knowledge of their purposes would provide a reason for them and, consequently, justify them.  
The second question does not relate to the reasons for the commandments but to the reason 
for the command (ta’am ha-tzav). It applies most obviously to interpersonal commandments like 
the prohibition of murder or the prescription of charity. In contrast to the first group, these 
commandments seem only too justified. Their reason seems clear: it is immoral to murder and it 
is moral to give charity. These moral prohibitions and prescriptions, according to Berkovits, are 
accessible to human reason. The question concerning them is not about their purpose; rather, it is 
that since they could be known through reason, why was it necessary for them to be revealed. In 
summarizing these problems, Berkovits writes, “It is not easy to say which is the less perturbing 
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difficulty: The question of what need there is for revelation, if the laws are to be accepted on the 
basis of their rationality; or our all-encompassing ritual code, which seems difficult to associate 
with any spiritual significance.”
84
  
b. Two Problems of Moral Philosophy 
Berkovits answers these questions by posing two problems in moral philosophy: “One is the 
source of ethical obligation; and the other is the examination of human behavior in light of this 
obligation.”
85
 The former concerns the source of moral normativity, that is, how do 
unconditional obligations arise. The latter concerns the method of inducing behavior in 
accordance with moral obligations, that is, moral motivation.
86
 Berkovits loosely follows the 
“critical positivist” method he attributes to  ume:  e delimits the power of reason in originating 
both normativity and motivation in order to clear the way for other sources. 
Berkovits poses the problem of moral normativity in the language of obligation. Though he 
does not explicitly state it here, he assumes that moral normativity must be unconditional. He 
describes the moral imperative elsewhere as possessing “the quality of absolute obligation”
 87
 
and notes the “absoluteness of the ethical coordinates.”
88
 Moral obligations at least claim 
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unconditional normativity; the question is whether that claim can be vindicated. He describes the 
problem as follows: “As to obligation, it is not enough to know the rational essence of the good 
and the right; one must also understand why it is imperative to adhere to the good and the 
right.”
89
 He distinguishes between the axiological question of the good and the deontological 
question of obligation.  e then briefly surveys ethical theories in order to argue that “[n]one of 
the extant theories of ethics is able to show that ethical obligation has its source in the essence of 
the good itself.”
90
 His brief discussion clarifies the specific problem he raises: 
Let us assume, for example, that hedonism is a logically valid theory. What law is there in 
reason to forbid a person to behave unreasonably and to act contrary to the pleasure 
principle? Reason may, of course, describe the consequences of such “foolish” action—but 
what if one does not care about the consequences? Or consider utilitarianism. Let it be 
granted that the greatest happiness of the greatest number is indeed the essence of goodness. 
How can it be proved that one ought to care about it, and that one should be morally 
condemned if one does not? It is not different with intuitive ethics either. Man may have 
some innate concepts of good and evil; he may even be able to entertain an intuitive 
appreciation that he act in accordance with the standards of such an inborn ethical code. But 
since he is capable of disobeying his moral “instinct,” what is there in the intellectual grasp 
of such intuitive ideas that will obligate him to obey? Perhaps the most interesting illustration 
of this point is provided by Kant’s categorical imperative. At best, Kant has shown that to act 
so that the maxim of our will may…serve as the principles of a general law is indeed an a 
priori requirement of “pure, practical reason.”  owever, he overlooked the most important 
thing: To prove that man is obligated to act in accordance with his famous “factum” of 
reason. If Kant is right, one may say that an action which does not conform to the categorical 
imperative is not dutiful, as the term must be understood by practical reason. But he has…not 




In his evaluation of hedonism, utilitarianism, intuitionism, and Kantianism, Berkovits claims that 
though each of them may have offered a coherent definition of the good, they have not 
substantiated one’s obligation to act in accordance with it. For each definition of the moral good, 
its proponents may have described the obligations that derive from it, yet they have not shown 
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that one is obligated to the moral good itself. But if they have not proven that one is obligated to 
the moral good itself, then there can be no unconditional moral obligation.   
The terminology of contemporary metaethics can clarify Berkovits’ point. A debated 
question in this area of inquiry is the relation between morality and reasons for action. Two 
positions have been articulated: morality/reasons internalism and morality/reasons externalism. 
Stated most succinctly, morality/reasons internalism consists in the claim that “[i]f S morally 
ought to do A, then necessarily there is reason for S to do A consisting either in the fact that S 
morally ought so to act, or in considerations that ground that fact.”
92
 That there is a moral reason 
to do a certain act is always a reason simplicter to do that act. Morality/reasons internalism thus 
upholds morality’s claim to unconditionality; one always has a reason do what one morally ought 
to do. Morality/reasons externalism denies this claim. It maintains that even if an individual 
morally ought to do a certain action, this does not necessarily provide a reason for him to do that 
action or at least not an overriding reason. It simply means that morally one ought to perform the 
action. For Berkovits, the problem of normativity is that moral obligation should be 
unconditional, but it has not been demonstrated that one is actually obligated to obey moral 
obligations.    
Berkovits describes the second problem as follows: “Assuming the obligatory character of an 
ethical code, whatever the source of obligation, how is mankind to be induced to act 
accordingly?”
93
 He surveys the main answers to this question as well and finds them all 
inadequate. He divides them into three categories: Socratic-Platonic, Christian, and 
Deterministic-Evolutionary. The Socratic-Platonic tradition provides an intellectualist response. 
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It holds that “[g]oodness is…knowledge itself, and, like all knowledge, it is teachable.”
94
 Thus, 
all wrongdoing results from ignorance. The Christian tradition, in contrast, takes evil more 
seriously and roots it in fallen human nature. Thus, evil cannot be removed by human means but 
only by God’s grace.
95
 Berkovits argues that neither of these traditions stands the test of 
experience. The Socratic-Platonic tradition is belied by the behavior of individuals and 
civilizations. Noting the prevalence of akrasia, weakness of the will, Berkovits claims, “Man 
may have ample knowledge of the good, yet more often than not he will act against his better 
insight.”
96
 Similarly, he notes that there is “little difference between ages of greater and lesser 
enlightenment”
97
 in terms of the crimes civilizations commit. Given this experience, the 
Christian tradition initially seems more accurate. However, conjoint with its negative claim it 
makes a positive assertion: Human nature can be reformed through grace. Berkovits appeals to 
the particular experience of the Jewish people to contradict it. Christian violence against the 
Jews, climaxing in the  olocaust, “is irrefutable evidence that…mankind has remained 
unredeemed.”
98
 The Deterministic-Evolutionary perspective is comprised of Dialectical 
Materialism and Bergsonian Evolutionism. In Berkovits’ telling, the former claims that if the 
material conditions of human existence are properly organized, humanity will automatically act 
properly.  owever, he argues that this claim is unwarranted given the perspective’s materialistic 
assumptions. In contrast, the latter appeals to elan vital to explain matter’s unconscious drive for 
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moral action. However, Berkovits contends that Bergson’s view undermines the possibility of 
moral action: “[T]he moment ethical obligation becomes a form of compulsion, however 
ingeniously implanted in the workings of evolution, it ceases being ethical.”
99
  
In Berkovits’ criticism of Bergson’s account of moral motivation, another of his assumptions 
about morality is evident.  e writes, “Man acts ethically when, choosing among alternatives, he 
decides to act in conformity with the ethical demand.”
100
 Berkovits might disagree with Kant 
about the source of moral normativity, but he agrees with him about the criterion for morally 
significant action: An agent must freely choose to comply with a norm for her behavior to be 
moral. Any account of morality that denies human freedom by compelling the human being to 
act morally through nature or grace denies the possibility of moral action. Berkovits therefore 
claims that moral philosophy confronts two major obstacles: It has failed to substantiate 
unconditional moral obligation. And it has failed to provide an account of moral motivation that 
stands the test of experience, is philosophically cogent, and preserves freedom.  
In addition to a negative evaluation, Berkovits also presents a deeper diagnosis of this failure 
that allows the resolution of the problems of both moral philosophy and philosophy of halakha. 
According to him, the root of the failure of moral philosophy is its defective account of reason:  
The misunderstanding of the function of reason has been the tragic mistake which the 
Western world inherited from the Greeks…. Reason was believed to have authority to 
command, as well as power to compel…. It was taken for granted that the reasonable was 
also obligatory. Similarly, it was assumed that once the reasonableness of the good was 
understood, reason itself would cause man to act ethically…. But reason as such may neither 
command nor induce action. Reason is the faculty of understanding, of recognition and 
interpretation, of analysis and synthesis…. The source of all obligation is a will, and the 
motivation of a will is a desire…. Reason may describe what is  it cannot prescribe what 
ought to be…. It is always a desire, and not objective reason, which by setting a goal moves 
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the will, and it is the will that issues the command. Not everything that is desired and willed 




The Western tradition has misunderstood the relation between reason and action. It assumed that 
reason determined normativity and motivated action. However, Berkovits claims that reason can 
neither determine normativity nor induce action. Desire is needed for both. It sets a goal that 
reason determines how to attain and moves the will that impels action.  
As described above, Berkovits receives this conception of reason from Hume. For both of 
them, reason is not originative but operates on the deliverances of experience. Theoretical reason 
involves the analysis and synthesis of ideas that derive from sensory impressions. Practical 
reason consists simply in determining how to achieve goals set by desire. But Hume claimed that 
all human beings are equipped with a natural sentiment of sympathy that is the origin of moral 
action. Berkovits does not accept this claim for two reasons: First, as noted, he accepts the 
Kantian perspective that moral action must be free; it cannot arise from any sort of internal 
compulsion. Second, he denies the existence of a common human sentiment or reason that results 
in uniform desires and moralities. History reveals competing desires and moralities.
102
  
Instead, Berkovits draws on other English proponents of the belief-desire account of reason, 
such as Thomas Hobbes and Bertrand Russell. In Leviathan, Hobbes reduces all claims about 
goodness and evil to statements about desire and aversion.
103 
Russell recognizes the basic 
elements of  obbes’ analysis but adds nuance. A dispute about value is not a clash of truth 
claims but a disagreement of taste. Thus, he too argues, “the whole idea of good and bad has 
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some connection with desire. Prima facie anything that we all desire is “good,” and anything that 
we all dread is bad. If we all agreed in our desires, the matter could be left there, but 
unfortunately our desires conflict….”
104
 This situation gives rise to ethics and the distinctive 
features of ethical discourse. Ethical discourse, claims about what is valuable or good, is an 
attempt to escape from the subjectivity of desires and grant them universality. They are 
imperatives that attempt to recruit others to these same expressive judgments.
105
  
While Berkovits articulates his diagnosis of the problems of ethical theory in terms of 
modern (Hobbes, Hume, and Kant) and early twentieth-century (Bergson and Russell) 
philosophy, the view he presents about the relation between reason and motivation has been 
discussed in contemporary metaethics in the debate surrounding a second externalism and 
internalism distinction, which was introduced in a previous chapter. Reason/motives internalism 
and its contrary, reasons/motives externalism, concern the relation between reasons for action 
and motivation. This relation has been of interest mainly in connection with the debate between 
morality/reasons internalism and externalism. At least initially, reasons/motives internalism is 
the more intuitive position. Prima facie, it seems reasons for action should have some connection 




Reasons/motives internalism and externalism have each been articulated in a number of 
different forms. As has been discussed, Leibowitz hold a form of “judgment” reasons/motives 
internalism. The form most useful for clarifying Berkovits’ view on normativity is described by 
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Stephen Darwall as “metaphysical” internalism or externalism.
 
Metaphysical internalism holds 
that “p is a reason for S to do A only if S would have some motivation to A were she aware of p 
under appropriate conditions.”
107
 Metaphysical externalism denies the connection. The most 
famous advocate of the internalist view is Bernard Williams, who explicitly traces it to a 
Humean conception of reason. His most concise statement of the view is that “[S] has some 
reason to [A] iff S has some desire the satisfaction of which will be served by his [A]-ing.”
108
 
Thus, reasons for action are relative to an agent’s “subjective motivational set”  they must be 
capable of moving him to act by being properly related to the motivations that he possesses.
109
 
Williams’ argument for this claim turns on the role that reasons for action play in the explanation 
of action.  e argues, “If there are reasons for action, it must be that people sometimes act for 
those reasons, and if they do, their reasons must figure in some correct explanation of their 
action.”
110
 But for that to be possible, the reasons for action must link up with their motivations. 
Williams is clear that motivations can be altered by reflection on one’s motivational set. Still, 
any modification must begin with preexisting motivations. In contrast, external reasons, reasons 
that have no connection to an individual’s motivation set, cannot be reasons for action because 
they cannot figure in an explanation of the individual’s action. Reason itself is incapable of 
introducing motivations that are foreign to a motivational set. Significantly, this entails 
morality/reasons externalism, for it is not necessary that every individual possess the motivation 
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to act morally. Moral reasons do not necessarily entail reasons for action. Only if moral reasons 
are properly related to an individual’s motivations will they be reasons for action for her.
111
  
Berkovits is committed to a similar form of reasons/motives internalism. As indicated, for 
him obligation only derives from the will, which, in turn, originates in desire. And he, like 
Williams, takes this view to entail morality/reasons externalism: There is no necessary 
connection between moral obligations and reasons for action. But Berkovits, unlike Williams, 
thinks that morality should possess unconditional normativity. Berkovits could reestablish 
morality’s connection to reasons for action by claiming, like Hume, that there is some common 
and natural desire to act morally. Moral reasons would then always be reasons for action because 
they would always be properly related to individuals’ motivational sets.  owever, this would be 
problematic for two reasons: First, it is questionable whether such a contingent harmony between 
morality and human nature could be described accurately as resulting in an unconditional 
obligation. Second, again, since Berkovits holds that moral action must be freely undertaken, a 
built-in motivation to act morally might undermine the possibility of moral action. He seems to 
be left with a conundrum: Morality requires both unconditional obligation and freedom, but his 
account of reasons and motivations seems to rule them out. Something else is necessary to 
substantiate morality’s claim to unconditionality.  
Another feature of Berkovits’ discussion of ethical theory is illuminated by comparison with 
Williams. While the problem of morality’s unconditional obligation has yet to be solved, at this 
point in Berkovits’ argumentation the problem of moral motivation has disappeared. 
Reasons/motives internalism does not allow for the problem of motivation, for since reasons for 
action are connected to motivations, one is ceteris paribus always motivated to do what one has 
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reason to do. The problem of motivation only arises when reasons for action that are external to 
the individual’s motivational set are recognized. But this denies reasons/motives internalism. 
Berkovits’ argumentation is thus only understandable if one anticipates his solution: a special 
type of will that can generate reasons for action for another individual regardless of her 
motivation set. A method for producing in the other individual the motivation to comply with 
these external reasons for action would then be necessary. 
c. Reciprocal Solutions: Absolute Will and Moral Training 
Berkovits claims that a proper understanding of the philosophical difficulties regarding moral 
normativity and motivation removes the two problems of ta’amei ha-mitzvot. Moreover, the 
command, or revelation, and the commandments, or the regimen of ritual commandments, 
present solutions to the problems of moral normativity and motivation respectively; that is, they 
show how unconditional moral normativity is grounded and how moral motivation is created.  
Berkovits claims that the problem of the need for revelation for the ethical commandments 
only made sense on the assumption that rationality could entail normativity.
112
 However, having 
concluded that all normativity derives from desire, a new appreciation of revelation emerges: 
The essence of justice may be described in terms of reason; its obligation must forever be 
based on a will. This, however, is tantamount to saying that all law derives its authority from 
some form of “revelation.” The lawgiver must make his will known to establish the law. Let 
a law be ever so rational, if it has not been instituted as such by the will of the legislative 




Desire is not reducible to rationality; thus every expression of a will is an event. Further, the 
expression of the will of someone with authority creates an obligation for those subordinate to 
him. The occasion of its expression is a type of revelation in that it is not rationally determined 
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by anything that preceded it. Even if a command was fully rational, its normativity could only 
derive from the expression of the authority’s will. Thus, despite their clear ethical significance, 
the interpersonal commandments would not be obligatory unless they had been commanded by 
God. Indeed, Berkovits claims, “It is the will of God that makes the good obligatory as the law of 
God.”
 114
 The moral justifiability of the interpersonal commandments would not secure their 
normativity; this can only be established by revelation.  
Importantly, in Berkovits’ view not only is the revelation of the interpersonal commandments 
now understandable; it is also becomes apparent that it is necessary. While the other proponents 
of reasons/motives internalism mentioned are satisfied with morality/reasons externalism, he 
wants to reestablish unconditional moral normativity. To do this, he adduces a unique will, that 
of God, the revelation of which creates obligations for others. Only the will of God secures 
unconditional moral obligation: “God alone is the source of objectivity for all value and law.”
115
 
A secular ethics with the very same content as the interpersonal commandments is possible; 
however, its normativity would only be conditional. It would be valid only for those that desire it 
or for those under an authority that desires it and only so long as that desire persists. But, for 
Berkovits, God is the ultimate authority and his will is eternal. Thus, Berkovits argues, not only 
is revelation required for the normativity of the ethical commandments; it is necessary for any 
unconditional moral obligation.  
 owever, this creates an additional problem, which is unique to Berkovits’ combination of 
an unconditional moral obligation with a general commitment to reasons/motives internalism. 
This combination is consistent if one posits, perhaps like Hume, that humans have a natural 
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motivation to act for moral reasons. But Berkovits denies this. He establishes unconditional 
moral obligation by recognizing God’s desire as imposing obligations on human beings.  ence, 
despite moral reasons always being reasons for action, and despite the general link between 
reasons for action and motivation, external reasons for action have been introduced. An 
individual is confronted by reasons that apply to her unconditionally, God’s commands, yet she 
may be unmotivated to comply with them. Berkovits therefore must provide some means for 
creating the motivation to comply with these external reasons.  
Berkovits presents the ritual commandments as the solution to this problem.
116
 He shows 
how they are not merely “ritual” in nature but are auxiliaries to the ethical commandments. As a 
foundation for this position he presents what he claims is the Jewish view of humanity, which 
contrasts with both Socratic-Platonic moral psychology and Christian theological anthropology. 
This view is based on what Berkovits calls “critical optimism.” Contra the Socratic-Platonic 
tradition, Judaism maintains that knowing the good is not sufficient for moral action, for “the 
physical organism…is in essence under the sway of laws of self-centeredness.”  owever, contra 
the Christian tradition, Judaism maintains that “an appetite for goodness” is “implanted in human 
nature.” The latter, however, is initially at a disadvantage to the “self-centered and self-regarding 
urges and needs of the physical man.”
117
 At the outset, the human being lacks sufficient 
motivation to act in accord with morality. Thus, Judaic critical optimism claims not that human 
beings are good, that they already possess sufficient moral motivation, but that they can become 
good through nurturing it. Berkovits explains: 
It is…necessary to foster the emotional force of the desire for the good, to increase its 
intensity and its hold over the emotional pattern of the human personality. In order to achieve 
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effective ethical conduct, not the mind alone, but, foremost, needs and appetites have to be 
educated; the seat of desire in human nature must be so influenced that emotional forces are 
willing to submit to the discipline required for moral action. This, however, is not enough. 
Beyond the education of needs and desires, it is also necessary to make the physical organism 





Knowledge is not sufficient for moral action. Moral reasons unconnected to motivation cannot 
result in moral action. But neither is the human condition hopeless. The motivation to comply 
with morality can be created. However, this is not an intellectual process. Human corporeality 
must be recognized and leveraged for moral purposes. Emotions and desires must be educated 
and bodily reactions must be trained.
119
 
Berkovits maintains that there are two main elements to such education and training. The 
first is negative and works to “increase the intensity of the desire for the good by sublimating 
some of the egocentric inclinations of the human nature” through the inhibition of natural 
desires. This “creat[es] reserves of emotional energy” that are then channeled into the desire for 
the good. The second is positive and directly “educat[es] the human body…for the ethical deed” 
by making it rehearse actions that do not originate in its own desires.
120
 The ritual laws comprise 
such a form of ethical training: 
The aim is to teach purely subjective emotion, needs, and desires, a new ‘awareness,’ which 
is foreign to the organic component of the human personality. It is the awareness of the other, 
of an order of being as well as meaning different from that of organic egocentricity. The 
purpose of the inhibitive rules is to practice saying ‘no’ to self-centered demands; whereas 
the fulfillment of the positive command is an exercise of saying ‘yes’ in consideration of an 
order different from one’s own. By such training, one breaks down the exclusiveness of 
man's organic selfishness. The obedience to the rules and commands is itself an exercise in 
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behavior that is not purely self-regarding and orients a person to an other; awareness of the 




The purpose of the ritual laws is to train the human being and, more specifically, the human body 
to be responsive to ethical demands. Berkovits describes this responsiveness as a type of 
awareness, though he makes clear that this intellectualist portrayal is metaphorical. A moral 
habitus is created: dispositions to perceive the concerns of the other and respond to them.
122
  
A corollary of this interpretation of the ritual commandments is that they are, as David Shatz 
notes, content-independent.
123
 The prescriptions and prohibitions of the ritual laws do not 
command or disallow actions that are intrinsically right or wrong; rather, they create situations 
akin to drills to prepare an individual to encounter successfully situations where the moral stakes 
are real. Indeed, Berkovits accepts this conclusion directly, arguing, for example, that there is 
nothing harmful per se in non-kosher food.
124
 He also notes that the form of the ritual 
commandments may depend on historical considerations. However, because their ethical purpose 
is served independently of their content, their validity endures outside of their original context.
125
 
Thus, on this account, all of the commandments have a moral purpose. However, their 
relations to morality differ. The actions prescribed or prohibited by the ritual commandments are 
merely instrumental to morality. They serve as a means to a moral end that is external to them. In 
contrast, the actions prescribed or proscribed by the ethical commandments are internally related 
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to morality. Crucially, they have moral value qua actions as opposed to expressing moral 
intentions. Berkovits makes clear that “the essence of every [commandment] is a deed.”
126
 
Indeed, this is the reason for his concern with the source of moral motivation, for “[t]he task is to 
induce man to implant the demands of morality in human conduct.”
127
 He places a premium on 
the deed’s effectiveness because “in order to be, the deed must be effective and it must be so in 
the place where it belongs—in the external world, in history.”
128
  
Based on comments like these, David  azony describes Berkovits’ thought as a form of 
consequentialism.
129
 This description is misleading. Berkovits does posit a summum bonum that 
human beings are meant to advance—sedeq. But the label “consequentialism” implies that all the 
mandated actions are externally related to sedeq, which is incorrect. He does hold that the actions 
mandated by the ethical commandments contribute to the establishment of the world as the 
Kingdom of God. But they do this by being themselves acts of sedeq. His account should thus be 
labeled teleological, which is neutral about the relation between the actions and their end. In 
sum, in Berkovits’ ethical account of the purpose of the commandments, he provides a 
teleological justification of them, according to which the “ritual” commandments are means for 
the development of a moral habitus and the interpersonal commandments are moral actions. 
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3. The ‘Religious’ Purpose: Material God-Orientation and Sedeq 
Despite this ethical justification of the commandments, Berkovits is concerned that religion 
not be reduced to morality. Indeed, as early as HD, he stresses its independence from morality.
130
 
This reduction is particularly problematic for him as regards the ritual commandments because 
they are seemingly devalued by being reduced to a moral means.
131
 He thus maintains that they 
also have a religious purpose: 
On the religious plane, the indirect method of ethical concern becomes direct religious 
commitment. The training by the indirect method conditions the human organism for non-
egocentric action; the origin of the law in the divine will, however, turns the non-egocentric 
conditioning into theocentric behavior. The “awareness” established is not directed merely 
toward some outside order, but toward a divine one. It is not just “an other” which the 
organic component of the human being senses, but the “Wholly Other” that is God. From the 
ethical standpoint, inhibiting some of the radical self-regarding impulses is a negative act; but 
in the religious context, by inhibiting one fulfills a divine command. Not only does one learn 




Though the religious function of the ritual commandments is accomplished by the same actions 
as the moral purpose, because of their divine origin they fulfill an additional task: the creation of 
a relationship with God. Moreover, because they primarily mandate actions, one’s body and not 
merely one’s soul is brought into relationship with God. The practice of the ritual 
commandments serves to create “a material ‘awareness’ of the divine Presence.”
133
 
This is significant for a number of nested reasons: First, it allows the whole human being to 
worship God. Contrary to the claims of other philosophical and religious traditions, Judaism 
insists, according to Berkovits, that the human being is essentially an entity uniting body and 
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soul or a “bio-psychic being.”
134
 And while the soul can relate to God through faith, it is unclear 
how the body may encounter him. But Berkovits claims, “If religion is relatedness to God, then 
the whole human being must be so related and not man as soul only, for as such he does not exist 
in this world. Man, soul and body, must enter in the relationship.”
135
 By creating a “material 
awareness” of God both body and soul may worship him. Second, despite the human being’s 
essential bio-psychic nature, her actual existence is often bifurcated between body and spirit, or 
the desires of the flesh and the ideals of the soul. The ritual commandments achieve the goal of 
unifying human nature through the implantation of the ideals of the spirit into the body. 
Concurrently, since they never deny but only curb the desires of the body, they vindicate it and 
its needs, like sex and other “earthly delights.”
136
 Indeed, Berkovits describes the 
interpenetration of body and soul as “the origin of holiness,” for holiness does not reside in an 
ethereal realm but in the sanctification of life: “[O]nly life is capable of holiness.”
137
 The human 
being is unified and sanctified by having the spirit implanted in the body. Lastly, the 
interpenetration of body and spirit has more than individual significance; it is a principle element 
of Berkovits’ eschatological vision.  e writes, “The real task is to orient the whole world of 
man, matter and spirit, toward God.”
138
 God’s purpose, which originates in creation and 
advances through the revelation, is to impregnate created being with value. By instilling in the 
human body an orientation to God, the ritual commandments begin this process. But 
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sanctification must extend to the whole creation. All of matter must be organized according to 
the axiological purposes of the Creator.
139
  
While Berkovits insists that this purpose of the commandments is uniquely religious, there 
are indications that it too is ultimately moral. First, as noted, the same actions that bring the body 
into relationship with God train it to respond to human beings. There are no uniquely religious 
activities that do not also serve a moral purpose. Second, he speaks of these commandments as 
bringing the body into relationship with God, but recall that the only relationship to God that can 
be established is through his moral dispositions. This should hold for the body as well as the 
spirit; no relationship to God is possible except a moral relationship. Third, the goal that the 
ritual commandments advance in their religious function can only be described in moral terms. 
While Berkovits often writes abstractly of the interpenetration of being with value, as has been 
shown, by value he means moral value and, more specifically, sedeq.  The purpose of creation 
and revelation is the transformation of being from tohu to sedeq. Instilling matter with an 
orientation towards God means organizing the world as the Kingdom of God.  
Indeed, Berkovits himself makes the connection between the religious and ethical purposes 
of the commandments on two levels. First, he describes the sanctification of the body and the 
wider material world that occurs through the ritual commandments as itself an expression of 
concern for the other. Though still describing the vindication of matter as “an essentially 
religious task,” he portrays it as an expression of imitatio dei, which means the imitation of 
God’s moral dispositions. Just as God meets his other, the human being, with concern, so too the 
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human being must meet all her others, including her own materiality, with concern. Facilitating 
the body’s orientation to God is moral action towards it.
140
  
Second, Berkovits claims that the ethical and religious purposes of the commandments are 
intertwined from a developmental perspective. On the one hand, the ethical purpose of the 
commandments depends on their religious character, for both their unconditional normativity and 
motivational effectiveness rest on their religious features. On the other hand, as indicated, since 
God can only be known through his moral dispositions, a relationship with this “Other” can only 
be established through imitating his dispositions in one’s relationships with “others.”
141 
Thus, 
despite Berkovits’ insistence that the religious purpose of the commandments is distinct from 
their ethical purpose, the former is both an expression of the latter and intertwined with it. This 
does not mean that he has, despite himself, “reduced” religion to “mere” morality. On the 
contrary, by placing moral action in a religious framework, his account is better described as the 
sanctification of morality than the secularization of religion. In any event, the ritual laws are 
teleologically justified by showing how they too are moral acts and increase sedeq. 
4. Law, History, and the Eschaton 
Lastly, it is necessary to sketch the connection Berkovits creates between practice of the 
commandments, history, and the Kingdom of God to complete his account of the justification of 
the commandments. As indicated, he claims that practice of even the ethical commandments is 
not only of intrinsic value but is also valuable because of the commandments’ consequences. The 
commandments do not merely prescribe individual indirect and direct moral actions; they drive a 
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process of transformation of society and the world into the Kingdom of God. Berkovits spells out 
the relation between individual action and social structure as follows: 
[Judaism] is a religion for the whole of man. It aims at relating life in its entirety to God. It is 
not, therefore, so much a religion of creed as it is the religion of the deed on earth…. The 
deed, directed to the outside, is always in relationship to an “other.” This other may be the 
world, a neighbor, or God. However, in order to be, the deed must be effective and it must be 
so in the place where it belongs—in the external world, in history…. The deed makes history 
if it is the materialization of the desire and will of a community…. Because the deed is to be 
effective in the external world of man, the community that it requires must be a living society 




Berkovits makes two connected points: one about the nature of the human being and the other 
about the nature of action. When the bio-psychical nature of the human being is understood, it 
becomes apparent that not just the body but also society must be oriented towards God. Since the 
body must be related to God, the focus of the commandments shifts from intentions to actions. In 
addition to their objective rightness, actions must be evaluated in terms of their effectiveness. 
Further, the human being is not only physically embodied but also socially embedded. The 
effectiveness of an individual’s deeds depends on the structure of her society. Thus, society too 
must be organized with an orientation to God. Because of this, Judaism takes as its primary 
object a sovereign people. It is only such a politically autonomous social unit that can 
accomplish the goal of Judaism: “All the material aspects of society, its complete biophysical 
structure, are…in need of being invested with value and God-centeredness.”
143
 Indeed, Berkovits 
claims, “The Biblical conception of the Jewish State is the Kingdom of God on Earth.”
144
 
The telos of Judaism is not achieved with the creation of a God-centered society by the 
Jewish people, however. Its aim is the creation of a universal Kingdom of God. Still, progress 
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towards this goal must begin with one nation, which serves as a model for the rest of the world. 
According to Berkovits, this is necessary for two reasons: First, while Judaism’s goal is for all of 
humanity, humanity as such does not yet exist in history. It must be created out of the individual 
nations that are in existence.
145
 Second, because the goal is not an abstract ideal, it cannot be 
taught but must be modeled.
146
 
Berkovits removes any remaining doubts about the moral nature of this telos in his 
description of the universal Kingdom of God:  
A universal mankind will come into being only through the reconciliation of all separative 
interests, ambitions, and aspirations in the world. Reconciliation, however, means awareness 
of and care for the ‘other.’ This brings us back to our starting point: The obligation to care 
we found in the imitation of God; the effectiveness of the caring deed we saw safeguarded 
through the law of God. The harmony of mankind is the end-result in history of a 
development which starts with the individual mitzva, the deed of interpenetration of the 
spiritual and the material. The God orientation of the whole of the human being is the 
beginning of a process that aspires to a kind of universalism, or to what we have called the 




The purpose of the commandments is thus the attainment of a universal reign of sedeq, the 
Kingdom of God. This process begins with the individual through the prescription and 
prohibition of moral actions as well as actions for the development of moral dispositions. 
Simultaneously, the body is implanted with an orientation to God, which, as indicated, is both an 
expression of concern itself and aids in moral action. But because the deed must be effective in 
reality, the social, economic, and political order must be organized according to the principles of 
sedeq. Lastly, the first outpost of the Kingdom of God, the Jewish state, serves as an example for 
other nations. In imitation of the Jewish people the other nations are recruited to the furtherance 
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of sedeq, culminating in the establishment of the world as the universal Kingdom of God, the 
thoroughgoing organization of the world by sedeq. 
Berkovits is direct about the implications of this teleological justification of halakhic norms: 
The commandments, qua commandments and distinct from the actions that they mandate, are 
only necessary so long as their goal, which he also refers to as “the purification of mankind,” has 
not been achieved: 
When the task of purification is completed, the law will be fulfilled.… [T]o exercise “mercy, 
justice, and righteousness on earth” will have become the natural desire of the whole man. 
When, as the result of the sanctifying deed, mankind as a whole will “delight in these 
things,” the law will no longer be needed. But there are no shortcuts in history. Only through 
the law will the law be overcome. When that phase is reached, mankind will have fulfilled its 




 istory comprises the period during which “mercy, justice, and righteousness” or, taken 
together, sedeq has not yet become the natural desire of all human beings. When sedeq fully 
interpenetrates all of created being, the commandments as external law will no longer be 
required and the world will be established as the Kingdom of God.  
In sum, Berkovits provides a perspicuous teleological justification of the commandments in 
terms of the moral ideal of sedeq and the goal of the establishment of the world as the Kingdom 
of God. The commandments and the various actions mandated by them have various teleological 
relations to this purpose. The commandments qua commandments have a strictly instrumental 
relation to it. The actions mandated by the commandments, however, have more complex 
relations. From one perspective, the actions mandated by the ritual commandments are simply a 
means for the creation of moral motivation and dispositions. Thus, they too have an instrumental 
relation to their end. From another perspective, however, they themselves are moral acts towards 
one’s own materiality. Consequently, they have an internal relation to their end. The actions 
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mandated by the interpersonal commandments are by all accounts moral actions. They are thus 
internally related to the end of sedeq. But even these actions have a teleological aspect. They also 
advance the establishment of the world as Kingdom of God. Still, they do this by being 
themselves acts of sedeq.  
D. Normative Difficulties 
Despite offering a clear justification of the commandments with a corresponding account of 
normativity and motivation, there are significant difficulties with Berkovits’ account of ta’amei 
ha-mitzvot. These difficulties are not all of a piece. Some concern issues that are more essential 
than others. Further, Berkovits recognizes some of these difficulties and offers resolutions to 
them, while others are unrecognized and left unresolved.   
The first and least essential difficulty is the warrant for the cosmological and eschatological 
scheme within which Berkovits’ justification of the commandments is embedded and upon 
which it partially depends. On his account, moral action does not just concern relationships 
between human beings but involves any other. The extension of moral obligations to include 
one’s own body  separate from one’s person  and non-human beings is an interesting proposition 
that could aid in the development of moralities and theologies that are sensitive to the bio-
technological and environmental threats of late-modernity. However, it is difficult to make sense 
of the notion of moral obligations to inanimate matter. Berkovits grounds this obligation in 
imitation of God’s creation of the world and as part of the human contribution to the 
establishment of the Kingdom of God. It is challenging to determine what would warrant this 
cosmological and eschatological scheme. Berkovits is not clear which commandments are 
strictly for the purpose of promoting sedeq towards matter, but to the extent to which these 




Berkovits does appeal to revelation to warrant his cosmological and eschatological scheme. 
Indeed, the status of his claims about revelation is central to his account of ta’amei ha-mitzvot. 
The normativity of the commandments as well as morality itself depends on the expression of 
God’s will. As has been shown, Berkovits marshals a number of arguments to support the 
possibility of revelation and the credibility of the Biblical witnesses. It would be an undue detour 
to engage in a detailed evaluation of these contentions. Even if his arguments for the possibility 
of miracles are cogent on Humean premises, which they most likely are not, the veracity of the 
Biblical record still must be established. Berkovits thereby introduces a great deal of contingency 
into the justification of the commandments and morality more generally. Ultimately, they depend 
on uncertain historical arguments.   
Additionally, the grounding of the normativity of the commandments in a historical 
revelation restricts the obligation to practice them to the Jewish people. On the one hand, this is 
advantageous as it explains why, if the commandments are rationally justifiable, only Jews are 
obligated to perform them. On the other hand, it engenders difficulties for Berkovits’ moral 
philosophy and eschatology. He maintains that only the absolute will of God can create an 
unconditional moral obligation. However, by locating the disclosure of that will in a historical 
and particular revelation to the Jewish people, he denies unconditional moral obligation to non-
Jews. They could adopt the same moral practices as Jews, but they could never be bound by 
them in the same way. Similarly, he describes the revelation to the Jews as the initial stage in an 
eschatological project that includes the entire world. Non-Jewish nations are meant to be drawn 
to the model of the Jewish people and to emulate it, organizing their societies according to sedeq. 




Even more significant difficulties concern Berkovits’ account of normativity. To explain the 
need for revelation he separates the axiological question of the good and the deontological 
question of obligation. But it is not clear that this can be accomplished so easily. Surely one is 
obligated to advance the good. Similarly, the fulfillment of one’s moral obligations is a good. 
The failure to disentangle these issues is evident in his description of the normativity that issues 
from revelation. At times he describes it as deriving from imitation of God, while more often he 
links it to God’s command. Using physical metaphors, imitation seems to ascribe more “pull” to 
God’s sedeq, while command seems to attribute more “push” to God’s will. For sedeq to have 
“pull” though it must be something that human beings independently recognize as valuable. 
However, Berkovits stresses that even if sedeq is valuable, it still would not be obligatory for 
humanity had God not commanded it.  
Berkovits also fails to explicate why God is an authority and his will normative for human 
beings. It is the singular exception to his account of normativity in that it introduces an external 
reason for action. Berkovits attributes intrinsic authority to God. This is not a radical claim for a 
theist to make. If anyone has authority, then surely God does. However, Berkovits does not 
elaborate on this claim. Thus, despite his efforts, he leaves unclear the relation between sedeq 
and normativity. Ex hypothesi, God’s authority and the normativity of the divine command 
cannot derive from the content of the command. Similarly, it cannot derive from a duty human 
beings possess to obey God, for that simply shifts the question to the normativity of that duty. 
One is thus left with the claim that it derives from the brute fact of God’s role as creator. But 
what is the normative force of that fact? 
Relatedly, Berkovits seems to be inconsistent about the balance between heteronomy, or as 




before the divine will. However, he also describes revelation as the induction of the Jewish 
people into fellowship with God,
149
 which implies a non-hierarchical relationship. Lastly, while 
Berkovits has clarified the content of sedeq and its subordinate values to a certain extent by 
showing how the Biblical commandments advance them, they remain rather indeterminate. 
Correlatively, it is still not obvious how all the commandments can be described as expressions 
of these values. As opposed to the preceding challenges, Berkovits attempts to resolve these last 
two difficulties in his theory of halakha. He views halakhic-legal practice as transforming 
theonomy into autonomy and guiding the commandments to advance sedeq. 
II. Teleological Theory of Halakha 
The major influences on Berkovits’ philosophy of halakha have been identified by Roth as 
Rabbi Jehiel Jacob Weinberg and Rabbi Moshe Shmuel Glasner.
150
 In this section the connection 
between elements of Berkovits’ own thought is examined, in particular the relation between his 
justification of the commandments and theory of halakha. It is argued that the latter closely 
corresponds to the former. Just as the commandments are justified through their purpose, 
halakhic-legal practice is guided by that purpose. Principles within the halakha direct the 
implementation of the commandments to ensure that the telos of the Torah is advanced. 
Berkovits thus presents a comprehensive teleological theory of halakha. Moreover, the direct 
connection he establishes between the justification of the commandments and halakhic-legal 
practice through their purpose represents a robust justification of halakhic practice. If halakhic-
legal practice is guided by purpose that justifies the commandments, then the justification for 
acting according to the halakha can be maintained.  
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 owever, Berkovits’ theory of halakha is susceptible to two interpretations, which 
correspond to different accounts of the nature of law and legal decision-making as well as the 
relation between philosophical reflection on law and legal practice. These accounts have been 
introduced in the previous chapter. The first interpretation is that of inclusive legal positivism, a 
position that recognizes that a legal system may contain moral principles and values. The second 
interpretation is that of legal post-positivism, an interpretive account of legal decision-making 
that claims that judges engage in constructive interpretations of the law that combines 
description and justification. Despite both recognizing a role for moral values in law, the 
difference between these interpretations is significant for a number of issues, including the share 
of autonomy in halakha, the relation between ta’amei ha-mitzvot and halakhic-legal practice, and 
the nature of Jewish philosophy.   
The outlines of Berkovits’ theory of halakha are presented to display its teleological nature 
and direct connection to his justification of the commandments (A). Examples of his actual 
halakhic-legal practice are then analyzed to show the consistency between it and his theory of 
halakha (B). The competing interpretations of his theory are subsequently presented along with 
their differing implications (C). Lastly, problems in his theory of halakha are discussed (D).  
A. Theory of Halakha and Teleology 
Berkovits argues for a teleological theory of halakha: Halakhic-legal practice is guided by the 
telos of the Torah. This contention is twofold: descriptive and prescriptive. He aims to describe 
the authentic nature and function of the halakha in order to resurrect its practice. His main 
discussions of philosophy of halakha, included in two related works, The Halakha: Its Power 




of Talmudic halakhic-legal practice.
151
 These studies are of interest as statements of Berkovits’ 
own theory of halakha rather than as contributions to Talmudic scholarship. On their basis, he 
argues for the necessity of halakhic-legal practice in addition to the written Torah (1) and 
contends that it is an essentially human endeavor (2) aimed at achieving the telos of the Torah 
(3). Further, he presents a theory of rabbinic authority (4) and a historical account of halakhic-
legal practice (5).  
1. The Necessity of the Halakha 
Berkovits identifies the halakha with the Oral Torah and describes it as the “wisdom of Torah 
implementation in the daily life of the Jewish people.”
152
 In NFH he explains the need for it: 
Halakha is the wisdom of the application of the written word of the Torah to the life and 
history of the Jewish people. However, this wisdom and its implementation cannot be 
contained in any book. No written word can deal in advance with the innumerable situations, 
changes of circumstances, and new developments that normally occur in the history of men 
and nations. The eternal word of the Torah required a time related teaching in order to 
become effective in the life of the Jewish people. This was the tradition passed on by the 
living word from generation to generation, the Torah sh’baal’Peh, the Oral Torah, beside the 




The Torah must be rendered effective in life. It contains commandments that aim to organize 
society according to the ideal of sedeq. Yet, life is characterized by particularity; no historical 
period or situation is identical to any other. Some medium is thus required to translate the 
commandments into new circumstances so that their purpose is achieved. Berkovits emphasizes 
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that this is not a problem that is unique to the Torah but one that afflicts any legal system 
because of the necessary generality of law and the particularity of life.
154
 In this, Shatz points 
out, Berkovits indicates the problem of “uncodifiability” recently discussed by Rynhold.
155
 The 
world contains too much complexity for rules to fully determine what ought to be done in every 
circumstance. A process of operationalization beyond simple application is required. It is 
principles, according to Berkovits, that allow the Torah to achieve the same purpose in different 
circumstances by guiding the implementation of the commandments.  
Berkovits is not the first Jewish thinker to notice this problem or suggest this solution. He 
marshals a number of medieval Jewish authorities to support his view, including Nahmanides 
and Joseph Albo (1380-1444).
156
 While both fix on the role of principles in enabling the 
commandments to be applied in new circumstances, the former focuses on the Torah’s moral 
principles. Berkovits follows Nahmanides in this regard, which is consistent with his view of the 
Torah. If the function of the principles is to allow the implementation of the commandments in 
new circumstances while preserving their purpose, and if the Torah has a moral purpose, then the 
principles should be moral.
157
 Halakhic-legal practice involves the implementation of the laws of 
the Torah in new circumstances under the guidance of these moral principles to ensure the 
advancement of the moral purpose of the Torah.  
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2. Halakhic Authority: Autonomy in the Context of Theonomy 
The Torah, according to Berkovits, is the divine law for humanity. Not only is it intended to 
organize human society, it is meant to do this through the participation of human beings. Indeed, 
he ascribes a large measure of human independence to the implementation of the Torah. The title 
of NFH refers to a Talmudic story that is central to his theory of halakha. The Talmud describes 
a halakhic debate between Rabbi Eliezer and the sages regarding the ritual status of a peculiarly 
constructed oven. The former ruled the oven pure, while the latter ruled it impure: 
On that day R. Eliezer brought…every imaginable argument, but [the sages] did not accept 
them. Said he to them: ‘If the halakha agrees with me, let this carob-tree prove it!’ 
Thereupon the carob-tree was torn a hundred cubits out of its place…. ‘No proof can be 
brought from a carob-tree,’ they retorted…. Again he said to them: ‘If the halakha agrees 
with me, let it be proved from  eaven!’ Whereupon a  eavenly Voice cried out: ‘Why do ye 
dispute with R. Eliezer, seeing that in all matters the halakha agrees with him!’ But R. 
Joshua arose and exclaimed: ‘It is not in heaven.’ What did he mean by this? - Said R. 
Jeremiah: That the Torah had already been given at Mount Sinai; we pay no attention to a 
 eavenly Voice, because Thou hast long since written in the Torah at Mount Sinai, ‘After 
the majority must one incline.’ R. Nathan met Elijah and asked him: What did the Holy One, 
Blessed be He, do in that hour? — He laughed [with joy], he replied, saying, ‘My sons have 




For Berkovits this story is significant for two reasons: It asserts the primacy of human reason in 
halakhic-legal practice and indicates the nature of that reason.   
Rabbi Eliezer attempts to marshal divine authority to support his ruling, and, indeed, he 
receives the endorsement of a heavenly voice. However, based on a truncated citation of a 
Biblical verse (Deut. 30:12), the sages reject this proof and assert that one pays no attention to 
such a voice in halakhic-legal decision-making. Rather, the majority is followed as described in 
another Biblical text as interpreted by the rabbis (Ex. 23: 2).
159
 Further, the Talmud reports 
through the testimony of Elijah that God approved of their assertion. Berkovits interprets this 
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follow-up story as expressing “an insistence on the human share and responsibility in the 
interpretation and administration of the revealed Word of God.”
160
 Halakhic-legal practice is the 
responsibility of human beings. By citing the verse-fragment, “it is not in heaven,” the sages 
claimed, “God  imself, in the act of revelation, handed the deciding authority to man.”
161
  
Berkovits maintains that this authority is transferred to humanity for a number of reasons. 
First, it redeems the “autonomy deficit” introduced in revelation. Despite the theonomy of 
revelation, God calls the Jewish people to fellowship with him. Only in this way can the 
eschatological goal of the emergence of the Kingdom of God from created being be 
accomplished. Human autonomy is introduced into this relationship in halakhic-legal practice: 
Words of the covenant are not dictates from on high…. They invite man to his own 
contribution and to accept his share of responsibility. Halakha is the final outcome of this 
covenantal mutuality of recognition….  In the mutuality of the covenant, theonomy and 
autonomy serve together for a common purpose. The supreme principle of the law to which 
man is subject is theonomous, its ultimate source of authority is the will of God; the 





Second, he claims that only finite human reason can organize human society. The heavenly voice 
is rejected because halakha “does not aim at absolute truth, nor… universal truth,” for such truth 
is not accessible to human beings.
163
 Moreover, even if it were, it would be inappropriate for the 
purposes of the Torah. Society must be organized by “pragmatic-moral” truth. In HPF this 
contrast is summarized:  
Simple truth is objective truth…the truth of the pure reason of theoretical logic. In…this truth 
one cannot build worlds for human beings. The halakhic truth is the truth of law, and the law 
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is entirely concerned with the establishment and enhancement of life…. Through the power 
of this pragmatic-moral truth, the world is established as the kingdom of God, and so we are 
made, as it were, partners with God in the act of creation.164 
 
The telos of the Torah is the transformation of the world into the Kingdom of God through the 
efforts of human beings. Therefore, in the implementation of the Torah by halakhic-legal 
practice, “one takes into consideration human nature and its needs, human character and its 
problems, the human condition in its forever fluctuating dimension, the Jew and the Jewish 
people in their unique historical reality.”165 And, according to Berkovits, this can only be 
accomplished through finite human reason, which operates within the constraints of pragmatic 
feasibility and with regard to the unique moral features of situations.  
3. Halakhic-Legal Decision-Making 
The operation of finite human reason in halakha is elaborated in Berkovits’ theory of 
halakha, which consists of a comprehensive analysis of the halakhic-legal decision-making 
process. For ease of exposition, it can be divided into two stages: the abstract analysis by a 
decisor of a given case in view of the basic halakha (a) and the somewhat messier elements of 
decision-making, including decision procedures in a halakhic-legal court (beit din) and the 
authority of a contemporary decisor confronting precedent (b).  
a. Halakhic Reason: S’bara and Principles 
Berkovits describes “halakhic reason” using the Talmudic term “s’bara” and explains its role 
in Talmudic halakhic-legal practice. According to him, the Talmud privileges human reason in a 
number of ways. Halakhic positions based on reason are granted equal authority to those that 
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derive from the Biblical text. Additionally, according to the Talmud, the Torah itself in at least 
one instance assumes a norm based on reason to be valid and then establishes its own command 
through an a fortiori argument.
166
  
But, more importantly, s’bara is characterized as “practical” and “moral-pragmatic” reason, 
and this results in far-reaching capacities. In its implementation of the commands of the Torah it 
is not driven by logical consistency as theoretical reason would be. Instead, “[i]t is practical 
reason in the sense that it requires consistency in the halakhic endeavor to realize  alakha’s two 
guiding ideals, as presented to it by the Torah, ‘Thou shalt live by them…and not die by them,’ 
and ‘All its ways are ways of pleasantness, and all its paths, paths of peace.’”
167
 The consistency 
of s’bara is constancy in the attainment of the pragmatic and moral ideals expressed by the 
Torah. The pragmatic ideal is expressed by the verse, “You shall keep My laws and My Rules, 
by the pursuit of which man shall live: I am the Lord”  Lev. 8:5 , to which the Talmud adds 
‘You shall live by them and not die by them.”
168
 While the literal sense of the Bible is an 
exhortation and the Talmud understands it as an injunction concerning the preservation of life,
169
 
Berkovits takes it to establish the overarching principle of the Wisdom of the Feasible (WoF). 
This principle guides the implementation of the Torah’s commandments in view of “the 
practicality and effective functioning of the material, economic, and social structure of Jewish 
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 The moral ideal is expressed in a verse in Proverbs that Wisdom’s “ways are 
pleasant ways, And all her paths, peaceful”   : 7 . Berkovits takes this to be a “comprehensive 
description of the nature of the Torah as found in the Torah itself,”
171
 which establishes the 
principle of the Priority of the Ethical (PoE) in halakhic-legal practice.  
The central feature of the WoF and PoE principles is that they mediate the implementation of 
halakhic norms so that the Torah’s telos is realized. They guide the interpretation of Biblical 
texts, serve as the basis of rabbinic injunctions, and circumscribe the application of Biblical 
commands.
172
 Sometimes their underlying verses are directly cited in rabbinic literature; more 
frequently different verses or other principles are adduced. However, Berkovits interprets these 
verses and principles as subordinate to the two overarching principles. Each primary verse and 
principle caps a ramified structure of subordinate verses and principles, each with its own 
meaning and application. His discussion, though exhaustive in terms of the range of rabbinic 
material covered, is not well organized. A rough organization can be reconstructed. Some of the 
structure and operations of the principles are discussed below (i-ii), before the emergency powers 
of halakhic-legal practice are briefly mentioned (iii). 
i. Priority of the Ethical 
As indicated, Berkovits describes the primary moral principle as the “Priority of the Ethical” 
 PoE  and maintains that it is rooted in the Torah’s self-description as “ er ways are pleasant 
ways, And all her paths, peaceful”  Proverbs  : 7 . According to the Talmud, this verse indicates 
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that “[t]he Torah in its entirety exists for the sake of the ways of peace [shalom].”
173
 While peace 
is not identical to sedeq, Berkovits understands it to mean morality in the broadest sense. In any 
case, PoE principles serve a central function in Talmudic halakhic-legal practice. He explains,  
The rabbis in the Talmud were guided by the insight: God forbid that there should be 
anything in the application of the Torah to actual life situations that is contrary to the 
principles of ethics. What are those principles? They are Torah principles, like: ‘And thou 
shalt do that which is right and good in the sight of the Eternal One’  or, ‘ er ways are ways 
of pleasantness, and all her paths are peace’ or, ‘That thou mayest walk in the way of good 




Berkovits marshals the verses upon which the PoE principles are based, including the primary 
PoE verse  Prov.  : 7 , “Do what is right and good in the sight of the Lord”  Deut. 6:   , and 
“So follow the way of the good and keep the paths of the just”  Prov.  :    .  
Berkovits devotes a large portion of NFH and even more in HPF to exploring PoE in 
Talmudic halakhic-legal practice. He describes three ways PoE and its subordinate principles 
operate in Talmudic halakhic-legal practice. They influence the interpretation of biblical verses 
(1), result in rabbinic enactments that extend biblical commandments (2), and circumscribe 
biblical commandments to render them inapplicable when they would result in morally 
problematic consequences (3).
175
 He also describes different types of relations between the PoE 
verses and principles, on the one hand, and halakhic-legal practice, on the other: a PoE verse is 
cited in support of an interpretation or position (a), a PoE principle is presented in support of an 
interpretation or position (b), and there is evidence of the implicit influence of PoE but no verse 
or principle is directly adduced (c).  
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Occasionally, the primary PoE verse is directly cited to interpret the Bible when the text is 
unclear about the way a particular commandment should be performed (1a). For example, it is 
used to interpret the Torah with regard to a particular case of levirate marriage. If a married man 
dies without a child, his brother is commanded to marry his widow. The brother and the widow 
are allowed to forego marriage; however, they must undergo the levirate marriage refusal 
ceremony (halitzah), before she may marry another (Deut. 25: 5-10). The case concerns a 
woman who bore a child and then whose husband dies. Because her husband did not die 
childless, she need not enter into a levirate marriage nor undergo halitzah. She then permissibly 
marries someone other than her former brother-in-law. Subsequently, the child dies. The Talmud 
offers an a fortiori argument to the effect that her first husband should be considered as having 
died childless, and thus she should be obligated to undergo halitzah with her former brother-in-
law.  owever, this argument is countered with the Torah’s self-description as “pleasant ways” 
and “paths of peace.” Apparently, it would not be consonant with that character for a married 
woman to undergo halitzah. The verses regarding levirate marriage are then read in a manner to 
preclude the necessity of her undergoing halitzah.176  
The primary PoE verse is also used as the basis for rabbinic enactments that “establish laws 
and behaviors that complete the Torah in matters that it did not explicitly dictate.”177 For 
example, when the Torah commands acts of assistance only for other Jews, such as charity, 
visiting the sick, and burial, the Talmudic sages often extend the requirements to include non-
Jews. Though the primary PoE verse is not explicitly cited, the rationale offered is “ways of 
peace,” which Berkovits takes to reference it directly. Thus, according to him it is a case of (2a). 
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Sometimes a principle that does not reference the original verse at all is cited as the basis for the 
enactment (2b). For example, the Talmudic sages ruled, extending the Biblical law, that minors 
could acquire property so that objects that they found would not be taken from them. The reason 
given for this is the prevention of “hatred.” They also ruled that one could acquire objects via 
one’s personal space, without the Biblically required physical conveyance, thus preventing 
physical struggles over objects. The rationale given for this is the prevention of “strife.” In these 
cases, despite their status as rabbinic enactments and lack of Biblical source, Berkovits claims 
that “since the source of their enactment is the basic moral imperative ‘All its ways are ways of 
pleasantness, and all its paths, paths of peace,’ [they] are also from the Torah.”178 
Berkovits also elaborates on the application of each subordinate PoE verse and principle, 
articulating the differences among them. This discussion is a testament to his expertise in 
rabbinic material; however, a summary of it is beyond the purpose of this section.179 Obviously, 
the combination of (3) and (c) results in the most controversial instances: Biblical 
commandments are rendered inapplicable and this is due to the implicit influence of the Torah’s 
moral principles without the invocation of another Biblical verse or a principle that derives from 
it. One exemplary case involves the stubborn and rebellious son, who, according to Biblical law, 
can be handed over by his parents to be executed (Deut. 21: 18-21). Talmudic interpretation fixes 
on his character as a glutton and drunkard and speculates that he is preemptively punished.180 
Still, Rabbi Judah interprets the requirements in a strictly literal manner to rule out any 
possibility of the law’s application. Finally, he concludes “it never happened nor will it ever 
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happen.” The Talmud then asks “If so, why was it written?,” to which it replies “To interpret it 
and receive reward for its study.”181 For Berkovits this means that the commandment was a 
moral challenge for the rabbinic interpreters: to see whether they could reconcile it with the 
Torah’s moral principles.182  
Berkovits maintains that the most significant area where the rabbinic response to the Torah’s 
moral challenge can be seen is in the Talmudic sages’ approach to the laws of marriage and 
divorce. Significantly, in most of these cases there is no explicit appeal to PoE verses or 
principles. Nonetheless, he claims, 
It is doubtful whether the halakhic conscience is any more strongly in evidence than in the 
area of the marriage and divorce laws…. As is the way of the Halakha, great efforts are made 
to retain the meaning of the legal principle and yet find solutions to the daily problems 
arising from the confrontation between the written word and the ethical needs of the concrete 
situation.183 
 
He details rulings in which the rabbinic sages sought to remedy the vulnerable position of 
women in Jewish marriage through enactments without the explicit invocation of PoE verses or 
principles (2c). A significant example is the introduction of the marriage contract (ketubah), 
which is unnecessary according to Biblical law. This provided a halakhic-legal instrument for the 
introduction of a range of conjugal rights and obligations, such as forbidding polygamy and 
increasing alimony.184  
For Berkovits the most important aspect of Talmudic halakhic-legal practice regarding 
women was in the area of the dissolution of marriage. This area was of particular concern 
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because of the possibility of igun, or “anchoring.” As indicated previously, igun refers to the 
situation where a marriage has effectively ended but without halakhic divorce, either through the 
disappearance of one of the partners or the disintegration of the spousal relationship. The root of 
this problem lies in the nature of marriage and divorce in Jewish law. For, as Broyde points out, 
“marriage and divorce in the Jewish legal tradition is different from that of any other…legal or 
religious system in that [they] are private neo-contractual rights rather than public rights.”185 
Since marriage and divorce are based on a private contract between the husband and wife, it can 
only be created or dissolved by the contracting parties. Halakhic-legal authorities do not 
conceive of themselves as creating marriages and divorces but only as discovering facts, such as 
whether the contract is valid, satisfied, or breached.186 Thus, cases can arise where one party is 
unwilling or unable to dissolve the marriage and the other party is “anchored” in the marriage. 
While technically both men and women can fall victim to igun, a second feature of Jewish 
marriage and divorce results in the problem being more prevalent and problematic for the wife: 
Men and women have asymmetrical statuses in the creation and dissolution of the marriage 
contract. Only the man can initiate both the creation and dissolution of the marriage, though the 
woman must accept the marriage (according to the Bible) or the divorce (based on rabbinic 
enactment). Additionally, according to Biblical law, the husband can create multiple marriage 
contracts, that is, polygyny is permitted, while she can only take part in one, that is, polyandry is 
prohibited. Thus, if the wife was to refuse to accept a divorce or disappear without proof of 
death, the husband would not truly be “anchored,” for he could still enter into another marriage. 
And while polygyny was prohibited for European Jews by enactment, its violation is not as 
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severe as violation of the Biblical prohibition by the wife, and it is waivable by rabbinic 
authorities. In contrast, the Biblical prohibition for the woman cannot be waived; its violation is 
punishable by death; and any resultant offspring have the status of bastards (mamzerim).187 
The possibility of cases of igun and attempts at their prevention appear as early as the 
Talmud, and, Berkovits claims, the halakhic moral conscience is evident in the manner in which 
the Talmudic sages resolved them.  e writes, “In many cases the sages decided that it was 
proper to be lenient on a woman in various matters so that she should not be anchored…. [T]hey 
permitted divergences from the principles of halakha that are valid in other places.”188 Some of 
these halakhic principles are Biblical commandments. For example, Biblical law requires two 
free, male witnesses for testimony to any fact. However, the Talmud presents a case in which 
one male, a female, a slave, or even an indirect report is accepted as evidence of a husband’s 
death, thus freeing the wife to remarry. The Talmud and medieval authorities offer many 
explanations for this irregularity; Berkovits, however, fixes on the statement that concludes the 
Talmudic discussion: “Because of the danger of her becoming an agunah, one made it easier on 
her.”189 Because of the consequences of the usual Biblical laws of testimony in this case, the 
Talmudic sages altered their application. According to Berkovits, they did this out of moral 
concern but without citing a PoE verse or principle; it is thus an example of (3c).190 
Additionally, the Talmud records a case in which the rabbinic sages annulled a marriage 
because the husband violated a rabbinic enactment. According to Biblical law, a husband who 
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sends a bill of divorce (get) by messenger to his wife can void it before a local beit din so long as 
she has not received it. This obviously introduces uncertainty about such divorces. An enactment 
was thus issued that forbids the husband from exercising this right. The Talmud entertains the 
question of the consequences of the violation of this enactment. Rabban Gamliel contends that 
despite the husband’s Biblical right to void the get and continue the marriage, the get remains 
valid and the marriage dissolved. A marriage that is valid according to Biblical law is thus 
dissolved by a get that is only valid according to rabbinic enactment. To support this remarkable 
conclusion the Talmud offers the rationale that ‘[w]hen a man betroths a woman, he does so 
under the conditions laid down by the Rabbis, and in this case the Rabbis annul his betrothal.”191 
One marries with the knowledge that the halakhic-legal basis of the marriage is established 
according to the understanding of the rabbis. Compliance with their enactments is therefore an 
implicit condition of the marriage, such that their violation renders the marriage annulled. Thus, 
despite the husband rendering the get void, his violation of the rabbinic enactment in doing so 
renders the marriage retroactively annulled.  
For Berkovits this halakhic-legal maneuver is a paradigmatic instance of the influence of the 
PoE in Talmudic halakhic-legal practice. Moral considerations stemming from the Torah 
circumscribe the application of a Biblical law even when neither a verse nor a principle is 
explicitly mentioned   c .  e writes, “The rabbis were fully aware of the legally disadvantaged 
status of the women…and endeavored to correct the situation.”192 They did this through rabbinic 
enactments and even overrode Biblical commandments. This Talmudic halakhic-legal practice 
attests to the halakha’s teleological nature. It stems from the Talmudic insight that the Bible’s 
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claim, “ er ways are pleasant ways, And all her paths, peaceful,” means that “The Torah in its 
entirety exists for the sake of the ways of peace.” Implementation of the Torah’s commands must 
advance sedeq.  
ii. Wisdom of the Feasible 
Berkovits’ second basic principle is the Wisdom of the Feasible  WoF . It is based on a 
single Biblical verse, “You shall keep My laws and My Rules, by the pursuit of which man shall 
live: I am the Lord”  Lev.  8: 5 , though it too issues in a structure of subordinate principles. 
Berkovits claims that it establishes that “the practicality and effective functioning of the material, 
economic, and social structure of Jewish existence” must be considered in the implementation of 
halakhic-legal norms.
193
 He maintains that WoF principles also operate in Talmudic halakhic-
legal practice in a number of different ways (1-3) and that their use is apparent to varying 
degrees (a-c). Moreover, he insists that WoF does not relate simply to effectiveness but to 
pragmatic and moral “feasibility.”
194
 
The highest-order WoF principle is that “The Torah was not given to the ministering 
angels,”
195
 which Berkovits explains as meaning “it is forbidden for the halakha to evade the 
existing reality, the daily and historical existence of the individual and the nation.”
196
 Human 
attributes and social realities are taken into consideration when implementing the 
commandments. This principle is explicitly utilized in a Talmudic pericope concerning the 
construction of the Temple. To prevent the workers from accidentally utilizing the materials in a 
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manner that is ritually prohibited, the Temple was constructed out of materials that were not 
initially sanctified. Only after its completion was the structure as a whole consecrated.
197
 The 
workers could have simply been exhorted to be meticulous while constructing the Temple; 
however, it was recognized that such precision was beyond their capacities, and a roundabout 
method of preventing the violation of ritual law was introduced. The manner of carrying out a 
Biblical command was determined by the explicit invocation of a WoF principle (1b).  
A more interesting—and morally fraught—case where Berkovits sees this principle at work 
is in the rabbinic interpretation of the Biblical commandment of the captive woman. The Bible 
(Deut. 21: 10-14) effectively allows an Israelite soldier to rape a woman from a warring nation 
so long as he then takes her into his house for a trial period. Should he decide not to marry her, 
he is forbidden to sell her into slavery or otherwise oppress her. Rabbinic literature describes this 
commandment as prescribed with a view towards man’s evil inclination.
198
 According to 
Berkovits, the Torah recognizes the savagery of war and aims to change it. It does this not by 
directly denying even the most barbaric of human urges but by reforming them. The Torah’s 
restrictions were a “revolutionary breakthrough” considering behavior in war in antiquity as well 
as today.  e claims that it evidences that “according to Talmudic understanding the Torah does 
not command anything that man, because of his intrinsic nature or the prevailing conditions 
would not be able to do.”
199
 As described below, however, Berkovits also claims that the Torah 
works developmentally  it takes into account “prevailing conditions” and works to change them.   
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While the preceding invocations of WoF principles involve the interpretation of Biblical 
laws, Berkovits also claims that they circumscribe the implementation of Biblical laws. For 
example, as understood by the Talmud, it is a Biblical prohibition to travel a certain distance 
outside of the city of one’s residence on the Sabbath. As in most cases, this prohibition can be 
violated to save a life. According to Biblical law, however, once one has concluded the 
lifesaving efforts one may not move beyond one’s immediate location until after the Sabbath. 
However, the Talmud rules that individuals who cross the boundary to save a life may return to 
their place of residence on the Sabbath.
200
 Berkovits claims that the sages felt that if individuals 
knew that they could not return home afterwards, they would not initially cross the boundary. 
The Talmudic sages could have insisted that individual fulfill both of their obligations, to save a 
life and to remain in place until the conclusion of the Sabbath. They recognized, however, that 
insisting on this would disincentivize individuals to fulfill their obligation to preserve life and 
thus allowed them to return home.
201
 Since this is a circumscription of a Biblical law and a WoF 
principle is not directly adduced, it is an example of (3c).  
The most wide-ranging subordinate WoF principle is that of “when it is possible, it is 
possible  when it is impossible  it is impossible,” which Berkovits refers to as the “principle of 
the possible.”
202
 The use of this seemingly tautological principle demonstrates two crucial 
features of WoF: its capacity to introduce apparent inconsistencies into the halakha and its 
connection to PoE. Berkovits describes its operation in connection to a set of cases concerning 
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 In the first case, a deathly ill husband on a journey sends a get to his wife. He is 
childless and, believing his death imminent, wants to relieve his wife of the obligation either to 
engage in levirate marriage or to undergo halitzah with his brother. But because he is deathly ill 
there is a possibility that he will die before the get reaches his wife, which would render it void. 
The opinion accepted in the Talmud is that, barring evidence otherwise, it is assumed that he is 
still alive when the get reaches his wife, thus freeing her to marry whomever she pleases. In the 
second case, a priest (cohen) who is married to an Israelite woman gives her a get that is 
formulated to become effective just before his death. There are certain tithes that can only be 
eaten by a cohen and his household. Now, however, uncertainty has been introduced into the 
woman’s status as member of that household. It is unknown when he will die, and thus when she 
will become divorced from him. The opinion accepted in the Talmud is that she must 
immediately cease to partake of the tithes. Thus, in this case, in contrast to the previous one, it is 
immediately assumed that he may have died. The Talmud puzzles over the differences in these 
cases and concludes that, while in in the second case it is “possible” to be concerned that he may 
have died, in the first case it is “not possible.”
204
 That is, the consequence of assuming that the 
husband died in the second case is simply that his wife must not partake of priestly tithes, while 
the consequence of not assuming that the husband is alive in the second is that his wife will have 
to engage in levirate marriage, undergo halitzah, or even become “anchored.”
205
   
This application of the “principle of the possible” demonstrates that it is not as tautologous as 
it initially seemed. Berkovits claims, “The category of Efshar, the possible, represents what in 
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view of human nature and with proper attention to human needs is practically or morally 
feasible.”
206
 It is not logically or physically impossible to be concerned that the husband might 
have died in the first case; it would just have unpleasant consequences for his wife. But it is not 
feasible from a practical or moral perspective to burden the wife in this manner. In contrast, in 
the second case the practical and moral stakes are low; the wife must simply refrain from certain 
foodstuffs. Thus, apparent inconsistencies are introduced into the halakha because of differing 
practical and moral consequences. But Berkovits argues that, in fact, this is constancy in the 
operation of s’bara. Halakhic-legal reason does not aim to apply its assumptions in the same 
manner in every case but to decide cases in a manner that practically furthers the Torah’s goals. 
Other rulings evidence the operation of WoF principles in terms of pragmatic feasibility in 
the economic field. Berkovits writes, “As the ‘wisdom of the feasible,’ halakha safeguards the 
effective pragmatic functioning of the economic and social structure of an autonomous Jewish 
society.”
207
 The paradigmatic example relates to the Biblical commandment canceling debts in 
the Sabbatical year (Deut. 15: 1-12). Initially, this is advantageous to poor debtors. However, 
Hillel the Elder recognized that it created a disincentive for wealthy individuals to lend money as 
the Sabbatical year approached. He consequently instituted the prosbul, which, as introduced 
previously, is a halakhic-legal instrument that transforms private debts between the creditor and 
the debtor into public debts between the debtor and the beit din. Such debts are not canceled by 
the Sabbatical year, and thus the beit din could collect the debts and return them to the creditor. 
Clearly, this involves the circumvention of the Biblical commandment. Berkovits argues, 
however, that it is warranted by virtue of the principles and telos of the Torah. Indeed, the 
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Mishnah describes the prosbul as having been enacted because of “the establishment of the 
world.”
208
 In addition to ensuring the availability of credit for the poor as the Sabbatical year 
approached, it removed a moral hazard for the wealthy as they were liable to violate the 
prohibition against not giving to the poor (Deut. 15: 9). 
Other enactments have the operation of the economic domain as their object even more 
directly. This is the case even when no WoF principle is adduced and there is a deviation from a 
Biblical commandment (3c). For example, it was ruled that if an individual claims that another 
individual possesses goods that had been stolen from him and the second individual claims that 
he purchased them from a third party without knowing they were stolen, the second individual 
swears regarding the amount that he paid for the goods and the first individual purchases them 
from him.
209
 Thus, the original owner of the property is required to purchase goods seemingly 
stolen from him. According to Berkovits, this enactment, which violates the owner’s property 
rights according to Biblical law, was necessary to “protect normal functioning of…business 
transactions.”
210
 If every buyer was concerned that the goods he purchased could be taken from 
him because they had been stolen, market transactions would be impossible.  
While this last case may seem solely concerned with the economic order, Berkovits insists 
that such concerns involve moral considerations: “Concern about the material welfare of society 
is not materialism, but an expression of moral responsibility for the life of the people.”
211
 There 
                                                 
208
 M Gittin 4: 3. Thus, regarding the classification of the case, since a principle—“the establishment of the 
world”—is invoked, it is an instance of (b). However, it is unclear whether it should be understood as a rabbinic 
enactment, extending the Biblical commandment of granting loans (2), or a circumscription of the Biblical 
commandment concerning the Sabbatical year (3), or both. 
209
 M Bava Kamma 10: 3.  
210
 Berkovits, NFH, 16. 
211




is therefore a connection between WoF and PoE. This is not surprising for, as indicated, 
Berkovits claims that sedeq is not simply a moral ideal; it is also conducive to human 
flourishing. And if the purpose of halakhic-legal practice is to implement the Torah in manner 
that achieves its telos, it ought to be guided by pragmatic as well as moral considerations. 
Indeed, he writes, “the halakha makes reality the material for the establishment of our world as 
the kingdom of God.”
212
 
iii Emergency Powers 
In addition to the operation of PoE and WoF principles, Berkovits attributes emergency 
powers to halakhic-legal practice. These should be interpreted as part of the teleological 
operation of halakhic-legal practice, perhaps as extensions of WoF. They aim to ensure the 
continuity of the project of the Torah in moments of crisis while allowing the violation of 
specific commandments.  
Berkovits divides the emergency powers into three types: The first type consists of actions 
that are undertaken “to guard a situation.”  e contends that “when there are behaviors opposed 
to the laws of the Torah, or even moral sensitivity whose source is the Torah, then it is possible 
to do things ‘not from the Torah’ to rectify the crooked.”
213
 An example of this is Elijah’s 
sacrifice on Mount Carmel (I Kings 18), despite the ban on sacrifices outside the Temple.
214
 The 
second type consists of actions that are undertaken when “it is time to act for God,” that is, when 
“it is appropriate to breach the law for the sake of a purpose whose importance is superior to 
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some individual commandments, and [this is done] for the sake of heaven.”
215
 An example of 
this, which is discussed below, is the compilation of the Mishnah, despite the prohibition of 
writing down the Oral Torah.
216
 Lastly, the third type consists of actions described as “temporary 
ordinances.” An example of this is the irregular offerings that Ezra brought when the Jews 
returned from exile  Ezra 8 . For Berkovits “temporary ordinances” differ from the other 
emergency powers in that they do not, strictly speaking, violate a Biblical commandment. They 
concern unanticipated situations, where there is a legal gap, and a novel ruling is required.
217
   
b. Decision Procedure and Contemporary Halakhic-Legal Authority 
The preceding discussion abstracted from the “messier” elements of halakhic-legal practice, 
including decision-making within the context of a beit din and a decisor confronting halakhic 
precedent. In this sub-section Berkovits’ approach to these elements of halakhic-legal practice is 
presented. It is argued that he balances procedural and substantive concerns and preserves the 
capacity for contemporary decisors to respond to the unique features of cases that confront them.  
According to Berkovits, the Talmudic story of Rabbi Eliezer and the heavenly voice has 
another lesson for halakhic-legal practice. Not only is the heavenly voice rejected in favor of the 
opinion of finite human reason, but the final decision is reached according to the procedural rule 
of the majority. As is indicated in the pericope, the validity of this rule is grounded in a rabbinic 
reading of a Biblical verse (Ex. 23:2). He explains that it, along with other procedural rules of 
adjudication, has an important, though limited, role in halakhic decision-making. On the one 
hand, there must be a way of coming to a decision when proponents of opposing positions cannot 
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convince one another. A decision procedure is required “so that disputes do not proliferate in 
Israel,” which would not be conducive to “proper order in the life of the nation.”
218
 Since the 
Torah is meant to organize a society, standardized practices must be established. Majority rule in 
particular is an advantageous procedure for this because, Berkovits claims, it is commensurate 
with the demands of justice.
219
 On the other hand, he limits its applicability: It only applies when 
both positions are equally reasonable, though he is not clear who determines their reasonability. 
It also only governs the deliberations of a sitting court. A decisor surveying past decisions is not 
bound to follow the position endorsed by the majority of previous decisors. Majority rule is 
merely a fair means of resolving a dispute. Thus, the minority opinion is not invalidated.
220
 If a 
later decisor thinks it is more reasonable and appropriate to his situation, it can still be applied. 
Berkovits points to a number of features of Talmudic halakhic-legal practice that attest to the 
merely pragmatic validity of majority positions and the continuing relevance of minority 
positions. An opinion in the Mishnah contends that minority views are preserved so that later 
decisors can rule in their favor if they seems more reasonable to them.
221
 Additionally, in ending 
a dispute between the schools of Hillel and Shammai, the Talmud writes as follows: “These and 
these are the worlds of the living God, but the halakha follows the school of  illel.”
222
 This 
dictum is interesting for a number of reasons: First, it recognizes both positions as valid even 
while deciding according to one of them. Second, the Talmud explains that the reason for the 
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ruling in accordance with school of Hillel was due to the moral character of its members. 
Berkovits explains that since “the whole Torah is for the sake of peace,” the character of the 
school of Hillel meant that their rulings would best approximate that goal.
223
 Third, in 
understanding how both interpretations can be “the word of the living God,” Berkovits fixes on 
the interpretation of Rabbi Shlomo Yitzchaki (1040-   5 , also known as Rashi, who writes, “at 
times one reason is valid; at other times, another reason. For reasons change in the wake of even 
only small changes in the situation.”
224
 The vagaries of situations call for different halakhic 
positions; each position is right for its unique circumstance.
225
 
Indeed, according to Berkovits, the responsibility of the decisor is to choose from among the 
previous positions, even those of the minority, or to construct his own position in view of his 
understanding of the specific situation that confronts him. This is the meaning of the Talmudic 
dictum that “a judge must be guided only by what his own eyes see.”
226
 Berkovits takes this to be 
“one of the basic principles of halakhic authority,” and interprets it to mean that “in all matters in 
which a [halakhic decisor] makes a decision, he must follow his own understanding.”
227
 This is 
so even when a previous authority has already offered a ruling, for perhaps confronted by new 
circumstances, he would have changed his mind.
228
  
                                                 
223
 Berkovits, HPF, 118. 
224
 BT Ketubot 57a, s.v. ma kamashma lan, translation in Berkovits, NFH, 53. 
225
 Berkovits, NFH, 53. 
226
 Ibid., 74. See BT Bava Batra 131a. 
227
 Ibid., 54. 
228




Correlative to this principle directed at the decisor that commands independence from 
previous authorities is a principle directed at the Jewish people that commands obedience to 
contemporary decisors. In the Bible (Deut. 17: 8-   it is written, “If a case is too baffling for you 
to decide…you shall… appear before…the magistrate in charge at the time….” The Talmudic 
sages fix on the command to go to “the magistrate in charge at the time,” which in  ebrew 
seems to mean literally the “magistrate that will be in those days.” This appears superfluous, for 
what other magistrate could one approach? The Talmud replies, “This is to teach you that once a 
person has been appointed to be the [decisor] for the community, may he be ever so insignificant, 
he is like the mightiest among the mighty.”
229
 Berkovits claims this establishes the principle that 
“You have only the judge of your own days to turn to.”
230
 One must consult the decisors of one’s 
own day and ascribe to them full authority relative to previous decisors. 
Berkovits also strives to buttress contemporary halakhic-legal authority in his interpretation 
of the Mishnaic ruling that a beit din cannot annul the rulings of a previous beit din unless it is 




 he argues that this ruling is 
restricted to enactments and does not apply to interpretations of the Torah. Further, he restricts it 
to cases where the reason for the enactment was not explicitly given, the enactment concerns a 
value judgment as opposed to a practical concern, and there is no rationale arising from the 
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Torah itself against the enactment. In all other cases, the enactment may be annulled by any beit 
din and it might even lapse of itself.
233
 The binding force of precedent is thus sharply limited.  
Berkovits’ approach seems to confront an obstacle in the form of canonical texts like the 
Mishnah and Talmud. He acknowledges that one cannot directly disagree with them. However, 
this seems to conflict with his empowerment of contemporary halakhic-legal authority and, 
moreover, transforms the halakha into a literary canon or legal corpus. Following the account 
given by Maimonides,
234
 he explains that the composition of the Mishnah and Talmud did 
contravene Biblical commandments, including the prohibition of writing down the Oral Torah 
and prescribing obedience to contemporary halakhic authorities. However, he maintains that they 
are a type of emergency regulation so that “the Torah should not be forgotten from Israel” during 
the exile. Further, again based on Maimonides, he suggests that the authority of the Mishnah and 
Talmud depends on their continual acceptance by the Jewish people.
235
 Should the Jewish people 
reject them, contemporary decisors would regain their authority, and halakhic-legal practice 
would reclaim its dynamism in pursuit of sedeq.  
4. Rabbinic Authority: Democracy in the Context of Theonomy 
In addition to premising the authority of the Mishnah and Talmud on the Jewish people’s 
acceptance, Berkovits claims that the halakhic-legal authority of rabbis is based on democratic 
legitimacy. He argues that the vesting of authority of halakhic-legal decision-making in certain 
individuals is no less democratic than the restriction of legislative powers to elected officials and 
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judicial powers to appointed judges. Decisors and communal rabbis similarly derive their 
authority from popular acceptance. He cites Maimonides, who writes, “It is a commandment of 
the Torah to appoint judges and officers in all provinces and in all districts, for it is written: 
“Judges and Officers thou shalt give unto yourself in all your gates.”
236
 For Berkovits this means 
that “it is the people who set up the Sanhedrin and other courts. These institutions function 
because they are accepted by the people. To this day a rabbi has to be elected by the community 
and no matter how great a scholar he may be in Talmud and Halakha, he has authority only in the 
community in which he was elected by the people.”
237
  
In Towards Historic Judaism (THJ), Berkovits discusses the character of the ideal halakhic-
legal authority. While expertise in Biblical and halakhic sources is a desideratum, it is not 
sufficient.  e writes, “Rabbinical authority…is not that of an office  it is the authority of a 
calling, of an ideal…. It [is] an authority of being, the authority of a personality in which an ideal 
has taken concrete shape.”
238
 The character of rabbinic authorities must be shaped by the ideals 
of the Torah. But since the whole Torah is for the sake of peace, this means that rabbinic 
authorities must be judged by their moral character. This is advantageous for the advancement of 
the purpose of the Torah, for they are responsible of the implementation of the Torah in order to 
accomplish its moral telos.  
Berkovits even claims that the Torah is more respectful of minority rights than democratic 
governments. The state coerces recognition of its basic legitimacy on a dissenting minority. In 
contrast, he maintains that Torah rule cannot be forced on a minority: “For a society to function 
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democratically and yet in accordance with Halakha, it would have to be unanimous regarding its 
acceptance of Halakha. This is, of course, utopia  maybe ‘at the end of days’….”
239
 Currently, 
rabbis only have the power of persuasion; they must engage in authentic halakhic-legal practice 
to make halakha practice morally and practically attractive.  
5. Halakhic History: Development and Crisis 
This is no easy task. Alongside his theory of halakha, Berkovits also discusses its history. 
This discussion has two components: First, he offers an ideal developmental history of halakhic-
legal practice, which shows how halakha has operated in the past and how it ought to operate in 
the present and future (a). Second, he describes how halakha underwent a crisis, which has 
rendered it incapable of operating according to its authentic nature and function (b).  
  a  Berkovits’ ideal developmental history of halakhic-legal practice is based on 
Maimonides’ discussion of the sacrificial commandments in the Guide of the Perplexed. In 
attempting to justify these commandments, Maimonides confronts a problem. According to his 
conception of God and worship, nothing could be less justified than these laws. God should be 
served with intellectual contemplation not bloody offerings. However, he explains that God acted 
through “wily graciousness and wisdom” in commanding them. God recognized that given the 
ancient Israelites’ conceptions of God and worship, they could not accept a religion without 
animal sacrifice. Animal sacrifice was therefore tolerated but limited and modified in a manner 
that emphasized monotheism.
240
 Similarly, Berkovits claims that while God aimed to introduce 
lofty moral ideals, he had to reckon with the moral capacities of the ancient Israelites.  
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Indeed, God himself had to operate in accordance with WoF principle in implementing PoE 
principles as seen in the case of the captive woman. Berkovits writes,   
The goal and values are…forever. But they are taught and applied with the wisdom and 
understanding that time-conditioned reality cannot be changed overnight. The method of the 
Torah is to acknowledge reality, to take human nature into account and apply the eternal 
word to it so far as is possible. Thus to teach values and guide behavior, indicating the goal 




The Torah introduced humanity to moral ideals, culminating in sedeq; yet, it was necessary to do 
so in manner that acknowledged that human nature and society change incrementally. The Torah 
thus tolerated many existent practices that conflicted with its moral ideals, while indicating the 
direction that they ought to be reformed. The completion of this process, eliminating the immoral 
practices and realizing the Torah’s moral telos, is the task of halakhic-legal practice.  
Berkovits’ primary example of this process is the changing status of women. Initially, the 
Torah mainly tolerated the non-personal status of women that was prevalent in the ancient Near 
East. However, it introduced some changes that indicated the nature of its ideals and the 
direction in which it desired society to develop. This is evident in the case of the captive women. 
The second phase, which occurred primarily in the time of the Mishnah and the Talmud, 
advanced the Torah’s ideals by establishing women’s personal status. As indicated, the rabbis 
introduced reforms to protect women in their marriages and in the event of divorce. Still, they 
did not complete the implementation of Torah-teaching into reality. The third phase is our own: 
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  b  This historical account and, indeed, his entire theory of halakha represent Berkovits’ 
view on ideal halakhic development and authentic halakhic-legal practice. In his view, however, 
halakha has undergone a crisis. With the loss of sovereignty not only were the Jewish people 
exiled from their land, but halakha was exiled from reality and into literature.  
The exile of the halakha from reality follows directly from the exile of the Jewish people. In 
THJ, Berkovits explains that the Torah and reality should have a dialectical relation: 
On the one hand we have Torah, trying to give shape to that raw lump of life which is so 
reluctant and evasive; on the other, hand, each bit of Torah-shaped life—in social 
institutions, in economic arrangements, in the relations between man and his neighbors, in 
the street and in the market as well as in the places of worship—living Torah reacting on the 
intentions of Sinai. For just as Torah shapes life, so does Torah-shaped life, in its turn, direct 




Halakhic-legal practice is the medium of this dialectical relation. But Berkovits argues that this 
relation can only exist when the Torah and reality can fully confront and shape one another. In 
NFH he explains that when the Jewish people ceased to be a sovereign nation, Judaism ceased to 
be an autonomous civilization. Halakha no longer responded to the problems of a Torah-shaped 
life but confronted the demands of an alien culture and civilization. It thus became protective, 
bent merely on preserving the Jewish people as opposed to achieving its proper telos.
244
 
Additionally, in response to the physical exile and persecution of the Jewish people, the 
transmission of the wisdom of halakhic-legal practice from teacher to student was disrupted. It 
became necessary to compile earlier rulings in writing. Halakha was also exiled into literature. 
This process began with the Mishnah, which still preserved minority opinions, continued through 
the Talmud, which restored the deliberations behind the rulings, and reached its apotheosis in 
Maimonides’ Mishneh Torah, which simply states its ruling apodictically. Despite the practical 
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necessity of halakhic codes, according to Berkovits, “Codification is contrary to the very nature 
of  alakha. It works like shackles upon its creative vigor.”
245
 The exile of the halakha into 
literature has only deepened in the twentieth century, preventing the Torah from grappling with 
new circumstances and problems that confront it. This is even true in the State of Israel, where 
halakha has the opportunity to return to reality yet remains exiled in literature. He writes, 
“Orthodoxy is, in a sense, halakha in a straightjacket.  aving had to transform the Oral Torah 
into a new written one, we have become Karaites of this new [Written Torah].”
246
 In fact, NFH 
and HPF can be read as manifestos for the renewal of a halakhic-legal practice equal to the 
Jewish people’s return to sovereignty. In this way, a medium will be readied for the 
transformation of the State of Israel into the first outpost of the Kingdom of God.  
Thus, corresponding to his teleological justification of the commandments, Berkovits 
presents a teleological theory of halakha. He explains that halakhic-legal practice is necessary to 
implement the Torah’s commandments to achieve its telos. Simultaneously, as a human 
endeavor, it redeems the autonomy deficit that results from the theonomy of divine revelation. 
Halakhic-legal practice is characterized by the use of s’bara, which strives for constancy in the 
attainment of the Torah’s purpose. Central to this is the operation of PoE and WoF principles, 
which derive from Biblical verses and issue in ramified structures of subsidiary principles. The 
PoE and WoF principles guide the implementation of the Torah’s specific commands, ensuring 
that such norms advance and do not conflict with the Torah’s telos. On an operational level, 
halakhic-legal practice is controlled by both the substantive concerns of s’bara and the need for 
formal decision procedures. But such rulings can be revisited by later decisors. Indeed, Berkovits 
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stresses both the requirement that the decisor exercise independence and the obligation of the 
Jewish people to abide by the decisions of contemporary decisors. He grounds the decisor’s 
authority in a democratic theory of halakhic-legal authority, while noting certain moral 
qualification as also necessary. Lastly, he incorporates his theory of halakha into an historical 
account of ideal halakhic development and actual crisis.  
B. Consistency and Constraint: Halakhic-Legal Practice 
Berkovits’ own halakhic-legal practice is mainly consistent with his justification of the 
commandments and theory of halakha. It is guided by PoE and WoF principles to advance the 
telos of the Torah. However, it is somewhat less radical than his theory of halakha would predict. 
While in his theory he touts the contemporaneous nature of halakhic-legal authority, in his actual 
practice he is concerned with recruiting earlier authorities to his own view. In fact, much of his 
halakhic-legal writings are devoted to the clarification of the positions of previous authorities. 
This renders them complex. Still, simplified discussions of two halakhic issues suffice for 
presenting the character of his halakhic-legal practice. And an interpretation of the slight 
discrepancy between his theory and practice is then offered (1-2). 
1. Conditions in Marriage and Divorce 
As a halakhic-legal decisor, Berkovits was intensely involved in the area of marriage and 
divorce. Recall that he claims that the halakhic conscience found its highest expression in the 
Talmudic sages’ concern for the welfare of women in this area.  e saw the failure of modern 
decisors to offer a solution to the problem of igun as evidence of the inability of contemporary 
halakha-legal practice to realize the authentic nature and function of halakha. He writes, 
How far removed we are from the care and concern for the well-being of the daughters of 




and often disillusionment with Judaism itself, caused by its fear to accept halakhic 
responsibility for the solution to the present-day agunah problem. Its members seem 
indifferent to the many violations of the teachings of the Torah, especially in the areas of 
ethics and morality, that are due to the unresolved status of the agunah problem! Ultimately, 
the situation involves a high measure of [desecration of God’s name] for which [it] is 




While in earlier periods the problem of igun mainly concerned husbands who disappeared, today 
it results from recalcitrant husbands, who refuse to free their wives for remarriage through a get 
even after deterioration of the spousal relationship. The get is used as a bargaining chip in the 
civil divorce settlement, a means of financial extortion, or an instrument of revenge.
248
  
In his Hebrew halakhic work, Conditionality in Marriage and Divorce: Halakhic 
Clarifications (CMD), Berkovits presents three methods to prevent the occurrence of igun, 
corresponding to three different cases. One case does concern situations, such as during wartime, 
where the husband is at risk of disappearing. The method requires the husband’s preemptive 
commission of a scribe and witnesses to compose and execute a get should he not return after a 
certain time.
249
 The other two methods concern recalcitrant husbands and dissolve the marriage 
without a get. They retroactively annul the marriage based on the husband’s violation of 
conditions upon which the marriage is made contingent ab initio.   
In the first case, Berkovits proposes that during the marriage ceremony conditions are 
explicitly stipulated by the bride and groom. His discussion of this proposal evidences a number 
of features of his halakhic-legal practice. First, his proposal encounters difficulties from classical 
halakhic codes as well as contemporary decisors; yet he labors to show that it is not rejected by 
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them and recruits other halakhic authorities to his position through interpretation. In his 
discussion of such conditional marriages Rabbi Joseph Karo raises the problem of the survival of 
any conditions into the marriage.
250
 Some authorities are concerned that the conditions are 
cancelled when the marriage is executed. Other authorities are concerned that the presence of 
conditions voids the original marriage, but the bride and groom establish a new marriage without 
the conditions when they engage in sexual intercourse. Berkovits argues that these concerns only 
apply if the conditions are not stated explicitly and if it is not made clear that neither party 
desires the marriage without the conditions. Further, if the condition is for the benefit of the 
bride, such as preventing her from becoming an agunah, the husband lacks the authority to 
cancel the condition and it is assumed that she will not cancel it. Berkovits thus contends that in 
this situation nearly all authorities would recognize the survival of the conditions.
251
  
Berkovits utilizes a form of conditional marriage that was allowed by Rabbi Moshe Isserles 
as the basis for his proposal. The latter endorses a conditional marriage that was proposed by 
Rabbi Israel Bruna (1400-1480) in the case of a husband who has an apostate brother. The 
concern was that should the groom die childless, the bride would fall in levirate marriage to this 
brother, who she could not be expected to marry and who might refuse to undergo halitzah. She 
would thus be anchored. Rabbi Bruna ruled that the groom and bride may marry on condition 
that the groom not die childless and his brother not continue to be an apostate. Thus, if the groom 
does die childless and his brother is still an apostate, the marriage is retroactively annulled.
252
  
Berkovits’ proposal differs from this case in that it does not concern levirate marriage but the 
original marriage. He thus confronts the seeming opposition of a wide range of modern decisors, 
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who rejected proposals by the French and Turkish rabbinates in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries in the collection of responsa, There are No Conditions in Marriage.
253
 
Berkovits directly counters some of the objections to conditional marriages presented in that 
work. However, he generally aims to acknowledge their arguments while distinguishing his own 
proposal from those earlier attempts. He focuses on the French proposal, which simply made the 
marriage contingent on the absence of a civil divorce without a concurrent get. Consequently, if 
a couple that had entered into both halakhic and civil marriages received a civil divorce and the 
husband does not immediately grant a get, the halakhic marriage would be retroactively 
annulled. A number of objections were offered to this proposal. The objection that Berkovits 
describes as “delving to the depth of the matter” contends that such a condition is “a stipulation 
against what is written in the Torah,” a condition to violate a Biblical commandment that is thus 
void.
254
 According to the halakha only the husband has the right to grant divorce.
255
 Despite the 
use of retroactive annulment, since its execution is made independent of the husband’s  will or 
actions—once the civil judgment is rendered, he either grants a get or the marriage is annulled—
it violates the Torah and is void.  
In contrast, Berkovits makes the marriage directly contingent on the behavior of the husband. 
He lists a number of conditions that could be stipulated and would retroactively annul the 
marriage, including violating the enactment against polygyny, attempting to extort money from 
his wife, or simply refusing to grant a get because he rejects the Torah. Crucially, he also 
includes any behavior that constitutes “act[ing] against [the wife] in a manner that is opposed to 
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the moral principles of Judaism.”
256
 Further, he assigns a bet din the power to ascertain whether 
the husband has violated these conditions, which he describes as the “the laws of the Torah and 
Jewish morality.”
257
 Thus, the status of the marriage does not depend on the subjective judgment 
of the bet din, which would be problematic because it too would deprive the husband of his right 
over the dissolution of the marriage. It is determined by the husband’s compliance with what 
Berkovits claims are objective standards that he accepted as conditions of the marriage. It also 
reverses the objection about “a stipulation against what is written in the Torah.” The conditions 
do not nullify the husband’s Torah-granted right to dissolve the marriage; they hold him 
accountable to the Torah’s moral principles to which he is already obligated. This claim 
evidences Berkovits’ commitment to the existence of moral principles within the halakha. It is 
not specific actions that trigger the retroactive annulment of the marriage but violation of the 
Torah’s values. 
In the second case, the marriage is made contingent on conditions that are incorporated into 
every marriage through rabbinic enactment. Thus, the bride and groom need not explicitly 
stipulate them. This proposal is based on the halakhic-legal procedure of hafka’at kiddushin 
(expropriation of betrothal). There are a few instances of its use in the Talmud. Indeed, the 
classic case was discussed above: The sages retroactively annulled a marriage because the 
husband violated the enactment banning the cancelation of a get after it had been sent to the wife 
by a messenger. As discussed, in response to the objection of how rabbinic courts could dissolve 
a marriage valid according to Biblical law, the anonymous voice of the Talmud replies, “When a 
man betroths a woman, he does so under the conditions laid down by the rabbis, and in this case 
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the rabbis annul his betrothal.”
258
 Rashi explains elsewhere, “All who betroth a woman 
according to the opinion introduced by the sages of Israel in Israel, he betroths that [it] should be 
established as a betrothal according to the words of the sages.”
259
  
According to Berkovits, Rashi’s language implies that this broad condition cannot be waived 
by the bride and groom. Further, it does not conflict with the right of the husband to dissolve the 
marriage, for the “opinion” and “words” of the sages are enactments that are known to him when 
he enters into the marriage. This provides a powerful tool for the prevention of igun, for 
enactments could be instituted to cover a broad range of cases. These conditions are similar to 
those offered by Berkovits in the previous proposal, including specific actions as well as 
“behavior opposed to…Jewish moral principles.”
260
 However, once again, the proposal confronts 
difficulties from earlier authorities. A number of medieval commentators restrict the authority to 
expropriate marriage to the Talmudic sages. Nevertheless, Berkovits argues that many other 
authorities can be interpreted as extending this authority to contemporary rabbis, especially if the 
consequences of violation are explicitly stated in the enactment.
261
 Still, former British Chief 
Rabbi Immanuel Jakobovits points out that the canonical authorities seem to rule out its use.
262
 
Even Rabbi Jechiel Jacob Weinberg in his endorsement of CMD acknowledged that traditional 
decisors “recoil and their souls strain to allow conditions in betrothal and marriage.”
263
 Indeed, 
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Berkovits admits that “[e]ven though according to the law it is possible to expropriate 
betrothals…the great sages restrained their hands from [it] in practice.”
264
 Nevertheless, he notes 




Berkovits marshals authorities that allow the expropriation of betrothal in practice, including 
Judah Gaon, Hai Gaon, Rabbi Asher ben Jehiel, and Nahmanides, and he interprets others as 
having remediable concerns, especially Maharam Alshaker (1466-1522). Berkovits interprets the 
latter as allowing expropriation of marriage as long as many or all the Jewish communities in a 
country accept the enactment that establishes the implied conditions. Berkovits endorses this 
proposal and recommends that national rabbinic and communal organizations collaborate to 
institute enactments that would become implied conditions in all marriages performed in their 
region. Violation of these conditions would result in the retroactive annulment of marriages. If 
the enactments were properly crafted, the problem of igun could be solved.
266
  
In view of Berkovits’ theory of halakha, the intensity of his engagement with halakhic 
precedent is surprising. Certainly, he allows himself to disagree with canonical authorities, but 
this is only when all possibility of reinterpretation is exhausted. When disagreeing with these 
authorities he marshals other authorities that support him or recruits them to his view through 
reinterpretation. Further, far from rejecting the canonicity of the Talmud, he aims to restore the 
authority to expropriate betrothals that was part of its halakhic-legal practice. His argumentation 
is thus less radical than one would expect on the basis of his theory of halakha.  
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Still, his halakhic-legal practice deviates from common Orthodox approaches. In fact, the 
Orthodox rabbinic establishment rejected his proposals. The journal that offered to publish CMD 
withdrew that commitment and published a critique that would not even mention his name.
267
 It 
was even alleged—apparently falsely—that Weinberg withdrew his endorsement.
268
 In truth, 
despite its conservatism when compared with his own theory, Berkovits’ practice diverges from 
the characteristic traditionalism of most contemporary Orthodox decisors. As Menahem Kasher, 
the author of the critique of CMD, points out “the moral principles of Judaism,” upon which 
Berkovits conditions marriage, is not a traditionally recognized halakhic category.
269
 Thus, 
Kasher, a representative of the Orthodox mainstream, rejects a major component of Berkovits’ 
theory of halakha—its guidance by moral principles. Indeed, the combination of their lack of 
explicit endorsement by canonical authorities and the fact that they were not widely practiced in 
the past would decisively count against conditional marriages for many Orthodox decisors. Due 
to the severity of the consequences of a legal error—bastardy, such decisors would aim to satisfy 
as many authorities as possible. This effort inevitably leads to conservative results as countless 
halakhic-legal concerns must be considered. In contrast, Berkovits’ approach can be described as 
an attempt to “carve a path” through the previous authorities to a resolution. Indeed, Roth points 
out that Berkovits, unlike the general practice of decisors, indicates the solution toward which he 
aims at the outset of his discussion.
270
 He then recruits as many authorities to his view as 
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possible and satisfies as many halakhic concerns as possible, though he is antecedently 
committed to offering a solution to the problem of igun. This is not to endorse Blu Greenberg’s 
comment that “when there was a rabbinic will, there was a halakhic way.”
271
 Berkovits is 
constrained by halakhic-legal precedent; he simply uses more of the halakhic-legal tradition and 
reads it more creatively than others. 
Moreover, Berkovits would claim that his commitment to resolving the problem of igun is 
itself part of the halakha. As indicated, he saw the persistence of the problem as a desecration of 
God’s name  the halakha was being used by husbands to oppress their wives. The specific 
commandments regarding marriage and divorce were producing results that conflicted with the 
moral principles of the Torah. Consequently, according to him, the commitment to finding a 
solution does not derive from the imposition of a foreign agenda on the halakha but from the PoE 
in the halakha itself. As to the objection concerning the lack of strong precedent in favor of his 
proposal, he would respond by invoking the contemporaneous nature of halakhic-legal authority: 
He, the decisor, must rule independently even if his ruling diverges from precedent because the 
present situation did not appear before any earlier decisor. Correlatively, the Jewish community 
must place their confidence in contemporary authorities, like himself, and not rely on those of 
the past. Commitment to this view of authority is also manifest in his arguments against the 
claim that only the Talmudic sages possessed the authority to expropriate betrothals.  
Lastly, by attenuating the husband’s exclusive right to dissolve the marriage, Berkovits may 
have seen himself as continuing halakha’s trajectory of incrementally replacing the Torah-
tolerated non-personal status of women with the Torah-taught personal status. He might claim 
that by making the marriage contingent on behavior in accordance with the moral principles of 
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the Torah, he is simply creating a broader coherence between specific commandments and the 
moral vision of the Torah. In addition to resolving an ethical difficulty that arose in the 
application of the Torah to a specific situation, his efforts advance the telos of the Torah by 
reordering the relationship between husband and wife to conform more fully to sedeq. 
2. Autopsies 
Another example of Berkovits’ halakhic-legal practice that merits discussion is his analysis 
of the permissibility of autopsies. As discussed in a previous chapter, the Mishnah codifies a 
Biblical prohibition against desecrating the dead, though what actions constitute desecration is 
disputed.
272
 In a  ebrew article Berkovits prefaces his analysis by reflecting on the question’s 
context and import: “The question is very serious, precisely since the establishment of the State 
of Israel…. There is no doubt, that the people of Israel in the land of Israel require excellent and 
advanced medical service.”
273
 Having returned from exile, the Jewish people confront the 
responsibility of establishing the necessary institutions of a modern state, including medical care 
based on autopsies. Halakha-legal practice thus confronts a challenge that it previously avoided, 
for in the Diaspora non-Jews could be relied upon as both the subjects and objects of autopsies. 
Halakha is thus called back from its exile from reality.  
Berkovits begins his discussion by stating, “ostensibly the matter seems very simple.”
274
 
Except for the prohibitions against idolatry, murder, and sexual immorality, even Biblical 
prohibitions can be overridden to save life (pikuah nefesh). This is so even when it is not certain 
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that life will actually be saved; even the possibility of saving a life warrants overriding the 
prohibition. Thus, since by means of autopsies medical knowledge will be gained that may save 
lives, they ought to be permitted despite the desecration of the dead involved. However, during 
the exile, halakhic-legal practice was not only exiled from life; it was exiled into literature. 
Contemporary decisors, like Berkovits, confront precedents that were established under different 
conditions with which they must reckon in providing a ruling for new situations. Indeed, Rabbi 
Yechezkel Landau (1713-1793) ruled that the category of saving a life or even possibly saving a 
life only includes cases when the patient who could benefit from the knowledge gained from the 
autopsy is “before us.” For him this excludes most autopsies because in such cases “there is no 
patient who needs it, [the doctors] only want to learn this knowledge in case a patient appears 




Berkovits defuses Landau’s ruling by setting it in its historical context. In doing so, however, 
he does not ignore the ruling. He argues that even Landau would rule differently in the present 
situation. Two features of the present situation differ from those of the eighteenth century: 
modern knowledge of pathology and scientific collaboration. While in the eighteenth century 
each illness was thought to have a discrete cause, by the twentieth century it had been discovered 
that there are families of diseases. Thus, the likelihood of gaining useful knowledge from any 
autopsy increases significantly. Consequently, since Landau only prohibits autopsies because he 
thinks that it is merely a “weak suspicion” that life-saving knowledge will be gained from it, he 
too would allow them in the present situation. Additionally, in the eighteenth century there was 
no means of communication that allowed medical discoveries to be shared rapidly. When Landau 
claims that the patient that stands to benefit from the autopsy must be “before us,” he did not 
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mean that she must literally be in the same room. He simply meant that it must be known or 
reasonably believed that there is patient that will benefit from the procedure. However, in the 
twentieth century the medical research community spans the globe, communicating new 
discoveries and life-saving procedures. Berkovits thus concludes, “in our time all the patients in 
the world are like they are found constantly in front of us” and claims that even Landau “would 
agree that the possibility of saving a life overrides the desecration of the dead.”
276
 
Not content with establishing that even Landau in the present situation would permit 
autopsies because they could be life-saving, Berkovits adduces another argument. By reflecting 
on the nature of the prohibition of desecration of the dead as described by the Talmud and Rashi, 
he argues that any action towards the dead that is for the benefit of the living is permissible: 
“[D]igrace of the dead is…precisely when one does something to the dead in a manner of 
disgrace because one does not care about his dignity, but what one does because of the needs of 
the living is not disgrace of the dead. [For] everything that is done for the living, because of 
concern for the needs of the living, is based on the glory of all living [beings], and what is done 
for the sake of [that] is no desecration of the dead.”
277
 This claim “goes behind” previous 
decisors, like Landau, and argues based on the Talmud and medieval commentators. Landau had 
identified autopsies with desecration of the dead, which then led to the question whether this 
prohibition could be overridden by the possibility of saving lives. Berkovits now argues that they 
do not cause the desecration of the dead and could be performed even without that possibility.  
This argument coheres with Berkovits’ theory of halakha. First, the prohibition of the 
desecration of the dead has moral import, for whether it applies depends on whether the action 
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demonstrates lack of concern for the dignity for the dead. And concern for the needs of the living 
ipso facto does not demonstrate lack of concern for the dignity of the dead. The application of 
this prohibition is thus guided by PoE principles. Second, since according to this argument the 
autopsy need only benefit the living, it also demonstrates Berkovits’ use of WoF principles. The 
halakha is concerned for the material well-being of human society as well as its moral character. 
Indeed, as indicated, these two concerns are inseparable. Lastly, overall Berkovits is motivated 
by the belief that the Torah has the creation of a model society as its aim. Modern medical care is 
crucial for a modern state, and thus halakha must enable it to function.  
In sum, Berkovits’ halakhic-legal practice mainly corresponds to his justification of the 
commandments and his theory of halakha. It manifests a teleological approach, in which the 
application of specific commandments is guided by PoE and WoF principles. Additionally, it 
aims to realize the ideals of the Torah in relationships governed by the halakha as well as to 
create a functioning and ideal society. He uses halakhic-legal practice for the creation of a 
Kingdom of God. In pursuing these aims, he does not shy away from disagreeing with previous 
authorities; he asserts the claim of contemporaneous halakhic-legal authority. Still, his exercise 
of this authority is not as a radical as one would expect given his theory of halakha. The latter, 
however, actually provides an explanation for this discrepancy. According to him, halakhic-legal 
practice aims to organize society. This cannot be accomplished by a lone decisor offering rulings 
that are rejected by other authorities. It requires building consensus so that rulings are applied 
broadly. It is therefore reasonable that in his halakhic-legal practice he would eschew his more 
radical arguments and offer those that might be accepted by traditionalist decisors. Yet, 
concurrent with this effort, he offers arguments in his theory of halakha to shift their approach to 




C. Legal Theory: Moral Principles and Law  
Berkovits’ recognition of moral principles and a telos in halakhic-legal practice raises 
questions in legal theory concerning legal validity and adjudication. These queries aid in 
clarifying his theory of halakha and its relation to the justification of the commandments; they 
are also of intrinsic interest. First, the questions in legal theory are discussed (1), before returning 
to reinterpret Berkovits’ theory of halakha in view of them    .  
1. Moral Principles in the Law: Inclusive Positivism and Post-Positivism 
Ross distinguishes two types of positivism prevalent in Orthodox philosophy of halakha, 
formalist positivism and non-formalist positivism, and identifies Berkovits with the latter. For 
her, positivism “refers merely to a theory regarding law's essential grounding, whereas the 
terminology of formalism and non-formalism refers to theories regarding law's nature and its 
process of deliberation.”
278
 By grounding the normativity of the commandments in revelation, 
Berkovits seems to subscribe to positivism. But whereas formalism defines the nature of law “in 
terms of clear-cut rules and legal concepts,” non-formalism also recognizes an “ultimate 
purpose” and “ideological principles, ethical standards, policy considerations, and even political 
theories”
279
 within the law. Thus, by including moral principles and a telos within halakha, 
Berkovits advocates non-formalism.  
Further, according to Ross, since for formalism the halakha consists of “clear cut rules and 
legal concepts,” it can “run out.” That is, situations can arise to which no legal norm applies. 
There is a gap in the law and the decisor must exercise discretion. In contrast, for non-formalism, 
“there are no legal lacunae, because when there is no relevant rule the broader principles 
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 But Ross also claims that for non-formalism, discretion “lies in the application of 
those general principles within the law in a manner that realizes their purpose...”
281
 Thus, she 
equivocates in her use of the term “discretion.” She uses it to denote cases where the halakha has 
run out and the decisor must retroactively legislate. This is what has been referred to as “strong” 
discretion. But, she also uses it to denote any case where the decisor’s ruling is not directly 
entailed. This is “weak” discretion.
282 
This inconsistency evidences a lack of clarity about 
positivism, its varieties, and their implications. All forms of positivism recognize indeterminacy 
in legal application and distinguish this from cases where there is a true legal gap. They differ 
concerning what is included in the law and thus with what frequency gaps arise and “strong” 
discretion becomes necessary. 
A more perspicuous contrast than between “formalism” and “non-formalism” is between 
inclusive and exclusive legal positivism. As discussed, positivism is defined by subscription to 
    the social thesis, that is, “what counts as law in any particular society is fundamentally a 
matter of social fact or convention,” and     the separability thesis, that is, “there is no necessary 
connection between law and morality.”
283
 (1) entails (2): If law derives from a social fact or 
convention, and since there is no necessary connection between social facts or conventions and 
morality, then there is no necessary connection between law and morality. (1) also allows for the 
possibility of “strong” discretion.
284
 Since the law derives from having been enacted through a 
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social fact or convention, it can in principle run out. However, depending on what they allow to 
be included in the law, forms of positivism differ on the frequency of cases of discretion.  
How (2) is understood is significant in this connection. No one denies that there is often an 
overlap between moral imperatives and legal rules. For positivism the question about the 
connection between morality and law concerns the relation between morality and criteria of legal 
validity: Can conformity with moral values and standards be a criterion of legal validity, such 
that an otherwise validly enacted law is declared legally invalid because it is immoral, or a moral 
imperative is declared legally valid because of its moral content despite not being positively 
enacted? Inclusive positivism delivers an affirmative answer to either of these questions, whereas 
exclusive positivism answers both in the negative. This disagreement has implications for 
discretion because the inclusion of moral principles in the criteria of legal validity significantly 
extends the scope of the law and decreases the frequency of discretion.  
These varieties of positivism and their differing implications are best understood through 
their dialectical history. Recall that according to Hart a legal system is constituted by a union of 
primary and secondary rules. Primary rules are rules of obligation and concern actions. 
Secondary rules are rules about rules; they specify the criteria of legal validity, change, and 
adjudication. Foremost among them is the rule of recognition, which specifies the ultimate 
criteria of legal validity.
285
 In his early critique of  art’s CL, Dworkin offers a number of 
arguments against positivism. In particular, he points out that judges sometimes appeal to 
principles that are not found in the recognized sources of the law. Often these are moral 
principles, such as “No man may profit from his own wrong,” which indicate that the judge is 
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drawing on his own moral reasoning instead of any positively enacted law.
286
 While positivism 
may describe these as instances of discretion, this is inconsistent with judges’ rhetoric and the 
authority assigned to them.
287
 In the “Postscript” to CL, Hart responds to Dworkin and articulates 
the basis of inclusive legal positivism.
288
 He argues that such invocation of moral principles can 
be accommodated within positivism. Moral values and principles can be criteria of validity if 
they are incorporated into the law through positive enactment. Their legal authority then derives 
from this enactment and not their moral status. When judges invoke moral principles they are 
often, though not always, drawing on these elements of morality in the law.
289
 This extends the 
range of the law and limits the area of discretion, though it does not preclude it.
290
  
Exclusive legal positivists, however, claim that the incorporation of moral principles 
undermines the concept of legal authority. As will be discussed below, Raz argues that law’s 
authority consists in it providing content-independent and preemptive directives. Legal directives 
are content-independent because their normativity derives from their source. They are 
preemptive because they aim to foreclose further practical deliberation by their subjects. If the 
law were to require its subjects to reflect on the same considerations that it is meant to settle, 
then it would not be an authority. But the incorporation of moral values and principles into the 
law does just that by directing its subjects to reflect on what should be done morally in the 
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circumstances. Instead, Raz claims, legal systems that seem to incorporate moral principles 
should be interpreted as assigning judges “limited and guided legislative power.” It picks out 
instances in which the judge should exercise discretion but also mandates what types of 
considerations should guide her.
291
  
 owever, in addition to Dworkin’s specific criticisms about moral principles in legal 
reasoning, his rejection of positivism stems from an argument regarding the nature of 
interpretation. Indeed, he uses such considerations to articulate his own post-positivist legal 
theory. In Law’s Empire (LE), he claims that positivism fails to realize the complexity of legal 
interpretation, which combines description and justification.
292
 When interpreting a social 
practice like law an individual “proposes value for the practice by describing some scheme of 
interests or goals or principles the practice can serve to express or exemplify.”
293
 All 
interpretations of law are constructive  the interpreters “try to show legal practice as a whole in 
its best light, to achieve equilibrium between legal practice as they find it and the best 
justification of that practice.”
294
 On the level of adjudication this means that “the judge’s 
decision…must be drawn from an interpretation that both fits and justifies what has gone before 
as far as that is possible.”
295
 In delivering a legal decision the judge presents principles that 
describe legislation and precedent as well as justify them. Crucially, to render a justifiable 
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decision a certain amount of reconstruction of the legal tradition and practice may be necessary; 
the requirements of fit and justification trade off against one another.  
This is true of philosophy of law as well as legal practice. Indeed, Dworkin claims that “no 
firm line divides” them.
296
 Both require constructive interpretation that negotiates description 
and justification. In his own account of legal practice, Dworkin claims “propositions of law are 
true if they figure in or follow from the principles of justice, fairness, and procedural due process 
that provide the best constructive interpretation of the community’s legal practice.”
297
 This itself 
is a constructive interpretation of the legal practice of liberal democracies, thus the specific 
moral principles that Dworkin identifies may be particular to such nations. They describe and 
justify the legal practices of these nations in terms of purposes for law that liberal democracies 
accept. But his argument is general: Propositions of law are true in other legal systems if they 
figure in or follow from principles that provide the best constructive interpretation of the 
community’s legal practice in terms of that community’s view of the purpose of law. Obviously, 
the attribution of that purpose is also an interpretive claim that may be evaluated by how well it 
both describes and justifies the practice.  
Dworkin’s debate with positivism is therefore not primarily about the possibility of moral 
principles within a legal system but about the relation between these principles and judicial 
deliberation. It cannot be avoided then by the adoption of inclusive positivism. For the latter, 
moral values and principles can be criteria of legal validity by virtue of being positively 
incorporated. In appealing to them the judge is applying antecedently given standards. The 
possibility of discretion still exists though it is limited. In contrast, for Dworkin the moral 
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principles in judicial rulings are the result of constructive interpretations. The judge does not find 
them antecedently given. And because of the interpretive nature of judicial decision-making the 
line between adjudication and discretion is blurred. It is unclear when, if ever, there are legal 
gaps and the judge legislates. 
But Dworkin’s disagreement with inclusive positivism runs deeper. The latter respects the 
basic positivist insight that there is a difference between what the law is and what the law ought 
to be. The judge’s legal responsibility is to apply the law as it is, though this may involve moral 
reflection if the law mandates it. Dworkin, however, claims that this distinction is untenable. As 
the interpretation of a social practice, determining what the law is perforce involves the judge in 
its normative justification. Further, inclusive positivism refrains from any normative stance in its 
theorizing. In contrast, Dworkin claims that legal philosophy cannot abstract from justificatory 
considerations as well. The theorist too describes as well as justifies the law. Normative 
justification occurs at all levels of legal discourse.  
2. Interpreting Berkovits Interpreting Halakha 
The best description of Berkovits’ theory of halakha is inclusive positivism. For him, the 
basic normativity of the commandments derives from the revelation of God. The commands of 
God as manifest in the Torah constitute the rule of recognition in the halakhic-legal system. 
Berkovits labors to show how PoE and WoF principles derive from Biblical verses. They are 
moral criteria of halakhic-legal validity that have been positively incorporated into the Torah. 
And though he assigns a high degree of independence to decisors, this authority is explicitly 
delegated by the Torah. Lastly, although he limits the frequency of discretion by the 
incorporation of PoE and WoF principles, he explicitly recognizes its possibility under the rubric 




of their positive enactment by God, it is possible for them to run out and then the decisor must 
deliver “a ruling for the hour.”  
However, Berkovits also offers some remarks that render his view more similar to post-
positivism. Indeed, Roth has compared his halakhic-legal approach to Gadamer’s interpretive 
theory.
298
 However, this underestimates the inclusive positivism that characterizes most of his 
halakhic-legal writings and misses the more apt comparison with Dworkin in these other 
instances: Berkovits occasionally describes decisors as offering constructive interpretations of 
the halakhic-legal tradition and halakhic practice.  
In CF Berkovits discusses some of the same instances of Talmudic halakhic-legal practice 
that he analyzes in HPF and NFH, but his description of them is substantially different. Recall 
that in those works he describes the case of the sages accepting testimony regarding the death of 
a husband that would not ordinarily be admissible in order to prevent igun. He describes the 
same case in CF with a different emphasis: 
[I]t is the authentic halakhic problem situation. There is the written law of the Bible… [I]t is 
in conflict with another obligation of the Torah-true Jew, the care and concern for a woman 
whose husband has disappeared…. [T]here was no written code to consult. On the basis of 
the rabbis’ understanding of the overriding Torah-purpose formulated nowhere explicitly, but 
absorbed into their own consciousness as the result of a life of dedication and commitment to 





In HPF and NFH Berkovits describes this deviation as the circumscription of the rules of 
testimony by higher-order principles that are traceable to explicit Biblical texts. Here, in contrast, 
he describes it as resulting from the ‘overriding Torah-purpose’ that is not stated explicitly 
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anywhere in the Torah. The Talmudic sages drew on their own understanding of the purpose of 
the Torah to arrive at their decision.  
Similarly, recall that in HPF and NFH he adduces  illel the Elder’s establishment of the 
prosbul as a classic example of the operation of the Torah’s WoF principles.  ere he writes,  
Where did Hillel find the authority for his innovation? Where was it written in the Torah? It 
was, of course, not found in any text, in any code. He found it within himself. There was a 
clash between equally valid laws, principles and concerns of the Torah. He had to find a 
resolution to the conflict. There was no text…to tell him which course to follow.  e could 
find the solution…within his own understanding of the comprehensive ethos of Judaism as 
he was able to gather it in his own heart and in his own conscience from the totality of the 




In this case, Berkovits is not clear about whether the principles educe from the Biblical text. But 
he is explicit that the ruling did not directly derive from the combination of principles and rules. 
Even if the WoF principles are explicitly stated, it was not obvious how they should combine 
with the rules of the Sabbatical year. Only the “comprehensive ethos of the Torah” allows a 
resolution. And he is adamant that this is not explicitly stated in the Torah but results from the 
decisors’ interpretation of the Torah as a whole.   
Berkovits adopts this view for contemporary halakhic-legal practice as well, especially in his 
interventions into debates about conversion. He was concerned about the halakhic status of 
Reform and Conservative conversions and their implications for Jewish unity. If Orthodox 
decisors refused to accept the conversions of other denominations, schism within the Jewish 
people threatened. In a Hebrew article Berkovits undertakes an examination of the halakhic 
issues in a manner similar to his discussions of Talmudic halakhic-legal practice in HPF and 
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NFH and his actual halakhic-legal practice.
301
 In CF, in contrast, he describes the general 
approach that should be taken by a decisor: 
He will accept the authoritative validity of the laws on conversion at the same time that he 
will acknowledge the importance of the reality of [all of Israel] and [love of Israel], and will 
then seek a resolution of the conflict from the source and the quality of the comprehensive 
ethos of Judaism, from what Judaism is about in its totality, according to his understanding 
and commitment…. This is not a purely subjective decision; but just because of the 
subjective element involved in it, it will be a truly halakhic solution to a genuinely halakhic 
problem.302 
 
Once again, there is a conflict between the specific halakhic laws and Jewish values. Though he 
is not clear about the source of these values, he is unequivocal that the resolution must derive 
from the “comprehensive ethos of the Torah” and that this is not explicitly stated in the Torah. 
While it is not a completely idiosyncratic imposition on the Torah, it is certainly the decisor’s 
interpretation of it. 
In CF Berkovits eschews the language of positivism in describing Talmudic halakhic-legal 
practice and the approach that should be taken by contemporary decisors. Halakhic-legal rulings 
are made in view of the purpose or comprehensive ethos of the Torah. But these are not simply 
given in the Torah. The decisor must engage in constructive interpretation of halakhic practice to 
deliver decisions. He must adduce a purpose that it can be seen as a fulfilling. Halakhic-legal 
practice itself therefore involves the normative justification of halakhic practice. Further, while 
he is equivocal about the status of the overarching principles, it is plausible to understand them 
as also constructed through interpretation. In rendering decisions the decisor offers constructive 
interpretations of the halakhic-legal tradition. He delivers a ruling that derives from principles 
that describe and justify the halakhic-legal tradition. On this interpretation, the frequency of 
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instances of discretion decline, for that tradition is the source of almost boundless interpretive 
possibilities. Berkovits thus articulates a post-positivist theory of halakha in CF.  
Despite both capturing Berkovits’ insistence on the role of moral principles in halakhic-legal 
practice, these two interpretations have substantial difference like those between inclusive 
positivism and post-positivism. Recall that Berkovits tasks halakhic-legal practice with 
redeeming the autonomy deficit that is incurred by the theonomy of revelation. However, the 
share of autonomy in halakhic-legal practice differs between the two interpretations. On the 
positivist interpretation autonomy is limited to halakhic-legal application and infrequent 
instances of discretion. In the former, it is manifest in cases when the combination of the relevant 
rules and principles is indeterminate. The principle and the rule are both objectively given in the 
halakhic sources, but the decisor must determine how they should be reconciled in the particular 
case. Perhaps they are resolved in view of the purpose of the halakha, but this too is antecedently 
given. Recall that in both MG and NFH Berkovits elaborates a positivist interpretive method for 
Jewish philosophy. The faith and the message of the Bible as well as the nature and function of 
the halakha can be objectively ascertained from the Biblical and rabbinic texts. In the latter, 
novel circumstances arise and the decisor delivers “a ruling for the hour.” Though the decisor is 
then more autonomous, he is guided by the antecedently given purpose of the halakha.  
On the post-positivist interpretation, in contrast, autonomy diffuses throughout halakhic-legal 
practice. Though instances of discretion nearly disappear, the principles of halakhic-legal 
practice and even the purpose of the halakha emerge out of the decisor’s constructive 
interpretation. While the decisor must still attempt to accurately describe the halakhic-legal 




penetrates deeper into the halakha and allows a more equal fellowship between God and 
humanity to emerge.  
Additionally, although both interpretations ascribe a direct relation between the project of 
ta’amei ha-mitzvot and halakhic-legal practice, on the positivist interpretation the relation is 
unidirectional and on the post-positivist interpretation it is reciprocal. Both interpretations 
present a direct relation between the justification of the commandments and halakhic-legal 
practice because both conceive of the latter as guided by the purposes that justify the 
commandments. This creates a robust justification of halakhic practice, for it ensures that it 
continues to conform to its justification. On the positivist interpretation these purposes are 
antecedently given and govern halakhic-legal practice. There is thus a unidirectional relation 
running from the justification of the commandments to halakhic-legal practice. In contrast, on 
the post-positivist interpretation there is no firm boundary between reflection on the halakha and 
halakhic-legal practice. The decisor offers constructive interpretations of the halakhic-legal 
tradition and halakhic practice that combine description and justification. Thus, halakhic-legal 
practice itself involves the normative justification of the commandments. Lastly, while 
Berkovits’ methodological positivist approach to Jewish philosophy is strongly stated in NFH 
and MG and coheres with the positivist interpretation of his theory of halakha, the post-positivist 
interpretation opens up new possibilities. Indeed, the post-positivist impulse cannot be restricted 
to halakhic-legal practice but extends to Jewish philosophy. In CF the “Torah-purpose” and 
“comprehensive ethos” are not antecedently given. Rather, they derive from the decisor’s 
interpretation. Jewish philosophy itself is thus a constructive interpretation of Jewish texts and 





The inclusive positivist and post-positivist interpretations of Berkovits’ theory of halakha 
thus have significantly different implications and cannot be reconciled with one another. The 
positivist interpretation better accounts for most of his writings. The post-positivist interpretation 
draws on an underdeveloped strand in his oeuvre and it is unclear whether he would relinquish 
the rhetorical strength of the claim to objectivity that the positivist approach encourages. 
However, there are advantages to the post-positivist interpretation. While too weighty a claim to 
defend here, it may simply offer a more adequate account of interpretation.303 Moreover, by 
creating a reciprocal relation between reflection on the halakha and halakhic-legal practice, an 
integration of theory and praxis emerges. This is philosophically advantageous and coheres with 
Berkovits’ life and thought.  
Since Karl Marx the separation of theory and praxis has been the object of criticism. If 
thought is conditioned by social relationships that are organized by material factors, then a 
theorist’s distance from the predominant social and material conditions of his society distorts his 
thought. It renders him incapable of comprehending his own society, including its forms of 
oppression. The ideal of disengaged reflection thus fails to attain its own objective. Based on this 
insight Antonio Gramsci pointed out the success of the clerics of the Catholic Church compared 
to secular intellectuals in maintaining their connection to predominant social and material 
conditions.304 Because priests were both intellectuals and ministered to the community, they 
combined engaged theory with reflective practice. But one need not embrace Marxism to 
recognize the advantages of the union of theory and praxis. In the pragmatic tradition, C.S. 
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Peirce reconceived beliefs as habits of action and doubts as the disruptions of practice. The aim 
of reflection is to resolve doubts and restore action. A humbler but more realistic task is assigned 
to philosophy. It is called back from “paper doubts” to the pragmatic, whether instrumental or 
ethical, concerns of life.305 By uniting legal philosophy with legal practice, post-positivism 
continues this turn in modern philosophy. Positivism separates itself from normative legal 
practice and claims to objectively describe law. Post-positivism recognizes that legal philosophy 
is continuous with legal practice and that both involve normative claims. Thus, interpreting 
Berkovits as a post-positivist allies him with this productive philosophical movement.  
Moreover, concern with the unity of theory and practice is consonant with Berkovits’ life and 
thought. He, as compared to other modern philosophers of halakha, is distinguished both by 
having served in communal roles throughout most of his life and by the extent of his practical 
halakhic-legal writings. The two are related: Serving as a communal rabbi brought him into 
contact with the practical concerns of Jewish communities.306 Unsurprisingly if one takes 
Gramsci’s perspective, Berkovits’ engagement with the concerns of the Jewish community 
influenced his reflection on halakha. Indeed, Berkovits notes the importance of contact with the 
realities of the Jewish community for the halakha and the decisor. For him there is no such thing 
as the halakha simplicter. Each Jewish community has its own halakha, which develops in 
interaction with the community’s social and material conditions.307 Thus, Berkovits argues, 
“Since halakhah deals with the concrete situation, it is essential that the halakhist himself be 
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personally involved in the life of the community within which the problems arise. There is no 
halakhah of the ivory tower. The attitude to human needs is decisive. Without understanding, 
without sympathy and compassion, one cannot be an authentic halakhist.”308 Berkovits combines 
reflection on halakha, theoretical analysis of halakhic-legal practice, actual halakhic-legal 
practice, and communal service. The result is an engaged philosophy of halakha that conceives 
of halakha as a teleological practice for the betterment of human society and a reflective 
halakhic-legal practice that ensures that halakhic practice is continually guided by this purpose.  
D. Legal Problems 
On any interpretation Berkovits creates a direct connection between the justification of the 
commandments and halakhic-legal practice, which issues in a robust justification of halakhic 
practice. However, his theory of halakha encounters a number of difficulties. A central problem 
is the relation between the inclusive positivist and post-positivist interpretations. They both have 
some textual basis, though the former is better supported. As has been shown, they have different 
implications and cannot be resolved with one another. They are also afflicted by somewhat 
different difficulties.  
Some difficulties burden both interpretations but in different ways. Berkovits claims that the 
autonomy deficit introduced by grounding the normativity of the commandments and morality in 
revelation is redeemed in halakhic-legal practice. As indicated, the share of autonomy in 
halakhic-legal practice differs depending on whether a positivist or a post-positivist 
interpretation is adopted. But on neither of these interpretations is the deficit adequately 
redeemed.  
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On the inclusive positivist interpretation, autonomy merely consists in the application of the 
commandments in situations of indeterminacy and infrequent instances of discretion. This seems 
unequal to balancing out the heteronomy of revelation. Moreover, it does not answer the related 
question regarding the normativity of the divine command. Ex hypothesi, it cannot derive from 
the content of the command. Similarly, it cannot derive from a duty human beings possess to 
obey God, for that simply shifts the question to the normativity of that duty. Berkovits is thus left 
to claim that it derives from the brute fact of God’s role as creator. But the normative force of 
that fact is unsupported.  
On the post-positivist interpretation, autonomy penetrates deeper into halakhic-legal practice. 
Consequently, the distinction between what is given by God and what is constructed by human 
beings is blurred. Revelation still stands at the origin of the commandments. But since even the 
basic principles of the halakha and telos of the Torah are now subject to human interpretation, it 
takes on the appearance of a merely formal anchor of normativity: It is what must be posited to 
make the halakha and morality normative. But since normativity cannot be generated by mere 
posit, the real justificatory work is done in the constructive interpretation of halakha in halakhic-
legal practice. But without an ultimate ground of normativity how does such justification operate 
on Berkovits’ account?  e needs a new account of normativity, yet his “critical positivism” 
seems to deny any source except divine command.  
Some difficulties afflict only a positivist interpretation and can be resolved by the adoption of 
a post-positivist interpretation. Shalom Carmy questions Berkovits’ confidence in identifying the 
basic values and principles operant in halakhic-legal practice.
309
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reading contemporary sensibilities into the Bible.
310
 These concerns are valid only on an 
inclusive positivist interpretation. If Berkovits believes that the values and principles are 
antecedently given in the Bible and rabbinic literature, then the warrant for his confidence in 
identifying them can be requested and the similarity between them and modern sensibilities can 
be questioned. But if he maintains that they result from constructive interpretation, the 
plausibility of his interpretations may be debated but he no longer carries the burden of showing 
that he has definitely ascertained the divine intent.
311
  
Likewise, some problems only arise on a post-positivist interpretation. While a positivist 
interpretation claims that there is a definite answer to most halakhic questions, the post-positivist 
interpretation seems to render them essentially contested. The positivist claims that what is the 
law in most cases can be derived from the combination of rules and principles. However, post-
positivism implicates moral reflection, over which there is often little consensus, in legal practice 
itself. This is not only problematic for analytic reasons, but also for reasons of legal legitimacy. 
Intuitively, it is only fair that individuals should be held responsible for laws of which they could 
be aware. But if the law is continuously constructed by judges based on their moral reflection, 
individuals can never know whether they are complying with the law. For similar reasons the 
positivist interpretation better coheres with Berkovits’ democratic approach to halakhic-legal 
authority. On this account the content of the halakhic-legal tradition is set and rabbinic authority 
is limited. The Jewish community knows the scope of the rabbinic role and the rules by which it 
is bound. Additionally, the need for the rabbinic role is clear; the occupant must possess rare 
expertise in the halakhic-legal tradition. In contrast, on the post-positivist interpretation rabbinic 
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authority is bound only by the interpretive skill of any particular rabbi. Further, the need for the 
rabbinic role becomes questionable. If halakhic-legal practice involves normative justification 
and moral reflection, what qualifies a rabbi more than a layperson?  
However, as indicated, exclusive positivists like Raz have argued that even inclusive 
positivism has difficulty supporting legal authority because incorporating moral reflection into 
legal practice undermines the very notion of legal authority. Indeed, it seems that a similar 
difficulty regarding legal authority afflicts any approach that attempts to create a direct 
connection between the normative justification of legal directives and legal practice. If legal 
directives are only valid so long as they are independently justified, then it seems that legal 
authority is otiose. Whenever a legal directive is valid, the subjects of the directive already 
possess independent reasons to perform the mandated action. The law makes no practical 
difference.
312
 Thus, in Berkovits’ thought a central dilemma in the relation between normative 
justification and legal authority is confronted. On the one hand, practical reason seems to require 
one to perform only justified or justifiable actions. On the other hand, legal authority seems to be 
distinguished by its ability to command, that is, to direct its subjects to perform actions that they 
would not otherwise do and to do them because it commands them. Thus, although the direct 
connection between the justification of the commandments and halakhic-legal practice creates a 
robust justification of halakhic practice, it seems to eviscerate halakha’s legal character.  
III. Conclusion: Issues and Insights 
Berkovits presents a teleological philosophy of halakha. The commandments and halakhic-
legal practice are media for the transformation of the world into the Kingdom of God by creating 
a universal order organized by sedeq. This end both justifies the commandments and guides 
                                                 
312




halakhic-legal practice. The direct connection of the justification of the commandments and 
halakhic-legal practice presents a robust justification of halakhic practice because it ensures that 
it tracks its justification. Halakhic practice is continuously adjusted to achieve the purpose by 
which it is justified.   
Within Berkovits’ teleological justification of halakhic norms different relations are created 
between the elements of halakhic practice and its telos. The commandments themselves are 
simply means to an end. When the Kingdom of God is achieved, humans will act with sedeq 
without the need for external imperatives. In contrast, the actions mandated by the ethical 
commandments contribute to the creation of the Kingdom of God by themselves being acts of 
sedeq. They are thus internally related to their end. The actions mandated by the ritual 
commandments are instruments for the creation of moral motivation, though they are also acts of 
sedeq towards materiality. Thus, all elements of halakhic practice are unified by the end of 
sedeq. But while Berkovits describes sedeq as a desirable moral order, he insists its normativity 
can only derive from God’s command because only that can generate unconditional obligation. 
This creates a number of problems for Berkovits’ account. In particular, the Jew’s obligation to 
obey God and the normativity of morality for the non-Jew remain unsubstantiated.  
Conceiving the former problem as a deficit of autonomy, Berkovits claims that it can be 
resolved by the exercise of human independence in halakhic-legal practice. The motto of the 
halakha is that the Torah is “not in heaven”  human beings are responsible for its implementation 
in the world. However, they must put the commandments into practice in a manner that realizes 
their purpose; authentic halakhic-legal practice is teleological. In this effort, decisors are guided 
by the principles of the halakha, such as the Priority of the Ethical and the Wisdom of the 




under changing conditions. Berkovits also assigns a high degree of independent authority to the 
contemporary decisor before the halakhic tradition; for only he can understand the novel 
circumstances that confront him and his community. However, Berkovits also grounds halakhic-
legal authority in democratic legitimacy. His halakhic-legal practice is mainly consistent with 
this theory of halakha, though some of its more radical features are attenuated.  
Since it recognizes moral principles in halakha, Berkovits’ theory of halakha can be 
interpreted as inclusive legal positivism or legal post-positivism. The former is supported by 
most of his writings, though the latter is also represented. Further, the latter is philosophically 
advantageous and consonant with elements of his life and thought. The two interpretations are 
not reconcilable; they have different implications and difficulties. The most serious of them 
derives from the robustness of Berkovits’ justification of halakhic norms. The direct connection 






Ta’amei Ha-Mitzvot and Normative Justification 
Normative justification as used in this study refers to the justifications of norms. But 
normative is meant in a further sense that might seem to render the term a pleonasm: It refers to 
offering reasons for a norm the acceptance of which by someone entails that the individual ought 
to comply with it or at least that it is rationally acceptable to comply with it. As such, normative 
justification is distinguished from providing reasons that rationalize why someone with certain 
beliefs and motivations, which may be false or aberrant, would abide by the norm. Justification is 
thereby contrasted with explanation, and the modifier “normative” seems superfluous.  owever, 
as indicated at the outset, normative justification has a further specific meaning in this study that 
may be contrasted with legal justification, that is, the justification of a norm within the context of 
a legal system, such that were someone to accept the authority of the legal system, the norm 
would be justified. In contrast, normative justification refers to the all-things-considered 
justification of a norm. This may involve appeal to the role of a norm within a legal system, but 
then the legal system as a whole or the authority that mandates the norm must grounded. 
In the previous three chapters, the relations Leibowitz, Soloveitchik, and Berkovits establish 
in their philosophies of halakha between ta’amei ha-mitzvot and theory of halakha and, 
consequently, between normative justification and legal justification have been examined. In this 
chapter and the next difficulties and problems that emerge out of these examinations are 
thematized and explored. Specifically, in this chapter a critical account of normative justification 
informed by the thought of Habermas is offered as a productive framework for ta’amei ha-




of, the justification of norms, while leaving their substance—the actual reasons offered—to the 
participants themselves. Additionally, while this account is intellectually responsive to demands 
for justification and practically responsive to their failure, it is contextualist, that is, pragmatic 
and intersubjective, rather than foundationalist. As a consequence, it is also pluralist. In the next 
chapter, the role that authority may hold in normative justification is assessed.  
In the following, the shared features of the approaches to ta’amei ha-mitzvot of Leibowitz, 
Soloveitchik, and Berkovits are reviewed and their common problematic concerning justification 
and rationality is articulated (I). Next, the philosophical assumptions concerning justification and 
rationality that motivate their accounts are criticized through an engagement with American 
Pragmatism, while certain problems with an alternative, contextualist account of justification that 
emerges from this philosophical tradition are noted (II). A more adequate, context-transcending 
contextualist account of justification based on the thought of Jürgen Habermas is then proposed 
(III).  owever, it is contended that  abermas’ view of religion and religious language must be 
modified to be serviceable for ta’amei ha-mitzvot. A dialectic is thus developed, in which his 
account of justification is applied to halakhic norms and simultaneously modified (IV). Lastly, a 
sketch of the application of this account to a currently contentious issue, infant male 
circumcision, is offered to display its critical orientation as well as how it might contribute to the 
resolution of current social conflicts over religious norms and authority (V).  
I.  An Attempt at a Critique of All Ta’amei Ha-Mitzvot 
The accounts of ta’amei ha-mitzvot of Leibowitz, Soloveitchik, and Berkovits share 
important features that cripple their attempts to justify halakhic norms. These shared features are 
described and their individual difficulties are briefly reviewed (A). A general diagnosis of the 




A. Shared Features of Twentieth-Century Philosophies of Halakha 
The accounts ta’amei ha-mitzvot of Leibowitz, Soloveitchik, and Berkovits share three 
central features: First, notwithstanding certain rhetoric to the contrary, in offering reasons for the 
commandments these philosophers of halakha do provide justifications for halakhic norms by 
showing why obeying them is at least as justified as any other practical decision. This draws 
them into philosophical analyses of justification and rationality. Second, despite the different 
reasons they offer for the commandments, they all combine a foundationalist account of 
justification with skepticism about the practical normativity of reason. They conceive of 
justification as the tracing of a norm to a source of normativity; but they claim that reason cannot 
be this source. Third, they each consequently identify an alternative source of normativity in 
which, they contend, halakhic norms can be grounded. However, these alternatives are untenable 
and their conceptions of reason are constricted. The position of each figure is reviewed using this 
schema and the weaknesses of their respective positions are articulated (1-3). 
1. Leibowitz: The Capricious Will 
Despite Leibowitz’s explicit rejection of the project of ta’amei ha-mitzvot, he does offer a 
reason for the commandments. He only rejects approaches to ta’amei ha-mitzvot that subordinate 
halakhic practice to non-religious value orientations, and he proposes his own theocentric 
account in their stead: The only reason for every halakhic norm is service of God. As the 
meaning and value of halakhic practice, this must be an individual’s reason for action in 
complying with halakhic norms. And because of the link between reasons for actions and 
justifications, this must be the justification for the action in order for it to have religious 
significance. Moreover, he embeds this position within metaethical and axiological arguments 




justifications with varying strengths: According to the first, commitment to the value of service 
of God through obedience to halakhic norms is on all fours with commitment to any other 
axiological orientation and its entailed norms. Thus, halakhic norms are at least as justified as 
any other norms. In contrast, according to the second, service of God is the only true value 
because of its capacity to be willed in radical freedom. Hence, halakhic norms are more justified 
than any other normative system. 
Leibowitz subscribes to a form of foundationalism because he holds that norms must be 
grounded in a source of normativity to be justified. His specific form of foundationalism is a 
tense combination of Kantian and anti-Kantian insights. He agrees with Kant about the 
connections among axiological significance, attributability, and autonomy. For an action to have 
value, it must be attributable to an individual; and for it to be attributable to an individual, it must 
be willed autonomously. Thus, norms must be grounded in the human will to be justified. But 
whereas Kant identifies the autonomous will with one that conforms to reason, Leibowitz rejects 
reason as an external constrain. This is because he holds that reason only operates instrumentally 
and uniformly. It is inherently coercive, for it stands outside of the individual and forces its 
conclusions upon him. The rationally unbounded human will is thus the source of normativity. 
Leibowitz is encouraged in this non-cognitive position by the fact/value distinction supported 
by the comparison of the objectivity of factual conclusions with the subjectivity of evaluative 
judgments as well as reasons/motives internalism. For him, facts and values represent two 
different orders of being. Reason can determine facts and select means given ends, thus the 
uniformity in scientific inquiry. However, it cannot establish ends or legislate values, for ends or 
values are incommensurable. Moreover, evaluative judgments issue in motivation while factual 




which the judgment that one has a reason to perform an action issues in the motivation to do it. 
But in his view one’s reasons for action derive from the rationally unconstrained choice of a 
value. In sum, Leibowitz’s decisionist account of justification has a foundationalist structure, 
albeit one that is “flat.” Norms are justified through reasons for actions that stem directly from 
the values to which an individual commits himself by a rationally unconstrained decision.  
 owever, Leibowitz’s account of justification is problematic, for it presents caricatures of 
both evaluative judgments and factual conclusions, overdraws the fact/value distinction, and 
misses the link between rationality and attributability. Moreover, in its most radical form where 
only a contentless value like service of God can be willed with the requisite freedom, the 
connection between an individual and her action is severed. Indeed, the basic weakness of 
Leibowitz’s account is its constricted conception of rationality, which yields an untenable 
alternative source of normativity. Since he only recognizes an instrumentalist form of reason that 
delivers conclusions that all are forced to accept, he must insulate axiological decisions from it to 
preserve space for autonomy and difference. This is all the more pressing for him as he seeks to 
justify a marginalized value like service of God and a particularistic practice like halakha. 
However, once the human will is disconnected from reason it becomes caprice and both the 
individual who possesses the will and the value the will selects become contentless. The blind 
will thus cannot serve as the source of normativity. Leibowitz does not recognize the possibility 
of a form of rationality that could reflect without coercion and evaluate without erasing 
difference. Such a form of rationality could be a medium for expressing substantive autonomy 





2. Soloveitchik: Queer Values 
While Soloveitchik does not explicitly reject the project of ta’amei ha-mitzvot like 
Leibowitz, he too initially seems to avoid offering a true justification for the commandments. He 
appears to make halakhic norms the starting point for reflection on the reasons for the 
commandments. This reconstructive account would not be a foundationalist approach to 
justification because it would begin with the norms themselves. Indeed, commentators like 
Kaplan and, more explicitly, Rynhold have argued that Soloveitchik challenges the 
foundationalist paradigm altogether. However, he actually offers a second justification for the 
commandments that is clearly foundationalist. This account undergirds his more overt account, 
explains his focus on experiential commandments, and better corresponds to his theory of 
halakha and halakhic-legal practice. According to it, halakhic norms are the objectified 
expression of collective Jewish consciousness’s cognition of reality, which contains veridical 
value perceptions and apt affective responses. Halakhic practice, in turn, is a discipline for the 
individual to achieve appropriate emotional responses and to attain accurate value perceptions. 
Thus, even if the specific reasons for a halakhic norm can only be ascertained through reflection 
on the norm, the justification for the norm, which makes it a fit object for such reflection in the 
first place, relies on its origin in religious cognition of reality.  
Consequently, for Soloveitchik, when properly interpreted, objective values that inhere in 
reality are the source of normativity. Admittedly, he does describe a second experience of 
normativity, that of the individual who already finds himself within a normative system and 
accepts its norms without first perceiving their connection to reality. Still, this is merely an 
individual’s experience and not the actual source of normativity itself. The ultimate goal of the 




encountering this source. Soloveitchik thus justifies halakhic norms by a philosophical account 
that traces them back to objective values that serve as the source of normativity. 
Soloveitchik is less direct in his rejection of reason as the source of normativity than 
Leibowitz. He maintains that reason is necessary to discover objective moral and religious 
values, both initially through collective religious consciousness and for the individual reflecting 
on the norms after the fact. However, he dismisses reason as the source of morality, because he 
argues that it cannot render determinate rulings, is motivationally inert, and, more significantly 
for the question of normativity, devolves into relativistic decisionism. Soloveitchik thus asks too 
much of reason and then underestimates its capacities. He holds that reason ought to be able to 
motivate as well as to inform and demands that it fully determine particular judgments but claims 
that it succumbs to relativism. His conception of reason is thus constricted as well. He does not 
conceive of a more substantive, though modest, role for reason, in which it would serve as 
medium for reflection on norms while neither fully prescribing values, nor determining the 
application of norms, nor ensuring the motivation to comply with them.  
However, though dismissing reason as the source of normativity, Soloveitchik recognizes the 
untenability of Leibowitz’s suggestion. If reason cannot be the source of normativity for 
Soloveitchik because he believes that it issues in relativism, the more direct route to relativism 
through the arational human will is also unacceptable. Rather, he seeks an objective source for 
norms in reality. Moreover, his realist account better corresponds with the experience of 
normativity than Leibowitz. According to the latter’s decisionist account, obligations stem from 
an individual’s own free choice, but individuals usually feel that obligations have a claim on 
them beyond their revisable commitments. Recognizing objective values as the source of 




But if Leibowitz’s account falls into difficulties due to its effort to protect axiological 
freedom and religious difference, Soloveitchik’s account is problematic because it lacks the 
resources to assert the particularism that it does want to protect. This problem can be articulated 
from both deontic and epistemic perspectives: If halakhic norms derive from objective values, 
then non-Jews’ lack of obligation by them is not immediately understandable  they should be 
universally obligatory. And if these values are an objective feature of reality, then their want of 
common accessibility and the consequent absence of broad intersubjective agreement about them 
are not explicable. But this raises a further, metaphysical difficulty about these values: their 
“ontological queerness,” such that they exist in the same way as ordinary objects yet issue in 
obligations. Thus, while better articulating the experience of normativity than Leibowitz, 
Soloveitchik’s suggestion of objective values as the source of normativity is also untenable.  
3. Berkovits: Question-Begging Authority 
Berkovits’ thought corresponds to this schema more directly than Leibowitz or Soloveitchik. 
He offers a justification of the commandments, articulates a foundationalist account of 
justification while expressing skepticism about the practical normativity of reason, and proposes 
an alternative source of normativity. Despite certain comments about the limits of human 
understanding, which are general epistemological constraints, he confronts the question of 
ta’amei ha-mitzvot without qualms about the appropriateness of the endeavor. For him, if a law 
is not acceptable to reason, then revelation is useless. Revealed laws devoid of rational 
justification cannot command assent. Halakhic norms thus require reasons, which he conceives 
of as purposes. Indeed, he expresses his commitment to the justification of even revealed norms 
by reversing the initial question about the reasons for ritual laws: He asks about the need for the 




Ta’amei ha-mitzvot thus divides into two queries: the reasons for the ritual laws and the need 
for the revelation of the ethical laws. In responding to these questions, Berkovits reflects on 
justification and rationality. For him justification is teleological and consequently foundational. 
It is achieved through the adduction of moral purposes that norms either directly or indirectly 
serve. These purposes advance a moral telos, sedeq, which is the summum bonum of reality. 
Norms are justified by pointing towards this ultimate justificatory source.  
However, Berkovits contends that even once the norms are traced back to a telos, the whole 
justificatory structure still lacks normative force. The normativity of the ultimate value is neither 
inherent as Soloveitchik might claim nor can it be established by reason. Like Leibowitz, 
Berkovits contends that reason only operates instrumentally and espouses a form of 
reasons/motives internalism; reason can neither establish obligation nor motivate action, only the 
will and its desires can accomplish these tasks. Yet, in contrast to Leibowitz and like 
Soloveitchik, he is concerned about relativism and attempts to restore unconditional obligation. 
He too criticizes Kant and argues that there is no single practical reason; there are only the 
reasons of individual human beings, which are really the expression of their wills. Thus, reason 
cannot establish unconditional obligation. The individual’s will merely establishes normativity 
for him or those who accept his authority; it can only establish conditional obligation. The 
absolute will of God and thus revelation is necessary to create unconditional obligation even for 
norms that advance the moral telos. Therefore, after norms are justified by being traced back to a 
moral end, they are not normative until they are grounded in the divine will, which can 
exclusively endow the end and thus the norms that advance it with absolute normativity. The 
divine will is thus the source of normativity and halakhic norms are justified by showing how 




Because Berkovits directly reflects on justification and rationality, the difficulties in his 
philosophical premises are even more evident. Despite differing with Soloveitchik about the 
source of normativity, Berkovits’ view confronts similar problems concerning particularism and 
universalism: He implicitly denies unconditional moral obligation to non-Jews even while 
including them in the eschatological goal. Additionally, to explain the need for normativity-
endowing revelation he separates the axiological question of the good and the deontological 
question of obligation without offering an explanation of this possibility. Moreover, he fails to 
explicate why God’s will is normative for human beings. Ex hypothesi, the normativity of the 
divine command cannot derive from its content. Similarly, it cannot arise from a duty humans 
possess to obey God, for that simply shifts the question to the normativity of that duty. Relatedly, 
he is inconsistent about the relation between heteronomy and autonomy in revelation, and his 
efforts to resolve this inconsistency in halakhic-legal practice are inadequate. Thus, while 
providing a perspicuous justification for halakhic norms, Berkovits’ philosophical premises are 
deficient. Indeed, it seems that after providing a robust justification of the commandments in 
terms of their telos, he needs to constrict reason by denying it normative force in order to make 
room for revelation. He too does not recognize a fuller conception of practical reason that would 
impose constraints and prescribe consequences for justification, while respecting the givenness 
of normativity, which could interpret the idea of revelation.  
B. Diagnosis: Foundationalist Justification and Constricted Rationality 
A study of the accounts of ta’amei ha-mitzvot of these philosophers of halakha thus reveals 
shared features: They all provide justifications of halakhic norms by showing that engaging in 
Jewish religious practice is at least as justified as any other practical decision. This draws them 




justification with skepticism about the practical normativity of reason. They each thus identify an 
alternative source of normativity in which halakhic norms can be grounded: Leibowitz focuses 
on human will; Soloveitchik claims objective values; and Berkovits fixes on divine revelation.  
These argumentational similarities are motivated by common assumptions that lead to a 
shared problematic: They all concede that justification must be foundational and that, when 
applicable, reason is universal. But this makes justifying halakhic norms and practices seem 
hopeless, for it is difficult to derive such an emphatically particularistic normative system and 
practice from a universal source. Thus, for fear of a universalizing reason, they deny reason’s 
practical normativity. But each of their alternative sources of normativity is untenable: Among 
other issues Leibowitz’s focus on human will devolves into arbitrary choice  Soloveitchik’s 
objective values are ontologically queer  and Berkovits’ embrace of divine revelation begs 
questions about the normativity of God’s command.  
Moreover, each seems to dismiss practical reason too quickly, often as a result of a contrast 
between it and theoretical reason. They conceive of theoretical reason as fully determinative and 
distinguish it from the seemingly complete subjectivity of practical reason. Both Leibowitz and 
Berkovits explicitly subscribe to a form of epistemological positivism, according to which facts 
about the world can be established with certainty by proper employments of reason, and contrast 
it with evaluative judgments. In fact, Leibowitz directly opposes decisions about values with 
factual conclusions in science. While the latter are objective because they are forced on inquirers 
by reality itself, the latter are subjective because they are left to the free choice of agents. 
Soloveitchik too compares evaluative and factual judgments, though he is more hopeful about 
the parallel: Value perceptions justify norms in the same way that ordinary perceptions would 




and deontic problems. The failures of the justificatory accounts of Leibowitz, Soloveitchik and 
Berkovits combined with their dependence on a foundationalist account of justification and stark 
opposition between practical and theoretical reason motivates a reexamination of justification 
and rationality to construct a more productive framework for ta’amei ha-mitzvot. 
II. Foundationalism and Rationality 
In fact, the foundationalist account of normative justification is under-motived and should be 
replaced by a contextualist account, which levels the distinction between theoretical and practical 
reason. Stimulated by the preceding diagnosis, it is first suggested that a comparison and contrast 
between theoretical and practical reason prompts the search for a source of normativity (A). 
Then, through an engagement with thinkers associated with the pragmatist philosophical 
tradition it is argued that foundationalism is unsustainable as an account of justification for 
theoretical reason and should be replaced by a contextualist account (B). With the contrast with 
theoretical reason removed, a parallel justificatory account for practical reason is then described 
and some difficulties with it are noted (C).  
A. Foundationalist Justification in Theoretical and Practical Reason 
A foundationalist account of normative justification requires norms to be justified by being 
traced back to a source of normativity. The norms derive their normative force from this source. 
It is thus a type of general foundationalism, according to which beliefs or norms must be rooted 
in some certain ground to be justified and thus for it to be rational to commit oneself to them or 
act upon them.
1
 In fact, foundationalism about the justification of norms, or normative 
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foundationalism, is encouraged by a comparison with foundationalism about beliefs, or doxastic 
foundationalism, for the notion that beliefs must be traced back to a certain ground seems 
plausible in the case of theoretical reason, specifically empirical knowledge.  
Doxastic foundationalism is closely linked to representationalism and the correspondence 
conception of truth. According to these positions, beliefs purport to accurately represent 
independently reality and, correlatively, a belief is true if, and only if, it corresponds to an 
independently reality. Doxastic foundationalism construes justification as aimed at establishing 
that a belief does accurately represent this reality: A justified belief should be more likely to 
correspond to this reality. It does this through its positions about proper doxastic structure and 
the various types of beliefs it recognizes: Proper doxastic structures must have foundations. 
These foundations are most certain to reflect reality and can anchor the rest of the structure. 
Fortunately, then, according to this view, there are beliefs that are fully determined by either 
logic or the world; such beliefs are either immediately justified or need no justification at all, for 
they are certain to reflect reality. To be justified a belief must either be foundational or be traced 
back to such a belief by a chain of inferences.
 
Perceptual beliefs, or beliefs directly caused by 
perceptions of reality, could be foundational beliefs for empirical knowledge.  
However, as Habermas suggests in The Inclusion of the Other (IO), a comparison between 
theoretical and practical reason and, more specifically, between empirical knowledge and ethics 
on foundationalist terms establishes a standard that the latter is hard pressed to meet. It quickly 
becomes a contrast, for it is not obvious what may serve as the foundational norms to parallel 
perceptual beliefs.
2
 While Moore and his contemporaries may have thought that the good was 
immediately intuitable, the range of disagreement in ethics casts doubt on the certainty about 
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such purported foundations for practical reason. Consequently, it is not clear what should serve 
as the objects ethical norms represent or to which they must correspond to be true. It is then 
tempting to claim that while empirical knowledge is rational because it can be justified by being 
grounded in the foundation of perceptual beliefs, ethics is not rational because it cannot be 
justified by being grounded in foundational norms. However, if normative foundationalism is 
encouraged by doxastic foundationalism, it must be established whether the latter is in fact 
sustainable. For if empirical knowledge does not have foundations, both the comparison and the 
contrast with ethics collapse. Norms do not need to be traced back to a source of normativity to 
be justified and for it be rational to accept them.  
B. Pragmatism: From Foundationalism to Contextualism 
Despite the initial plausibility of the existence of perceptual beliefs to anchor empirical 
knowledge, doxastic foundationalism is not tenable. This has been argued persuasively by 
figures in the philosophical tradition of American Pragmatism, beginning with C.S. Peirce and 
continuing with W.V.O. Quine and Wilfred Sellars. Their arguments are presented (1-3) because 
they offer compelling critiques of doxastic foundationalism and articulate more productive, 
though not unproblematic, contextualist approaches to justification that are applicable both to  
theoretical and practical reason.  
1.  Peirce: Intuitive Cognition, Habits of Action, and Inquiry 
Peirce undermines doxastic foundationalism by rejecting its premises: He refutes the notion 
of foundational beliefs (a). He also denies representationalism and the correspondence 
conception of truth (b), while providing a new model for justification (c). In addition to the 




 (a) In a series of essays Peirce marshals a range of arguments against “intuitive cognition,” 
which he defines as a “cognition not determined by a previous cognition of the same object, and 
therefore so determined by something outside of consciousness.”
3
  Such a cognition would “refer 
immediately to its object”
4
 and be “determined directly by the transcendental object.”
5
 Thus, 
intuitive cognitions would be certain to properly represent and correspond to the world. They 
would be immediately justified and would not need justification by other beliefs. They could be 
the perceptual beliefs that serve as the foundation for empirical knowledge.  
Peirce methodically removes the resources to defend the claim for the existence of such 
beliefs. He first notes that the best evidence for their existence is that individuals feel that they 
have them. For example, when perceptual experience gives rise to beliefs, individuals do not 
experience themselves as inferring them; rather, perceptual beliefs seem as if they have been 
immediately determined by the world itself. But Peirce asks whether one can have intuitive 
knowledge that one has cognized intuitively. He notes that historically many beliefs had been 
accepted as intuitive only later to be shown to result from inference, including vision from the 
blind-spot and perceptions of space. Thus, whether intuitive cognition is possible cannot be 
determined by the feeling that certain beliefs are intuitive. Instead, intuitive cognition must be 
supported by arguments. He then analyzes some beliefs that are often taken to be intuitive. He 
examines the evidence supporting the claims that these cognitions are directly determined by 
their object and unmediated by other beliefs. He argues that a number of beliefs that are thought 
to be intuitive, such as self-consciousness, the modality of a thought, and beliefs derived from 
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introspection, can be better explained as the result of inference. Lastly, he argues that once it has 
been granted that the intuitive nature of a belief can only be established by inferring that it is 
intuitive from observed facts, such beliefs have been rendered impossible. This is because other 
beliefs are invoked to explain the determinations of the purportedly intuitive belief, thus 
rendering it determined by other cognitions. For example, the object that is posited as its source 
would be known under a description; one would thus have beliefs about that object that would 
explain the determinations of purportedly intuitive belief. Otherwise, one would explain the 
belief as determined by an unknowable thing-in-itself, but that would be no explanation at all.
6
   
This brings out a more central point: Once it is granted that the intuitive nature of a belief 
must be supported by reasons, it no longer serves the justificatory role that it was meant to serve. 
Such beliefs were meant to serve as the foundations of a doxastic structure; but if they are 
supported by reasons, they are no longer foundational. Summarizing the implications of his 
denial of intuitive beliefs, Peirce writes,  
All cognitive faculties we know of are relative, and consequently their products are relations. 
But the cognition of a relation is determined by previous cognitions. No cognition not 
determined by a previous cognition, then, can be known. It does not exist, then first because 
it is absolutely incognizable, and, because cognition only exists in so far as it is known.
7
   
 
Peirce thus articulates a form of epistemic holism, which he makes more explicit when he writes, 
“No present actual thought...has any meaning, any intellectual value  for this lies not in what is 
actually thought, but in what this thought may be connected with in representation by subsequent 
thoughts  so that the meaning of a thought is altogether something virtual.”
8
 Beliefs are justified 
and even possess meaning only due to their relations to other beliefs. Therefore, an intuitive 
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belief, a belief not determined by a prior cognition but by the world itself, would be a surd. But if 
there are no beliefs that are fully determined and justified by the world, then there are no beliefs 
that can serve as the foundations of doxastic structures.
9
  
(b) In a later series of essays, Peirce denies representationalism and the correspondence 
conception of truth.  e writes, “And what, then, is belief…? The essence of belief is the 
establishment of a habit, and different beliefs are distinguished by the different modes of action 
to which they give rise.”
10
 Beliefs are thus reconceived as rules for action rather than 
representations of reality. Though the implications of the denial of doxastic foundationalism for 
normative foundationalism are discussed below, it is already evident that in Peirce’s thought a 
sharp distinction between them is no longer sustainable.
11
 
Corresponding to the shift from representation to habit, Peirce also reconceptualizes truth, 
which “is distinguished from falsehood simply by this, that if acted on it will carry us to the point 
we aim at and not astray….”
12
 If beliefs are habits of action instead of representations, then truth 
is efficacy instead of correspondence. In fact, Peirce’s view on truth is more complex, for he also 
writes that “the opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate, is what 
we mean by the truth….”
13
 Indeed, there is a tension in his thought between truth that can be 
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asserted here and now about beliefs that “carry us to the point we aim at” and truth that would 
only be known at the end of inquiry. Habermas exploits this tension in developing his own 
“Janus-faced” conception of truth. 
 (c) But once foundationalism, representationalism, and the correspondence conception of 
truth are discarded, an alternative account of justification becomes both necessary and possible. 
Peirce articulates such an account, which he simply labels “inquiry”: 
The irritation of doubt causes a struggle to sustain a state of belief. I shall call this struggle 
inquiry…. The irritation of doubt is the only immediate motive for the struggle to attain 
belief. It is certainly best for us that our beliefs should be such as may truly guide our actions 
so as to satisfy our desires; and this reflection will make us reject any belief which does not 
seem to have been so formed as to insure this result. But it will only do so by creating a 
doubt in the place of that belief. With the doubt, therefore, the struggle begins, and with the 
cessation of doubt it ends. Hence the sole object of inquiry is the settlement of opinion. We 
may fancy that this is not enough for us, and that we seek, not merely an opinion, but a true 
opinion. But put this fancy to the test, and it proves groundless; for as soon as a firm belief is 
reached we are entirely satisfied, whether this belief be true or false…. The most that can be 
maintained is, that we seek for belief that we shall think it to be true. But we think each one 
of our beliefs to be true, and, indeed, it is mere tautology to say so. That the settlement of 
opinion is the sole end of inquiry is a very important proposition. It sweeps away, at once, 




Peirce presents a pragmatic account of justification. Justification is not a standing condition of 
rationality as foundationalism conceives it. It is not necessary to doubt every belief and construct 
a doxastic structure from certain foundations. Rather, the need for justification arises from the 
disturbance of beliefs construed as habits of action. In coping with the world it becomes apparent 
that a present habit of action is inadequate. This disturbs the habit of action and doubts about it 
are raised. Justification is the process of resolving this doubt and settling on a new habit of 
action. The goal of justification is not, therefore, the attainment of truth conceived as 
correspondence to an independent reality but the resolution of doubt. Once doubt is resolved by 
the fixation of a new habit of action, justification comes to an end. Consequently, beliefs need 
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not be justified by being traced back to foundational beliefs; rather, they must only be justified 
on the basis of presently undoubted beliefs. Of course, such beliefs are thought to be true, but 
truth is not the aim of justification. The aim is a belief that is not disturbed by doubt, and a belief 
is justified when all actual objections to it have been defeated. 
More generally, Peirce’s account of justification can best be described as a form of 
contextualism. His comments about epistemic holism initially seem to encourage coherentism, 
for the latter accepts the critique of foundationalism and reconceives justification as a relation 
among beliefs. But in coherentism, like in foundationalism, this justificatory relation is viewed as 
an objective feature of beliefs. In contrast, his discussion of inquiry makes clear that he provides 
a central role for an individual’s or a community’s present beliefs and practices in justification. 
Justification occurs in the context of these beliefs and practices. It becomes necessary only when 
actual doubt arises. But when exactly doubt arises depends on what disturbs the habits of action 
of the individual or community. There is no absolute standard of when a belief must be doubted. 
In addition, a belief must only be justified in the context of presently undoubted beliefs, and if 
there is no absolute standard for when a belief must be doubted, then which beliefs are presently 
undoubted will also be determined by the beliefs and practices of the individual or the 
community. Lastly, a belief is justified when all the existing doubts about it have been settled, 
but what doubts exist about a belief is determined by the specific questions that have been raised 
about it. Thus, justification is not an unalienable property of a belief; new questions and doubts 
can undermine the justification of a belief that had previously been held as certain. 
Andrew Norman details some of the features of contextualism and distinguishes it from both 
foundationalism and coherentism.  e claims that “[t]o contextualist eyes, both foundationalism 




epistemological attention to the inferential…relations that a belief bears to other beliefs, sense-
data, and the like.”
15
 Contextualism is not unconcerned by inferential relations among beliefs, 
but these relations are understood in terms of the epistemic practices of a community. For the 
contextualist epistemic statuses are social statuses and justification is part of the dynamic of a 
social practice of argumentation. What needs to be justified and what counts as a justification is 
determined by what a community takes to need justification and counts as a justification. To 
justify a claim is to defend it against an objection that has been offered. But what counts as an 
objection and thus calling for a justification is determined by what a community takes to be a 
challenge to a belief. Contextualism is thus also characterized by fallibilism; new challenges can 
threaten the justification of a belief that had previously been justified. Overall, contextualism 
focuses on the “agonistic dimension of epistemic practice ” justification is seen as a communal 
practice of stabilizing disputed claims, or, as Peirce phrases it, settling opinion. It involves 
intersubjective recognition of a claim.
16
 In this study, the combination of these pragmatic and 
intersubjective features marks on account of justification as contextualist.  
2.  Quine: The Promise and Threat of Contextualism 
Peirce's criticism of foundationalism and articulation of a contextualist account of 
justification are further developed by Quine.  is “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” is aimed at two 
views that underpin empiricist philosophy. According to Quine, the empiricist approach to 
philosophy is beholden to two dogmas: the dogmas of analyticity and the dogma of 
reductionism, which both support foundationalism. He rejects them (a) and in the process 
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articulates a contextualist account of justification  b .  owever, Quine’s analysis demonstrates 
both the promise and threat of contextualism (c). 
(a) The dogma of analyticity is “the belief in some fundamental cleavage between truths 
which are analytic, or grounded in meanings independently of matters of fact, and truth[s] which 
are synthetic, or grounded in fact.”
17
 The dogma of analyticity is foundationalist because if there 
were statements that are true by definition, then these statements could serve as logically 
foundational beliefs. He argues, however, that the analytic/synthetic distinction is untenable 
because any attempted explication of the notion of analyticity relies on notions such as meaning, 
definition, or synonymity that are just as unclear or even depend on it for their own explication. 
He contends instead that synonymity and thus analyticity are dependent on actual linguistic 
usage. Terms are synonymous simply if they are treated as such in practice. Consequently, 
instead of logic determining what is analytic, the latter is what is treated as “true no matter what” 
by language users. Linguistic practice determines which truths are analytic. 
The dogma of reductionism is “the belief that each meaningful statement is equivalent to 
some logical construct upon terms which refer to immediate experience.”
18
 It is foundationalist 
because if statements could be reduced to terms that refer to immediate experience, those 
statements that were confirmed by immediate experience could serve as empirically foundational 
beliefs. Quine argues, however, that even the most sophisticated attempts to show how 
statements about the physical world can be constructed out of statements about sense experience 
have failed.  owever, the dogma of reductionism lives on in “the supposition that each 
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statement, taken in isolation from its fellows, can admit of confirmation or infirmation at all.”
19
 
But if statements about the physical world cannot be reduced to statements about sense 
experience, then they cannot individually and directly be compared to experience.  
 b  Quine’s counter-suggestion to the dogma of reductionism is that “our statements about 
the empirical world face the tribunal of sense experience not individually but only as a corporate 
event.”
20
 Each statement is not evaluated by holding it up against the sense experience; rather 
whole networks of beliefs are presented to reality for confirmation or disconfirmation. Indeed, he 
develops an alternative image of doxastic structure and justification to counter that of 
foundationalism: 
The totality of our so-called knowledge or beliefs...is a man-made fabric which impinges on 
experience only along the edges…. A conflict with experience at the periphery occasions 
readjustments in the interior of the field. Truth values have to be redistributed over some of 
our statements. Re-evaluation of some statements entails re-evaluation of others, because of 
their logical interconnections—the logical laws being in turn simply certain further 
statements of the system….  aving re-evaluated one statement we must re-evaluate some 
others, whether they be statements logically connected with the first or whether they be the 
statements of logical connections themselves. But the total field is so undetermined by its 
boundary conditions, experience, that there is much latitude of choice as to what statements 
to reevaluate in the light of any single contrary experience. No particular experiences are 
linked with any particular statements in the interior of the field, except indirectly through 
considerations of equilibrium affecting the field as a whole…. Any statement can be held 
true come what may, if we make drastic enough adjustments elsewhere in the system…. 




Quine, like Peirce, articulates a form of epistemic holism. The justification and even content of a 
belief is dependent on its relations to other beliefs. Doxastic structures are thus not vertical 
structures with analytic and synthetic foundations; they are networks with various connections 
among beliefs. Beliefs closer to the center of the doxastic network are labelled analytic truths, 
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while those at the periphery are labeled empirical beliefs. But a conflict with experience does not 
necessarily call for the rejection of beliefs at the periphery. Beliefs closer to the center could be 
revised and the peripheral beliefs kept.  
Indeed, though Quine too initially seems to endorse a form of coherentism, he like Peirce 
ultimately gives primacy to social practice in justification. He writes,   
Certain statements…seem peculiar germane to sense experience....  But in this relation of 
“germaneness” I envisage nothing more than a loose association reflecting the relative 
likelihood, in practice, of our choosing one statement rather than another for revision in the 
event of recalcitrant experience…. A recalcitrant experience can…be accommodated by any 
of various alternative re-evaluations in various quarters of the total system; but, in the cases 
which we are now imagining, our natural tendency to disturb the total system as little as 





The beliefs at the periphery and the beliefs at the center of the network are determined by actual 
practices of belief revision. Peripheral beliefs are those that are more likely to be revised; central 
beliefs are those that are less likely to be revised. In view of recalcitrant experience, the 
assessment of beliefs is revised so as to reduce the amount of disturbance of the overall system. 
But in principle any belief can be placed at the center, held to be true come what may be, and any 
belief can be placed at the periphery, subject to revision. Epistemic strength is explained in terms 
of likelihood of revision in practice. There is no one right way to rearrange beliefs; a doxastic 
network can be rewoven in all sorts of ways. Thus, Quine too advocates a form of contextualism.  
(c) Further, Quine does not see the overall adequacy of reweaving as determined by accurate 
representation. Instead, he focuses on predictive reliability at least for science: 
As an empiricist I continue to think of the conceptual scheme of science as a tool, ultimately, 
for predicting future experience in the light of past experience. Physical objects are 
conceptually imported into the situation as convenient intermediaries—not by definition in 
terms of experience, but simply as irreducible posits comparable, epistemologically to the 
gods of  omer…. The myth of physical objects is epistemologically superior to most in that 
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it has proved more efficacious than other myths as a device for working a manageable 




This has the result that the status of the entities posited by science and those of Greek mythology 
are epistemologically on par. They both can be justified by being woven into a network of 
beliefs. For Quine science is superior in that it has proven more effective in experience. But one 
might have other purposes for which another network of beliefs might be superior. 
Quine’s analysis indicates both the promise and threat of contextualism, for if justification is 
not an objective relation to a foundational source but determined by social practice, there does 
not seem to be any limits on what may be justified given the right network of beliefs, purposes, 
and practices of reweaving. Because it is not obvious that everyone should have the same 
purposes, this allows for the possibility of pluralism. However, it also threatens relativism, 
because there is no longer any standard to adjudicate among competing truth-claims. 
3.  Sellars: Myth of the Foundation 
 Though directed at specific philosophical positions associated with empiricism, Sellars’ 
Empiricism and Philosophy of Mind also takes aim at a much wider philosophical trend that 
underlies foundationalism. In fact, he writes that though his argument is directed against certain 
positions that accept what he calls the “Myth of the Given,” his real target is the “framework of 
givenness” as such.
24
 The framework of givenness is the assumption that knowledge must be 
founded on some bedrock that can be known independently of any other beliefs. “The given” is 
thus a more generic specification of the foundational beliefs posited by foundationalism. Sellars’ 
assault on the framework of givenness is thus an attack on foundationalism (a). In its place he 
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offers a fully developed contextualist account of justification and rationality that emphasizes 
intersubjectivity (b). 
(a) Sellars combats versions of the myth that take an empiricist form. He writes, “the point of 
the epistemological category of the given is…to explicate the idea that empirical knowledge rests 
on a ‘foundation’ of non-inferential knowledge of matters of fact….”
25
 It is a reasonable intuition 
that empirical knowledge should be knowledge that is derived from the world and not directly 
inferred from other beliefs. Philosophical views that accept the Myth of the Given move from 
this intuition to the problematic position that empirical knowledge must rest on knowledge that is 
independent of any other beliefs. But there is a difference between directly inferring knowledge 
from other beliefs and knowledge depending on the possession of other beliefs. Sellars draws out 
this distinction in capturing the reasonable intuition while rejecting the problematic position.  
Sellars exposes the contradictions that the Myth of the Given yields through an analysis of 
the views of sense-data theorists. Sense-data theorists hold that empirical knowledge is founded 
on non-verbal episodes of awareness or sensings. Sensings are said to depend on no other 
knowledge but themselves give rise to knowledge. For a sense-data theorist, to sense a red sense-
content x is to know non-inferentially that x is red. Sensings are foundations for doxastic 
structures, and epistemic facts are thus analyzed without remainder into non-epistemic 
occurrences. Sellars points out, however, that the sense-theorist thereby demands incompatible 
things from this ‘given.’ Though it is particulars that are sensed, it is facts that are known. But 
this leads to an inconsistent triad: 
i. X senses red sense-content s entails x non-inferentially knows that s is red. 
ii. The ability to sense sense-contents is unacquired. 
iii. The ability to know facts of the form s is ϕ is acquired.26 
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The sense-theorist is committed to (i) because he wants to found non-inferential knowledge of 
facts solely on non-epistemic sensings, (ii) because he wants sensings to depend on no other 
knowledge or conceptual capacities, and (iii) because all knowledge of facts involves 
classification, which requires concept-use and learning. But if the ability to sense sense-contents 
is unacquired and the ability to know facts is acquired, then sensing sense-content cannot directly 
entail knowledge. Something else is needed.  
 To explain what is needed, Sellars restates his criticisms but now directs them against a 
variation of the sense-data position. This position designates observation reports, or verbal 
expressions of sensings, as the basic expressions of empirical knowledge. When correctly made, 
that is, on the occasion of sensings, observation reports are true. Their authority is thought to rest 
solely on these episodes of awareness. Observation reports are potential foundations for doxastic 
structures, and again epistemic facts are reduced to non-epistemic occurrences. This view is thus 
also beholden to the Myth of the Given and afflicted by its contradictions.  
But Sellars argues that it is correct to accord observation reports epistemic authority by 
allowing them to serve as justifications for beliefs, even if it is not episodes of sensing alone that 
provide that authority. He reconstructs their authority but without reducing epistemic facts to 
non-epistemic occurrences. Instead, he argues that epistemic facts, instances of knowing, are 
social statuses that depend on non-epistemic occurrences but not exclusively. To claim that an 
observation report of a green object, for example, is an instance of knowledge is to attribute 
epistemic authority to it. One attributes authority to it because “one can infer the presence of a 
green object from that fact that someone makes this report.”
27
 Thus, to attribute knowledge to 
someone is to claim that one could reliably infer that what they report is the case from the fact 
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that they have reported it; it is to recognize that their report could serve as a justification for what 
they report. Sellars thus construes knowledge as part of a social practice: “A report can be 
correct as being of a general mode of behavior which in a given linguistic community, it is 
reasonable to sanction and support.”
28
 To know x is to be recognized by others as a knower of x, 
to be considered by them as a reliable reporter that x. In addition, he notes that “to be an 
expression of knowledge, a report must not only have authority, this authority must in some 
sense be recognized by the person whose report it is.”
29
 But this entails that the knowledge that is 
expressed in an observation report is dependent on much other knowledge. To be able to know 
that x is the case, a reporter must also know that she is a reliable reporter that x is the case. Thus 
observation reports cannot be the foundation of empirical knowledge, for the former is dependent 
on a range of other beliefs about the reliability of one's own reporting abilities.  
(b) Two important points result from Sellars’ analysis: First, empirical knowledge is not 
wholly reducible to non-epistemic occurrences, but is rather part of a social practice of 
attributing the epistemic authority to serve as a justification: “The essential point is that in 
characterizing an episode or state as that of knowing, we are not giving an empirical description 
of that episode or state; we are placing it in the logical space of reasons, of justifying and being 
able to justify what one says.”
30
 Justification thus ceases to be a foundationalist relation between 
a knower and the world or a coherentist relation among beliefs; rather, justification is an 
intersubjective relation.  










Second, even the seemingly basic instances of empirical knowledge are dependent on the 
possession of a battery of other concepts and beliefs. This has implications for justification and 
rationality: 
[T]he metaphor of “foundation” is misleading in that it keeps us from seeing that if there is a 
logical dimension in which other empirical propositions rest on observation reports, there is 
another logical dimension in which the latter rest on the former. Above all, the picture is 
misleading because of its static character…. For empirical knowledge, like its sophisticated 
extension, science, is rational not because it has a foundation, but because it is a self-




The justificatory relation between observation reports and general empirical propositions is not 
the vertical one claimed by foundationalism. While the latter depend on the former in the sense 
that observation reports express, in terms of content, rudimentary beliefs about the world, the 
former depend on the latter for their epistemic authority, for their capacity to serve as 
justifications. But once this interdependence is recognized, a different image of the structure of 
empirical knowledge must be acknowledged. It is no longer a structure with foundations that are 
rooted in reality but one more like a Quinean network.  
Moreover, Sellars too claims that a different standard besides correspondence must be 
recognized for the adequacy of this network. It is not rational because it represents the world 
accurately but because of its self-corrective capacity. It is intellectually responsive to challenges 
to its claims by providing reasons for them and practically responsive by revising them as a 
result of failures of justification. And if rationality means self-correction, then a rational 
approach to justification means participating in a game of giving and asking for reasons. Sellars 
thus also offers a contextualist account of justification, in which the focus shifts from 
justification and rationality to justifying and reason-giving to others.    
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This discussion of Peirce, Quine, and Sellars focused on their criticisms of foundationalism 
and articulations of alternative contextualist, that is, pragmatic and intersubjective, approaches to 
justification. They have shown that the notion of foundational beliefs, whether understood as 
intuitive cognitions, analytic truths and statements that refer directly to immediate experience, or 
sensings and observation reports, are not viable. But if there are no beliefs that are most certain 
to reflect reality, then the notions that beliefs ought to represent or to correspond to reality, that 
they are thus unjustified if one does not have reason to think that they do reflect reality, and that 
one is irrational for holding such beliefs become implausible. In effect, since 
representationalism, truth as correspondence, and foundationalism are all mutually supporting 
and all depend on the existence of foundational beliefs, the denial of the latter causes their 
common persuasiveness to dissipate. Despite its initial plausibility, doxastic foundationalism in 
empirical knowledge and theoretical reason is not sustainable. 
But once the standards of foundationalism are discarded, new positions on justification and 
rationality become both possible and necessary. Peirce, Quine, and Sellars subscribe to forms of 
contextualism, which incorporates pragmatic and intersubjective features. Some of these features 
are more evident in one thinker rather than another. But common to them all is the pragmatic 
insight that justification is not a standing obligation nor is it accomplished by tracing a belief 
back to other beliefs that are certain to represent or correspond to reality. Rather, justification 
becomes necessary when doubts arise about or challenges are raised against a belief, and it is 
accomplished by supporting the belief with other presently undoubted or unchallenged beliefs. 
Further, while it is indicated in Peirce, it becomes clear with Quine and Sellars that justification 
is not conceived as a property of a belief but as a social practice of readjusting beliefs. Moreover, 




attribute of a belief, and rationality is not an attribute of an individual who only holds justifiable 
beliefs; rather, justification involves offering reasons for beliefs to others and rationality is a 
disposition of giving and asking for reasons for beliefs. It requires being intellectually responsive 
to requests for justifications and practically responsive to their failures.  
C. Implications for the Justification of Norms and Practical Reason 
If doxastic foundationalism has collapsed, then the contrast with normative foundationalism 
falls away. The notion of foundational beliefs that anchor empirical knowledge encouraged the 
search for foundational norms to anchor ethics. But once foundational beliefs are discarded, the 
pursuit of foundational norms is demotivated. Moreover, the contextualist accounts of 
justification offered by Peirce, Quine, and Sellars are just as suitable for norms as they are for 
beliefs. Indeed, Peirce breaks down the division between theoretical and practical reason by 
describing beliefs as habits of action: Beliefs just are norms. Further, if doxastic structures are 
not evaluated by their correspondence to the world but in view of their efficacy in achieving 
one’s purposes as Quine suggests, then the lack of obvious objects to which norms must 
correspond is not a failing of ethics. Lastly, if rationality is not the possession of a doxastic 
structure with a foundation in reality but engagement in self-corrective reason-giving as Sellars 
claims, then practical reason could be on as firm a footing as theoretical reason. Rationality does 
not require correspondence with the world but giving and asking for reasons, and this is as 
possible for norms as for beliefs. 
 These developments disclose a promise and a threat for both theoretical and practical reason: 
pluralism and relativism. For if neither beliefs nor norms are determined by reality but are 
justified through practices of reason-giving in the context of other held beliefs and norms, then 




philosophers of halakha’s concerns about the oppressive universalism of reason, but it also raises 
concerns about relativism. Indeed, while the accounts of justification and rationality of Peirce 
and Quine are enlightening, certain difficulties about their positions on truth, the locus of the 
promise of pluralism and the threat of relativism in terms of beliefs, were noted. By reconceiving 
truth as efficacy in view of the purposes that one holds, Quine accepts the relativistic conclusion 
that incompatible conceptual schemes can each be true. Depending on one’s purposes, the myths 
of modern science and ancient Greece are on par. Peirce, too, sometimes seems to invite 
relativism. Indeed, he appears to hold two explications of truth that are in tense relation with one 
another: One is an attribute of all current undoubted beliefs; the other can only be known at the 
end of inquiry. The former courts relativism by allowing individuals or communities to hold 
incompatible and true beliefs, because as long as they are undoubted they are true. The latter 
invites skepticism by withholding truth to some utopian era of complete knowledge. These 
worries concerning relativism also accompany any attempt to apply contextualism to practical 
reason; moral relativism threatens. An approach to justification and rationality is necessary that 
recognizes the contextual nature of justification, thereby affirming pluralism, but that also 
prevents relativism about both beliefs and norms.  
III. Communicative Reason and Justification 
Habermas develops such an account of justification and rationality. His communicative 
conception of reason escapes the oppressive universalism feared by the philosophers of halakha, 
while rejecting their skepticism about the practical normativity of reason. Reason is not a source 
of normativity in which beliefs and norms must be grounded; but it does establish constraints and 




to engage in the practice of justification.
32
 But his context-transcending contextualist account of 
justification both fulfills the promise of pluralism and avoids the threat of relativism by fully 
recognizing the role of justification in linguistic practice. It is also compatible and even resonates 
with some of the insights of the philosophers of halakha about justification. It thus provides a 
productive framework for normative justification in general and ta’amei ha-mitzvot in particular. 
This account of justification endorses the pragmatic and intersubjective insights that there is 
no requirement to ground all beliefs and norms in a foundation as well as that beliefs and norms 
are justified to others in terms of the undoubted beliefs or norm within a social context. 
Moreover, it locates a commitment in linguistic practice to offering justifications for claims 
when they are challenged, thus ensuring intellectual and practical responsiveness to demands for 
justification. But it also distinguishes on the basis of their role in modern linguistic practice 
between ethical-claim and aesthetic-claims that only assert their validity within the social context 
in which they were made, on the one hand, and truth-claims and moral-claims that implicitly 
assert their unconditional validity, on the other hand. The former suffice with justifications that 
remain within that social context, while the latter require justifications that aim to transcend it.  
The recognition of the assertion of conditional validity implied by ethical-claims and 
aesthetic-claims fulfills the promise of pluralism. When they are challenged, context-bounded 
justifications that acknowledge that individuals and communities have diverse conceptions of the 
good or the beautiful suffice. The recognition of the assertion of unconditional validity implied 
by truth-claims and moral-claims avoids relativism. When they are challenged, context-
transcending justifications that are guided by the goal of one truth or a single morality are 
required. Even here, however, justification is understood intersubjectively: Context-
                                                 
32




transcendence is construed as acceptability by an imagined universal society and context-
boundedness is construed as acceptability to an actual particular community.  
Habermas is perhaps one of the last great systematic philosophers. His communicative 
conception of reason and context-transcending contextualist account of justification are 
embedded in a broader social theory and relies on a specific conception of linguistic practice and 
meaning. Similarly, communicative reason is meant to unify theoretical, practical, and aesthetic 
forms of reason. The goal in this section is to extract his account of justification from this system 
in a manner that is coherent as well as productive for the question of normative justification. This 
involves briefly presenting elements of his system so that his account of justification is plausible 
while suppressing others.
33
 Thus, in the following, the basic aims of his philosophical program 
and the place of justification within it are sketched (A). His account of justification is then 
elaborated in the context of his theories of linguistic practice and meaning (B).  
A. Habermas’ Philosophical Program 
 abermas’ philosophical program can be understood in terms of two problems: The first 
emerges from social theory (1), while the second responds to developments in philosophy (2). 
(1) Though Habermas has dedicated much of his work in the recent decades to questions 
concerning theoretical and practical reason, the motivations of his philosophical program are 
presented in his Theory of Communicative Action (TCA), which is a contribution to the critical 
social project of the Frankfurt School.
34
 The issue of justification arises within this project as an 
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attempt to “clarif[y] the normative foundations of a critical theory of society.”
35
 He aims to 
identify the resources for the critique of modern forms of social pathology.  
There are certain features of the modern situation that Habermas takes for granted. He 
follows Max Weber in understanding modernity as characterized by the rationalization of 
worldviews: Comprehensive mythical or religious worldviews break down and are replaced by a 
secular realm consisting of a plurality of value spheres, including truth (theoretical reason), 
morality (practical reason), and beauty (aesthetic judgment). If religion persists, it no longer 
provides the framework within which all life occurs but is simply one value sphere among 
others.
36
 Further, expert cultures dedicated to these values, including science, law, and art 
criticism, emerge. Lastly, the economy and government separate from everyday life and are 
institutionalized as steering media for society that are focused on formal-purposive rationality.
37
  
In fact, Habermas identifies the predominant social pathology of modernity as the one-sided 
development of reason as formal-purposive rationality and its over-extension to social life, which 
results in the instrumentalization of social relations and decisionist approaches to values and 
norms. His mentors, Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, similarly diagnosed modernity, but 
they accepted the identification of reason with formal-purposive rationality. They thus denied 
that reason could be a source of critique.
38
 In contrast, Habermas claims that there is another type 
of reason—communicative reason—that is always already present in the basic form of linguistic 
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practice—communicative action. Communicative reason recognizes the full spectrum of value 
spheres, including truth, morality, and beauty, while unifying them through the commitment to 
justification in linguistic practice.  
(2) Parallel to this project in social theory, in his work Postmetaphysical Thinking (PM) 
Habermas describes his philosophical program as developing a conception of reason that is 
“postmetaphysical, yet not defeatist.”
39
 Postmetaphysical thought is in some sense the 
philosophical corollary to modern sociological developments. Four changes characterize it: 
(a) The relation between theory and practice has been reversed: Whereas traditionally 
philosophy has glorified reflection over practice, reflection is now seen as emerging from and 
reflecting back on praxis. (b) The relation between philosophy and science has also shifted: 
Philosophy too has been affected by the rationalization of worldviews. It is no longer understood 
as granting access to a substantive form of reason, but, following the lead of the sciences, 
employs a procedural form of rationality. Correspondingly, whereas philosophy had previously 
claimed to be the ultimate arbiter of knowledge, now it works fallibly in tandem with science. (c) 
“Philosophy of consciousness” has given way to “philosophy of language”: The subject-object 
relation of the individual to the world had previously been the locus of philosophical inquiry. 
Now, following the “linguistic turn,” the shared languages of communities and intersubjectivity 
are explored. (d) Reason has been situated in nature and history: It is no longer understood as a 
supernatural and timeless attribute of humanity; it is conceived as capacity that has developed 
through the course of human natural evolution and assumes various forms in cultural history.  
While these “postmetaphysical” developments allow the resolution of previously intractable 
philosophical problems, they have dangers that threaten to render reason “defeatist.” Some of 
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these dangers are directly relevant to  abermas’ diagnosis of modernity:  a  The new relation 
between theory and practice has issued in a productivism that only values economic growth, (b) 
while the new relation between philosophy and science has promoted a scientism that only 
recognizes cognitive and instrumental relations between the individual and the world. Others are 
philosophical positions that deny the existence of resources to combat modernity’s social 
pathologies:  c  The transition from “philosophy of consciousness” to “philosophy of language” 
has enabled a form of relativistic contextualism that anoints the language of a community as the 
final arbiter of truth and morality. (d) The situation of reason in nature and history has led to 
critiques of rationality that interpret it as a form of oppression and seek refuge in the irrational.
40
 
 abermas’ philosophical project is “postmetaphysical, yet not defeatist” because it reverses 
the relation between theory and practice, but then discovers within linguistic practice a form of 
procedural rationality that is not limited to the achievement of economic goals or the technique 
of scientific method. Instead, it conceives of rationality as the engagement in the process of 
justification of claims across a spectrum of values or spheres of validity, including truth, 
morality, and aesthetics. Further, while recognizing that claims are articulated and justified in 
particular social contexts, he argues that because of their role in linguistic practice, claims to 
truth or morality aim to “transcend the various contexts in which they are formulated and gain 
acceptance.”
41
 Hence their justifications must aim to be acceptable beyond that context. 
Communicative reason allows for the critique of modern society and prevents the collapse 
into productivism, scientism, relativism, and irrationalism. It accomplishes this by exploiting the 
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commitment to justification implicit in linguistic practice. Justification thus plays a central role 
in  abermas’ conception of communicative reason and, in turn, broader philosophical program. 
B. Theory of Communicative Action, Formal Pragmatics, and Discourse 
Not only is the commitment to providing justifications for claims implicit in everyday 
linguistic practice, the character of such practice conditions justification and accounts for both its 
contextualist and context-transcending features. In fact, this account of justification relies on a 
particular theory of linguistic practice, which, in turn, depends on a specific theory of linguistic 
meaning. In the following,  abermas’ theory of communicative action and formal-pragmatic 
theory of meaning are reviewed (1), before his general account of justification is explained (2).   
1. Communicative Action and Formal Pragmatics 
Habermas claims that the most basic form of linguistic practice is communicative action. He 
offers his clearest definition of it in TCA: 
I shall speak of communicative action whenever the actions of the agents involved are 
coordinated not through egocentric calculations of success but through acts of reaching 
understanding. In communicative action participants are not primarily oriented to their own 
individual success; they pursue their individual goals under the condition that they can 
harmonize their plans of action on the basis of common situation definitions. In this respect 
the negotiation of definitions of the situation is an essential element of the interpretive 




Two aspects of this definition are crucial for the relation between communicative action and 
justification: Participants aim to reach an understanding with one another (a) about the situation 
in which they act (b). These two aspects are supported by a theory linguistic meaning (c) and 
give rise to four related pragmatic presuppositions of communicative action (d). 
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a. Action Oriented Towards Reaching Understanding  
Communicative action is not an objectifying description of linguistic practice; rather, it is a 
rational reconstruction of the self-understanding of its participants. Its aim of reaching 
understanding can thus be further characterized to reveal normative features: 
Reaching understanding is considered to be a process of reaching agreement among speaking 
and acting subjects…. Processes of reaching understanding aim at an agreement that meets 
the conditions of rationally motivated assent to the content of an utterance. A 
communicatively achieved agreement has a rational basis; it cannot be imposed by either 
party, whether instrumentally…or strategically through influencing the decisions of 
opponents. Agreements can indeed be objectively obtained by force; but what comes to pass 
manifestly through outside influence or the use of violence cannot count subjectively as 
agreement. Agreement rests on common conviction. The speech act of one person succeeds 
only if the other accepts the offer contained in it by taking (however implicitly  a ‘yes’ or 
‘no’ position on a...claim that is in principle criticizable. Both ego, who raises a...claim, and 




In communicative action participants understand themselves as aiming to come to an agreement. 
This goal determines the process of reaching understanding by placing normative constraints on 
it. An individual who is psychological or physically coerced to adopt the claims of his 
interlocutor does not understand himself as coming to an agreement with her. Rather, the 
individual must be convinced by reasons to accept the claims of his interlocutor. 
Correspondingly, when an individual communicates with another with the aim of reaching 
agreement she does not merely attempt to influence him causally to adopt her claims. Rather, she 
tries to convince him to accept them by offerings reasons for them.  
Now these reasons are often not always necessary—the interlocutor may immediately agree 
with her viewpoint. But the aim of reaching a rationally motivated agreement stands in the 
background of each communicative speech act: Such an act depends on the acceptance of its 
content by its recipient for its success. The recipient can either accept it because he is convinced 
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by it or reject it because he is dubious of it. Therefore, even when it is not necessary to offer 
reasons for her claim, the participant in communicative action aims to convince her interlocutor 
to accept it by undertaking the commitment to provide reasons if necessary. The interlocutor 
correspondingly relies on her claim because he attributes such a commitment to her. Using 
 abermas’ terminology, when an individual performs a communicative speech act, she raises 
and is understood to raise a “validity claim,” that is, she implicitly asserts that her initial claim is 
justified and undertakes to provide her reasons for it if necessary. This secondary speech act is 
also a communicative speech act oriented towards reaching understanding. Thus, the reasons 
themselves may be challenged by the interlocutor, unleashing a process of argumentation aimed 
at achieving agreement about both the initial claim and its supporting reasons.  
b. Claims, Formal World Concepts, and the Lifeworld 
Participants in communicative action aim to achieve agreement about those features of the 
situation necessary for the coordination of their activities. Communicative speech acts thus 
perform a number of different functions:  
[They] serve (a) to establish or renew interpersonal relations, whereby the speaker takes up a 
relation to something in the world of legitimate (social) order; (b) to represent (or 
presuppose) states and events, whereby the speaker takes up a relation to something in the 
existing state of affairs; (c) to manifest experiences—that is, to represents oneself—whereby 





Participants in communicative action must agree about the description of the physical word in 
which they act, the norms that regulate their actions, and the intentions that they have in acting. 
When making such factual, normative, or expressive claims, participants in communicative 
action consequently commit themselves to providing the reasons for them. Each of these claims 
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can be thematized in particular speech acts: assertions, imperatives, and self-expressions. 
However, Habermas maintains that every communicative speech act implicitly asserts its truth, 
normative rightness, and truthfulness.   
Correspondingly, participants in communicative action assume three “formal world 
concepts”: an objective world, a social world, and a subjective world. The contents of these 
worlds are not given; rather, they are that about which participants aim to achieve agreement. 
Maeve Cook suggests that they be understood as “validity dimensions,” entirely correlative to 
the validity claims of truth, moral rightness, and truthfulness.
45
 Since the aim is to achieve 
rationally motivated agreement, the objective and the social worlds are assumed to be accessible 
to all participants in communicative action. This allows claims to be evaluable by everyone: 
A speaker puts forward a criticizable claim in relating with his utterance to at least one 
‘world’; he thereby uses the fact that this relation between actor and world is in principle 
open to objective appraisal in order to call upon his opposite number to take a rationally 
motivated position…. A definition of the situation by another party that prima facie diverges 
from one’s own presents a problem of a peculiar sort; for in cooperative processes of 
interpretation no participant has a monopoly on correct interpretation. For both parties the 
interpretive task consists in incorporating the other’s interpretation into one’s own in such 
way that in the revised version ‘his’ external world and ‘my’ external world  can…be 





Though there are differences between the objective world and the social world which are 
discussed below, because they both must be assumed to be common to all participants in order to 
enable communicative action, incompatible claims about them launch processes of 
argumentation aimed to achieve rationally motivated agreement. In contrast, the subjective world 
can be understood as a residual domain to which the subject has privileged access. Still, the 
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truthfulness of an individual’s self-expressions can be evaluated in view of their consistency with 
his behavior.  
While the three formal world concepts are that about which participants in communicative 
action aim to achieve rationally motivated agreement, they do this against the background of 
those features of the situation about which agreement currently prevails. Habermas refers to this 
network of assumptions as the “lifeworld,” or the “the unthematically given horizon within 
which participants in communication move in common when they refer thematically to 
something in the world.”
47
  e writes, “Every process of reaching understanding takes place 
against the background of a culturally ingrained preunderstanding. This background knowledge 
remains unproblematic as a whole; only that part of the stock of knowledge that participants 
make use of and thematize at a given time is put to the test.”
48
 Obviously, the boundary between 
the formal world concepts and the contentful lifeworld can shift. Indeed, this is precisely what 
occurs when a claim that had previously been taken for granted is challenged. Nonetheless, some 
shared assumptions are necessary for communication to be possible in the first place.  
c. Formal Pragmatics 
Communicative action is the basic form of linguistic practice because of its role in agents’ 
self-understanding.
49
 Further, though action may be coordinated in individual instances through 
non-communicative means, communicative action is necessary for the broader processes of 
cultural reproduction, social integration, and personality formation.
50
 Even instrumental use of 
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language is dependent on its communicative use, for an interlocutor must first understand the 
content of a claim to be deceived by it.
51
 Indeed, Habermas offers a theory of linguistic 
meaning—formal pragmatics—that reinforces the centrality of communicative action and the 
commitment to justification within it.  
Formal pragmatics is a pragmatic account of language because it takes the speech act as 
opposed to the sentence as the basic linguistic unit. It is a communication-theoretic account of 
language because it understands the communicative function of language as primary over its 
propositional-representational, illocutionary-instrumental, and expressive-disclosive functions. 
Communicative speech acts are thus the basic units of language-use. Crucially, according to 
Habermas, such speech acts only possess meaning and are only understandable in terms of 
possible justifications. Recall that, according to the theory of communicative action, in 
performing a communicative speech act an individual raises and is understood to raise a validity 
claim: She implicitly asserts that her claim is justified. Drawing on Michael Dummett’s 
justificationist semantics,  abermas further argues that “we understand a speech act when we 
know what makes it acceptable.”
52
 More generally, he maintains that “[i]t is part of 
understanding a sentence that we are capable of recognizing grounds through which the claim 
that its truth conditions are satisfied could be redeemed.”
53
 While  abermas writes of “truth 
conditions,” this account of meaning applies to any claim for which reasons could be offered and 
not exclusively those that assert their propositional truth.   
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More recently,  abermas has endorsed, with a few significant caveats, Robert Brandom’s 
inferentialist semantics as the best explication of the internal relation between linguistic meaning 
and justification. Briefly, for Brandom the semantic content of a speech act is constituted by its 
inferential role, what would serve as reasons for it and what it could serve as a reason for. 
Consequently, to understand the content of a speech act an individual must at the very least, first, 
conceive its speaker as committing herself to the content’s justifiability and, second, attribute 
possible reasons for the speech act to its speaker.
54
 Crucially, for Habermas and Brandom the 
reasons for a claim are constituted neither by objective features of the claim nor the subjective 
intentions of its speaker  rather, it is “conditions for the intersubjective recognition of a claim.”
55
 
According to Habermas, the justification of a claim is thus the reasons that the speaker could 
offer to gain the interlocutor’s agreement to it. The aim of reaching understanding thus stands 
behind the basic constitution of linguistic meaning.  
Consequently, the link between linguistic practice and justification is reinforced, for as 
 abermas writes, “The set of grounds available in any given instance is circumscribed by 
internal relations of a universe of language that can be explored only in and through 
argumentation.”
56
 Because linguistic meaning is constituted by justification and justification is 
intersubjective, making a claim involves the commitment to argue about it. In fact, the relation 
between communicative action and argumentation is significant for both of the relata: 
communicative action is conceived as a rudimentary form of argumentation; communicative 
action and argumentation are continuous with one another; and the aim of argumentation is to 
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enable communicative action. This indicates both the fragility and resilience of communicative 
action. Communicative action depends on linguistic understanding, which, in turn, depends on 
agreement on what would justify a claim. But since justification is intersubjective, what would 
justify a claim can always be challenged by a participant in communicative action and thus a 
breakdown of understanding is always possible. However, because the generation of linguistic 
meaning depends on the commitment to offer justifications, communicative action can continue 
in argumentation with aim of restoring agreement and returning to action.  
d. Pragmatic Presuppositions 
This description of communicative action and formal pragmatics indicates their pragmatic 
presuppositions. Pragmatic presuppositions are implicit and indispensable commitments of a 
practice.  abermas’ most recent discussion of the pragmatic presuppositions of communication 
is in his work Between Naturalism and Religion (BNR). There he reflects on the nature of 
pragmatic presuppositions in general and those of communicative active in particular by 
contrasting them to Kantian transcendental conditions for the possibility of experience: 
Formal Pragmatics holds that the rational structure of action oriented toward reaching 
understanding is reflected in the presuppositions that actors must make if they are to engage 
in this practice at all. The necessity of this ‘must’ has a Wittgensteinian rather than a Kantian 
character. That is, it does not have the transcendental meaning of universal, necessary, and 
noumenal conditions of possible experience, but has the grammatical meaning of 
‘unavoidability’ stemming from the conceptual connections of a system of learned—but for 
us inescapable—rule-governed behavior. After the pragmatic deflation of the Kantian 
approach, ‘transcendental analysis’ means the search for presumptively universal, but only de 
facto inescapable, conditions that must be met if certain fundamental practices or 
achievements are to be possible. All practices for which we cannot imagine functional 




Because communicative action itself is a central practice of human life, for which humans 
currently know of no replacement, its pragmatic presuppositions are unavoidable for us. The 
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pragmatic presuppositions of communicative action are assumptions necessary for the possibility 
of action oriented towards reaching understanding. They do not follow from one another in an 
entailment relation; rather, they are linked and mutually reinforcing in their roles in 
communicative action. They have already been indicated in the description of communicative 
action. They include: rational accountability (i), shared objective (ii-a) and social worlds (ii-b), 
unconditional claims to truth (iii-a) and morality (iii-b), and rational discourse (iv).
58
 
(i) Participants in communicative action must mutually presuppose that they are rationally 
accountable: “This supposition states that a subject who is acting intentionally is capable, in the 
right circumstances, of providing a more or less plausible reason for why she…expresses herself 
this way rather than some other way. Accountability consists…in an agent’s general ability to 
orient her actions by validity claims…..”
59
 A participant in communicative action assumes his 
interlocutor has reasons for her claims that she could offer him. For if she did not have reason for 
her claims that she could offer him, he could not understand her as pursuing agreement with him. 
Now, this assumption may be mistaken: She might be merely trying to influence him causally to 
accept her view, or she might be incompetent. Despite its defeasibility, this presupposition is 
necessary as a starting point for communicative action.  
The correlate of rational accountability is the pragmatic presupposition of shared objective 
(ii-a) and social worlds (ii-b). While similar in some respects, the objective and social words 
differ in their connection to action, which issues in dissimilar substantiations of the next crucial 
pragmatic presupposition, or pair of pragmatic presuppositions: unconditional truth-claims (iii-a) 
                                                 
58
 Though Habermas discusses the shared objective and social worlds as well as the unconditionality of truth-claims 
and moral-claims together, because of the different relations of the objective world and unconditional truth-claims, 
on the one hand, and unconditional moral-claims and rational discourse, on the other hand, I find it useful to offer a 
different order of presentation.  
59




and moral-claims (iii-b). The objective world and unconditional truth-claims are thus discussed 
first, followed by the social world and unconditional moral-claims.  
(ii-a) Though communicative action evidently involves communication, it aims to coordinate 
action. In addition to being that about which participants communicate, the world is that which 
impinges on them and upon which they act. This creates a complex relation between agents-
communicators and the world, on the one hand, and action and communication, on the other:  
Whether in communicating about states of affairs or in practical dealing with people and 
things, subjects can refer to something only if they start—each on her own, yet in agreement 
with everyone else—with a pragmatic presupposition. They presuppose “the world” as the 
totality of independently existing objects that can be judged or dealt with. All objects about 
which it is possible to state facts can be ‘judged.’ But only spatio-temporally identifiable 
objects can be ‘dealt with’ in the sense of being purposefully manipulated. To say that the 
world is ‘objective’ means that it is ‘given’ to us as ‘the same for everyone’…. Through this 
formal presupposition of the world, communication about something in the world is 
intertwined with practical interventions in the world. Speakers and actors reach an 
understanding about and intervene in one and the same objective world. To achieve secure 
semantic references, it is important that speakers, as agents, are in contact with the objects of 




The actional and communicative relations to the objective world are linked to each other through 
the linguistic practice of reference. Habermas draws on the theory of reference developed by 
Hilary Putnam, according to which a common causal connection to objects in the world is 
necessary for shared reference.
61
 This dual relation to the world establishes it as both given, or 
not generated by the participants, and the same for everyone, or shared.   
(iii-a) The given character of the objective world is significant for the relation between truth 
and justification and is discussed below. Presently, its shared character is pertinent: Because the 
objective world is assumed to be shared, participants in communicative action must also 
presuppose that truth-claims implicitly assert their unconditional validity: “The supposition of a 
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common world of independently existing objects about which we can state facts is 
complemented by the idea of truth as a property that assertoric sentences cannot ‘lose’….”
62
 
Truth-claims must refer to the same objective world, even if they offer different descriptions of 
it. In fact, the assumption of a shared world makes such disagreement possible in the first place. 
Consequently, the assertion of validity implicit in truth-claims is not restricted to the context in 
which they are made. Though truth-claims are always made in a particular context, they 
implicitly assert that they are valid in every context. Now, this assertion may be incorrect. Many 
truth-claims turn out to be incorrect or only accurate for a subset of phenomena; but the only way 
to understand their being incorrect or inaccurate is to view them as having asserted their 
unconditional validity in the first place.  
(ii-b) The social world is both similar to and different from the objective world.  Like the 
objective world, it is also implied by language-use: “[M]embers comprehend their ‘social world’ 
as the totality of possibly legitimately regulated interpersonal relationships. Like the ‘objective 
world,’ this system of references is also a necessary supposition that is grammatically coupled to 
regulative  as opposed to constative  language use.”
63
 However, unlike the objective world it is 
not given to agents but produced by participants in communication and argumentation. In 
coordinating their action, agents do not causally interact with a preexisting social world, though 
they may encounter other actors whose actions conflict with theirs. Action oriented toward 
reaching understanding is thus possible only if shared norms to govern action can be established. 
Similarly, unlike the objective world, the social world is not the same for all agents as a 
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preexisting condition for coordinated action; rather, it must be presupposed that it could become 
the same for them through rational discourse aimed at resolving disputes about norms.   
(iii-b) Consequently, only some normative claims implicitly assert their unconditional 
validity. This subset is comprised of moral-claims, which are distinguished from other normative 
claims by their relation to rational discourse: 
Moral norms must be able to command the rationally motivated recognition of all subjects 
capable of speech and action, beyond the historical and cultural confines of any particular 
social world…. The validity of such norms “consist” in the universal recognition that they 
merit. Because moral claims to validity lack the ontological connotations that are 
characteristic of claims to truth, reference to the objective world is replaced by an orientation 
toward an expansion of the social world, that is, toward the progressive inclusion of strangers 
and their claims. The validity of a moral statement has the epistemic significance that it 
would be accepted under ideal conditions of justification.  owever, if the meaning of “moral 
rightness” unlike that of “truth,’ is exhausted by rational acceptability, then our moral 
convictions must ultimately rely on the critical potential of self-transcendence and 
decentering that is built into the practice of argumentation—and the self-understanding of its 




In contrast to truth-claims, which in referring to the world implicitly assert their unconditional 
validity, moral-claims implicitly assert their unconditional validity by their connection to rational 
discourse. Moral-claims implicitly assert that they could be accepted under rigorous conditions 
of argumentation. This claim is more fully explored below. In any case, such rational discourse is 
a pragmatic presupposition of communicative action and contains its own such presuppositions, 
which interpret the unconditional validity claimed by both moral-claims and truth-claims. 
(iv) Rational discourse is a pragmatic presupposition of communicative action because it 
simply is a more rigorous form of action oriented towards reaching understanding, though now 
the action is argumentation, or “cooperative competition for better arguments,” that is explicitly 
oriented towards attaining rationally motivated agreement. It becomes necessary when mutual 
understanding is elusive in communicative action, and it is aimed at achieving agreement and 
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returning to communicative action. Like communicative action, Habermas offers a description of 
it in terms of the self-understanding of its participants that preserves its normative features:  
The cooperative nature of the competition for better arguments is explained by the goal or 
function constitutive for the language game of argumentation: participants want to convince 
one another. In continuing everyday communicative action at the reflexive level of 
thematized claims to validity, they are still guided by the goal of mutual understanding 
inasmuch as a proponent can win the game only if she convinces her opponents that her 
validity claim is warranted. The rational acceptability of the corresponding statement is based 
on the convincing force of the better argument. Which argument does convince is not 
decided by private insight but by the stances that…are adopted by everyone who participates 
in the public character of exchanging reasons. Now, standards for whether something counts 
as a good or bad argument may themselves become controversial….  ence the rational 
acceptability of validity claims is ultimately based only on reasons that withstand objections 




Rational discourse has pragmatic presuppositions that are crucial for the self-understanding of 
participants as participants in argumentation. They cannot consciously deny them, while still 
understanding themselves as engaging in argumentation. The central insight is that  “[i]f the 
process of argumentations is to live up to its meaning, [it] must allow, if possible, all relevant 
information and explanations to be brought up and weighed so that the stance participants can 
take can be inherently motivated solely by the revisionary power of free-floating reasons.”
66
  
The pragmatic presuppositions of rational discourse include publicity and inclusiveness, 
equal rights to engage in communication, exclusion of deception and illusion, and absence of 
coercion. The most important presupposition for the purpose of this study is publicity and 
inclusiveness: Individuals cannot understand themselves as engaged in argumentation while 
consciously shielding some claims from evaluation and excluding relevant individuals. The latter 
claim establishes a universal society as the imagined audience for arguments in rational 
discourse. Participants must offer arguments that they think would be acceptable to those who 
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might not share their parochial beliefs and norms. They must also be willing to subject all of 
their beliefs and norms, though certainly not all at once, to evaluation to determine whether they 
are, or rely upon, parochial premises. While these presuppositions are often false in practice—
arguments are private or exclusive; opportunities to participate are unequal; deception, illusion, 
and even coercion are present—they are still efficacious. They force participants in rational 
discourse to make their discussions more public, inclusive, equal, transparent, and free. They 
push them to offer arguments that abstract from beliefs or norms that they know to be parochial 
and to subject as many of their beliefs and norms as possible to evaluation.  
Now since moral-claims are those claims that can secure agreement in rational discourse, 
they implicitly assert that they could be accepted in such an idealized form of communication. 
As is discussed below, according to Habermas, that is what is meant by morality and such 
agreement is constitutive of a moral-claim’s moral rightness. In contrast, while the justification 
of a truth-claim can also only be understood in the context of rational discourse and thus it too 
implicitly asserts that it could be accepted by a universal audience, the truth of the truth-claim 
must be understood in a more realistic manner. 
Justification thus occupies a central place in communicative action: The commitment to 
providing reasons for one’s claims enables action oriented towards reaching understanding. 
Justification itself, understood as argumentation or rational discourse, serves as a forum for 
concentrated efforts by individuals to achieve agreement about disputed claims and return to 
communicative action. But justification is also conditioned by that role, which establishes both 




2. Context-Transcending Contextualism 
With this background established  abermas’ account of justification is understandable. At its 
core it is a type of contextualism (a), which incorporates both context-transcending (b) and 
contextual-bounded features (c) at the level of the justification of specific claims. The crucial 
distinction in his account is not between normative and doxastic justification but between those 
claims that call for justifications that aim to transcend the context in which they are raised and 
those claims that suffice with justifications that are restricted to their initial context. This 
classification cuts across the distinction between beliefs and norms, placing truth-claims and 
moral-claims in the former category and ethical-claims and aesthetic-claims in the latter group. 
Indeed, the dissolution of the unfavorable contrast of normative justification with doxastic 
justification is a central motivation of the account.
67
  
a. Contextualism  
 abermas’ account of justification is contextualist because it conceives of justification as 
both pragmatic and intersubjective. As described in TCA, justification is understood in terms of 
its role within communication. While the commitment to offer justification is implicit in every 
communicative speech act because of the latter’s aim of achieving understanding, it only 
becomes necessary to offer reasons for a claim when it is challenged by an interlocutor. 
Argumentation then ensues with the goal of stabilizing the disputed initial claim and its 
underlying validity claims through rationally motivated agreement and of returning to 
communicative action.  
In other explicitly philosophical works Habermas critiques the foundationalist account of 
justification and suggests his own intersubjective account. Though he focuses on normative 
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justification in earlier works, he most fully discusses foundationalism and contextualism in his 
more recent work Truth and Justification (TJ), the subtheme of which is the relation of his 
thought to American Pragmatism. His discussion focuses on truth-claims because, as suggested, 
foundationalism is most plausible for doxastic justification and empirical knowledge. However, 
like the pragmatists, Habermas shows how it fails even in that case, thus removing the contrast 
with normative justification and ethics.  
Like Peirce, Quine, and Sellars, Habermas argues that there is no unmediated epistemic 
relation to the world and thus that representationalism and the correspondence conception of 
truth are implausible:  
As we cannot grasp reality except in terms of our concepts, the idea that we could somehow 
step in between the linguistic realm of concepts and ‘naked’ reality, purified, as it were, of all 
subjective components make no sense…. This insight destroys the illusion that we might be 
able to compare propositions and facts in order to determine whether they correspond to or fit 
with one another. Hence the notion that the world causes representations in the knowing 




For Habermas an unmediated epistemic relation to the world is impossible because human 
experience is always already mediated by language. The bare world cannot directly cause beliefs 
that accurately represent it. It is thus impossible to compare beliefs with the world in and of itself 
to determine whether they correspond to it. But if that is case, then “we cannot identify a class of 
basic propositions that are self-legitimating and might therefore serve as the beginning and end 
of a linear chain of justifications.”
69
 Therefore, the foundationalist or, as Habermas refers to it, 
semantic-deductive, account of justification collapses for want of foundational beliefs.  
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Instead of grounding in reality,  abermas suggests that the “the truth of beliefs and sentences 
can be justified or repudiated only by means of other beliefs and sentences….”
70
 Beliefs are 
justified in terms of other beliefs. While this might suggest a coherentist account of justification, 
in IO Habermas is clear that he too proffers a pragmatic and intersubjective account with 
normative features: 
This failure of foundationalism recommends a…conception of justification as a public 
practice in which criticizable validity claims can be defended with good reasons. Of course, 
the criteria of rationality that determined which reasons count as good reasons can 
themselves be made a matter for discussion. Hence procedural characteristics of the process 
of argumentation itself must ultimately bear the burden of explaining why results achieved in 
a procedurally correct manner enjoy the presumption validity. For example, the 
communicative structure of rational discourse can ensure that all relevant contributions are 
heard and that the unforced force of the better argument alone determines the ‘yes’ and ‘no’ 




Justification is a public practice of argumentation, in which both initial claims and the reasons 
for them are subjected to intersubjective evaluation. Such claims and reasons are justified to 
others in terms of shared and currently undisputed claim and reasons. These constitute the 
lifeworld of a particular community; but they too can be challenged. The lifeworld then 
“recedes,” and they, in turn, must be justified to others in terms of common and presently 
undisputed claims and reasons. Moreover, such argumentation contains normative features that 
substantiate why agreement in argumentation should be understood as justification. Specifically, 
they establish the context-transcendence that allows this account to avoid the relativism that 
threatens other contextualist accounts of justification.  








b. Context-Transcending: Morality and Truth 
The context-transcending features of this account emerge from the implicit assertion of 
unconditional validity by truth-claims and moral-claims in communicative action. Since 
participants in communicative action implicitly assert the unconditional validity of their truth-
claims and moral-claims, they must provide context-transcending justifications for them. 
Crucially, these claims are context-transcending as opposed to context-transcendent.
72
 In raising 
a truth-claim or moral-claim a speaker does not implicitly assert that she has somehow infallibly 
accessed the context-independent truth or morality. Rather, she commits herself to providing 
justifications that aim to transcend the context in which the initial claim was raised. Such 
justifications must abstract from premises that are known to be parochial and can be criticized 
for depending on premises that can be shown to be parochial. 
The engine of this context-transcendence is the pragmatic presuppositions of rational 
discourse, specifically the commitment to publicity and inclusiveness, which establishes an 
imagined universal society as the justificatory audience for truth-claims and moral-claims. The 
universality of this audience is a limit concept, which creates a “transcendence from within” in 
 abermas’ terms.
73
 It is always conceived from within the speaker’s context: it is an audience 
that does not share those beliefs or norms that the speaker knows to be parochial. By imagining 
such an audience for her justifications, she is motivated to examine her beliefs or norms to 
determine whether they could be accepted by someone who does not share her background or 
experiences. This promotes testing of truth-claims and moral-claims with the goal of 
apprehending the one truth and single morality. Consequently, relativism is denied. 
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Yet,  abermas’ accounts of the context-transcending justification of moral-claims and truth-
claims confront problems. In the case of moral-claims, he seems to presume the truth of certain 
metaethical and normative moral positions. In the case of truth-claims, he appears to assimilate 
truth to justification. These difficulties are discussed in turn (i-ii), which shifts the discussion 
from the justification of moral-claims and truth-claims to morality and truth themselves.  
(i) In maintaining that moral-claims require context-transcending justifications, Habermas 
seems to assume a cognitive metaethics and universalist normative moral theory. He appears to 
presume that moral-claims are susceptible to justification and that these justifications must be 
acceptable to everyone. But these positions are controversial: Subjectivist metaethical 
approaches, like decisionism and emotivism, maintain that moral-claims are non-cognitive and 
thus cannot be expected to garner widespread agreement. As has been seen, Leibowitz and 
Berkovits dismiss the cognitivism of evaluative judgments along with the possibility of universal 
agreement about them. In Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action (MCCA), Habermas 
criticizes such positions and, in the process, argues in favor of his own moral theory: Discourse 
Ethics. Discourse Ethics identifies morality with vindication in rational argumentation. As 
indicated, not only do moral-claims require justification oriented towards universal acceptance, 
the latter is constitutive of morality. Notwithstanding that both truth-claims and moral-claims 
require context-transcending justification, this indicates a difference between truth and morality. 
Subjectivist metaethical approaches are directly opposed by objectivist approaches like moral 
realism, which defend the cognitivism and often universalism of moral-claims by identifying 
their object as independently existing moral values. Yet, Habermas dismisses moral realism 
because of specific philosophical difficulties and general conflicts. As discussed in the critique of 




epistemological difficulties: Such values are “ontologically queer” in that it is claimed that they 
exist like physical objects but give rise to obligations. Likewise, since they are not directly 
perceptible, their apprehension seems to require a unique form of intuition. Further, Habermas 
maintains that moral realism clashes with the postmetaphysical character of the modern age and 
the autonomy of modern individuals.
74
 Instead, Discourse Ethics vindicates the cognitivism and 
universalism of moral-claims through a constructivist metaethical account: Morality is not given 
but constructed by moral agents.  
Habermas develops Discourse Ethics through an engagement with subjectivism. To start, he 
identifies linguistic practice as the explanandum of philosophical ethics: It must account for the 
generality, impartiality, and orientation towards reasons that characterize moral deliberation. 
Metaethical accounts or normative moral theories that require the revision of these practices thus 
begin at a disadvantage. In contrast, following his theory of communicative action, he aims to 
reconstruct the pragmatic presuppositions of such linguistic practice.
75
 Habermas nonetheless 
identifies two arguments in support of subjectivism: The first relies on what can be described as 
the identity premise. It asserts that when moral validity is understood as identical to the validity 
of truth-claims, all attempts to explain the former have failed. The second can be described as the 
disagreement claim. It points to the lack of agreement about moral principles as evidence for the 
non-cognitive nature of moral-claims.
76
 
Habermas strategy in combating these arguments is to relinquish the identity premise and 
then deny the disagreement claim. Instead of identifying the validity of moral-claims with the 
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validity of truth-claims, he understands them to be analogous, for they are both assessed through 
offering reasons with the aim of attaining a single right answer. He thus acknowledges the 
distinction between facts and values insisted upon by Leibowitz and Berkovits but without 
sacrificing the possibility of practical reason. Indeed, Habermas adduces a principle that could 
make agreement in moral argumentation possible: 
(U): All affected can accept the consequences and the side effects its general observance 
can be anticipated to have for the satisfaction of everyone's interests (and these 




He describes (U) as a bridging principle that if accepted as a rule of moral argumentation, would 
make agreement possible when matters that concern everyone can be regulated in their equal 
interest.  
In a second step, Habermas explains why (U) should be accepted in this role. He denies that a 
foundationalist justification of (U) can be offered. The justification of moral principles succumbs 
to either an infinite regress or circularity or breaks off at an arbitrary point. This was evident in 
the analysis of the philosophers of halakha. Their attempts to establish a foundation for 
normativity were beset by difficulties. Instead, Habermas offers a transcendental-pragmatic 
argument, which aims to show that “every argumentation, regardless of the context in which it 
occurs, rests on pragmatic presuppositions from whose propositional content the principle of 
universalism  U  can be derived.”
78
 The details of this justification were reviewed above in the 
discussion of the pragmatic presuppositions of argumentation. It establishes that the justification 
of moral-claims must be oriented towards universal acceptability. But Habermas argues that 
more can be derived from (U). Specifically, it entails the basis of Discourse Ethics: 
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(D) Only those norms can claim to be valid that meet (or could meet) with the approval 




Whereas (U) is a principle of moral argumentation, (D) is a moral theory, which identifies 
morality with that which could be accepted in rational discourse by all affected.  
Obviously,  D  is a descendant of Kant’s categorical imperative  CI , in particular the 
formula of universal law  “Act only according to that maxim by which you can at the same time 
will that it should become a universal law” .
80
 In addition to their cognitivism, universalism, and 
constructivism, they share a deontological focus: They concentrate on the validity or invalidity of 
norms or maxim for human action as opposed to establishing its telos. There are, however, 
significant differences between (D) and (CI). While (CI) may be deployed by an individual 
monologically, corresponding to  abermas’ appeal to pragmatic presuppositions of 
communication, (D) requires actual dialogue. Indeed, he describes it as a discourse-theoretical 
interpretation of the categorical imperative, which acknowledges the imaginative limitations of 
individuals in determining what norms might be rejected by others.
81
 Moreover, whereas (CI) 
establishes a rule for testing all of the maxims of one’s actions, the assessment of norm in terms 
of (D) only becomes necessary when the morality of an action is challenged. This constitutes part 
of the critical orientation of Habermas account of normative justification: (D) is not a 
foundational source of normativity and it does not legislate what norms a community ought to 
adopt; rather, it serves as a constraint on justification. When moral-claims are challenged, their 
justifications must aim to meet the approval in a practical discourse of all affected. 
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 ii   Initially,  abermas proposed a discursive conception of truth to match  D : “The 
condition of the truth of a statement is the potential agreement of all others.
82
 Truth, like 
morality, just is acceptance in rational discourse. This echoes Peirce’s claim that “The opinion 
which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate is what we mean by truth….”
83
 
However, this seems to confuse the justification of a claim, which does occur through 
argumentation, and what makes the claim true, which refers to the world. In TJ Habermas 
articulates this objection: 
It is counterintuitive that a proposition…should be true on the basis…of its ability to survive 
in discourse. Epistemic conceptions of truth certainly do justice to the linguistic insight that, 
faced with controversial claims to truth, we depend exclusively on the better reasons because 
we are barred from direct access to uninterpreted truth conditions. Yet the truth of a 
proposition does not become an epistemically mediated state of affairs merely in virtue of the 
fact that we can determine whether its truth conditions…are fulfilled only by means of 
justification…. The gap between truth and justification cannot be closed even by idealizing 
the conditions of actual processes of justification. Since any real discourse that takes place in 
time will remain provincial relative to learning processes in the future, we cannot know 
whether propositions that today seem to us to be warranted even under approximately ideal 




Truth cannot be assimilated to justification, even when justification is idealized as the end of 
inquiry (Peirce) or through the pragmatic presuppositions of argumentation (Habermas). The 
cautionary use of the word “truth” in linguistic practice alerts us to the fact that even claims 
justified in ideal justificatory conditions may turn out to be false because truth depends on the 
world and not human practices.
85
  abermas thus develops a pragmatic “Janus-faced” conception 
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of truth, which distinguishes truth and justification, has implications for the justification of truth-
claims, and differentiates truth and morality.   
The Janus-faced conception of truth brings into relation the roles of truth in discourse and 
action. In fact, it reconciles the two explications of truth (the end of inquiry and habits of action) 
that Peirce presented. The discursive, or epistemic, conception of truth is not abandoned but is 
supplemented by a realist, or non-epistemic, conception that is expressed in action. Habermas 
describes these roles and conceptions: 
The practices of the lifeworld are supported by a consciousness of certainty that in the course 
of action leaves no room for doubts about truth…. Actors rely on certainties of action in their 
practical dealings with an objective world, which they presuppose to be independent and the 
same for everyone. And these certainties in turn imply that beliefs that guide actions are 
taken to be true absolutely…. To the realism of everyday practice, there corresponds a 
concept of unconditional truth, of truth that is not epistemically indexed….  From the 
perspective of the routines of the lifeworld, the truth of propositions becomes a topic of 
discussion only when practices fail and contradictions arise. As a result, what has hitherto 
been taken for granted and thus accepted as valid comes to be seen as merely ‘presumed 
truths,’ that is, as fundamentally problematic truth claims…. Only once they make the 
transition from action to discourse do participants take a reflective attitude and dispute the 




In action individuals operate with a realist concept of truth. Everything that they currently 
believe is true; they do not relate to their beliefs as if they were merely held-to-be-true. In 
contrast, in discourse they operate with a concept of truth that is relative to their justificatory 
practices. They attempt to determine what is true by offering reasons for and against truth-
claims. These concepts of truth are related through the functional connection between action and 
discourse. Individuals move from action to discourse when practical certainties are disrupted; in 
discourse they aim to settle disputed claims and return to action.  
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In fact, the relation between action and discourse and the realist and discursive conceptions 
of truth establishes justification-transcendent truth as the goal of justification, even while 
justification can only ever attain the discursive vindication of truth-claims:  
The nonepistemic concept of truth, which manifests itself only operatively, that is, 
unthematically, in action, provides a justification-transcendent point of reference for 
discursively thematized truth claims…. This transcending relation guarantees the difference 
between truth and rational acceptability…. Th[e] very dogmatic constitution of the lifeworld 
is a necessary condition for the fallibilist consciousness of participants in discourse who 




As indicated, the experience of interacting with and communicating about the world establishes 
that it is both shared and given. While its shared character establishes universal acceptability as 
the aim of justification, its given character instills assertions with ontological connotations that 
survive the transition from action to discourse: The goal of justification is not just a context-
transcending truth but a justification-transcendent truth that refers to the way the world is.  
This has two related implications: First, truth and morality are differentiated in terms of their 
relation to justification:  
Looking at a truth-evaluable proposition ‘p,’ we read it realistically from left to right. If p is 
true, the proposition is unconditionally valid and merits being recognized by everyone. In 
order for p to be indeed universally recognized in this way, everyone has to be able to 
convince herself of the truth of this proposition and to know that p. This knowledge in turn 
can rely on the truth of p because (and insofar as) true propositions can be supported with 
good reasons. This consideration rests on a familiar connection between truth and 
knowledge: someone knows that p if she (a) believes that p and (b) has sufficient reasons for 
believing that p; and if (c) p is true. Moral knowledge cannot meet these conditions if we take 
‘rightness’ to be an epistemic validity claim because this means that the nonepistemic 




While morality is constituted by justification in rational discourse, truth is only indicated by 
justification even under ideally rational communicative conditions.  
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Second, in order to indicate why, if the goal of the justification of a truth-claim is truth that 
transcends justification, the vindication of a truth-claim in discourse licenses its translation into a 
practical certainty in action, Habermas establishes an additional condition on the justification of 
truth-claims. Drawing on the work of Lutz Wingert in response to the Gettier challenge to the 
Justified-True-Belief model of knowledge,
89
 Habermas argues that the justification for p must 
refer to a causal explanation of the process of coming to believe p. It must refer to a learning 
process that brought about the belief p.
90
 The justification of moral claims, in contrast, require no 
such reference to learning processes. Indeed, he rejects attempts to interpret Discourse Ethics as 
a form of moral realism.
91
 Such an ontological understanding of morality is not plausible in the 
modern world and infringes on modern subjects’ autonomy. Whereas truth-claims refer to a 
given and shared objective world, moral-claims construct a common moral order. Despite these 
differences, they are united in their implicit assertion of unconditional validity. Hence both of 
their justifications must aim for acceptance by an imagined universal audience.   
c. Context-Bounded: The Beautiful and the Good 
Habermas also recognizes that in modern linguistic practice some claims are legitimately 
context-bounded and thus their justification may suffice with acceptance by an actual particular 
community. In modernity aesthetic-claims have separated from truth-claims. Modern individuals 
do not conceive of beauty as an objective feature of objects but as part of their experience of 
them. They thus understand that assessments of beauty are made against the background of 
certain aesthetic standards, which may not be appreciated by everyone. Similarly, in modernity 
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morality and ethics emerge out of a previously undifferentiated normative realm. The moral-
point of view is comprised of those normative claims that can be justified in rational discourse 
and thus is constituted by impartiality. The remaining normative claims are those that articulate a 
particular individual’s and community’s conception of the good. Modern individuals are aware 
of a plurality of competing and incommensurable life projects, which can only be validated 
against the background of particular values. Consequently, whereas truth-claims and moral-
claims implicitly assert unconditional validity claims, aesthetic-claims and ethical-claims only 
implicitly assert their validity within the context of a certain lifeworld, in which particular 
aesthetic standards or ethical values are accepted. Correspondingly, whereas the former commit 
their speaker to providing justifications that are oriented towards acceptance by an imagined 
universal audience, the latter only commit their speaker to providing justifications that are 
oriented towards acceptance by the particular community that shares these standards and values.  
This context-bounded feature of his account of justification fulfills the promise of pluralism. 
Since these claims are justified in the context of a particular lifeworld, and as Habermas notes 
“even if they have the same communicative infrastructure at their disposal, lifeworlds always 
manifest themselves in the plural,”
92
 diverse communities may have different justified ethical-
claims and aesthetic-claims. But  abermas’ account of the justification of these context-bounded 
claims also requires discussion. Ethical-claims must be distinguished more adequately from 
moral-claims (i), and the type of validity claims raised by aesthetic-claims must be clarified (ii). 
Overall, the pragmatic nature of the distinction between different descriptive claims (truth and 
aesthetics) and normative claims (morality and ethics) must be appreciated. 
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 i  Whereas in English the distinction between “morality” and “ethics” is not obvious, in 
German the distinction between “Moralität” and “Sittlichkeit” has a long philosophical history 
exemplified by the Hegelian critique of Kantian practical philosophy. Hegel criticizes Kantian 
practical philosophy for its formalism and universalism, which neglects the particular substance 
of the life of a people, its traditional customs and values. In Justification and Application (JA) 
Habermas aims to join the Kantian focus on morality and the Hegelian concern with ethical life 
by recognizing both moral-claims and ethical-claims, uniting them through the basic 
commitment to justification and differentiating them by the type of justifications they require.
93
  
As communicative speech acts, ethical-claims also commit their speaker to offering 
justifications for them. Ethical claims of “[w]hat you ‘should’ or ‘must’ do [have] the sense that 
it is ‘good’ for you to act in this way in the long run, all things considered….” 
94
 They thus 
implicitly commit their speaker to justifying that they are actually good or lead to the good life. 
Such ethical justifications are exercises in “hermeneutic self-clarification” focused on “strong 
evaluations,” which are embedded in a cultural background: 
Ethical questions…take their orientation from the telos of one’s own life. From this point of 
view, other persons, other life histories, and structures of interests acquire importance only to 
the extent that they are interrelated or interwoven with my identity, my life history, and my 
interests within the framework of an intersubjectively shared form of life. My development 
unfolds against a background of traditions that I share with other persons; moreover, my 
identity is shaped by collective identities, and my life history is embedded in encompassing 
historical forms of life. To that extent the life that is good for me also concerns the forms of 




Ethical-claims require justifications in the context of shared tradition and form of life. Such 
justifications draw on their values and aim to achieve intersubjective recognition by others who 
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also share them. The subject of ethical-claims and ethical justifications can be an individual as 
well as a community as a whole:  
Just as an individual can reflect on himself and his life as whole with the goal of clarifying 
who he is and who he would like to be, so too the members of a collectivity can engage in 
public deliberation…with the goal of coming to an understanding concerning their shared 
form of life and their identity solely through the unforced force of the better argument. In 
such discourses… participants can clarify who they are and who they want to be…. The 
strong evaluations that shape the self-understanding of the person or of the community as a 
whole are here up for discussion. An individual life history or an intersubjectively shared 
form of life is the horizon within which participants can critically appropriate their past with 
a view to existing possibilities of action. Such processes of self-understanding lead to 




Just as an individual can reflect on what is good for her in an existential-ethical discourse, a 
community can reflect on what is good for it in an existential-political discourse. Such reflection 
is similar to rational discourse, though it takes place within the context of its shared tradition and 
form of life and does not aim to transcend it. Indeed, the crucial distinction between ethical-
claims and moral-claims is that while the latter implicitly assert that they are unconditionally 
valid, “there is no universal validity claim connected with ethical wisdom.”
97
 Ethical 
justifications do no need to be oriented towards universal acceptability; they may legitimately 
appeal to the particular values of a tradition or form of life that is not shared by others.  
Yet, it is not initially clear how the distinction between moral-claims and ethical-claims is 
sustainable except by fiat. Normative claims are not explicitly marked and it seems that any 
norm might raise moral issues. This distinction is not intended as between natural kinds, 
however. It is a pragmatic differentiation that occurs during the course of argumentation itself. 
The type of challenge to a normative claim and defense offered for it renders the claim moral or 
ethical. Indeed,  abermas writes, “Maxims are the plane in which ethics and morality intersect 
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because they can be judged alternately from ethical and moral points of view.”
98
 The moral point 
of view is a modern achievement that developed under the conditions of the confrontation of a 
plurality of forms of life and cultures; it is aimed at the impartial resolution of interpersonal 
conflicts in the absence of a consensus about substantive values. Moral-claims are those that are 
susceptible to this type of assessment. In contrast, the ethical point of view concerns questions 
that “are accessible to rational discussion only within the unproblematic horizon of a concrete 
historical form of life or the conduct of an individual life.”
99
  
The recognition of the abiding relevance of the ethical point of view indicates  abermas’ 
rejection of oppressive universalism. Indeed, he maintains that ethical cultures continue to be 
necessary for the creation of moral motivation and the application of moral norms.
100
 In this, his 
view resonates with the insistences of Leibowitz, Soloveitchik, and Berkovits about the 
motivational deficit and applicative shortcoming of “pure” reason, even while rejecting their 
skepticism about the practical normativity of reason.  
In any case, the distinction between moral-claims and ethical-claims is constituted by the 
type of challenge aimed at a claim and the type of justification offered for it as opposed to any 
objective feature of the claim itself: 
A mode of examining maxims or a heuristic for generating maxims guided by the question of 
how I want to live involves a different exercise of practical reason from reflection on whether 
from my perspective a generally observed maxim is suitable to regulate our communal 
existence. In the first case, what is being asked is whether a maxim is good for me and is 
appropriate in the given situation, and in the second, whether I can will that a maxim should 
be followed by everyone as a general law.
101
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But in actual justificatory practice shifts can occur between these perspectives. A normative-
claim that is challenged in terms of the values of a community can provoke a justification that 
appeals to its universal acceptability. In contrast, a justification for a normative-claim that 
appeals to the values of a community can itself be challenged on the basis of its universal 
acceptability. Indeed,  abermas claims that “there is no metadiscourse on which we could fall 
back to justify the choice between different forms of argumentation…”
102
 The important point is 
that each type of argumentation calls for its specific type of justification. A moral challenge to a 
norm cannot legitimately be answered by an ethical justification and vice versa.  
However, an argument may be offered about the proper classification of a claim. During the 
course of argumentation, it may be objected that what was thought to be an ethical issue actually 
raises moral questions. Moral arguments, that is, justifications oriented towards universal 
acceptability, must now be offered to establish either that it does not actually raise moral 
questions or that it is morally justifiable. Similarly, it may become apparent that what was 
thought to be a moral issue is not actually susceptible to universal agreement because the 
competing claims cannot be detached from particular evaluative vocabularies. These claims are, 
in fact, ethical-claims and can only be evaluated by ethical arguments, that is, context-bounded 
justifications. Still, there might be an overarching moral question about how to order a public 
sphere comprised of competing forms of life. Habermas claims that abortion may be an issue of 
this sort.
103
 Likewise, more recently, he has indicated that there may be an overarching species-
ethic that underlies communicative action and its pragmatic presuppositions.
104
 In general, 
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despite not establishing a conceptual distinction between ethical-claims and moral-claims, 
Habermas provides a framework for pragmatically classifying normative-claims and 
justifications and for detailing their rational constraints and practical consequences.   
(ii) While Habermas has devoted significant attention to the distinction between moral-
claims and ethical-claims, he has never intensively focused on aesthetic-claims, which as 
descriptive-claims have a similar relation to truth-claims. For the purposes of this study, they are 
significant because he has compared aesthetic-claims to religious-claims.
105
 It is clear that his 
view on aesthetic-claims has undergone development. In TCA he presents a subjectivist account 
of them in which their object is the artist’s subjectivity, including feelings, needs, and values. 
They are therefore expressive-claims that raise a claim to truthfulness.
106
 However, in an essay 
on Walter Benjamin he connects them to the interpretation of the world in light of human 
needs.
107
 Elsewhere he describes them as raising a more substantial claim to disclose the world in 
a new way.
108
 They are world-disclosive-claims. Their object therefore seems to be identical to 
that of truth-claims: the world. However, they differ from truth-claims in that they articulate 
experiences of “everything in our speechless contact with reality that is so fleeting, so 
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Perhaps the best way to grasp the relation between aesthetic-claims and truth-claims is on 
analogy to the relation between moral-claims and ethical-claims. The differentiation of 
descriptive-claims into truth-claims and aesthetic-claims is also an achievement of modernity, in 
this case connected both with the development of science as well as the confrontation of a 
plurality of forms of life and cultures. Aesthetic-claims refer to those elements of human 
experience that are neglected by the fact-stating discourse that approximates the language of 
science, which has proven itself to be distinctively corroborated by learning processes in the 
world and uniquely capable of achieving consensus among its participants. Like the distinction 
between normative-claims, this distinction is also pragmatic: What was once understood to be a 
feature of the objective world can be reconceived an element of an individual’s or community’s 
experience of the world. In any case, whereas truth-claims aim to refer to the objective world and 
state facts about which universal agreement can be expected, aesthetic-claims refer to an 
individual’s or community’s experience of the world and portray images about which only 
limited consensus can be anticipated. Because they draw on particular aesthetic standards for 
support, only those who share the same form of life or tradition can be expected to agree with 
them. They too are context-bounded claims that only aim for acceptance by a particular 
community.   
In addition to both being context-bounded, aesthetic-claims have another interesting 
connection to ethical-claims. Habermas claims that world-disclosive experiences and thus the 
claims that refer to them make possible new interpretations of needs, which advance the goal of 
creating a happy as well as emancipated society.
110
 They thus seem to have at least some 
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connection to normative-claims. Indeed, if ethical-claims can be seen as those context-bounded 
claims that are inherently conservative or at least only moderately reformist of an inherited form 
of life or tradition, then aesthetic-claims can be understood as almost revolutionary claims that 
aim to transfigure it by providing new orienting images.
111
 Such images must, of course, draw on 
existing expectations or standards, but they put them to new uses or subvert them, which can 
then issue in new self-understandings, values, and norms.  
In sum, Habermas provides a contextualist account of justification. It is pragmatic because it 
recognizes that there is not standing need to trace beliefs or norms to a certain foundation for 
them to be justified and for it to be rational to accept them. Rather, although the commitment to 
offer a justification is implicit in every speech act, justification only becomes necessary when a 
belief or norm is challenged, and it is accomplished on the basis of other unchallenged beliefs or 
norms. It is intersubjective because it conceives of justification in terms of acceptance by others. 
Further, it joins together context-transcending and context-bounded features in order to fulfill the 
promise and avoid the threat of contextualism evident in the pragmatists. Truth-claims and 
moral-claims are justified with the goal of one truth and a single morality. Aesthetic-claims and 
ethical-claims are justified with acknowledgement that different communities may legitimately 
have diverse conceptions of the beautiful or the good. Indeed, while he is most known for his 
defense of universalism,  abermas proclaims, “Someone who in the name of universalism 
excludes another who has the right to remain alien or other betrays his own guiding idea. The 
universalism of equal respect for all and of solidarity with everything that bears the mark of 
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humanity is…put to the test by radical freedom in the choice of individual life histories and 
particular forms of life…”
112
 Space must be found within the universal for the particular. 
This account is fruitful for the justification of norms because of its critical orientation, which 
recognizes the practical normativity of reason without succumbing to the oppressive 
universalism feared by the philosophers of halakha. It does not identify reason with the source of 
normativity nor does it recognize any other foundation for normativity, whether the human will, 
the world, or revelation. Instead, it is non-foundationalist in that it acknowledges the givenness 
of normativity; individuals or communities begin with the norms that they possess. It thus 
incorporates some of the insights of Leibowitz and Soloveitchik when they write in an 
interpretive, as opposed to foundationalist, mode about justification. However, unlike them, 
communicative reason expresses an already present commitment to justification, which 
establishes rational constraints on, and practical consequences of, justification. There is no 
standing obligation to justify norms, but individuals and communities must be intellectually and 
practical responsive to demands for justification. They must be willing to offer appropriate 
justifications for their claims and ready to modify or to retract them if they fail. 
IV. Religious Language, Validity Claims, and Halakhic Discourse 
More specifically,  abermas’ account of justification provides a productive framework for 
the justification of halakhic norms. It eschews the search for a basic source of normativity from 
which halakhic norms could be derived; however, it determines the rational constraints on, and 
practical consequences, of their justification. Significantly, because it conceives of justification 
in terms of intersubjectivity, it does this by relating these halakhic norms to the communities, 
particular or universal, real or imagined, before which they must be justified. The philosophical 
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project of ta’amei ha-mitzvot is thus correlated with, but not reduced to, the social conflicts over 
religious norms and authority from which it often emerges. It is also offers a path toward their 
resolution.  
However, for this account to be applied to halakhic norms its approach to religious-claims 
must be modified, for Habermas insists on identifying religion with unique area of culture and a 
distinctive validity claim. Thus, after a brief exposition of  abermas’ view of religion and 
religious-claims (A), a dialectic is developed between his account of justification and halakhic 
discourse, in which the latter is modified in the process of its application to the former (B).  
A. Religion and Religious Language in Habermas’ Thought 
Religion and religious-claims were neglected in the foregoing discussion of  abermas’ 
philosophical program and account of justification because, until recently, they have been 
tangential to his interests. A brief review of his engagements with religion in the context of his 
wider project is offered (1), followed by a reconstruction and initial critique of his conception of 
religious language and its validity claim (2).  
(1) Eduardo Mendieta identifies three main areas of reflection on religion in  abermas’ 
thought, including sociology, philosophy, and political theory, though he is currently at work on 




In TCA Habermas engages the sociological work of Weber, Emile Durkheim, and G. H. 
Mead to explore the linguistic role of religion as a precursor to communicative action. 
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Historically, religious thought and language mediates between mythical and modern thought and 
forms of communication. His most concise description of religion in this context is when he 
writes, 
The core of collective consciousness is a normative consensus established and regenerated in 
the ritual practices of a community of believers. Members thereby orient themselves to 
religious symbols; the intersubjective unity of the collective presents itself to them in 
concepts of the holy. This collective identity defines the circle of those who understand 
themselves as members of the same social group and can speak of themselves in the first-
person plural. The symbolic actions of the rites can be comprehended as residues of a stage 





According to Mendieta, in this passage Habermas articulates a developmental conception of 
religion in which religious ritual and symbols “linguistify” the world  they provide practitioners 
with the linguistic capacities to make sense of the world through various semantic and syntactic 
relations and distinctions. Ultimately, however, the “sacred,” or the normatively charged 
collective consciousness of the religious community, is itself “linguistified.” It becomes 
something that can be thematized, discussed, and examined. Such language-use subsequently 
becomes the source of solidarity instead of the sacred. It is thus unclear what role remains for 
religion in modernity, once it has sown the seeds of its own destruction.
115
  
In his philosophical writings, while strongly rejecting the notion that religion is necessary for 
unconditional obligations,
116
 Habermas recognizes how religion has served, and may continue to 
serve, a role in the modern world by provisioning semantic resources. Summarizing this line of 
thought, in PT he writes, “Philosophy even in its postmetaphysical form, will be able neither to 
replace nor to repress religion as long as religious language is the bearer of semantic content that 
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is inspiring and even indispensable, for this content eludes (for the time being?) the explanatory 
force of philosophical language and continues to resist translation into reasoning discourses.”
117
  
These semantic resources have personal, social, and philosophical significance: They provide 
personal consolation because they “invest unavoidable suffering and unrecompensed injustice, 
the contingences of need, loneliness, sickness, and death with new significance and teach us to 
bear them.”
118
 But religion is not merely a crutch for coping with personal tragedy; it retains 
visions of utopia for society that can be drawn upon for images of emancipation.
119
 Further, 
philosophy itself has drawn many of its central normative conceptual clusters from religious 
language, including: responsibility, autonomy, and justification; history and remembering, new 
beginning, innovation, and return; emancipation and fulfillment; expropriation, internalization, 
and embodiment  individuality and fellowship. In particular, the notion of an “image of God” has 
been transformed into the idea of the “identical dignity of all men that deserve unconditional 
respect.”
120
 Indeed, religion may yet retain semantic resources for philosophy. Habermas 
consequently describes a “translation” program of “critical appropriation,” in which philosophy’s 
ambition is “to rescue the profane significance of interpersonal and existential experiences that 
have so far only been adequately articulated in religious language.”
121
 In BNR he distinguishes 
this project from the  egelian rationalist endeavor to “subsume the substance of faith into the 
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 Instead, following Karl Jaspers, he describes it as dialogic, since it 




Also in BNR Habermas describes a similar project of translation, in which he makes clear the 
continuing relevance of specifically “modernized” religion from the perspective of political 
theory. In the course of a debate with John Rawls and other thinkers about the proper place of 
religion in political deliberation, Habermas presents a moderate view, in which he makes a 
distinction between democratic processes of legislation and decision-making, on the one hand, 
and discussions in the public sphere, on the other hand. While in the former he insists that only 
“public reasons,” which could be acceptable to those who do not share one’s religious beliefs, 
are permissible, in the latter he allows “religious reasons,” which may not be acceptable to those 
who do not share one’s religious beliefs, to be offered.
124
  
Still, Habermas maintains that in order to participate successfully in political deliberations in 
the public sphere, the consciousness of religious believers must undergo modernization through 
its encounter with “the fact of religious pluralism, the emergence of modern science, and the 
spread of positive law and secular morality.”
125
 Religious believers must develop a self-reflexive 
perspective on religious beliefs, in which they respect other traditions’ beliefs but do not deny 
the “exclusive claim to truth” of their own tradition. They must negotiate the relation between 
the findings of science and religious doctrines in a manner that acknowledges the epistemic 
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status of the former and reduces the conflicts between them. And they must recognize the 
priority of “public reasons” in political deliberations by linking individualism and universalistic 
morality into their own religious traditions.
126
  
Concurrently, Habermas places an obligation on non-religious citizens to help religious 
believers translate their “religious reasons” into “public reasons” so that they can be admitted to 
the democratic processes of legislation and decision-making.
127
 This is for two reasons: First, 
from a functional perspective, “the liberal state has an interest in the free expression of religious 
voices in the public arena and in the public participation of religious organizations.”
128
 Second, 
again, “[r]eligious traditions have a special power to articulate moral intuitions…. [T]his 
potential makes religious speech into a serious vehicle for possible truth contents, which can then 
be translated from the vocabulary of a particular religious community into a generally accessible 
language.”
129
 Thus, even after the “linguistification” of the sacred, modernized religion 
contributes to personal life, philosophy, and politics through the semantic resources it offers. 
(2) Despite his appreciation of the semantic potential contained in religious language, 
Habermas is unclear about the precise nature of religious language and the type of validity claim 
its raises.  e mentions both its “moral insights” and “truth contents.” For the most part, however, 
he aims to identify religion with a unique area of culture and religious language with a distinctive 
validity claim. Some features of it may be gathered from scattered remarks: Religious language 
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“refers to a common ritual praxis and bases itself on…specifically religious experiences….”
130
 It 
is anchored in a “sacred complex,” which “combines a specific interpretation of man in the world 
with the practice of communal worship.”
131
 It is thus inextricably linked to a particular 
community and combines normative and descriptive components, both of which occur in the 
context of the sacred. Indeed, according to him, the ritual organizes the encounter with the 
sacred, which is a necessary feature of religion.
132
 He also describes both religious faith and 
language as rooted “in religious modes of dealing with Heil [salvation] and Unheil [doom].”
133
  
He thus claims that religious language ultimately must appeal to revelation or some other contact 
with the divine.
134
 But this means that it references the “dogmatic authority of an inviolable core 
of infallible revealed truth” as its basis.
135
 Similarly, he claims that religious language’s 
connection to ritual protects it from problematization.
136
 
Habermas thus aims to distinguish religious language and religious validity claims from all 
other communicative speech acts and their validity claims. Religious-claims are contrasted with 
both truth-claims and moral-claims in that they are “tied to the thick experience in membership 
in a religious community.”
137
 Even when religious language seems to command unconditional 
obedience or assert eternal truths, it merely claims that they apply to everyone and not that they 
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could be accepted by everyone.
138
 Indeed, properly modernized religions, as understood by 
Habermas, would refrain from offering empirical truth-claims and would recognize the 
independent validity of moral-claims.
139
  
Habermas even attempts to differentiate religious-claims from other context-bounded claims. 
They differ from ethical-claims in their reference to religious themes (the sacred, salvation, and 
doom) and their insulation from criticism. Ethical-claims, despite their contextual nature, are 
susceptible to unreserved discursive examination. In contrast, religious-claims refer to the 
dogmatic authority of revelation and resists problematization due to their connection with 
ritual.
140
 Religious language is most similar to aesthetic-claims, though here too Habermas tries 
to distinguish them. In describing the relation of philosophy and religion, he appeals to the 
similarity of religion and aesthetics: “At its best, philosophy circumscribes the opaque core of 
religious experience when it reflects on the specific character of religious language and on the 
intrinsic meaning of faith. This core remains as profoundly alien to discursive thought as the 
hermetic core of aesthetic experience, which likewise can be at best circumscribed, but not 
penetrated, by philosophical thought.”
141
 Moreover, following Cooke’s suggestion,  abermas 
attributes a world-disclosive character to religious language.
142
 Like aesthetic-claims, religious-
claims implicitly assert a world-disclosive validity claim. Nevertheless, Habermas distinguishes 
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religious-claims and aesthetic-claims because of the latter’s exoteric character.
143
 Thus, on 
 abermas’ account, religious-claims can be described as quasi-aesthetic-claims. 
But this account of religious language and validity claims confronts a number of problems, 
which are best articulated through an engagement with examples of religious discourse. 
However, some points should be noted at the outset. Granted for the moment that religious-
claims are inherently connected with a particular community, still Habermas fails to differentiate 
them from other context-bounded claims because he unduly emphasizes their relative 
particularism and selectively portrays their “religious” character. Their supposed reference to 
religious themes and their insulation from criticism, which allegedly differentiate them from 
ethical claims, relies on a particular characterization of religion’s concerns, language, and 
practice. Not all religious language is preoccupied by the sacred, salvation, or doom. Nor is it 
clear why the connection of religious language to ritual should protect it from problematization 
to a greater extent than ethical values are buffered from challenge by their link to ethical 
practice. Indeed,  abermas’ understanding of ritual as concerned with organizing the encounter 
with the sacred unduly narrows the scope of religious practice in order to differentiate it from 
ethical practice. Lastly, simple appeals to revelation seldom serve as a justification for religious 
beliefs or norms. As Nicholas Wolterstorff notes, “in the orientation of most Christians, not to 
mention of that of other religious people, the pair revelation-faith does not have the looming 
importance it has had in the history of Christian theology; rarely does one hear someone say, 
“God told me, so it’s true  and that’s the end of the discussion.”
144
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Indeed, as indicated, in  abermas’ description of religious-claims they seem remarkably 
similar to aesthetic-claims, save his appeal to their esoteric character. But aesthetic-claims too 
are particular to a community that shares certain standards of beauty. Thus, they are also 
“esoteric” in a certain sense. Any other construal of the esotericism of religious experience, 
which might connect it ascetic or mystical practices, would rely on a very particular sampling of 
religious traditions. Still, perhaps their connection to ritual and practice distinguishes them from 
aesthetic-claims. However, as contended above, the distinction between ethical-claims and 
aesthetic-claims seems to be more of degree than kind. While ethical-claims rely on settled 
conceptions of the good, aesthetic-claims draw on accepted standards but put them to new uses 
or subvert them. 
Additionally,  abermas’ claim that religious traditions do not articulate those beliefs and 
norms that they understand to apply universally in manner that could gain universal acceptance 
confuses the attempt to articulate norms oriented towards universal acceptance with success in 
that attempt. Many movements in religious thought, including rationalist theologies and some 
philosophies of halakha, aim to provide justifications for religious beliefs and norms that they 
believe could be universally accepted. One may argue that they failed in this endeavor; however, 
in order to understand them as having failed, one must first conceive of them as attempting to 
offer justifications oriented towards universal acceptance.  
More generally, the very attempt to identify a unique “religious-claim” overly rigidifies the 
types of claims implicitly asserted in religious language, instead of recognizing the pragmatic 
nature of the distinction between different types of claims. As contended above, claims are not 
explicitly marked as asserting a particular validity claim. Rather, the type of validity claim raised 




raised against it and the justification that is offered for it. Normative-claims can be challenged 
and justified from an ethical perspective or a moral perspective. Similarly, descriptive-claims can 
be challenged and justified as an assertion about the world itself or an experience of it. The same 
should be true about religious-claims. They can be challenged on the basis of their claim to truth, 
beauty, morality, or goodness; but it is difficult to locate a distinctively “religious” validity 
claim.  
In sum,  abermas’ attempt to distinguish a particularly “religious-claim,” which asserts 
quasi-aesthetic validity claims of world-disclosure, does not seem promising. It is not clear how 
exactly religious language differs from aesthetic expressions even on  abermas’s account nor is 
it obvious that religious language is actually that homogenous and predefined. Instead, it is 
useful to develop another approach that  abermas indicates when describing the philosopher’s 
view on religious language: “[R]eligious ‘truths’ are formulated in concepts that are prior to the 
usual differentiation in descriptive, evaluative, and normative statements.”
145
 Religious language 
would this be a form of “mixed discourse,” which implicitly asserts a number of different types 
of validity claims. Thus, the justification of religious beliefs and norms involves the isolation and 
justification of diverse validity claims. These validity claims are constituted through justification 
and require different types of reasons depending on how they are challenged and defended. As 
such, however, religious language does not differ from other linguistic practices of the lifeworld, 
for on  abermas’ account it is only in regimented forms of discourse that each type of validity 
claim is isolated, thematized, and evaluated. This approach is further motivated through the 
application of it to halakhic discourse, which will demonstrate the irreducibility of at least one 
form of religious language to quasi-aesthetic-claims of world-disclosure. 
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B. Beyond World-Disclosure: Halakhic Discourse as a Mixed Discourse 
 abermas’ simple classification of religious-claims as akin to aesthetic-claims is belied by 
halakhic discourse, which involves the implicit assertion of a wide variety of claims. In addition, 
the identity of these claims is not predetermined but depends on their process of justification.  
 There are certainly expressions in halakhic discourse that may easily be understood as 
world-disclosive: the world is described as ma’aseh bereishit, the work of creation, for 
example.
146
 But it need not be understood in this manner. Such a claim can be understood either 
as a truth-claim, which asserts the world’s creation in time, or an aesthetic-claim, which portrays 
the world as inherently dependent. There is no a priori way to determine how it should be taken; 
rather, it is constituted as a particular type of claim when it is challenged and defended. One who 
attempts to justify it could aim to establish the event of creation or to depict the dependence of 
the world. He fixes it as a truth-claim in the former case and an aesthetic-claim in the latter case. 
The important point is that, if they are challenged, these justifications themselves would require 
different types of arguments to support them. In the former case they must aim for universal 
acceptability, while in the latter case they may suffice with acceptance by the Jewish community. 
Moreover, the most obvious aspect of halakhic discourse that does not fit in  abermas’ 
scheme is that it is emphatically normative. It neither simply refers to ritual nor merely implies 
new ways of acting through world-disclosure; rather, it mandates what ought to be done. For 
example, the Bible not only depicts the world as created but commands, “Remember the Sabbath 
day and keep it holy.... For in six days the Lord made heaven and earth…and  e rested on the 
seventh day”  Ex.   : 7 .  Now assume that the claim “in six days the Lord made heaven and 
earth” is constituted as an aesthetic-claim. But based on it an overtly normative-claim is raised: 
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“Remember the Sabbath day and keep it holy!”  alakhic discourse thus contains both world-
disclosive and normative-claims. In this case the normative-claim seems to be understood by the 
Jewish tradition as an ethical-claim. It expresses a norm that is only incumbent on Jews.
147
 Thus, 
the consequences for  abermas’ approach to religious-claims are not wide-reaching. Both 
aesthetic-claims and ethical-claims only require context-bounded justification. Indeed, recall that 
Habermas himself contemplates the comparison between ethical-claims and religious-claims. 
Still, it further calls into question his separations of aesthetic-claims and ethical-claims as well 
the differentiation of religious-claims from all other claims. Note how these claims interact: The 
aesthetic-claim serves as the justification for the ethical-claim: World-disclosure and ethical 
value are codetermining.  
More significantly, halakhic discourse also raises claims that are difficult, though not 
impossible, to understand as anything other than truth-claims and moral-claims. It does this both 
directly and in support of its ethical-claims. For example, and now turning to classic rabbinic 
literature, it does not merely prescribe norms related to menstruation or diet but in the process 
asserts claims about female physiology and the physical properties of cookery.
148
 While the 
norms may be ethical-claims since they are only applied to Jews, their justifications in rabbinic 
literature invoke what seem to be truth-claims about the world. Thus, on  abermas’ account, 
they must be defended in turn by offering reasons that aim for universal acceptance. Claims 
about female physiology and the physical properties of cookery cannot be defended merely by 
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appeal to canonical texts but must be either justified as claims about a shared empirical world or 
relinquished.  
Similarly, halakhic discourse seems to assert moral-claims, especially in the context of the 
Noahide laws.
149
 For example, and now turning to modern “rabbinic literature,” recall that in 
response to the Supreme Court’s ruling on the Defense of Marriage Act, the OU issued a 
statement in which it claimed that its “Divine system of law represents a system of universal 
morality, and therefore can stake a claim in the national discourse.”
150
 The OU explicitly 
describes its claim as moral and asserts that it is thus universal. This is not simply an assertion 
about the claim’s applicability, as  abermas assumes, but also about its role in extra-communal 
discourse. But if this claim ‘is staked’ in that manner, the OU must attempt to justify it in a way 
that could be accepted by an imagined universal audience.  
Halakhic discourse, like law more generally according to Habermas,
151
 is thus better 
described as a “mixed discourse.” It is emphatically normative, and it is often understood by its 
participants to raise both particularistic ethical-claims and universalistic moral-claims. These 
normative-claims are often supported by descriptive-claims, which are frequently construed by 
its participants as both particularistic aesthetic-claims and universalistic truth-claims.  abermas’ 
context-transcending contextualist account of justification still provides a productive means to 
conceptualize the justification of halakhic norms by articulating its constraints and consequences. 
However, it must recognize that halakhic discourse, despite its complexities, is neither a unique 
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area of culture nor an expert discourse focused on a single type of claim, like scientific inquiry 
and truth. Halakhic discourse may involve detailed knowledge of religious texts, but, perhaps 
like all religious language, it principally takes place within the “lifeworld” of a religious 
community. It consists of an interlocking network of various types of claims, which are not 
individually thematized or defined so long they are not challenged. But when a halakhic norm is 
challenged, the claims that support it must be identified and justified in their appropriate manner. 
The aesthetic-claims and ethical-claims may be supported by reasons that draw on the Jewish 
community’s particular experiences and values. In contrast, the justifications of moral-claims 
and truth-claims must consist of reasons that aim for universal acceptability.  
On this account, the justification of halakhic norms creates a complex form of 
intersubjectivity, for embedded within halakhic discourse are both centripetal forces focusing the 
Jewish community inward and centrifugal forces that refer it beyond itself. By eschewing the 
foundationalism of the philosophers of halakha in favor of contextualism, it thus allows for the 
reconciliation of universality and particularity toward which they aimed. Some halakhic norms 
assert their universal applicability in terms of reasons that everyone could accept, while others 
insist on their legitimate particularity in view distinctively Jewish values, perhaps service of God 
or sedeq. Yet, they all maintain their basic justifiability. 
V. Example: Circumcision 
Significantly, this account of justification does not directly provide justifications for halakhic 
norms. Rather, following Habermas’ approach, it is critical: It articulates the rational constraints 
on, and practical consequences of, the justification of halakhic norms. But it leaves the substance 
of their justification to actual practitioners of ta’amei ha-mitzvot. An example that is relevant 




circumcision is a Biblically mandated obligation
152
 and is considered by many a hallmark of 
Jewish identity. However, it has recently been the subject of a number of controversies, 
including efforts to ban it. For example, in 2012 the Kölner Landgericht in Germany ruled that 
infant male circumcision constituted “grievous bodily harm” and that the child’s “fundamental 
right to bodily integrity” outweighed a parent’s right to religious freedom.
153
 The German 
Parliament on December 12
th
, 2012 passed a bill to maintain the legality of such circumcision;
154
 
however, an intense public debate over the practice and religious freedom was launched.  
Now the primary challenge to such circumcision seems to concern the irreversible and 
apparently medically unnecessary alteration of an individual’s body without the possibility of his 
consent. It thus combines truth-claims and moral-claims: that such circumcision is medically 
unnecessary and that it always morally wrong to impose an irreversible and medically 
unnecessary alteration on an individual without his consent. Thus, in the simplest case, if one 
could show that the practice is medically necessary or perhaps merely medically beneficial, then 
the challenge could be met and the norm would be justified. Neonatal surgery to repair birth 
defects is considered uncontroversial, despite the incapacity of an infant to consent to the 
procedure. Whether male circumcision actually does have medical benefits is subject to dispute 
and cannot be decided by the proposed account of justification. However, it does indicate that 
since the challenge relates to a truth-claim, the medical necessity or advisability of circumcision, 
for it to be met the justification must aim for universal acceptability. The evidence marshaled to 
support the claim that circumcision is medically necessary or beneficial must be such that it 
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could be accepted by everyone. One could not appeal to religious texts, the Talmud or Mishneh 
Torah for example, in support of this claim.  
Moving to a more complex case, it is possible that the defender of circumcision might 
concede that it is not medically necessary or even beneficial. Still, he might challenge the claim 
that it always morally wrong to impose an irreversible and medically unnecessary alteration of an 
individual’s body without his consent.  e might contend that so long as the alteration does not 
cause bodily impairment and is central to a community’s sense of identity or view of the good 
life, then it is morally justifiable. It is crucial to recognize the complexity of this response: 
Overall it is a moral-claim but it contains a truth-claim and an ethical-claim as premises. Each of 
these latter claims must be justified independently and in their appropriate manner, and then the 
initial moral-claim must be justified in the manner appropriate to it. One must show that male 
circumcision does not cause bodily impairment. This is a truth-claim, and its justification must 
aim for universal acceptability. One must also show that it is a practice that is central to the 
Jewish community’s sense of identity or view of the good. This is an ethical-claim, and its 
justification need not aim for universality. It must simply aim for acceptance by the Jewish 
community. In this context it is appropriate and acceptable to appeal to texts that the community 
accepts as canonical. Lastly, one must justify the overarching moral-claim. It is not enough to 
appeal to the importance of circumcision for the Jewish people. A justification of the right of a 
religious community to engage in such a practice under these circumstances must be offered that 
aims for universal acceptability. If this justification fails, then the norm is immoral and must be 
modified or relinquished. Thus, while this approach does not directly provide a justification of 




An important component of this account’s critical nature is that it countenances the failure of 
the justification of halakhic norms; it is not only intellectually responsive to demands for 
justification but practically responsive to failures of justification. In such cases, barring certain 
premises about authority which are discussed in the next chapter, the norm must be modified or 
relinquished. This account thereby breaks with traditional approaches to philosophy of halakha, 
which even while engaging in sophisticated philosophical analysis often succumb to apologetics. 
In contrast, this approach instantiates a critical philosophy of halakha and, more broadly, a 
critical Jewish thought.  
 abermas’ own meta-theoretical comments about types of reflection on religion are fitting in 
this context. In distinguishing his own thought about religion from Christian theology, he writes, 
“No theology can embrace the unconditional openness to self-revision as long as it has to 
administer the means of salvation and must be nourished by the lived faith of a practicing 
community…..
155
 Habermas claims that because of its emergence from a religious lifeworld and 
institutional role for religious believers, theology cannot subject all of its claims to critical 
evaluation. In fact, however, it seems to be only the institutional role of Christian theology that 
accounts for its restraint. Philosophy itself, as Habermas acknowledges, emerges from a 
particular lifeworld, and yet it does not refrain from critical evaluation of it. Though similarly 
rooted in the lifeworld of a particular community, Jewish thought has never held the same 
institutional role in the Jewish community as Christian theology holds in the Christian 
community. It should thus allow for a more critical orientation towards the claims of the Jewish 
lifeworld. In fact, many years ago, writing about the contribution of Jewish thinkers to German 
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Legal Authority and Halakhic-Legal Authority 
Legal Authority has two features that stand in a tense relation to one another: On the one 
hand, authority commands and expects obedience of its subjects. As Thomas Hobbes notes, 
“Command is when a man saith do this or do not do this yet without expecting any other reason 
than the will of him that said it.”
1
 The imperatives themselves as opposed to their content, the 
actions commanded, are meant to be taken by an authority’s subjects as reasons for action. But if 
an authority commands arbitrary actions, for which its subjects have no independent reasons to 
comply, then it is illegitimate. On the other hand, as Joseph Raz notes, authority always at least 
claims to be legitimate; this is how its commands differ from the threats of a gunman.
2
 Similarly, 
Max Weber describes how from the perspective of the subject “the command [of an authority] is 
accepted as a ‘valid’ norm.”
3
 There must be reasons to obey the imperatives of an authority that 
make them valid. But if those reasons attach to the content of its imperatives, then the authority 
is unnecessary, for the subjects already possess independent reasons to perform those actions. 
Authority thus seems either authoritarian, demanding irrational obedience, or superfluous, 
requiring nothing new of its subjects. This tension is instantiated in the apparently competitive 
relation between ta’amei ha-mitzvot and halakhic-legal authority. On the one hand, if halakhic 
norms are fully justified, halakhic-legal authority is superfluous. On the other hand, if halakhic-
legal authority commands norms that cannot be justified, it is authoritarian.  
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A position that mediates between superfluity and authoritarianism is necessary for legal 
authority in general and halakhic-legal authority in particular. Such a position shows how the 
legitimacy of an authority is grounded,
4
 which then endows its commands with a uniquely legal 
normativity that is not reducible to the normative justification of the individual actions it 
commands. In addition to capturing the role of authority in a normative system like halakha, this 
conception of legal authority has a crucial implication for the justification of norms: It allows for 
the possibility that a norm that could not be independently and directly justified might be 
indirectly justified on the basis of its command by a legitimate authority. The legal justification 
of the norm, it originating in the pronouncement of a legal authority, is thus linked to its 
normative justification without being reduced to it.  
The analysis of ta’amei ha-mitzvot and normative justification in the previous chapter 
prescinded from the role of authority in the justification of halakhic norms. It focused on the 
justification of a halakhic norm regardless of its command by a halakhic-legal authority. If a 
halakhic norm could not be independently justified based on its content, it had to be modified or 
relinquished. In this chapter, the legitimacy of halakhic-legal authority and its implications for 
the justification of halakhic norms is explored. It examines how a halakhic-legal authority may 
be grounded and thus under what conditions a halakhic norm might be justified simply because 
of its pronouncement by such an authority. Crucially, this account of the legitimacy of authority, 
like that of normative justification offered in the preceding chapter, is critical: Halakhic-legal 
authority is not grounded; rather, the rational constraints on its grounding and the practical 
consequences for the justification of halakhic norms are articulated.  
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Further, the subject of this chapter is not the substantiation of halakhic-legal authority within 
the context of the putative halakhic-legal system; it is not concerned with the conferral of certain 
powers on individuals or institutions by higher-order halakhic norms. Such conferral falls short 
of answering whether the authority ought to be obeyed by individuals, for it must be established 
that these individuals are obligated to the halakhic system. Moreover understanding such 
relativized authority is parasitic on comprehending non-relativized authority.
5
 A “bottom-up” 
perspective is thus adopted, which inquires about what role the fact that a norm has been 
commanded by a halakhic-legal authority can play in the practical deliberations of individuals.  
Specifically, the grounding of halakhic-legal authority by appeal to the Biblical verses 
traditionally associated with rabbinic authority is ignored: 
If a case is too baffling for you to decide, be it a controversy over homicide, civil law, or 
assault—matters of dispute in your courts—you shall promptly repair to the place that the 
Lord your God will have chosen, and appear before the levitical priests, or the magistrate in 
charge at the time, and present your problem. When they have announced to you the verdict 
in the case, you shall carry out the verdict that is announced to you from that place that the 
Lord chose, observing scrupulously all their instructions to you. You shall act in accordance 
with the instructions given you and the ruling handed down to you; you must not deviate 
from the verdict that they announce to you either to the right or to the left. (Deut. 17: 8-11) 
 
Though these verses are discussed below in the context of models of authority within halakhic 
literature, they cannot ground halakhic-legal authority: The identity of “the magistrate” with the 
traditional claimants of halakhic-legal authority—rabbis—is not obvious and cannot be 
established by authoritative rabbinic interpretation on pain of circularity. Additionally, the 
continuity of the authority conferred by the verses after the destruction of the Temple, the 
traditional referent of “that place that the Lord chose,” is debatable.
6
 Most importantly however, 
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given the concern of this study with ta’amei ha-mitzvot, appeal to these verses only shifts the 
question from the grounding of halakhic-legal authority back to the justification of the 
commandment to obey halakhic-legal authorities. Investigation of the grounding of halakhic-
legal authority would therefore still be necessary.  
Lastly, this chapter does not aim to provide an account that would ground the coercive power 
of halakhic-legal authority. Such an account could be attempted by drawing on work in political 
philosophy focused on the coercive powers of the modern state. However, it would quite likely 
be an up-hill struggle against both a major impulse of modern philosophy and a central 
component of modern identity: freedom of conscience in matters of religion. In any case, this 
study accepts as given, and perhaps desirable, the condition of modern Judaism, in which 
obedience to halakhic norms is de facto voluntary. Consequently, for its model of authority it 
draws on an approach that conceptualizes legal authority in the framework of practical 
philosophy as opposed to political philosophy.
7
 
In the following, Leibowitz’s, Soloveitchik’s, and Berkovits’ respective accounts of the 
grounding of halakhic-legal authority are first reviewed to demonstrate the competitive relation 
between normative justification and legal authority and to point towards its resolution (I). Raz’s 
service conception of authority is then presented as a mediating position; and its implications for 
halakhic-legal authority and the justification of halakhic norms are detailed (II). It is next argued 
that the resultant account of halakhic-legal authority reconciles two models of authority that have 
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been identified in halakhic literature (III). Lastly, it is suggested that it is consistent with modern 
religiosity (IV). 
I. Between Authoritarianism and Superfluity 
In addition to the commonalities in their accounts of the justification of halakhic norms, the 
three philosophers of halakha share similarities in their approaches to halakhic-legal authority. In 
grounding halakhic-legal authority, they each pursue a dual track: They emphasize its consensual 
features and connect it to their respective justifications of halakhic-norms. Nevertheless, neither 
of them adequately grounds halakhic-legal authority. While the grounding of halakhic-legal 
authority in consent is prevalent in halakhic literature, exclusive reliance on such approaches 
ignores the issue of under what conditions it is justified for an individual to consent to authority.
8
 
Indeed, even in halakhic literature such approaches are often paired with qualifications about 
who may be the object of consent.
9
 Thus, beyond noting their nods to consent, such arguments 
are not analyzed. Instead, the focus is on the respective connections Leibowitz, Soloveitchik, and 
Berkovits establish between the justification of halakhic norms and the grounding of halakhic-
legal authority. The relation they posit between the reasons that justify halakhic norms and the 
type of halakhic-legal practice that grounds such authority is examined. In the process, the 
relation between normative justification and legal justification is explored (A-C).  
A. Leibowitz: Authoritarian Authority 
Leibowitz’s account of halakhic-legal authority initially seems promising. At least on one 
interpretation, he grounds it in the consent of the Jewish people. But he also attempts to ground it 
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by linking the normative and legal justifications of halakhic norms. He conditions the validity of 
halakhic-legal decisions on their compliance with the value that, according to him, justifies 
halakhic norms—service of God. However, when this view is examined, it is apparent that it 
renders halakhic-legal authority authoritarian.  
The necessity of halakhic-legal authorities for Leibowitz seems evident from his discussion 
of halakhic issues. He refrains from offering a formal halakhic-legal opinion because he is not a 
halakhic-legal authority. Yet, he also claims that the power of changing halakhic norms 
originally rests with the Jewish people, which can then delegate it to rabbis. On this account, 
halakhic-legal authority derives its legitimacy from the consent of the Jewish people. But, as 
indicated, this account alone does not explain under what conditions and to whom the Jewish 
people should delegate its authority.  
Indeed, Leibowitz insists that any halakhic-legal authority, whether the Jewish people or 
rabbis, is only legitimate when its decisions conform to the value of service of God. He thus aims 
to ground halakhic-legal authority by connecting it to his justification of halakhic norms. Since 
the reason for halakhic-norms is service of God, halakhic-legal authorities must advance that 
purpose to be legitimate. However, as was shown, service of God cannot serve as the criterion of 
halakhic-legal validity because it is contentless and excludes any other considerations. In fact, 
Leibowitz identifies other immanent principles of halakhic development, which expose halakhic-
legal decision-making to a range of factors. In his own forays into halakhic-legal practice he 
rules on the basis of other concerns, including his independent philosophical positions.  
Nevertheless, Leibowitz insists that individuals must comply with halakhic norms solely 
because they are service of God. The normative justification of halakhic norms is thus decoupled 




must comply as service of God but that were in fact determined by other factors. While this 
captures the way legal authorities command, it fails to establish their legitimacy. Granted his 
justification of halakhic norms, it is not clear why, even if one decides to serve God, one should 
follow the commands of a halakhic-legal authority.  
B. Berkovits: Superfluous Authority 
Berkovits too claims that the legitimacy of halakhic-legal authorities derives from both the 
consent of the Jewish people and its link to the normative justification of halakhic norms. But his 
account suffers from a contrasting problem: Due to the close connection between the normative 
and legal justifications of the commandments, halakhic-legal authority is rendered superfluous. 
Berkovits claims that rabbinic authority is based on democratic legitimacy: Vesting the 
power of halakhic-legal decision-making in decisors and communal rabbis is no less democratic 
than the restriction of legislative powers to elected officials and judicial powers to appointed 
judges. He also offers guidelines for who should be appointed to this position. While proficiency 
in halakhic-legal texts is necessary, it is not sufficient. The character of decisors and rabbis must 
be shaped by the ideals of the Torah. But since, according to Berkovits, the Torah has a moral 
telos, decisors and rabbis must be moral exemplars. Such character will enable them to interpret 
and apply halakhic norms to achieve their end. Berkovits thus provides a clear grounding of 
halakhic-legal authority by linking it to the justification of halakhic norms. Legitimate halakhic-
legal authorities must be guided by the justification of halakhic norms in their halakhic-legal 
practice.  
However, such a close connection between normative justification and legal justification 
actually renders authority otiose. Recall that Berkovits’ theory of halakha is susceptible to two 




afflicts his account on either interpretation, albeit to different degrees. According to the former 
interpretation, the antecedently existing moral purpose of the Torah both justifies halakhic norms 
and guides halakhic-legal practice. But if halakhic-legal practice achieves its goal, halakhic-legal 
authorities merely restate the moral-cum-religious obligations already incumbent on its subjects. 
Matters are worse for the former interpretation. According to it, the purpose of the halakha does 
not antecedently exist but is constituted through halakhic-legal practice; halakhic-legal decision-
making involves constructive interpretation, which both describes and justifies existing Jewish 
law. Indeed, halakhic-legal practice is a form of moral reflection. But then a halakhic-legal 
authority merely repeats its subject’s moral obligations. In either case, the directives of a 
halakhic-legal authority do not make any difference to its subjects’ practical reasoning  they just 
recapitulate the subjects’ preexisting duties.  
C. Soloveitchik: Towards a Mediating Position 
Soloveitchik provides a better approach to the legitimacy of halakhic-legal authority. He too 
points at a consensual grounding of halakhic-legal authority. But he also provides a grounding 
that links normative and legal justification without reducing them to each other. 
Soloveitchik, like Leibowitz, identifies two subjects of halakhic-legal authority: rabbis and 
the Jewish people. He identifies three grounds for the legitimacy of rabbinic authority: 
knowledge, intuition, and representation. Ultimately, however, intuition, the capacity to perceive 
the objective values from which halakhic norms derive and to determine how the latter ought to 
be interpreted and applied, is the basic ground. As was argued, Soloveitchik’s theory of halakha 
can best be described as non-formalist, which shifts the focus from knowledge of abstract 




authority. And the authority of the Jewish people also stems from intuition of values, though in 
the form of collective consciousness instead of individual perception.  
Soloveitchik grounds halakhic-legal authority instrumentally. For him, halakhic norms are 
justified through their source in objective values. Since halakhic-legal decisions are supposed to 
track these objective values, normative and legal justification are linked. Still, they are not 
reduced to one another since ordinary individuals cannot access these values. A halakhic-legal 
authority is necessary to allow its subjects to comply with their preexisting obligations. The 
halakhic-legal authority is like an expert who advises others how to accomplish what they want 
to achieve. Authority thus mediates between normative and legal justification.  
However, this approach suffers from problems at the level of details: First, it depends on an 
untenable account of the justification of the commandments. Second, although in principle it 
explains the benefits halakhic-legal authorities provide to their subjects, it renders the former 
entirely unaccountable to the latter in practice. Because the values at the origin of halakhic norms 
are inaccessible to ordinary individuals, they have no way to ascertain whether any particular 
authority or halakhic-legal authorities in general decide halakhic-legal decisions accurately. 
There is no way of determining whether any such authority actually satisfies the conditions of its 
legitimacy. Third, this account entirely assimilates halakhic-legal authority, which presumably 
should be a form of practical authority, to intellectual expertise. A halakhic-legal authority intuits 
objects that it subjects cannot perceive and shares this information with them. As is described 
below, such a thoroughgoing assimilation of practical authority and intellectual expertise ignores 
important differences between them. Still, the structure of this approach provides useful direction 




II. A Service Conception of Halakhic-Legal Authority 
Raz’s service conception of authority formalizes and improves features of Soloveitchik’s 
approach. Before sketching it and applying it to halakhic-legal authority, it is useful to determine 
more precisely the tensions inherent in authority, which are instantiated in Leibowitz’s and 
Berkovits’ approaches. Thus, in the following the so-called paradoxes of authority are described 
(A), before showing how Raz aims to resolve the paradoxes with his service conception of 
authority (B). A service conception of halakhic-legal authority is then sketched and its 
consequences for ta’amei ha-mitzvot are described (C).  
A. The Paradoxes of Authority 
Scott Shapiro identifies two related but distinct paradoxes that attach to the concept of 
authority. The first concerns the compatibility of authority with autonomy, while the second 
relates to the compatibility of authority with rationality. Both, however, are guided by the same 
insight: “When authorities are wrong, they cannot have the power to obligate others—when they 
are right, their power to obligate is meaningless. It would seem that the institution of authority is 
either pernicious or otiose.”
10
 When an authority commands an action that cannot be 
independently justified, it is not clear why anyone should be obligated to follow it. When an 
authority commands an action that can be independently justified, it is not apparent what 
contribution that authority’s command makes to its purported subjects’ reasoning  it merely tells 
them to do what they ought to do in any case. 
To better understand the paradoxes, it is necessary to comprehend the nature of the 
commands of authorities, or authoritative directives, as reasons for action. As indicated 
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previously, Hart describes them as peremptory and content-independent reasons for action.
11
 
Shapiro explains these features’ significance:  
A peremptory reason is a reason that cuts off or excludes deliberation…. [O]nce the 
command has been issued, the subject is expected to stop assessing the merits of the action in 
question…. Directives are [also] intended to be content-independent reasons for action, 
meaning that they are supposed to be reasons simply because they have been issued and not 




The commands of an authority are meant to cut off deliberation about the particular action and be 
obeyed because the action has been commanded by the authority. Now obviously individuals 
often continue to deliberate about the merits of an action commanded by an authority or perform 
the action commanded by the authority because of the specific action commanded and not 
because it was commanded. However, when that occurs the individual does not respond to the 
command in that manner in which it was intended. The more significant question is whether 
responding to the commands of an authority in this manner is consistent with canons of reason 
like autonomy (1) and rationality (2).  
(1) The challenge to authority from autonomy has been stated most forcefully by Robert Paul 
Wolff.
13
  is objection, Shapiro argues, concerns the “space of reasons.”
14
 To act autonomously 
means to always act on the basis of reasons. But the content-independent reasons that 
characterize authoritative directives are a strange type of reason for action. One performs an 
action not because of the nature of the action but simply because the authority said to do it. The 
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challenge from autonomy rejects such reasons as reasons at all because the reason is entirely 
unconnected with the action it ostensibly justifies. The authority could command anything, even 
the contrary action, and it would still justify it.  
The challenge from autonomy concerns the competitive relation between normative 
justification and authority that was evident in the thought of Leibowitz and Berkovits because by 
rejecting content-independent reasons it identifies all reasons for action with normative 
justifications. All justifications must appeal to the specific content of an action as opposed to its 
source. The origin of the norm in the directive of an authority can never serve as its justification. 
Thus, in order to respond to it, one must show that an individual might be justified in acting on 
the basis of a content-independent reason.  
(2) The challenge from rationality is even more relevant to the competitive relation between 
normative justification and authority. To act rationally, according to this challenge, is to always 
act on the balance of reasons. But this seems to make actually acting on the basis of an 
authoritative directive either irrational or impossible: 
[C]onsider any directive issued by an authority and any action A required by that directive. 
Either the balance of reasons supports A or it does not. If the balance of reasons supports A, 
an agent should perform A, but not because A is required by the directive, rather because 
agents should always act according to the balance of reasons. It would seem, therefore, that 
authoritative directives can never be reasons for action—if a directive gives the right result, 





When an authoritative directive diverges from the action mandated by the balance of reasons, it 
is irrational to obey it. But when it corresponds to the action mandated by the balance of reasons, 
one’s actions might conform to the directive but one does not thereby comply with the directive. 
One performs the action because it is independently justifiable and not because it is commanded.  
                                                 
15




By maintaining that one must always act on the balance of reasons, the challenge from 
rationality too asserts the priority of normative justification over authority. No authority of any 
form, qua authority, can be legitimate. Here too the directive of an authority can never serve as a 
justification for action. Consequently, in order to respond to the challenge from rationality, one 
must show that it might be rational to obey an authoritative directive even when it diverges from 
the balance of reasons.  
B. Raz’s Resolution 
Raz’s approach to authority has been described by one of its critics as “the most perspicuous 
analysis of the concept to date.”
16
 He proposes a service conception of authority that shows how 
one might have reason to act on the basis of a content-independent reason and even to act against 
the balance of reasons. He thus answers the challenges from autonomy and rationality. 
Significantly, this conception is a “normative-explanatory account of the core notion of 
authority.”
17
 It is meant neither to capture all usages of the term “authority” nor to define the 
concept. Rather, it is intended to elucidate features of a common conception of authority and to 
show how authority could be legitimate.  
Indeed, Raz shows how authority could be grounded, what considerations should guide its 
directives, and how these directives affect the practical deliberations of its subjects. It has two 
basic insights: First, authority is a type of normative power, specifically the “ability to change 
reasons for action.”
18
 Second, an authority’s “role and primary normal function is to serve the 
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governed…. It is to help them act on reasons which bind them.”
19
 Raz thus proposes an 
instrumental conception of authority. These insights are developed by three related theses: the 
Dependence Thesis (1), the Normal Justification Thesis (2), and the Preemption Thesis (3). 
    The Dependence Thesis is “a moral thesis about how authorities should use their 
powers.”
20
 It concerns the types of considerations that should underlie their commands. It states: 
All authoritative directives should be based on reasons which already independently apply to 





The commands of authority should reflect its subjects’ preexisting reasons for action, that is, 
those reasons for action they possess independently of the authority’s commands. In the simplest 
sense, the command should advance their compliance with them. This is not to say that an 
authority’s commands should always advance the interests of its subjects, for individuals often 
have reasons to act against their interests, especially if their interests are defined in exclusively 
hedonistic terms.
22
 For example, the orders of a military commander to his subordinates must 
reflect their preexisting reasons for action insofar as they are bound to the defense of their 
country; it may also require them to sacrifice their lives.  
In any case, legal justification is thereby connected with normative justification because the 
former reflects the latter. This is even the case when the authority does not directly base its 
directives on its subjects’ preexisting reasons for action. The authority may base its directives on 
specifically legal texts, principles, or precedents so long as its directives do in fact reflect its 
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subjects’ preexisting reasons. Indeed, as Raz argues, “Sometimes the best way to reach decisions 
which reflect the reasons which apply to the subjects is to adopt an indirect strategy and follow 
rules and considerations which do not themselves apply to the authority's subjects.”
23
  
(2) The Normal Justification Thesis states the standard manner in which an authority may be 
grounded, though it does not exclude non-standard groundings. Non-standard justifications are 
when the normal justification is only partially successful and other considerations, including 
solidarity or identity, which could not independently ground authority, fill the gap.
24
 The Normal 
Justification Thesis is closely related to the Dependence Thesis. It states: 
The normal way to establish that a person has authority over another person involves 
showing that the alleged subject is likely to better comply with reasons which apply to him 
(other than the alleged authoritative directives) if he accepts the directives of the alleged 
authority as authoritatively binding and tries to follow them, rather than by trying to follow 




An authority is grounded when its subjects will more reliably comply with their preexisting 
reasons for action by obeying the authority’s directives, which are based on the former, than by 
following their own deliberations about their preexisting reasons for action. As Shapiro notes, 
Raz therefore proposes an instrumental justification of authority because it is grounded by 
showing how it is an adequate means for its subjects to achieve their preexisting ends.
26
 The 
Normal Justification Thesis thus reconciles autonomy and authority by showing how one might 
be justified in acting on the basis of a content-independent reason as a means to act in 
conformance with standard reasons.  
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Indeed, the Normal Justification Thesis, like the Dependence Thesis, draws normative 
justification and legal authority closely together. Authority is instrumentally grounded by 
showing how it allows its subjects to conform to their preexisting reasons for action. It does this 
because its directives reflect those reasons. Its directives are thus susceptible to a somewhat 
complicated normative justification, which moves from the directives through the authority to 
preexisting reasons for action. Legal justification and normative justification are consequently 
also drawn together without being assimilated to one another.  
(3) However, Raz claims that the Normal Justification Thesis and the Dependence Thesis 
entail a further thesis, the Preemptive Thesis, which establishes the uniquely legal normativity of 
authority, prying apart, at least in individual instances, normative justification and legal 
justification. This thesis concerns the specific type of reasons for action constituted by 
authoritative directives and hence their effect on their subjects’ practical reasoning. It states that: 
The fact that an authority requires performance of an action is a reason for its performance 
which is not to be added to all other relevant reasons when assessing what to do, but should 




While accepting  art’s description of authoritative directives as content-independent reasons for 
action, Raz further characterizes them as preemptive as opposed to peremptory. Directives of 
legitimate authorities are neither simple, first-order reasons to perform the action commanded by 
the authority nor do they merely cut off or exclude further deliberation by the subjects. Rather, 
they are preemptive reasons for action, which combine a first-order reason for action with an 
exclusionary reason for action. An exclusionary reason for action is a second-order reason to 
disregard first-order reasons for action.
28
 An authoritative directive serves as both a reason to 
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perform a specific action and a reason to disregard other reasons to perform or not to perform it. 
It consequently obligates the legal subject to perform the action: After receiving an authoritative 
directive he possesses a reason to perform the action and no reason not to perform the action. 
Corresponding to the Dependence and Normal Justification Theses, because the commands 
of a legitimate authority are assumed to reflect the subjects’ preexisting reasons for action, it is 
not simply added to them. Rather, it replaces them (the first-order reason for action) and 
excludes consideration of them (the second-order exclusionary reason). This complex effect for 
practical reasoning is necessary to take advantage of the benefit provided by authority, for it 
would be negated if the subjects still considered their preexisting reasons for action after 
receiving an authoritative directive. Further, if the authoritative directive was simply added to the 
preexisting reasons for action, the latter would be double-counted since the authoritative 
directive is based upon them.   
The Preemptive Thesis demonstrates the uniquely legal normativity that the commands of a 
legitimate authority possess. From a formal perspective, they are not simply reasons for action 
but preemptive reasons for action. From a practical perspective, legal authority is rendered 
ampliative and thus normative justification and legal justification are distinguished. Once an 
authority is grounded, its directives function as both a reason for action and an exclusionary 
reason. Thus, even if in a particular instance the balance of reasons is against the performance of 
an action commanded by a grounded authority and the action cannot be independently justified, 
still it is justifiable for an individual to perform it. This is because 
[i]f every time a directive is mistaken, i.e. every time it fails to reflect reason correctly, it 
were open to challenge as mistaken, the advantage gained by accepting the authority as a 
more reliable and successful guide to right reason would disappear. In trying to establish 
whether or not the directive correctly reflects right reason the subjects will be relying on their 
own judgments rather than on the authority, which, we are assuming, is more reliable.
29
  
                                                 
29




The authority’s directive is not justified on the basis of its specific content but because it has 
been commanded by a grounded authority. Thus, even if the authority is mistaken and its 
command is not independently justifiable in an individual instance, the subject is still justified in 
obeying it. The Preemptive Thesis thereby reconciles rationality and authority by showing under 
what circumstances it is rational to obey an authority and to act against the balance of reasons.  
Nevertheless, the legitimacy of an authority and hence the justifiability of obeying its 
commands in the face of the balance of reasons are defeasible. If it becomes apparent that one is 
not more likely to comply with one’s preexisting reasons for action by obeying its directives, 
then the authority is no longer grounded and its commands cannot derive support from it. The 
actions it commands must then be independently justifiable for it to be rational to perform them.  
Additionally, because an authority is grounded by showing how it allows its subjects to 
comply with their preexisting reasons for action, it usually has specific and circumscribed 
competencies. The authority may enable its subjects to comply with some preexisting reasons but 
not others. For example, it may enable them to maintain their physical safety or to comply with 
technical regulations better but be less helpful when it comes to scientific knowledge or military 
strategy. Thus, if an authority makes a jurisdictional mistake by issuing a directive concerning an 
area for which its competence has not been grounded, then the directive possesses no legal 
normativity. It must then be independently justifiable for it to be rational to act according to it.  
In certain ways, Raz assimilates legal authority to intellectual expertise. Just as the expert 
allows those that inquire of him to know facts that there are preexisting reasons to believe, the 
authority allows those subject to him to perform actions for which they already possess reasons 
to act. For example, the lecture of the history professor allows her students to gain information 




just as the assertions of a grounded expert preempt its subjects’ deliberations about the facts, the 
directives of a grounded authority preempt its subjects’ deliberations about what to do. Once one 
has reason to trust the expertise of the history professor, one ought to heed her judgment about 
historical facts even when it conflicts with one’s own opinion.  owever, there are two significant 
differences between expertise and authority:  
First, the authority offers reasons for action, while the expert offers reasons to believe. It is 
mistaken to understand the directives of a legitimate legal authority as merely informing an 
individual about her preexisting reasons for action like the expert simply informs an individual 
about preexisting reasons to believe. Rather, he is obligating her by providing her with a reason 
for action and excluding countervailing reasons.  
Second, on the basis of preexisting reasons for action, a legal authority may create reasons 
for new actions that none of its subjects previously possessed reasons to perform. This is often 
the case when the authority is called upon to solve social coordination problems. In such cases, 
though the subjects might have general preexisting reasons related to the activity that needs to be 
coordinated, none have a preexisting reason to perform the specific action commanded by the 
authority in order to coordinate the activity. There may be many ways to coordinate the activity; 
it is only important that everyone perform the same action. Thus, despite coordinating the 
activity, there is a certain amount of arbitrariness in the specific action that the authority 
commands. Still, if the authority is properly grounded, its directive is a reason for action for its 
subjects. For example, while most individuals have reason to travel safely on the highways, none 
of them has a reason to drive specifically on the right side of the road. The authority’s directive 
to drive on the right side of the road reflects their preexisting reason to travel safely but 




Intellectual expertise possesses no such capacity to create reasons for new beliefs.
30
 These 
features of practical authority advance beyond the indications offered by Soloveitchik’s 
approach. It clarifies the practical and creative powers of a legal authority. 
Raz’s service conception of authority solves the paradoxes of autonomy and rationality. It 
shows how it is consistent with autonomy to act according to content-independent reasons and 
how it is consistent with rationality to act against the balance of reasons. The instrumental 
relation between authority and normative justification replaces their competition. It demonstrates 
that authoritative directives may possess uniquely legal normativity even when they cannot be 
independently justified. Appeal to the directive of a grounded authority can thus serve as the sole 
justification for a norm. Additionally, this conception shows how authorities may command 
actions which no one previously had reason to do. But it also requires that authority itself be 
grounded by independent reasons. Legal justification and normative justification are not reduced 
to one another but are linked by an authority that is grounded by independent reasons. This 
grounding is always for specific competencies, so authority is circumscribed as opposed to total.  
C. Halakhic-Legal Authority 
Raz’s service conception of authority provides a useful model for halakhic-legal authority 
that is neither authoritarian nor superfluous. While it is has been challenged for only engaging 
with reasons for action and failing to account for the coercive powers of the nation-state,
31
 this 
feature renders it ideal for modern halakhic-legal practice, which de facto lacks coercive power. 
On this account, because the directives of a grounded halakhic-legal authority reflect its subjects’ 
preexisting reasons for action better than their own deliberations, halakhic-legal justification and 
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normative justification are mediately linked. Appeal to the directive of a halakhic-legal authority 
to justify a halakhic norm indirectly adverts to its normative justification. However, because the 
directives of a grounded halakhic-legal authority may sometimes diverge from its subject’ 
preexisting reasons for action and still be justified, halakhic-legal justification is not reduced to 
normative justification. Appeal to the directives of a grounded halakhic-legal authority is 
consequently both valid and ampliative when justifying a halakhic norm. It is valid because the 
halakhic-legal authority itself is grounded instrumentally in terms of independent justifications. It 
is ampliative because the halakhic-legal authority may occasionally command actions that are 
not independently justifiable and may create reasons for new actions. 
However, to operationalize this conception for the justification of halakhic norms and 
authority two further steps are necessary: It must be integrated with the context-transcending 
contextualist account of normative justification (1) and then applied to the justification of 
halakhic norms (2) as analyzed in the previous chapter. 
1. The Service Conception and Context-Transcending Contextualism  
The contextualism of that account of justification is most relevant for the integration of this 
conception of authority. Its context-transcending features can easily be accommodated once its 
pragmatic (a) and intersubjective (b) character is appreciated.  
(a) The service conception of authority is rendered pragmatic without difficulty. The 
legitimacy of an authority and the validity of its directives are part of a community’s lifeworld. 
Individuals find themselves as members of societies and communities in which certain 
individuals or institutions are already accepted as legitimately authoritative. Appeal to them is 
accepted as a justification for a claim. These can be experts such as scientists or scholars or 




that individuals must begin by doubting any claim to authority. Thus, instead of the assumption 
that an authority is illegitimate and its directives unjustified until explicitly grounded, a socially 
accepted authority is grounded and its directives are justified until they are challenged.  
Once appeal to a socially accepted authority to support a normative-claim has been 
challenged, however, the authority cannot be shielded from the demands of justification. It must 
be shown that one is more likely to comply with one’s preexisting reasons for action by obeying 
its directives than by relying on one’s own deliberations in order to ground it and justify its 
directives. However, this grounding is also pragmatic: It appeals to claims about one’s 
preexisting reasons for action and the reliability of the authority’s directives in reflecting them 
that are currently unchallenged. Obviously, these claims can also be challenged and then they too 
require justification, but that is no different from the justification of any claim outside of the 
context of the grounding of authority.  
Take the expertise of a Freudian psychoanalyst for example. In some communities and at 
some point in time, for instance the Upper West Side of Manhattan in the 1960s-1980s, such 
analysts were socially recognized as experts on Freudian psychoanalysis and thus the mental 
lives of their clients. This expertise depended on the socially recognized validity of the Freudian 
framework as accurate for understanding psychic structures and dynamics. If an analyst’s 
expertise was challenged, it would have been necessary to show that one is more likely to come 
to true beliefs about psychic structures and dynamics as well as one’s own mental life by 
depending on his evaluations than by relying on one’s own deliberations. Crucially, however, 
this assessment would have often been conducted within the context of Freudian psychoanalysis. 
One would be assessing how good a Freudian psychoanalyst the particular analyst was, while 




Freudianism itself provides true beliefs about psychic structures and dynamics as well as 
individuals’ mental lives. This would be a more radical challenge, for it questions whether the 
purported reasons for belief upon which the analyst’s expertise is based are actually reasons for 
belief at all. The analyst’s expertise would play no role in answering this question. Though this 
question is conceptually prior to the grounding of a particular expert for it relates to the basis for 
the expert’s legitimacy, it is often pragmatically posterior. In any case, it is no different from the 
justification of truth-claims outside of the context of the grounding of expertise.  
(b)  Slightly more complicated is rendering the account intersubjective. While Raz has 
developed his own account of reasons and norms,
32
 the service conception of authority is neutral 
in relation to it. Still, the intersubjectivity of reasons is relevant to two related components of the 
service conception of authority: the preexisting reasons for action of an authority’s subjects and 
the grounding of an authority. While Raz’s conception at least suggests that individuals possess 
preexisting reasons for action that are objectively given, the account derived from Habermas 
insists that reasons are only constituted through a process of justification. A reason is that which 
would be accepted by an appropriate audience as a justification for a claim. Reasons thus are 
always susceptible to contestation and revision. But if subjects’ reasons for action are not 
preexisting, it is unclear how an authority’s directives can reflect them. Relatedly, if an authority 
is grounded by showing how its directives do reflect its subjects’ reasons for action, the validity 
of these arguments must also be viewed as intersubjective.  
The difficulty of integrating this account of justification and the service conception of 
authority is mitigated by the former’s pragmatic character. At least initially, reasons are taken for 
granted within a social context. Thus, an authority’s directives must reflect those reasons for 
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action that are currently accepted by its subjects, and the authority is grounded by showing that 
they do so better than its subjects’ own deliberations. In the simplest case, when an authority is 
challenged, its reliability in reflecting these taken-for-granted reasons for action may be 
contested. One who seeks to ground the authority must then show that the authority does in fact 
adequately serve the purpose of allowing its subjects’ to comply with them more reliably. Recall 
the example of a particular analyst being grounded as an expert in Freudian psychoanalysis.  
However, in a more complicated case, it may be accepted that the authority reliably serves 
that purpose, but the validity of these previously take-for-granted reasons for action themselves 
is challenged. Now, these reasons must be justified before the authority may be grounded in 
terms of them. But, as already indicated, this is now simply a standard case of the justification of 
claims. There is no hindrance to integrating the grounding of authority into this intersubjective 
scheme. So in the example of psychoanalysis, reasons would now be offered for and against the 
validity of the Freudian account of psychic structures and dynamics. Once that is established, an 
individual could be grounded as expert in terms of it.  
Now recall that  abermas’ account of justification is not only contextualist but also context-
transcending. While ethical-claims and aesthetic-claims may be justified by explicitly drawing 
on those values and standards accepted by a particular community, the justification of truth-
claims and moral-claims must aim for universal acceptability. This element may also be 
integrated with the service conception of authority. Additionally, recall that the type of a claim, 
whether it is truth, moral, ethical, or aesthetic, is not a difference in natural kind but is 
constituted in its process of justification. Nevertheless, for ease of exposition in the following 




To start, regardless of the character of the preexisting reasons for action of an authority’s 
subjects, the argument establishing the legitimacy of an authority is a truth-claim. It must be 
shown that the authority’s directives more reliably reflect its subjects’ reasons for action than 
their own deliberations. Whether the subjects’ preexisting reasons for action concern moral-
claims or ethical-claims or impinge on truth-claims or aesthetic-claims, this argument about 
reliability is a truth-claim. When it is challenged, its justification must aim for universal 
acceptability. While such a justificatory audience may disagree about the validity of the 
preexisting reasons for action, the justification must aim to convince it that the authority’s 
directives do indeed reflect them better than the subjects’ own deliberations. So in terms of the 
example, one could recognize that an individual is a good psychoanalyst in that he possesses a 
good knowledge of Freudian doctrine and can reliably apply its categories to individuals, but 
reject Freudianism as an accurate psychological theory. One could be a good Freudian 
psychoanalyst but, just because of that, a bad psychologist.  
Turning to the preexisting reasons for action, they may be moral or ethical norms or both and 
may impinge on truth-claims or aesthetic-claims or both. The authority may be understood as a 
moral authority and its directives may purport to better reflect its subjects’ reasons for action that 
stem from their moral duties than their own moral deliberations. Since on this account of 
justification moral norms must be universally justifiable, the authority must be grounded by 
showing how its directives are more reliably universally justifiable than its subjects’ own moral 
deliberations. For instance, the authority may be better at abstracting from its own parochial 
perspective and articulating reasons that others might accept. In addition or alternatively, the 
authority may be understood as an ethical authority and its directives may purport to better 




Since this understanding need not be universally justifiable, the authority may be grounded 
simply by showing how its directives more reliably reflect this understanding than its subjects 
own reflections. For example, the authority may be more deeply immersed in a community’s 
traditions and texts and thus may draw on them in ways that resonate better with the community 
than the attempts of an individual with less experience.  
Furthermore, though legal authority is primarily practical and thus pronounces normative-
claims, its directives may impinge on descriptive-claims. As described in the previous chapter, 
both moral-claims and ethical-claims may presuppose certain truth-claims or aesthetic-claims. 
For example, a legal authority may pronounce a new traffic regulation on the basis of certain 
truth-claims about how it will reduce the frequency of accidents. In such cases, the authority 
either must rely on the independent justifiability of these claims or it must be grounded as an 
intellectual expert concerning them. In the former case, in every instance its directive may be 
challenged for faulty presuppositions. In the latter case, it must be shown that the authority’s 
directive more reliably reflect its subjects’ preexisting reasons to believe certain claims than their 
own deliberations.  
On this account of justification, intellectual expertise concerning truth must be grounded by 
showing how its truth-claims are more reliably universally justifiable than its subjects’ 
reasoning. For example, the authority may have better acquainted itself with the facts relevant to 
its ruling than its subjects. Aesthetic expertise concerning beauty may be grounded by showing 
how its aesthetic-claims more reliably reflect its subjects’ shared aesthetic values than their own 
reflections. For example, and here again the connection between ethical-claims and aesthetic-




guiding images and thus may draw on them in ways that are more enlightening to the community 
than the attempts of a neophyte.  
While these norms and claims and thus assertions of authority and expertise may occur 
concurrently, the crucial point is that the actual legitimacy of a purported authority-cum-expert in 
each of these areas must be grounded independently and appropriately. If an authority is to issue 
authoritative directives concerning moral norms, it must be grounded as a moral authority. If an 
authority is to issue authoritative directives concerning ethical norms, it must be grounded as an 
ethical authority. Further, if its authoritative directives are to impinge on truth-claims or 
aesthetic-claims by presupposing their validity, it must be grounded as a theoretical expert in 
these areas. When an authority’s directives depend on claims for which it has not been grounded 
as an authority, they must be independently justifiable or it is not rational to comply with them. 
Indeed, recall that Raz pointed out that when an authority commits a jurisdictional error by 
issuing a directive concerning an area for which its authority has not been grounded, it may not 
be followed as an authority. Thus, on this conception, authority is circumscribed instead of total. 
2. A Service Conception of Halakhic-Legal Authority  
Halakhic-legal authorities engage in a number of activities. Drawing on Maimonides’ 
elaboration in the introduction to the Mishneh Torah, Michael Berger identifies five broad areas: 
clarification of biblical law, resolution of disputes, legislation, non-halakhic Biblical exegesis, 
and advice on non-legal matters. Clarification of Biblical law involves the interpretation of the 
Biblical text in order to render it applicable. It often involves analogical reasoning, exegetical 
arguments, logical reasoning, transmitted teachings, and accepted practice. The resolution of 
disputes encompasses both substantive arguments and formal procedures for deciding between 




not understood to derive from the Biblical text. Such rabbinic commandments include ordinances 
(gezeirot), regulations (taqqanot), and customs (minhagim). Ordinances are prohibitions intended 
to prevent the violation of Biblical laws. Regulations relate to social and religious concerns, such 
as commemorating post-Biblical salvations and disasters. Customs cover a wide variety of 
practices, some instituted directly by authorities and others arising from lay behavior. Non-
halakhic Biblical exegesis often involves homiletic expansion of the narrative. Advice on non-
legal matters range from remedies for ailments to accounts of historical events.
 33
  
Though Berger is interested in the authority of the Talmudic sages, each of these activities, 
except perhaps clarification of Biblical law, is also undertaken by later halakhic-legal authorities. 
In any case, insofar as the current concern is halakhic-legal authority in general, it includes that 
of the Talmudic sages. Additionally, while it is correct as Berger points out that the binding 
nature of rabbinic non-halakhic Biblical exegesis and advice on non-legal matters has been a 
matter of dispute,
34
 referring to them as “non-halakhic” and “non-legal” begs this question. The 
present concern is not with the halakhic status of such claims, whether they are obligatory or not 
according to halakha, but whether halakhic-legal authority can be grounded in these areas.  
In order to answer this question, a catalog of the types of claims that are made in the course 
of these activities would be helpful. However, such a broad survey is beyond the scope of the 
present study, which focuses on the role of authority in the justification of norms. Suffice it to 
note that the full range of claims identified in the previous chapter as encompassed in halakhic 
discourse is asserted by halakhic-legal authorities. The only seemingly new type of claim that 
might be added to this inventory is that asserted in the course of interpretations of Biblical and 
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rabbinic texts. However, these claims can be understood as either truth-claims or ethical-claims, 
depending on one’s theory of interpretation. An intentionalist approach might understand them 
as truth-claims about the intention of the texts’ authors, while a constructivist approach would 
understand them as ethical-claims that correlate a community’s texts with its view of the good. 
However, the difficulty of actually vindicating an interpretation of a text as a truth-claim about 
its author’s intention may argue in favor of construing it as an ethical-claim. It is hard to 
conceive of an argument that could convince a universal audience of an author’s intention. 
In any case, given the “mixed” character of halakhic discourse and consequently the claims 
of halakhic-legal authorities, the circumscribed nature of the service conception of authority is of 
particular significance. As described in the previous chapter, halakhic discourse is not comprised 
of a unique religious-claim; rather, it combines a wide-variety of normative-claims and 
descriptive-claims that are interwoven in often complex ways. It comprises ethical-claims like 
the commandment to observe the Sabbath, which is applied only to Jews. It also comprises 
moral-claims like the prohibition of murder, which is applied to Jews and non-Jews alike.  
Such normative-claims often depend on descriptive-claims. The latter can either be aesthetic-
claims or truth-claims, and it often cannot be determined a priori which type it will be. As 
mentioned, the description of the world as the “work of creation” can be understood as either an 
aesthetic-claim describing the world as inherently dependent or a truth-claim asserting that the 
world was created in time. Likewise, the description of humanity as “created in the image of 
God”  Gen.  :  7  can be understood either as an aesthetic-claim describing individuals as of 
superlative value or as a truth-claim asserting that humanity resembles God. Some descriptive-
claims are clearer. For example, as indicated previously, prohibitions concerning menstruation 




prohibitions concerning the mixture of meat and milk appear to depend on truth-claims about the 
physical properties of pots and pans.  
It was described in the previous chapter how normative-claims and their supporting 
descriptive-claims must be justified independently and appropriately when they are challenged. 
The moral-claims and truth-claims must be justified by offering reasons that could be accepted 
by an imagined universal audience. The ethical-claims and the aesthetic-claims may be justified 
by offering reasons that could only be accepted by a particular audience, in this case the Jewish 
community. The same holds for grounding halakhic-legal authority. A halakhic-legal authority 
often issues directives that aim to reflect both its subjects’ preexisting moral and ethical reasons 
for action. Additionally, these directives often impinge on both truth-claims and aesthetic-claims. 
Thus, in order for its authority to be grounded in a plenipotentiary manner, it would have to be 
shown that its directives more reliably reflect its preexisting subjects’ reasons both for ethical 
and moral actions and for truth and aesthetic beliefs than their own deliberations. Such all-
powerful halakhic-legal authorities must be shown to be practical experts concerning universal 
moral-claims and the particular ethical-claims of the Jewish tradition and theoretical experts 
concerning universal truth-claims and the particular aesthetic-claims of the Jewish tradition.  
However, it is possible and indeed likely that halakhic-legal authority could only be 
grounded in a circumscribed manner, for some areas and not others. For example, it might be 
grounded as an authority on the ethical-norms of the Jewish community but not truth-claims 
about the world. It might be possible to show that one is more likely to comply with one’s 
preexisting reasons for action that stem from one’s commitment to the Jewish tradition and its 
texts by obeying its directives than relying on one’s own reasoning. In contrast, one might be 




reasoning about the world than by accepting its claims. Contrariwise, perhaps it is possible to 
ground halakhic-legal authorities as moral authorities while rejecting their capacity for the vision 
required for aesthetic judgments. Indeed, the sage is often juxtaposed with the prophet. 
Consequently, the pronouncements of a halakhic-legal authority only possess authority in the 
areas for which it has been grounded. It is only for those types of claims that appeal to their 
authority serves as a justification. In other cases, an independent justification of their claims is 
necessary when they are challenged.  
For example, consider the prohibition of mixing meat and milk. Though the Biblical texts 
only mention cooking meat and milk (Ex. 23:19; 34:26; and Deut. 14:21), as understood by the 
rabbinic tradition the fact that it is mentioned thrice prohibits ingesting, cooking, or deriving any 
benefit from the mixture of meat and milk.
35
 This prohibition seems to be an ethical-claim 
because it is only applied to Jews. Justifying it independently would involve reflection on Jewish 
values as expressed in traditions and texts that are central to the community. However, it might 
be the case that an individual or institution has been grounded as an authority on such issues. The 
prohibition could then be justified by appealing to its authority.  
This prohibition has been extended in halakhic literature to include using the same pots and 
pans for cooking meat and milk because of the assumption that the milk or meat is absorbed 
during the cooking process only to be exuded when the cookery is used again. If the same pots 
and pans were used for meat and milk sequentially, the result would be the cooking of meat and 
milk together.
36
 Now this may well be an ethical-claim or aesthetic-claim expressing the same 
aversion to the mixture of meat and milk manifest in the original prohibition. However, because 
of the detail in which the mechanics of this absorption and exudation is discussed in halakhic 
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 it seems that it is understood as a truth-claim. It is claimed that the pots and pans 
actually do absorb and exude the meat and milk. Thus, a the halakhic-legal authority to 
pronounce with authority about this prohibition it must be grounded as an expert on the physical 
properties of cookery. It must be shown that one is more likely to believe true statements about 
such cookery by accepting its claims than by following one’s own deliberations. If the halakhic-
legal authority cannot be grounded as an expert on such matters, its claims about them must be 
independently justifiable. It still may be an authority concerning the ethical norms of the Jewish 
tradition regarding the mixture of meat and milk. But to the extent to which these norms depend 
on certain truth-claims about the properties of cookery the latter must be justified separately.  
This reemphasizes the importance of the manner in which a claim is justified by its defender. 
Recall again the example of the Sabbath. As indicated, the prescription of observing the Sabbath, 
along with its myriad prohibitions, is best understood as an ethical-claim since it is only applied 
to Jews. This claim may be justified independently. However, it also may justified by appeal to a 
halakhic-legal authority that is properly grounded in such matters. But recall that this ethical-
norm is dependent on the description of the world as the “work of creation,” which can be 
understood as either an aesthetic-claim or a truth-claim. Since it is most likely easier to ground a 
halakhic-legal authority as an expert about the aesthetic vision of the Jewish community than 
about cosmology, how this claim is justified is crucial. Assume that it is understood as an 
aesthetic-claim and the halakhic-legal authority is grounded as an expert on the ways of 
experiencing the world that are central to the Jewish community and tradition, then the claim 
may be justified on the basis of its authority. However, if it is understood as a truth-claim, then 
either the halakhic-legal authority must be grounded as expert in cosmology or the claim must be 
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independently justified. One must either show that one is more likely to believe true statements 
about the origin of the universe by accepting the claims of the halakhic-legal authority than by 
following one’s own reasoning or directly justify the creation of the world. In either case, the 
prospects are not promising.  
Yet, it is not the purpose of this approach to authority to ground halakhic-legal authority for 
any area of competence or to deny its possibility. It is left to first-order Jewish thinkers and 
halakhic decisors to determine the types of claims they raise, whether to truth, moral rightness, 
ethical goodness, or aesthetic beauty, as well as the sorts of authority they assert, whether to 
practical authority in morality or ethics or intellectual expertise in truth or aesthetics. Rather, as a 
critical account, this approach articulates the rational constraints on the grounding of halakhic-
legal authority and its practical consequences for the justification of halakhic norms. Halakhic-
legal authority must be grounded for specific competencies by showing how one is more likely 
to comply with one’s preexisting reasons for action or belief in that area by obeying its directives 
or accepting its claims than by following one’s own reasoning. If this is done, appeal to halakhic-
legal authority to justify a norm is valid and ampliative. The directives of a grounded halakhic-
legal authority can serve as a uniquely legal justification for a norm that could not be 
independently justified. Consequently, halakhic-legal authority is instrumental and 
circumscribed, and normative justification and halakhic-legal justification are mediately linked 
instead of reduced to one another.  
III. Reconciling Epistemic and Deontic Authority 
Not only does this approach to halakhic-legal authority ease the tension between normative 
justification and authority found in the thought of Leibowitz and Berkovits, it also reconciles two 




there are two models of halakhic-legal authority present in halakhic literature: an epistemic 
model and a deontic model.
38
 These two models can be illustrated through the interpretation of 
the passage that is taken to be the Biblical source for rabbinic authority (Deut. 17: 8-11). While 
this passage was cited in full above, the focus now is its final verse: “You shall act in accordance 
with the instructions given you and the ruling handed down to you; you must not deviate from 
the verdict that they announce to you either to the right or to the left.” Contrasting interpretations 
of this verse are found in the Talmud and in the Sifre. In the former it is interpreted as follows: 
Is it possible that if they tell you about the right that it is left, and about the left that it is right, 
that you should listen to them? Scripture says, “to the right or to the left.” Meaning [one 
should follow the sages’ instructions only if] they tell you about right that it is right and 




Halakhic-legal authorities must be obeyed only when they are correct, when they tell you that 
right is right and left is left. In contrast, in the Sifre it is written, “Even if they show that right is 
left and left is right, obey them.”
40
 Halakhic-legal authorities must be obeyed even when they are 
wrong.  
The former interpretation is associated with an epistemic model of authority, according to 
which “authority derives legitimation from the possession of knowledge in a certain realm.”
41
 
This grounding of authority has important consequences: “[T]he obligation to comply with their 
rulings applies only when they are true…. [O]beying them when they are wrong is mistaken and 
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 Indeed, because of this, Sagi notes that it is questionable whether this model 
of authority should be considered authority at all. In Raz’s terms it is better described as 
expertise. It even threatens to become entirely redundant since its subjects too are commanded to 
gain the requisite expertise through learning Torah. All the same, according to Sagi, it is 
espoused by both medieval and modern halakhists, including Nissim Gaon (990-1062) and Rabbi 
Chaim Hirschenson (1857-1905).   
The latter interpretation is associated with a deontic model of authority, according to which 
“authority is based on the power invested in the person in authority to determine binding 
norms.”
43
 It is supported by either citation of the Deuteronomic verse according to the 
understanding of the Sifre or the consent of the Jewish people. This grounding of authority has 
important consequences, for it “implies an obligation of unconditional obedience, meaning that 
an authority must always be obeyed, even when apparently wrong.”
44
  This model thus confronts 
the problem of authoritarianism; it is not clear how such an authority could be legitimate. Still, 
according to Sagi, it is endorsed by Rashi, Nahmanides, and Rabbi Abraham Isaac Kook (1865-
1935).  
Despite their respective shortcomings, Sagi claims that each of these models expresses an 
important element of halakhic-legal authority: 
The epistemic model represents the centrality of the Torah in the halakhic realm…. All Israel 
have an equal share in the Torah, and, beyond their knowledge, authorities enjoy no special 
status. In contrast, the deontic model emphasizes the status of halakhic sages as the bearers of 
the Torah. This model reflects the practical needs of the Jewish collective—the need for 
uniformity—as well as the religious-theological fact [of the Deuteronomic verse]. Both these 
elements are necessary and constitutive of halakhah. Supporters of the deontic model must 
assume that the Jew’s primary obligation is to the Torah; the duty of obedience incumbent on 
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believers relates, first and foremost, to God and His Torah rather than to other people. In 
turn, supporters of the epistemic model must assume that a system of authority is required, 
even if only on practical grounds, because not every individual can be a halakhic expert. If 
the halakhic system is open to interpretation, rulings are necessary to prevent the one Torah 




The epistemic model valorizes the value of the Torah, while the deontic model asserts the 
importance of communal uniformity. But both are necessary. Sagi notes that consequently efforts 
have been made to reconcile them. Sometimes a distinction is made among the subjects of 
authority: Only the greatest halakhic authorities possess deontic authority. Other times, a 
distinction is made between types of rulings: Only clearly mistaken rulings may be disobeyed.
46
   
The service conception of halakhic-legal authority provides the resources to reconcile these 
two models of authority. Like the epistemic model, it recognizes that authority is grounded 
instrumentally in its capacity to aid its subjects in complying with their preexisting reasons for 
action. These reasons for action include moral reasons as well as those ethical reasons that stem 
from the Jewish community’s commitment to the Torah, its texts as well as its values and 
images. Thus, the authority’s directives must be generally reliable or at least more reliable than 
its subjects own reasoning in reflecting those reasons in order to be legitimate. Like the deontic 
model, however, it recognizes that occasionally a legitimate authority must be obeyed even when 
its subjects disagree with its directives and even when it is objectively wrong. This is the price of 
the goods authority brings, including increased reliability in conforming to preexisting reasons 
for action and uniformity.  
In the previous discussion of Raz’s service conception of authority, uniformity was discussed 
in relation to the solution of social coordination problems. In order to resolve such situations, a 
practical authority can create reasons for a new action, which none of its subjects had a specific 
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reason to perform before its directive. Such cases can be found in halakhic-legal practice. Indeed, 
in his discussion of the commandments of animal sacrifice in the Guide of the Perplexed, 
Maimonides writes, “The generalities of the commandments necessarily have a cause and have 
been given because of a certain utility; their details are that in regard to which it is said of the 
commandments that they were given merely for the sake of commanding something… The 
offering of sacrifices has in itself a great and manifest utility…. But no cause will ever be found 
for the fact that one particular sacrifice consists in a lamb and another in a ram and that the 
number of the victims should be one particular number.”
47
 While the commandments of animal 
sacrifice have a general reason, which for Maimonides relates to the weaning of the ancient 
Israelites from the idolatrous practices of their neighbors, the details of the offerings are 
arbitrary. What matters is that a uniform practice is established by the Bible and its halakhic-
legal interpreters.  
However, there may also be intrinsic value to the solidarity that comes from shared practices, 
which may be especially relevant for halakhic-legal authority. Uniformity in the conduct of 
certain activities, especially if they are symbolic or anyway non-functional, is one of the 
foremost means of producing such communal solidarity. Certainly, this value can be offset if 
these practices are pernicious or even if uniformity is demanded too insistently at the cost of 
individuality. But in the absence of such defects or until they become apparent, arbitrariness may 
be worth the benefits of solidarity. Uniformity in the service of solidarity is thus another reason 
to empower an authority with the capacity to command obedience even when its directives do 
not directly reflect its subjects preexisting reasons for action. Nevertheless, since solidarity is a 
good that is recognized by the authority’s subjects, directives that aim to promote uniformity still 
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reflect its subjects’ preexisting reasons for action in an extended sense. The service conception of 
halakhic-legal authority therefore reconciles the deontic and epistemic models of authority found 
in rabbinic literature by balancing the demands of individual commitment to the Jewish tradition 
and the communal need for uniformity and solidarity. 
IV. Conclusion: Authority and Modern Religiosity 
Hannah Arendt claims, in her leadingly titled essay “What was Authority?,” that “authority 
has vanished from the modern world, and that if we raise the question what authority is, we can 
no longer fall back upon authentic and indisputable experiences common to all.”
48
 The argument 
of this chapter concerning halakhic-legal authority would seem only to add to her contention. It 
was noted at the outset that this approach to halakhic-legal authority does not support coercive 
powers. Indeed, though the differences between Raz’s conception of practical authority and 
intellectual expertise have been indicated, to a large degree practical authority has been 
analogized to expertise. Indeed, this is crucial to its instrumentalist strategy for reconciling 
authority with autonomy and rationality. It does not impinge on an individual’s autonomy or 
rationality to depend on the judgment of those who have superior knowledge to them. Indeed, in 
the modern world where individuals are confronted with ever more technical and specialized 
areas of knowledge such dependence is necessary. This conception of authority is situated in that 
context. From its subjects’ side it is a form of dependence, while from its side it is form of 
service by allowing them to comply better with reason. An authority that serves its subjects in 
this manner is opposed to what Arendt describes as “authentic” and “indisputable” experiences 
of authority. Such an authority derives from origins and foundations, whether of polities or 
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traditions, that have a unilateral claim on their subjects. It demands their reverence and 
obedience, regardless of its rationality or the benefits it provides to its subjects.  
It may seem particularly misguided to situate religious authority, of which halakhic-legal 
authority is a species, within that context. Conceiving of religious authority as providing a 
service to religious believers, it may be claimed, is a rejection of its very character as religious, 
which necessitates submission and humility. Presumably, this objection may be rebutted from 
two perspectives: the internal perspectives of a religious tradition and the external perspective of 
philosophical investigation. Echoing Leibowitz, one might argue that it is only God to whom 
religious believers owe their submission and humility. Religious authorities are legitimate only 
insofar as they advance service of him. Alternatively, one might contend that if authentic religion 
requires obedience to tyrannical authorities so much the worse for it. The only valid form of 
religion is a religion of reason that reconciles authority with autonomy and rationality.  
But the more significant contention, which can only be suggested here, is that this very 
picture of two opposed perspectives, internal and external, is false to modern religiosity. As was 
argued, modern religious discourse is not comprised of discrete and unique religious-claims but 
is a “mixed discourse” including a variety of claims. By extension, despite the legacy of 
particularly Protestant philosophies of culture and religion, religion is not a discrete and unique 
area of human life. The newspaper attests to the fact that “religion” continues to turn up in those 
areas from which it is supposed to be differentiated: politics, economics, and science. Likewise, 
religious believers do not schizophrenically isolate their “religious” lives from their other 
activities. Both the “religious” and the “non-religious” values that they endorse permeate their 
lives. To insist on the revival of authentic obedience to religious authority in the modern age 




identity, modern religiosity cannot be a refuge from them. Philosophically rethinking religious 
authority so as to reconcile it with them merely explicates this social fact. 
Consequently, this approach to halakhic-legal authority possesses a number of advantages: It 
eases the tension between ta’amei ha-mitzvot and halakhic-legal authority. Because of the 
instrumental nature of authority, a mediated link is established between normative justification 
and legal justification, in which the latter is not reduced to the former. In general, the directives 
of a halakhic-legal authority must reflect its subjects’ preexisting reasons for action and thus its 
halakhic-legal practice must roughly track the normative justification of the commandments. 
However, a grounded halakhic-legal authority may introduce reasons for new actions that are not 
directly derivable from its subjects’ preexisting reasons for action. Additionally, halakhic-legal 
authority is grounded for specific competencies and thus its legitimacy is circumscribed as 
opposed to total. But beyond addressing issues that arise out of the study of the philosophies of 
halakha of Leibowitz, Soloveitchik, and Berkovits, this approach to halakhic-legal authority 
reconciles two models of authority found in rabbinic literature and explicates a form of religious 






This study, like all philosophical investigations whether or not its participants are aware of it, 
arose out of practical concerns. It emerged out of worries about the social conflicts over religious 
norms and authority that rage in our society, including debates over abortion, same-sex marriage, 
circumcision, and veiling, which involve the claims of universalism and the legitimacy of 
particularism. It aims to aid in their resolution. It was suggested at the outset that instead of 
abstract reflection on the justification of religious norms and authority and their proper role in 
purportedly secular nation-states, a more intellectually unbiased and practically effective 
investigation should engage with the tradition of inquiry of a religious tradition involved in these 
conflicts. Judaism was identified as a productive participant in this dialogue with philosophy 
because of its role in such conflicts, its unique perspective on some of the underlying issues, and 
its robust tradition of inquiry into the justification of its religious norms and authority. In the 
process, philosophy of religion, a field in which this reflection has often been conducted, would 
be expanded through its engagement with the themes of Jewish thought and law as well as its 
connections to moral and legal philosophy. 
Ta’amei ha-mitzvot and theory of halakha were identified as sites for analysis of the 
justification of halakhic norms and authority. In the first part of this study the positions of three 
influential philosophers of halakha on these issues were analyzed and critically assessed. Insofar 
as the views of Leibowitz, Soloveitchik, and Berkovits underlie specific claims about the 
universal applicability of Jewish religious norms or legitimate particularity of Jewish religious 
practices, these examinations are directly relevant to the aim of resolving these social conflicts. 
They evaluated whether these claims were sustainable in view of their philosophical foundations. 




offered in the second part of the study also aims to resolve these social conflicts. It delimits the 
boundaries of religious claims, determining whether they could command universal assent, may 
be validly held by a religious community, or are unjustifiable on any terms. Its implementation 
was modelled through the example of circumcision.  
While this account was applied to halakhic norms and authority, its philosophical 
foundations abstracted from the Jewish tradition. It draws from Habermas and Raz instead of 
Maimonides and Mendelssohn. This is because it is contended that they represent the most 
sophisticated account of justification and conception of authority respectively. As Maimonides 
urges, “accept the truth from whatever source it proceeds.”
1
 But if this account is to be 
practically effective in resolving social conflicts over religious norms and authority, it must be 
retranslated into the terms and language of the Jewish tradition. This does not involve judaizing 
 abermas’ account of justification or Raz’s conception of authority  rather, it entails explicating 
those features of the resultant account that resonate with themes in Jewish thought and law. 
This was already begun in a piecemeal fashion in the preceding chapters. It was indicated 
how  abermas’ account of justification agrees with elements of the accounts of justification 
offered by Leibowitz, Soloveitchik, and Berkovits, even while rejecting their foundationalist 
approaches. In the case of Raz’s conception of authority, it was shown how it expands on 
features of Soloveitchik’s account of halakhic-legal authority and how it reconciles the deontic 
and epistemic models of authority present in rabbinic literature. To conclude this study, broader 
features of critical philosophy of halakha are placed into dialogue with themes from Jewish 
thought and law as developed by Emmanuel Levinas. This is not meant as a scholarly treatment 
of Levinas’ thought. Rather, it consists of reflections provoked by his engagement with Jewish 
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texts that are relevant to critical philosophy of halakha. Nevertheless, this will further articulate 
the unique perspective possessed by Judaism on some of the underlying philosophical issues of 
these social conflicts, specifically the relations between particularism and universalism (I) and 
between commitment to one’s faith and to one’s fellows  II .  
It must be noted, however, that these concluding reflections transcend the proper boundaries 
of this study. They offer normative interpretations of the Jewish tradition and even touch on 
theological issues in order to display the resonance between them and critical philosophy of 
halakha. They are thus no longer themselves “critical” but contributions to first-order Jewish 
thought. Stated otherwise, in contrast to the body of this study, which was philosophical in nature 
and thus offered truth-claims and moral-claims that aimed to be universally acceptable, the 
following meditations offer ethical-claims or aesthetic-claims about the Jewish tradition. Still, 
such “bridging” work is essential in order to reintegrate philosophical reflection into the social 
context from which it emerges.   
I. Universalism and Particularism 
Critical philosophy of halakha aims to strike a principled balance between the claims of 
universal reason, truth, and morality and the validity of communities’ particular conceptions of 
the good and the beautiful. It thereby interprets the tension of Judaism’s dual commitment to the 
idea of monotheism alongside the doctrine of chosenness, the idea of the “unique God”  Deut. 
6:4) that constitutes a universal humanity
2
 alongside the notion of a “treasured nation”  Ibid. 7:6  
that elevates a particular community. More directly, it explicates a related stress in Jewish law: 
While non-Jews are obligated by Jewish law to obey the Noahide laws, only Jews are bound by 
the vast majority of halakhic norms. Still, it is claimed both in the Torah and by practitioners of 
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ta’amei ha-mitzvot that the rationality of halakhic practice is recognizable to those outside of 
Judaism. In the Bible  Ibid.  : 6  it is written, “Observe [the commandments] faithfully for that 
will be proof of your wisdom and discernment to other peoples, who on hearing of all these laws 
wills say, ‘Surely, that great nation is a wise and discerning people.’” Maimonides understands 
this verse to authorize the project of justifying halakhic norms. There must be conceptual space 
for both universally applicable norms and norms that are valid for particular communities. 
Critical philosophy of halakha provides this space.   
In his essay entitled “The Pact,” Levinas reflects on the position of the covenant and halakha 
in this tension between universalism and particularism in Jewish thought and law. He describes a 
transformation that the depiction of the Israelite covenant ceremony on Mount Gerizim and 
Mount Ebal undergoes from its initial proleptic presentation in Deuteronomy (27), throught its 
represented execution in Joshua  8 , and to these texts’ interpretation in the Mishnah.
3
 This 
analysis serves as a further bridge between these basic elements of Jewish thought and law and 
features of critical philosophy of halakha. 
In Deuteronomy, Moses commands that a covenant ceremony be performed when the 
Israelites enter the land of Canaan. It is depicted as follows (27: 1-15): 
Observe all the Instruction that I enjoin upon you this day…. When you cross over to enter 
the land that the Lord your God is giving you…you shall set up…stones…on Mount Ebal, 
and coat them with plaster…. Do not wield an iron tool over them  you must build the altar 
of the Lord your God of unhewn stones…. And on those stones you shall inscribe every word 
of this Teaching most distinctly [be’er hetiv]. Moses and the levitical priests spoke to all 
Israel, saying: Silence! Hear, O Israel! Today you have become the people of the Lord your 
God: Heed the Lord your God and observe His commandments and His laws, which I enjoin 
upon you this day. Thereupon Moses charged the people saying: After you have crossed the 
Jordan, the following shall stand on Mount Gerizim when the blessing for the people is 
spoken: Simeon, Levi, Judah, Issachar, Joseph, and Benjamin. And for the curse, the 
following shall stand on Mount Ebal: Reuben, Gad, Asher, Zebulun, Dan, and Naphtali. The 
Levites shall then proclaim  ‘anah) in a loud voice to all the people of Israel. Cursed be 
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anyone who makes a sculptured or molten image….—And all the people shall respond, 
Amen….  
 
While the contents of the blessings are never described, a list of curses follows. Their objects 
include one who insults his parents, encroaches on his neighbor’s property, misdirects the blind, 
subverts the rights of vulnerable people, engages in incest or bestiality, surreptitiously assaults 
his fellow, accepts a bribe in a capital case, or generally abrogates the law. 
In his interpretation of this passage Levinas explicates the context and content of the 
covenant. The Israelites, their tribes enumerated, are arrayed on two mountains. He presumes 
that this means that they are facing inward and toward one another, which signals the intimacy of 
the religious community and the particularity of the covenant into which they enter. He indicates 
that besides the opening and closing maledictions that target the idolater and the abrogator of the 
law, the rest of the curses are directed at social injustices. Following rabbinic precedent, he also 
interprets the injunction that the altar must be composed of unhewn stones as symbolizing peace 
since iron—the material of armaments—has not defiled them.
4
 Lastly, he notes the manner the 
law must be inscribed, which is translated literally as “most distinctly.” 
In the book of Joshua, when the actual execution of the ceremony is represented, the 
description is briefer and a significant change is introduced (8: 30-35): 
Joshua built an altar to the Lord, the God of Israel, on Mount Ebal, as Moses, the servant of 
the Lord, had commanded the Israelites…an altar of unhewn stone upon which no iron has 
been wielded…. And there, on the stones, he inscribed a copy of the teaching that Moses had 
written for the Israelites. All Israel—stranger and citizen alike—with their elders, officials, 
and magistrates, stood on either side of the Ark, facing the levitical priests who carried the 
Ark of the Lord’s Covenant.  alf of them faced Mount Gerizim and half of them faced 
Mount Ebal, as Moses the servant of the Lord had commanded them of old, in order to bless 
the people of Israel. After that, he read all the words of the Teaching, the blessing and the 
curses, just as is written in the Book of the Teaching. There was not a word of all that Moses 
had commanded that Joshua failed to read in the presence of the entire assembly of Israel, 
including the women and children and the strangers who accompanied them. 
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While the text stresses the correspondence between the commandment of the ceremony and its 
execution, a change is introduced: The community does not simply include the tribes of Israel; it 
is expanded to include strangers, women, and children. Yet, the implications of intimacy and 
particularity remain: The halves of the people are arrayed on the two mountains facing inward 
and toward one another and the priests stand in the valley facing each group. The connotation of 
peace remains as well: The stones upon which the law is inscribed must be unhewn.  
The next textual site is a Mishnah that discusses the language in which certain ritual and legal 
acts may be performed, specifically whether Hebrew must be used. In support of the contention 
that the levirate marriage refusal ceremony (halitzah) must be performed in Hebrew a verse from 
the Deuteronomic iteration of the covenant ceremony is adduced. It is argued that just as the 
latter uses the terminology of “shall then proclaim [‘anah]”   7:    and must be in Hebrew, so 
too the former that also uses the terminology of “and make this declaration [‘antah]”  Ibid.  5: 9) 
must be in Hebrew. Seemingly only by association the Mishnah then engages in a description of 
the covenant ceremony by drawing on the versions of Deuteronomy and Joshua: 
How were the blessings and curses [pronounced]? When Israel crossed the Jordan and came 
to Mount Gerizim and Mount Ebal…. Six tribes ascended the summit of Mount Gerizim, six 
tribes ascended the summit of Mount Ebal, the priests and the Levites with the Ark were 
stationed below, in the center; the priests surrounding the Ark, the Levites [surrounding] the 
priests, and all Israel on this side and on that side…. They turned their faces towards Mount 
Gerizim and opened with the blessing, ‘Blessed be the man who does not make a graven or 
molten image,’ and both groups responded ‘Amen.’ They turned their faces towards Mount 
Ebal and opened with the curse, ‘Cursed be the man who makes a graven or molten image,’ 
and both groups responded, ‘Amen.’ [They continued in this manner] until they completed 
the blessings and curses. After that, they brought the stones, built the altar and plastered it 
with plaster, inscribing on it all the words of the Torah in seventy languages, as it is said: 




The Mishnah further emphasizes the intimacy and particularity of the event by clarifying the 
arrangement of the people. The ark is in the center, surrounded by the priests and then the 
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Levites. The rest of the tribes encompass them and thus face them and one another. Everyone 
faces inward except the priests who turn from side to side as they perform the curses and the 
blessings, which are now described as the inverse of the curses. Thus, the individual who refrains 
from idolatry, abrogating the law, and the various social injustices is blessed. Yet, an 
interpretation of the inscription of the law is offered that transcends the expansion of the 
community found in Joshua. “Most distinctly” is interpreted to mean that the Torah was 
inscribed in seventy languages, which in rabbinic literature implies every language.  
In the interpretive history of this covenant ceremony, there is thus a development in the 
relation of particularism and universalism centered on the covenant and halakha. Levinas 
explains this development as follows: 
A question about handwriting has been transformed into the language used…. The pact 
which, according to Deuteronomy, was concluded in the presence of all the tribes in front of 
an altar whose stands…are untouched by any tool of iron; the pact which, in Joshua includes 
women, children, and foreigners, has, in this Mishnah, become truly universal: its law is 
written in seventy languages. A message addressed to humanity as a whole! The real 
meaning of this apparently particular ceremony, performed by a people whose members can 
all look upon one another, a community which one gaze can encompass, is that all human 
beings are included in the legislation in whose name the pact is concluded…. The transition 
from Hebrew to the universality which I call ‘Greek’ is, then, very remarkable. The phrase 
be’er hetev [most distinctly]…takes on the new meaning of complete translatability. This 
process of liberating and universalizing the texts must, therefore, be continued…. This 
universality is rooted, in some way, in a society which makes itself entirely visible to its 
members congregated on the two mountain tops, visible as if on stage. From the outset the 
society which values the intimacy of its twelve tribes looking at each other, and which aims 




The law is that of a particular a community, the ideals of which are characterized by peace, 
social justice, and intimacy. The stones are untouched by iron; the curses and blessings focus on 
social injustice; each individual sees and faces the other. Simultaneously, the community 
expands and displays itself atop of mountains, while the law is translated into every language. 
There is a movement from within the particular community to the universal society. However, 
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the community never encompasses all nor does it dissolve into the society. Indeed, what the 
community displays to others is its intimacy and particularity. The law is similarly not adapted to 
society nor imposed on it; the law is merely rendered intelligible.  
Levinas may have a homogenous view of the relation between universalism and 
particularism in Jewish law; the law as a whole must be translated or universalized. Whether or 
not this is the case, his construal of this image suggests the complex relation between 
universalism and particularism in the justification of halakhic norms and authority described in 
this study. Most basically, the context of the justification of halakha is social: the covenantal 
community in its intimacy and the universal society to which it displays itself and explains its 
law. Peace is its foundation; coercive enforcement of authority is not grounded. Face to face 
encounter, or reciprocity, is its medium; justification is a process of intersubjective recognition. 
In addition, the law has its origin in the particularity of a community, which expands to 
include marginalized groups, and then finds its audience in a universal society. Missed by 
Levinas is that while in Joshua the participants in the covenant are expanded, in the Mishnah 
only the audience for the law is universalized. And even Levinas notes that this process of 
translation is difficult and ongoing. In all cases, the reciprocity of the community, the 
intersubjective recognition of its norms, is expanded to include those within the community who 
have previously been excluded. All the claims within halakhic discourse must be justifiable to 
every member of the Jewish community. But certain claims, those that can be rendered into 
Greek—morality and truth, must also be justifiable to a universal audience. Nevertheless, the 
intimacy and particularity of the community is sustained through those claims that can only be 
paraphrased with difficulty from the Hebrew—ethics and aesthetics. Indeed, the universal 




of universalization. The community continues to face inwards even as it expands itself, displays 
itself, and translates its law. Lastly, this whole process of expansion, display, and translation 
occurs pragmatically in historical and social contexts. Just as the covenantal community is 
expanded and the halakha is universalized through succeeding texts, the reciprocity of the law is 
perfected and the audience for the law is universalized through time and in different places.  
II. Intersubjectivity and the Trace of God 
Because it conceptualizes the justification of halakhic norms and authority in terms of 
acceptance by an audience, critical philosophy of halakha marks an intersubjective turn in Jewish 
thought and law. This offers a new perspective on the tension between universalism and 
particularism in Judaism. As indicated, this tension and its attempted resolution recur in a 
number of domains: Jewish thought attempts to negotiate it through the relation between 
monotheism and chosenness. Jewish law prescribes some norms solely for Jews and others for 
all of humanity. Ta’amei ha-mitzvot justifies halakhic norms within an intellectual framework 
that is shared with others; but it is still insisted that only Jews are bound by most of them.  
This suggests that all these instances of tension and attempted resolution stem from a more 
immediate need for such reconciliation: Jewish life. Modern Jews especially are members of 
overlapping communities and societies, some distinctively “Jewish” and others aiming at 
“secularity.” The tension between universalism and particularism emerges from this social fact. 
Efforts at negotiating it in Jewish thought and law express the desire by Jews to achieve 
intersubjective recognition in these social contexts as both accountable to shared standards and 
entitled to legitimate difference. By reconceiving justification in terms of universal and particular 





But this recognition provokes two related challenges to critical philosophy of halakha: one 
philosophical and the other theological. There is a tendency in first-order discourse about 
halakhic change and in the study of halakha to attempt to disentangle developments that are 
“internal” to Jewish law from those that are imposed by “external” forces, whether political or 
economic. Similarly, there is a temptation to distinguish between “authentic” and “apologetic” 
Jewish thought. Critical philosophy of halakha’s recognition of the social origins of Jewish 
thought and law may therefore be taken to suggest that all halakhic developments result from 
external forces and that all Jewish thought is apologetic.  
But fully recognizing the intersubjectivity of reason means that the historically and socially 
conditioned nature of Jewish practices, both those of Jewish law and Jewish thought, does not 
negate their intellectual “seriousness.” The dichotomies internal/external and 
authentic/apologetic only get off the ground if a “real” and non-social element is contrasted with 
another “squishy” and social element, if the non-social element is reified as “objective” and 
endowed with authority. But once it is realized that it is always human beings who so authorize 
it, both sides of the contrast disappear. This does not mean that there are no longer any “real” 
constraints on Jewish practices but only that they derive from social constraints. Individuals 
cannot be held accountable or recognized as justified simply by the contents of a tradition but 
only by others with whom they share this tradition. Critical philosophy of halakha acknowledges 
that these others include not only actual others who hold them accountable to the present sense of 
the tradition but also imagined others who may challenge their entitlement to this tradition as 
presently understood. 
Still, this response provokes a theological challenge. Critical philosophy of halakha entails 




(mitzvot beyn adam le-makom) and commandments between the individual and his fellow 
(mitzvot beyn adam le-havero) but commitment to the commandments involves relations both to 
God and to one’s fellows. In endorsing halakhic norms and engaging in halakhic practice one not 
only fulfills a commitment to God, one undertakes a commitment to justify them to others. One 
might therefore object that the theological error of shituf, of associating another being with the 
divine, has thereby been committed. The human other has taken the place of the Wholly Other. 
Indeed, one might argue that it is not human beings who authorize religious norms but God who 
commands them.  
Nevertheless, another interpretation is possible: Critical philosophy of halakha presents a 
method of justifying the commandments whereby one may hold oneself accountable both to 
one’s faith as well as to other individuals.  olding oneself accountable to one’s faith demands 
taking its claims to truth, rightness, goodness, or beauty seriously enough to require justification. 
Because one sees one’s faith and its norms and practices as valuable, indeed superlatively so, one 
commits oneself to the attempt to substantiate that value. Similarly, holding oneself accountable 
to others requires offering them reasons for one’s commitments when they demand their 
justification. Communicating with others entails making oneself and one’s commitments 
answerable to them.   
This dual commitment is the basic impulse behind the project of ta’amei ha-mitzvot as first 
expressed in Deuteronomy: The value of the commandments is expressed through the 
recognition of their value by others. It continues throughout the ages in the various attempts to 
show the rationality of Jewish religious practice by adducing reasons for it. This does not mean 
that one commits oneself to demonstrating to others the universal applicability of one’s norms 




standards of reason, truth, and morality and substantiating the legitimacy of particularity in other 
areas. 
Finally, it may be suggested that these two commitments could be linked even more closely. 
If one were to claim that an object of faith is always encountered indistinctly both in one’s faith 
and in one’s interactions with others, then justifying one’s commitments to others opens the 
possibility of justifying oneself before the object of faith. A theme in the philosophers of halakha 
that have been analyzed in this study is the human nature of halakhic-legal practice. While 
revelation may be acknowledged as the origin of the commandments, the interpretation, 
determination, and application of halakhic norms is given over to human beings. As Berkovits 
stresses, the motto of the halakha is that the Torah is not “in heaven.” Consequently, it is never 
certain whether halakhic practice corresponds to the divine will. The only assurance that can be 
gained about the validity of halakhic norms is through their vindication in intersubjective 
dialogue, whether this is the shakla ve-tarya, intellectual give-and-take, of halakhic-legal 
practice or the argumentation of normative justification. God’s will is thus apprehended in 
halakhic norms and practice only dimly and through human others.  
Similarly, there is a tradition that identifies interpersonal relations as the site of any possible 
apprehension of the divine. As discussed in the examination of Berkovits, God tells Moses that 
he “cannot see [his] face, for man may not see [God’s] face and live”  Ex.   :   . Only God’s 
“back” may be revealed to Moses. God’s “back” is also described as his “goodness” and later 
identified with his attributes of mercy. But elsewhere the human being is depicted as created in 
the “image [selem] of God”  Gen. 1:27), which seems to imply that the visage of the human 
being has some connection with God’s face. There thus appears to be some link among God’s 




These texts and their themes are drawn upon by Levinas in explicating his view about the 
relation between morality and religion. According to him, moral obligation to others is not 
something superadded to experience nor is it a responsibility that is voluntarily assumed. Rather, 
the normative force of morality is built into the phenomenology of intersubjective relations. In 
one’s encounter with another human being, metonymically referred to as the encounter with her 
“face,” one experiences his obligation to her even before he determines the content of that 
obligation.
7
 While rejecting the view that God is present in one’s encounter with the human 
other, Levinas maintains that an indication of God is detectable in this relationship. He writes, 
To be in the image of God does not mean to be an icon of God, but to find oneself in his 
trace. The revealed God of our Judeo-Christian spirituality maintains all the infinity of his 
absence, which is in the personal order itself. He shows himself only in his trace, as is said in 
Exodus 33. To go toward Him is not to follow this trace which is not a sign; it is to go toward 




That the human being was created in the image of God does not mean that God’s “face” can be 
seen, that God can be directly experienced, in the encounter with another individual. Rather, only 
a trace of the divine is apprehensible.  ere Levinas relies on the fact that while “selem” is often 
translated as “image,” it also evokes the word “sel” or “shadow.” The human being was created 
in the shadow of God, so God is not present in the human face but only suggested by it. God is 
only ever present in human relationships and there he is present in his absence. Similarly, 
Levinas references Exodus    where perception of God’s “face” is denied Moses while a view of 
his “back” is allowed. Only God’s retreat is accessible to human beings. This trace or retreat, 
which Levinas also refers to as illeity or that-ness, indicates moral responsibility for the other, 
                                                 
7
 For brief statements of his approach, see Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority, trans. 
Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1969), 33–52; 19–219. For an in-depth analysis of his 
thought in view of contemporary metaethics and moral theory, see Michael L. Morgan, Discovering Levinas 
(Cambridge UK & New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007).  
8
 Emmanuel Levinas, “The Trace of the Other,” in Deconstruction in Context: Literature and Philosophy, ed. Mark 




just as the God’s “back” represents his moral attributes. God is not experienced in the encounter 
with the other, but his demand concerning the other—moral responsibility—is felt.  
In his more explicitly Jewish writings, Levinas makes these textual and conceptual 
connections clear when he writes, 
Ethics is not the corollary of the vision of God, it is that very vision. Ethics is an optics, such 
that everything I know of God and everything I can hear of His word and reasonably say to 
 im must find ethical expression…. The knowledge of God which we can have and which is 
expressed, according to Maimonides, in the form of negative attributes, receives it positive 
meaning from the moral ‘God is merciful,’ which means: ‘Be merciful like  im’. The 
attributes of God are not in the indicative, but in the imperative. The knowledge of God 




God or the idea of transcendence that is associated with God is indicated in the phenomenology 
of the encounter with other human beings. Such encounters disclose the moral responsibility 
individuals have to each other that precede any assumption of obligation.  
While Levinas focuses on moral responsibility, there are indications that he can also be 
understood as referring to the type of discursive accountability to others that has been explored 
in this study. In a theologically oriented essay, he writes,  
Saying opens me to the other before saying what is said, before the said uttered in this 
sincerity forms a screen between me and the other…. Language understood in this way loses 
its superfluous and strange function of doubling up thought and being. Saying as testimony 
precedes all the said. Saying, before setting forth a said, is already the testimony of this 





Prior to the content of an utterance—the said, the very act of communication—saying—invokes 
a claim that the interlocutor has on the speaker. While Levinas writes of a responsibility for the 
interlocutor, it can also be understood as a responsibility to her. In communicating with another, 
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one is exposed to the responsibility to account for one’s claims to her. Similarly, in Totality and 
Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority, Levinas touches on the sort of reflection involved in normative 
justification. He writes, 
Reflection can, to be sure, become aware of this face to face, but the “unnatural” position of 
reflection is not an accident in the life of consciousness. It involves a calling into question of 





Just like encounter with the face of the other in the context of action reveals one’s moral 
responsibility for her, the encounter with the other in discourse discloses one’s accountability to 
her. The other possesses a type of authority over the individual. She calls his claims into 
question; he must justify them to her. 
Taken together, Levinas can be understood as expressing and developing strands in the 
Jewish tradition according to which God can only be apprehended in one’s relationships with 
others and then only indistinctly: God’s “face” cannot be seen. Only his “back” can be 
apprehended, and this glimpse refers one back to other human beings. One always already has a 
responsibility to these others. This authority that they possess over the individual is most 
centrally relevant to the morality of one’s actions: One is morally obligated to them. However, it 
also extends to one’s normative-claims. The other calls them into question, and an account of 
them is owed to her. If this discursive obligation can also be understood as a trace of God, then 
perhaps in justifying one’s norms to the other one may be justifying them as well to God. 
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